The Eclipse

2006-2010: during these four decisive years in the history of the peace movement, the movement experienced a dramatic eclipse. Within an Israeli society that had grown increasingly nationalist, more attached to symbols of Jewish identity and the memory of the Holocaust, more concerned than ever about security, and less interested in making peace with the Palestinians, the movement was incapable both of promoting a message of peace and taking a stance on the subject of human rights. It seemed apathetic, paralyzed, almost non-existent in the face of the terrible events that marked the period. This chapter shows how and why this eclipse occurred. These years were punctuated by two large-scale military operations, the war in Lebanon in July 2006 and Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip from late 2008 to early 2009. These hostilities caused turmoil in the Israeli collective psychology and the perception of war and peace.

Introduction

This introduction raises two fundamental questions: the first one tries to give a definition of what a peace camp is. What we call “the peace movement” in Israel is, in fact, an indistinct galaxy, a world that subdivides into a multitude of organizations and individuals, some highly prominent, and others completely unknown. It is a complex realm, crisscrossed by multiple currents that are often at variance with one another. It resembles no other peace movement in the world. Four main tendencies can be distinguished within this heterogeneous movement in Israel. The second question is that of the decline in the movement's capacity to organize mass demonstrations. Some argue that it is a result of a host of sociological changes that have come about in Israeli society. But the weight of sociological factors is secondary to emotional factors. The feeling of fear inspired by the Palestinians, the lack of confidence in the “other” that a great majority of Israelis refuse to consider a “partner for peace” weighs far more heavily than any sociological variable. This is one of the book's central arguments.

The Peace Camp Without Rabin

Yitzhak Rabin's assassination triggered a burst of enthusiasm for his project. In the months that followed, his supporters continued the struggle. It was a good opportunity for the dovish left to capitalize on the widespread emotion and so to consolidate its base and marshal support for the peace process. It was able to count on the support of Shimon Peres, who had meanwhile been named interim prime minister. He was committed to abiding by the commitments of his predecessor and was also very popular. The context could not have been more favorable to Israeli pacifists. Yet the opportunity was missed. Rabin's assassination did not benefit his supporters. The image of the peace camp continued to deteriorate and increasingly seemed to go against the grain of the dominant public mood in Israel. This chapter explains this inability to capitalize on the “Rabin effect".

From the Dream of Peace to the Grip of Fear

This chapter tries to take stock of half a century of activism by the dovish left. The peace camp promised peace but has failed to deliver it. Many Israelis no longer believe it is possible to undo everything that the various governments, right and left alike, have done in terms of building settlements. An analysis of the trajectory of the peace camp since the 1960s shows “however” a more nuanced picture. Peace movements did help to change attitudes. They can take credit for eroding the systematic hostility toward recognizing the Palestinian aspiration to nationhood and bringing around the most moderate Israelis, those unhappy with maintaining the status quo, to the idea of the two-state solution. Recognition of Palestinian nationhood became a reality. The majority of Israelis have come around to supporting the two-state solution. Another achievement to put on the dovish left's scorecard: many Israelis wanted to take charge of their future, “to do something concrete,” and to make themselves useful without waiting for policymakers to get around to reaching a peace agreement. In these respects, the Israeli peace camp has quite a respectable track record.

1983: A Pivotal Year

This chapter deals with the beginning of the decline of Peace Now. The leaders of the movement locate the turning point in 2000, with two significant events: the collapse in the summer of the Camp David negotiations between Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat, and the outbreak of the second Intifada in September, which led to the deaths of over a thousand Israelis. This interpretation, interesting as it may be, is not entirely faithful to the historical facts. Although 2000 was undoubtedly a significant year in the life of the peace movement, analysis of Peace Now's trajectory shows that its decline actually began in 1983, with the ending of the Lebanon War and Menachem Begin's withdrawal from political life. 1983 was the pivotal year, the date during which the movement appears to have reached its peak, and the moment at which its slow but steady decline began. The number and size of its demonstrations began to decrease.

Conclusion

One of the major consequences of the polarization within Israeli society is the deep fracture between the majority of Israelis and the various peace movements. The general public no longer has faith in its pacifists and appreciates human rights organizations even less. The peace camp is perceived as dangerous, ineffective, and at risk of corroding the Zionist narrative of the right to the land of Israel, which insists that there is only one victim in the conflict. Conversely, peace activists no longer expect support from their fellow citizens or their political leaders. Most now seek backing from abroad. This is a major change, which has nevertheless largely gone unnoticed.

Artisans of Hope

As the Israeli right has become firmly ensconced in power and the left shows signs of fatigue, a host of small peace organizations have proliferated that display amazing vitality. The most remarkable are reconciliation NGOs, which show an almost unbelievable dynamism. In a context that is increasingly difficult for the peace camp, these organizations simply refuse to give up and continue to fight for peace as though it were close at hand. They belie the most pessimistic diagnoses about the state of the dovish left. Their objective is ambitious and in many respects revolutionary. Their aim is to establish a partnership for peace on an equal footing. These NGOs strive to help Israelis and Palestinians live together and work towards mutual understanding by combating negative stereotypes and prejudices on either side. They view this form of action as a prerequisite to any political settlement of the conflict and make it the very cornerstone of their identity. This innovative position is an even greater challenge given that many Palestinian organizations feel they should adhere to the call to boycott Israel, while the large majority of Israelis either ignore them or look down on them.

Rabin: Peace Without the Peace Camp

This chapter describes the ambivalent relations between Peace Now and Yitzhak Rabin. Peace Now had had no role whatsoever in drawing up the Oslo agreements. Between 1993 and 1995, while the terms were being drafted by the Oslo negotiators, Peace Now found itself marginalized. And when Rabin went to Washington in September 1995 to sign the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, he invited only one peace activist to accompany him–the founder of an NGO for bereaved parents, who had supported his efforts in support of peace–ignoring Peace Now and its longstanding commitment to a negotiated settlement. The movement's influence was clearly on the wane. Paradoxically, the very peace for which Peace Now and other groups had fought so hard did them barely any good. There are several factors that help explain this phenomenon, the most important of which is the views of the prime minister himself: Rabin mistrusted the peace movement.

The Birth of the Dovish Left

This chapter describes the rise of the Israeli Peace Camp. It took place over a long period of time, and though the various organizations composing this peace camp were rooted in a left-wing ideology, their engagement did not come about as a result of a preconceived strategy but rather as a reaction to often unforeseeable events or psychological shocks, such as the Six-Day War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Likud victory of 1977, the visit of Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem in 1979, and the Lebanon War of 1982. In order to date the birth of the dovish left, we must go all the way back to the Six-Day War.