The Peace Camp Without Rabin

2019 ◽  
pp. 81-106
Author(s):  
Samy Cohen

Yitzhak Rabin's assassination triggered a burst of enthusiasm for his project. In the months that followed, his supporters continued the struggle. It was a good opportunity for the dovish left to capitalize on the widespread emotion and so to consolidate its base and marshal support for the peace process. It was able to count on the support of Shimon Peres, who had meanwhile been named interim prime minister. He was committed to abiding by the commitments of his predecessor and was also very popular. The context could not have been more favorable to Israeli pacifists. Yet the opportunity was missed. Rabin's assassination did not benefit his supporters. The image of the peace camp continued to deteriorate and increasingly seemed to go against the grain of the dominant public mood in Israel. This chapter explains this inability to capitalize on the “Rabin effect".

1996 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 449-466 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Capitanchik

The Israeli General Election of 1996 Has Been Described as a ‘referendum’ on the Middle East peace process, the central issue in the campaign. However, important as it was, the outcome of the election was determined not so much by the issue of peace, as by a change in the electoral law providing for the direct election of the prime minister. On 29 May, for the first time, Israelis went to the polls to elect a prime minister as well as a new Knesset and the result was yet another upheaval in Israeli political life.


Subject Prospects for peace in Mali Significance French Prime Minister Manuel Valls visited Bamako on February 18-19, just days after German President Joachim Gauck, to reiterate international support for Mali. Western governments are concerned about the threat from jihadist groups operating in the country's Saharan north and their potential for developing links with Islamic State group (ISG) in Libya. Despite the expanded terrorism threat, there have been some positive developments: the peace process in the north has taken major strides forward and decentralisation aimed to underpin peace has advanced. Impacts International partners will reinforce security efforts. To combat the risk of terrorism in Bamako, the authorities will encourage the public to report suspicious activity at community level. Regional elections will offer non-jihadist former rebel leaders a chance to assume a share of power locally.


2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-130
Author(s):  
Paul Karolyi

This update summarizes bilateral, multilateral, regional, and international events affecting the Palestinians and the future of the peace process, and covers the quarter beginning on 16 May and ending on 15 August 2016. The surge of unrest and resistance that began in Jerusalem in 9/2015 continued to dissipate this quarter as the Israeli government strengthened its crackdown on the occupied Palestinian territories, Israeli left-wing activism, and the Palestinian minority in Israel. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected an international push towards peace talks with the Palestinians, and shifted his ruling coalition further to the right. Despite Israel's opposition, the French peace initiative advanced with Palestinian backing and Egypt lent its weight to international peace efforts, but failed to break the Palestinian-Israeli diplomatic impasse. Internally, the Palestinians prepared for municipal elections on 10/8. In regional developments, Israel and Turkey reached a formal reconciliation agreement, paving the way for a return to full diplomatic relations.


2020 ◽  
pp. 301-327
Author(s):  
Jerome Slater

The last serious political negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians occurred between 2003 and 2008. The Road Map initiative of 2003 died because Sharon sabotaged it and the Bush administration abandoned it. Sharon’s intransigence also killed the Geneva Accords, a comprehensive two-state peace settlement negotiated between leading Israeli and Palestinian dovish political leaders. Similarly, the Arab Peace Initiative was ignored by Israel. However, the 2008 secret negotiations between Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert and PA president Mahmoud Abbas, apparently came close to success but died when Olmert was replaced by Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu had long history of opposing the creation of a Palestinian state. Although early in his presidency Obama had indicated support for a two-state settlement, he backed down when confronted with Netanyahu’s intransigence rather than risk a conflict not only with Israel but also with the US Congress and the Israeli lobby.


1996 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-81
Author(s):  
Benny Morris

The assassination of Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, a spate of bombings in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, the refusal of Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad to play ball in the peace process, and a change of heart among Israel's new Russian immigrants all contributed to the election in May 1996 of the most right-wing government in Israel's history, led by Likud hard-liner Benjamin Netanyahu. Among the likely consequences the author explores are the virtual freezing of the peace process, the rise of Palestinian frustration with the ensuing lack of progress, a resumption of anti-Israeli violence in the self-rule areas and in Israel, and increased pressure from Hizballah on Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.


Significance The deal represents a significant milestone in both the peace process and the wider transition. However, it remains only a partial peace, given the absence of the main armed groups in Darfur (the Sudan Liberation Movement/Abdel Wahid al-Nur (SLM/AW)) and the ‘Two Areas’ (the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North/Abdel Aziz al-Hilu (SPLM-N/al-Hilu)). Impacts The prime minister may seek a more direct role in finalising the peace process, at the expense of Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo ‘Himedti’. Integration of rebel groups will expand the bloated military, already a major drain on limited resources. Sharing of natural resource revenues may spur tensions with the military, whose affiliated companies control major mines in conflict areas.


2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 103-112
Author(s):  
Khaled Elgindy

The Bahrain workshop and its associated economic plan are little more than elaborate smokescreens for U.S. president Donald Trump's political vision centered on the broader goals of normalizing Israeli occupation, consolidating the “Greater Israel” agenda, and effectively foreclosing Palestinian political aspirations. By working together with the government of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to redefine the conflict and do away with the traditional ground rules of the peace process, including the two-state solution, Trump is attempting to turn back the clock to the pre-1967 era when Palestinians were viewed mainly as an economic, humanitarian, and security problem rather than a political one. For Palestinians to effectively confront this unprecedented challenge, they will need to put their political house in order, including ending the debilitating political division between Fatah and Hamas, reviving institutional politics, and working to build a national consensus around a new strategy.


2000 ◽  
Vol 11 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 198-212 ◽  

In a few minutes I will leave for Norway where leaders will gather to honor the memory of one of the great heros of this century, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin. We will honor him by not only remembering his life, but by pursuing his vision of a peaceful Middle East.


2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-35
Author(s):  
Paul Karolyi

This is part 131 of a chronology begun in Journal of Palestine Studies 13, no. 3 (Spring 1984), and covers events from 16 May to 15 August 2016 on the ground in the occupied Palestinian territories and in the diplomatic sphere, regionally and internationally. The habba, or uprising, that began in Jerusalem in 9/2015 dissipated further as the Israeli government expanded its crackdown on the occupied Palestinian territories, the Israeli Left, and the Palestinian minority in Israel. Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected international efforts to push Israel closer to peace talks with the Palestinians, instead shifting his ruling coalition further to the right. The French peace initiative advanced with Palestinian backing, despite Israeli opposition. Egypt lent its weight to international peace efforts, but failed to break the Palestinian-Israeli diplomatic impasse. Internally, the Palestinians prepared for municipal elections on 10/8/2016. Israel and Turkey reached a formal reconciliation agreement, paving the way for a return to full diplomatic relations. For a more comprehensive overview of regional and international developments related to the peace process, see the quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy in JPS 46 (1).


2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Taras Kuzio

The 2004 Orange Revolution and election of opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko, who had a stellar reputation in previous positions as National Bank Chairman and Prime Minister, was viewed as a new era in Ukrainian politics, ushering in deep seated reforms and a battle against corruption. Five years on, his opponent, Viktor Yanukovych, whose election in 2004 was annulled over election fraud, replaced him as President. The failure of the Yushchenko presidency to implement the majority of the hopes placed in it by millions of voters and protestors, specifically to decisively change the manner in which politics and economics are undertaken, is a good opportunity to analyse why Ukraine is a difficult country, an immobile state, in which to undertake change of any type. Yanukovych’s first year in office points to Ukraine undergoing a regression from the only tangible benefit to have emerged from “orange” rule; namely, democratization, media freedom, and free elections.


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