Internal Incentive Mechanism of Public Agent-Construction Enterprises Based on Common Agency Model

2011 ◽  
Vol 243-249 ◽  
pp. 6268-6272
Author(s):  
Zhong Bing Wu ◽  
Bing Yao ◽  
Yi Sheng Liu ◽  
Hong Di Wang
Keyword(s):  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Common Agency ◽  
Agency Model ◽  
Construction Enterprise ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
The Public ◽  
Construction Enterprises ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
Internal Incentive

Common agency is the main feature of public sector’s internal incentive mechanism. As the public sector, endogenous features of PACE will lead to defects of internal incentive system. Regarding the public agent-construction enterprise as an agent of two principals which are client and government, a common agent model is constructed and analyzed in-depthly. The findings of this paper clarify two aspects of theoretical basis for the regulatory policy: 1) the optimal conditions of an incentive contract; 2) the substitution relationship of the tasks of two principals causes distortion to the incentive mechanism and leads to incentive efficiency loss.

scholarly journals A Game Model for Incentive Mechanism of Distributed Nodes in Supply Chains

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Jingjing Jiang ◽  
Aobo Lyu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Operation Mode ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Public ◽  
Digital Currency ◽  
Distributed Ledger ◽  
Distributed Ledger Technology ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Reward Mechanism

This study aims to solve the credit problems in the supply chain commodity and currency circulation links from the perspective of the ledger, while the game model method has been adopted. The research firstly reviews the relationship between distributed ledger technology and the essential functions of currency. Then, by constructing two-agent single-period and multi-period game models in the entire supply chain, the researchers analysed the incentive mechanism and equilibrium solution of distributed nodes of Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). The results of this study include the incentive mechanism and optimization of distributed nodes based on licensed distributed ledger technology, which is an important issue that CBDC faces when performing currency functions. The implications of this study mainly cover the limitations of the underlying technology of the public chain and its reward mechanism in the supply chain management and provide support for the rationality of the CBDC issuance mechanism based on state-owned commercial banks, which provides a reference for the CBDC practice. The main value of the research not only serves the decision-making department of the CBDC issuance but also provides ideas on the operation mode of digital currency for the field of digital currency research.

The Analysis on the Incentive Mechanism of Technological Innovations in Industrial Symbiosis

2011 ◽  
Vol 281 ◽  
pp. 249-252
Author(s):  
Li Guo ◽  
Xiao Min Hu
Keyword(s):  
Technological Innovation ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Industrial Symbiosis ◽  
Waste Generation ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Innovation Activities ◽  
Generation Company ◽  
Principal Agent Model ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Major Factors

In order to explore relationship between industrial symbiosis and technological innovation, the paper applied the Becker-Stigler principal-agent model to analyze relevant factors that affect the technological innovation in companies engaged in industrial symbiosis and established the incentive mechanism for technological innovation in industrial symbiosis. The results indicates the extra income received from the technological innovation activities, the income received after the technological innovation activities are discovered and the company has been punished and the annual income of the waste generation company are the major factors that affect the waste generation companies on their technological innovation behaviors.

The Role and Perceptions of Independent Audit Partners in the Governmental Audit Market

2001 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suzanne H. Lowensohn ◽  
Frank Collins
Keyword(s):  
Risk Factors ◽  
Environmental Risk ◽  
Environmental Risk Factors ◽  
Political Climate ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Primary Means ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
Independent Audit

Audits are the primary means of monitoring that public funds are appropriately spent by governmental entities. Currently, independent auditors (rather than governmental auditors) are the primary suppliers of governmental audit services, despite the fact that many of them view governmental audits as “secondary” (AICPA 1987). Furthermore, nongovernmental auditors are believed to be less “independent” and more prone to lose sight of the programmatic demand to safeguard the public trust (Power 1997) than governmental auditors. To better understand the supply of governmental audit services, this study investigates independent audit firm partner opinions of governmental audits and their motivation to pursue these engagements. Multiple regression results of our data reveal that partners are more likely to pursue governmental audits if they believe that desirable intrinsic and extrinsic rewards are attainable through performing these audits. Furthermore, environmental risk factors—an active political climate and authoritative changes—reduce partner motivation to pursue governmental audits. It is suggested that environmental risk factors disrupt the comfortable principal/agent relationship of the auditor and auditee because the relationships have become decoupled (abstracted) from the audit's programmatic mission.

On the Volatile Relationship of Secularization and New Religious Movements

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Holland
Keyword(s):  
Religious Movements ◽  
New Religious Movements ◽  
Illustrative Case ◽  
Religious Groups ◽  
Christian Science ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Action ◽  
Public Square ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter considers the complex relationship between secularization and the emergence of new religious movements. Drawing from countervailing research, some of which insists that new religious movements abet secularizing processes and some of which sees these movements as disproving the secularization thesis, the chapter presents the relationship as inherently unstable. To the extent that new religious movements maintain a precarious balance of familiarity and foreignness—remaining familiar enough to stretch the definitional boundaries of religion—they contribute to secularization. However, new religious movements frequently lean to one side or other of that median, either promoting religious power in the public square by identifying with the interests of existing religious groups, or emphasizing their distinctiveness from these groups and thus provoking aggressive public action by the antagonized religious mainstream. This chapter centres on an illustrative case from Christian Science history.

scholarly journals How to encourage innovation failure knowledge sharing in virtual research organization: an incentive mechanism based on game theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhuang Xiong ◽  
Pengju Wang ◽  
Chengxia Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Knowledge Sharing ◽  
Fault Tolerant ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Research Organization ◽  
Incentive Model ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Innovation Ability ◽  
Relationship Of

AbstractInnovation failure knowledge sharing plays an important role in reducing the probability of repeated failure of subsequent innovation and improving innovation ability of virtual research organization. However, it is very difficult for members to actively share the innovation failure knowledge without incentives. To promote the sharing behavior of innovation failure knowledge in virtual research organization, by using game theory, considering the risk aversion degree of members and the negative effect of fault-tolerance environment, the incentive model of innovation failure knowledge sharing of virtual research organization was constructed, the incentive relationship of innovation failure knowledge sharing between organization and its members under the influence of different states was analyzed, and the theoretical model was simulated and verified through a case study from China. Results show that: (1) without considering the negative effect of fault-tolerant environment, the optimal incentive coefficient of innovation failure knowledge sharing is positively related to the shareable rate and the transformation ability of innovation failure knowledge of members, and negatively related to the sharing cost and risk aversion degree of members; (2) considering the negative effect of fault-tolerant environment, virtual research organization should make a corresponding modification of sharing incentive intensity according to the estimation of tolerance degree to fault-tolerant environment by itself and its members, so as to reduce the knowledge input of organization. The findings obtained from this study provide a novel idea and method for the design of incentive mechanism of innovation failure knowledge sharing of virtual research organization.

scholarly journals Cooperation Promotion from the Perspective of Behavioral Economics: An Incentive Mechanism Based on Loss Aversion in Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks

Electronics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiaqi Liu ◽  
Shiyue Huang ◽  
Hucheng Xu ◽  
Deng Li ◽  
Nan Zhong ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Ad Hoc Networks ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
High Speed ◽  
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Mobile Ad Hoc Network ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Hoc Networks

As a special mobile ad-hoc network, Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) have the characteristics of high-speed movement, frequent topology changes, multi-hop routing, a lack of energy, storage space limitations, and the possible selfishness of the nodes. These characteristics bring challenges to the design of the incentive mechanism in VANETs. In the current research on the incentive mechanism of VANETs, the mainstream is the reward-based incentive mechanism. Most of these mechanisms are designed based on the expected utility theory of traditional economics and assume that the positive and negative effects produced by an equal amount of gain and loss are equal in absolute value. However, the theory of loss aversion points out that the above effects are not equal. Moreover, this will lead to a deviation between the final decision-making behavior of nodes and the actual optimal situation. Therefore, this paper proposed a Loss-Aversion-based Incentive Mechanism (LAIM) to promote the comprehensive perception and sharing of information in the VANETs. This paper designs the incentive threshold and the threshold factor to motivate vehicle nodes to cooperate. Furthermore, based on the number of messages that the nodes face, the utility function of nodes is redesigned to correct the assumption that a gain and a loss of an equal amount could offset each other in traditional economics. The simulation results show that compared with the traditional incentive mechanism, the LAIM can increase the average utility of nodes by more than 34.35%, which promotes the cooperation of nodes.

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