Blasphemy and Defamation of Religions
Blasphemy laws, the paradigmatic example of prohibitions of religiously offensive speech, remain common in many contemporary liberal legal systems. The chapter begins by tracing how blasphemy evolved over time in two important respects. First, while the blasphemy offence was initially triggered by the mere denial of the truth of Christianity, it later came to depend on the manner of expression, and only insulting or intemperate communications fell within its scope. Secondly, modern blasphemy laws in the Western world have expanded to protect not only the dominant religion but all religious beliefs, and, in some cases, deeply held secular beliefs. These newer versions of blasphemy are often referred to as ‘defamation of religion’ or ‘disparagement of religion’ laws. I discuss two types of objections to them: that they are vague and impossible to enforce in a non-discriminatory manner; and that they are as such incompatible with a free speech principle. The final part of the chapter explores the argument that religious offence bans are necessary for the protection of public order because if insults are not censored believers will become indignant and resort to violence. I argue that while the protection of order and peace is a legitimate governmental interest, the morally appropriate way to pursue it is to arrest those who threaten others with violence, not silence the non-violent speakers who offend the feelings of the listeners.