scholarly journals The Metaphysics of Practical Rationality: Intentional and Deontic Cognition

Author(s):  
PRESTON STOVALL

Abstract Despite growing appreciation in recent decades of the importance of shared intentional mental states as a foundation for everything from divergences in primate evolution, to the institution of communal norms, to trends in the development of modernity as a sociopolitical phenomenon, we lack an adequate understanding of the relationship between individual and shared intentionality. At the same time, it is widely appreciated that deontic reasoning concerning what ought, may, and ought not be done is, like reasoning about our intentions, an exercise of practical rationality. Taking advantage of this fact, I use a plan-theoretic semantics for the deontic modalities as a basis for understanding individual and shared intentions. This results in a view that accords well with what we currently have reason to believe about the phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of norm psychology and shared intentionality in human beings, and where original intentionality can be understood in terms of the shared intentionality of a community.

Author(s):  
T.J. Kasperbauer

This chapter applies the psychological account from chapter 3 on how we rank human beings above other animals, to the particular case of using mental states to assign animals moral status. Experiments on the psychology of mental state attribution are discussed, focusing on their implications for human moral psychology. The chapter argues that attributions of phenomenal states, like emotions, drive our assignments of moral status. It also describes how this is significantly impacted by the process of dehumanization. Psychological research on anthropocentrism and using animals as food and as companions is discussed in order to illuminate the relationship between dehumanization and mental state attribution.


2018 ◽  
Vol 226 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonella Marchetti ◽  
Federico Manzi ◽  
Shoji Itakura ◽  
Davide Massaro

Abstract. This review focuses on some relevant issues concerning the relationship between theory of mind (ToM) and humanoid robots. Humanoid robots are employed in different everyday-life contexts, so it seems relevant to question whether the relationships between human beings and humanoids can be characterized by a mode of interaction typical of the relationships between human beings, that is, the attribution of mental states. Because ToM development continuously undergoes changes from early childhood to late adulthood, we adopted a lifespan perspective. We analyzed contributions from the literature by organizing them around the partition between “mental states and actions” and “human-like features.” Finally, we considered how studying human–robot interaction, within a ToM context, can contribute to our understanding of the intersubjective nature of this interaction.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Wykowska ◽  
Jairo Pérez-Osorio ◽  
Stefan Kopp

This booklet is a collection of the position statements accepted for the HRI’20 conference workshop “Social Cognition for HRI: Exploring the relationship between mindreading and social attunement in human-robot interaction” (Wykowska, Perez-Osorio & Kopp, 2020). Unfortunately, due to the rapid unfolding of the novel coronavirus at the beginning of the present year, the conference and consequently our workshop, were canceled. On the light of these events, we decided to put together the positions statements accepted for the workshop. The contributions collected in these pages highlight the role of attribution of mental states to artificial agents in human-robot interaction, and precisely the quality and presence of social attunement mechanisms that are known to make human interaction smooth, efficient, and robust. These papers also accentuate the importance of the multidisciplinary approach to advance the understanding of the factors and the consequences of social interactions with artificial agents.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisa Baek ◽  
Diana Tamir ◽  
Emily B. Falk

Information sharing is a ubiquitous social behavior. What causes people to share? Mentalizing, or considering the mental states of other people, has been theorized to play a central role in information sharing, with higher activity in the brain’s mentalizing system associated with increased likelihood to share information. In line with this theory, we present novel evidence that mentalizing causally increases information sharing. In three pre-registered studies (n = 400, 840, and 3500 participants), participants who were instructed to consider the mental states of potential information receivers indicated higher likelihood to share health news compared to a control condition where they were asked to reflect on the content of the article. Certain kinds of mentalizing were particularly effective; in particular, considering receivers’ emotional and positive mental states, led to the greatest increase in likelihood to share. The relationship between mentalizing and sharing was mediated by feelings of closeness with potential receivers. Mentalizing increased feelings of connectedness to potential receivers, and in turn, increased likelihood of information sharing. Considering receivers’ emotional, positive, and inward-focused mental states was most effective at driving participants to feel closer with potential receivers and increase sharing. Data provide evidence for a causal relationship between mentalizing and information sharing and provide insight about the mechanism linking mentalizing and sharing. Taken together, these results advance theories of information sharing and shed light on previously observed brain-behavior relationships.


Author(s):  
Christine M. Korsgaard

This book argues that we are obligated to treat all sentient animals as “ends in themselves.” Drawing on a theory of the good derived from Aristotle, it offers an explanation of why animals are the sorts of beings who have a good. Drawing on a revised version of Kant’s argument for the value of humanity, it argues that rationality commits us to claiming the standing of ends in ourselves in two senses. As autonomous beings, we claim to be ends in ourselves when we claim the standing to make laws for ourselves and each other. As beings who have a good, we also claim to be ends in ourselves when we take the things that are good for us to be good absolutely and so worthy of pursuit. The first claim commits us to joining with other autonomous beings in relations of reciprocal moral lawmaking. The second claim commits us to treating the good of every sentient animal as something of absolute importance. The book also argues that human beings are not more important than, superior to, or better off than the other animals. It criticizes the “marginal cases” argument and advances a view of moral standing as attaching to the atemporal subjects of lives. It offers a non-utilitarian account of the relationship between the good and pleasure, and addresses questions about the badness of extinction and about whether we have the right to eat animals, experiment on them, make them work for us, and keep them as pets.


Author(s):  
Rainer Forst

This chapter addresses the classical question of the relationship between enlightenment and religion. In doing so, the chapter compares Jürgen Habermas's thought to that of Pierre Bayle and Immanuel Kant. For, although Habermas undoubtedly stands in a tradition founded by Bayle and Kant, he develops a number of important orientations within this tradition and has changed his position in his recent work. The chapter studies this change to understand Habermas's position better. It also draws attention to a fundamental question raised by the modern world: what common ground can human reason establish in the practical and theoretical domain between human beings who are divided by profoundly different religious (including antireligious) views?


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Giacomo Figà Talamanca

Abstract Joint action among human beings is characterized by using elaborate cognitive feats, such as representing the mental states of others about a certain state of affairs. It is still debated how these capacities evolved in the hominid lineage. I suggest that the consolidation of a shared practice over time can foster the predictability of other’s behavior. This might facilitate the evolutionary passage from inferring what others might know by simply seeing them and what they are viewing towards a mutual awareness of each other’s beliefs. I will examine the case for cooperative hunting in one chimpanzee community and argue that it is evidence that they have the potential to achieve common ground, suggesting that the consolidation of a practice might have supported the evolution of higher social cognition in the hominid lineage.


Author(s):  
Gemma Modinos ◽  
Anja Richter ◽  
Alice Egerton ◽  
Ilaria Bonoldi ◽  
Matilda Azis ◽  
...  

AbstractPreclinical models propose that increased hippocampal activity drives subcortical dopaminergic dysfunction and leads to psychosis-like symptoms and behaviors. Here, we used multimodal neuroimaging to examine the relationship between hippocampal regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) and striatal dopamine synthesis capacity in people at clinical high risk (CHR) for psychosis and investigated its association with subsequent clinical and functional outcomes. Ninety-five participants (67 CHR and 28 healthy controls) underwent arterial spin labeling MRI and 18F-DOPA PET imaging at baseline. CHR participants were followed up for a median of 15 months to determine functional outcomes with the global assessment of function (GAF) scale and clinical outcomes using the comprehensive assessment of at-risk mental states (CAARMS). CHR participants with poor functional outcomes (follow-up GAF < 65, n = 25) showed higher rCBF in the right hippocampus compared to CHRs with good functional outcomes (GAF ≥ 65, n = 25) (pfwe = 0.026). The relationship between rCBF in this right hippocampal region and striatal dopamine synthesis capacity was also significantly different between groups (pfwe = 0.035); the association was negative in CHR with poor outcomes (pfwe = 0.012), but non-significant in CHR with good outcomes. Furthermore, the correlation between right hippocampal rCBF and striatal dopamine function predicted a longitudinal increase in the severity of positive psychotic symptoms within the total CHR group (p = 0.041). There were no differences in rCBF, dopamine, or their associations in the total CHR group relative to controls. These findings indicate that altered interactions between the hippocampus and the subcortical dopamine system are implicated in the pathophysiology of adverse outcomes in the CHR state.


1994 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard W. Fulweiler

Our Mutual Friend, published just six years after Darwin's The Origin of Species, is structured on a Darwinian pattern. As its title hints, the novel is an account of the mutual-though hidden-relations of its characters, a fictional world of individuals seeking their own advantage, a "dismal swamp" of "crawling, creeping, fluttering, and buzzing creatures." The relationship between the two works is quite direct in light of the large number of reviews on science, evolution, and The Origin from 1859 through the early 1860s in Dicken's magazine, All the Year Round. Given the laissez-faire origin of the Origin, Dicken's use of it in a book directed against laissez-faire economics is ironic. Important Darwinian themes in the novel are predation, mutual relationships, chance, and, especially, inheritance, a central issue in both Victorian fiction and in The Origin of Species. The novel asks whether predatory self-seeking or generosity should be the desired inheritance for human beings. The victory of generosity is symbolized by a dying child's "willing" his inheritance of a toy Noah's Ark, "all the Creation," to another child. Our Mutual Friend is saturated with the motifs of Darwinian biology, therefore, to display their inadequacy. Although Dickens made use of the explanatory powers of natural selection and remained sympathetic to science, the novel transcends and opposes its Darwinian structure in order to project a teleological and designed evolution in the human world toward a moral community of responsible men and women.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 110-121
Author(s):  
Rivanti Muslimawaty

Many parents do not understand the concept of faith education inchildren. This could be based on an assumption that children are stilltoo young to be educated in matters of faith. Whereas the family, in thiscase the parents, is an educational institution that is directly related tothe child since he was born. So there is a thought that the family isbelieved to have a very strong influence on children’s religiouseducation. This happens because the relationship that exists betweenparents and children for 24 hours is very important in education.Zakiah Daradjat is an education expert who also believes that theimportance of faith education is given to children as early as possible,so the purpose of this study is to find out how Zakiah Daradjat’sthoughts about children’s religious education are in the family. Byusing qualitative research methods, the author seeks to explain theeducation of children’s faith in the family according to ZakiahDaradjat. The author found that Zakiah Daradjat had clear thoughtsabout children’s religious education in the family, which aims to makechildren as human beings, through the six pillars of faith, with methodsof exemplification, habituation, wrong correction, erroneous quarrelsthat occur and reminding the forgotten. The evaluations carried out inthe form of memorization tests, tests of understanding and practice ofworship. This makes Zakiah Daradjat’s thoughts still relevant to beapplied in today’s life and become a reference for psrents, teachers abdother related parties.


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