Maps with a Mission Post-1967

Post-1967, the “peace camp,” what are considered left-wing peace and human rights organizations, also actively used maps to put forth their geopolitical visions of an Israeli territory delimited by international law, while drawing on scientific cartographic conventions. Maps produced by the “peace camp” are informed by a range of very different discourses, which include concerns about Israel’s occupation strategies, its compliance or non-compliance with international law, its demography, the need for the recognition of Palestinians’ human rights and historical presence in the region, and the feasibility of particular territorial solutions. Organizations such as Peace Now, B’Tselem, the Geneva Initiative, and Zochrot (Remembering) used various visual and textual signifiers to communicate concerns in regard to territorial annexation, to propose territorial compromises for possible peace negotiations, and to challenge Hebrew topography by retracing alternative Arab topography in the search for historical justice. Such maps tended to invoke legal as well as scientific standards to give the maps authority and persuasive power in the attempt to increase the legitimacy of the geopolitical visions put forth.

Feminist and Queer Anti-Militarism

This chapter looks at how feminist and queer anti-militarists have understood the relationship between militarism, gender and sexuality. Those relationships have been theorised in some detail by academics working at these intersections, and have occasionally taken centre-stage in British anti-militarist politics, most notably at the time of the Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp in the early 1980s. However, they are not often highlighted in contemporary British anti-militarism. The chapter considers the politics of this limited attention, before turning to a series of cases where anti-militarists have focused on the militarised politics of gender and sexuality. Across three vignettes, the chapter shows activists challenging central dynamics of militarism while also calling attention to the reproduction of militarised gender orders within anti-militarism.

Introduction

This introduction raises two fundamental questions: the first one tries to give a definition of what a peace camp is. What we call “the peace movement” in Israel is, in fact, an indistinct galaxy, a world that subdivides into a multitude of organizations and individuals, some highly prominent, and others completely unknown. It is a complex realm, crisscrossed by multiple currents that are often at variance with one another. It resembles no other peace movement in the world. Four main tendencies can be distinguished within this heterogeneous movement in Israel. The second question is that of the decline in the movement's capacity to organize mass demonstrations. Some argue that it is a result of a host of sociological changes that have come about in Israeli society. But the weight of sociological factors is secondary to emotional factors. The feeling of fear inspired by the Palestinians, the lack of confidence in the “other” that a great majority of Israelis refuse to consider a “partner for peace” weighs far more heavily than any sociological variable. This is one of the book's central arguments.

The Peace Camp Without Rabin

Yitzhak Rabin's assassination triggered a burst of enthusiasm for his project. In the months that followed, his supporters continued the struggle. It was a good opportunity for the dovish left to capitalize on the widespread emotion and so to consolidate its base and marshal support for the peace process. It was able to count on the support of Shimon Peres, who had meanwhile been named interim prime minister. He was committed to abiding by the commitments of his predecessor and was also very popular. The context could not have been more favorable to Israeli pacifists. Yet the opportunity was missed. Rabin's assassination did not benefit his supporters. The image of the peace camp continued to deteriorate and increasingly seemed to go against the grain of the dominant public mood in Israel. This chapter explains this inability to capitalize on the “Rabin effect".

From the Dream of Peace to the Grip of Fear

This chapter tries to take stock of half a century of activism by the dovish left. The peace camp promised peace but has failed to deliver it. Many Israelis no longer believe it is possible to undo everything that the various governments, right and left alike, have done in terms of building settlements. An analysis of the trajectory of the peace camp since the 1960s shows “however” a more nuanced picture. Peace movements did help to change attitudes. They can take credit for eroding the systematic hostility toward recognizing the Palestinian aspiration to nationhood and bringing around the most moderate Israelis, those unhappy with maintaining the status quo, to the idea of the two-state solution. Recognition of Palestinian nationhood became a reality. The majority of Israelis have come around to supporting the two-state solution. Another achievement to put on the dovish left's scorecard: many Israelis wanted to take charge of their future, “to do something concrete,” and to make themselves useful without waiting for policymakers to get around to reaching a peace agreement. In these respects, the Israeli peace camp has quite a respectable track record.

Conclusion

One of the major consequences of the polarization within Israeli society is the deep fracture between the majority of Israelis and the various peace movements. The general public no longer has faith in its pacifists and appreciates human rights organizations even less. The peace camp is perceived as dangerous, ineffective, and at risk of corroding the Zionist narrative of the right to the land of Israel, which insists that there is only one victim in the conflict. Conversely, peace activists no longer expect support from their fellow citizens or their political leaders. Most now seek backing from abroad. This is a major change, which has nevertheless largely gone unnoticed.

Artisans of Hope

As the Israeli right has become firmly ensconced in power and the left shows signs of fatigue, a host of small peace organizations have proliferated that display amazing vitality. The most remarkable are reconciliation NGOs, which show an almost unbelievable dynamism. In a context that is increasingly difficult for the peace camp, these organizations simply refuse to give up and continue to fight for peace as though it were close at hand. They belie the most pessimistic diagnoses about the state of the dovish left. Their objective is ambitious and in many respects revolutionary. Their aim is to establish a partnership for peace on an equal footing. These NGOs strive to help Israelis and Palestinians live together and work towards mutual understanding by combating negative stereotypes and prejudices on either side. They view this form of action as a prerequisite to any political settlement of the conflict and make it the very cornerstone of their identity. This innovative position is an even greater challenge given that many Palestinian organizations feel they should adhere to the call to boycott Israel, while the large majority of Israelis either ignore them or look down on them.

Rabin: Peace Without the Peace Camp

This chapter describes the ambivalent relations between Peace Now and Yitzhak Rabin. Peace Now had had no role whatsoever in drawing up the Oslo agreements. Between 1993 and 1995, while the terms were being drafted by the Oslo negotiators, Peace Now found itself marginalized. And when Rabin went to Washington in September 1995 to sign the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, he invited only one peace activist to accompany him–the founder of an NGO for bereaved parents, who had supported his efforts in support of peace–ignoring Peace Now and its longstanding commitment to a negotiated settlement. The movement's influence was clearly on the wane. Paradoxically, the very peace for which Peace Now and other groups had fought so hard did them barely any good. There are several factors that help explain this phenomenon, the most important of which is the views of the prime minister himself: Rabin mistrusted the peace movement.