Crafting Courts in New Democracies

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew C. Ingram
Keyword(s):  
New Democracies

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ekrem Karakoç
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
System Stability ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
The Czech Republic ◽  
Electoral Volatility ◽  
Large N ◽  
Multimethod Approach ◽  
Median Voter Theory ◽  
Nondemocratic Regimes

This chapter opens by providing empirical evidence that income inequality persists or increases in many new democracies after their transition. Then it gives a brief overview of studies that expect reduced inequality because of democratization and questions their three assumptions regarding median voters, party system stability, and the authoritarian legacy on citizen–party linkage. It offers a revision to the median voter theory, emphasizes high electoral volatility in new democracies, and reexamines the legacy of previous nondemocratic regimes on citizen–party linkage. Having offered its argument in a nutshell, it turns to research methodology and case selection. It offers the rationale behind employing a multimethod approach to test its arguments. It tests its argument through large-N analysis in new and longstanding democracies in Europe as well as two paired case studies: Poland and the Czech Republic in postcommunist Europe and Turkey and Spain in Southern Europe.

Presidentialism and the Effect of Electoral Law in Postcommunist Systems

2005 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terry D. Clark ◽  
Jill N. Wittrock
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
Legislative Agenda ◽  
Majority Control ◽  
Election Results ◽  
Duverger's Law ◽  
Electoral Law ◽  
Mixed Systems

Efforts to test Duverger’s law in the new democracies of postcommunist Europe have had mixed results. Research argues that mixed systems have an effect on the number of effective parties that is distinct from that of single-mandate district and proportional representation systems. Less attention has been given to the effect of other institutions on the party system, particularly strong presidents. Analyzing election results in postcommunist Europe, the authors find support for Duverger’s law after controlling for the strength of the executive. They argue that strong presidents substantially reduce the incentive for parties to seize control of the legislative agenda. Hence, the restraint that electoral systems exercise on the proliferation of parties and independent candidates is weakened. The authors find that a further consequence of strong presidents is that the incentive for majority control of committees and the legislative agenda is weakened.

Political and Institutional Checks on Corruption

2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (9) ◽  
pp. 1217-1244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcus André Melo ◽  
Carlos Pereira ◽  
Carlos Mauricio Figueiredo
Keyword(s):  
Political Competition ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Electoral Connection ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Institutional Activism ◽  
Accountability Mechanism ◽  
Empirical Tests ◽  
Performance Determinants ◽  
Positive Direct

This article investigates the performance determinants of accountability institutions in new democracies. Current scholarship on accountability has identified a distinct mechanism through which the introduction of political competition may affect such institutions: the electoral connection or vertical accountability mechanism. This connection is not expected to be effective in new democracies, because political competition is found to be volatile and nonprogrammatic. Another strand of the literature focuses on the effect of power alternation. Government turnover is expected to generate incentives for the creation and strengthening of autonomous institutions. By exploring a unique data set on 33 state audit institutions, the authors bring together these distinct claims and provide systematic empirical tests for them. They find a negative effect of volatility on their institutional activism and a positive (direct and indirect) influence of power alternation on their levels of autonomy and sanctioning patterns.

Influence of hosting a major sports event on patriotic attitudes: The EuroBasket 2013 competition in Slovenia

2017 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-383
Author(s):  
Simon Ličen
Keyword(s):  
Physical Activity ◽  
Public Service ◽  
High School Graduates ◽  
Nation Building ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Activity Levels ◽  
Major Event ◽  
Physical Activity Levels ◽  
Sport Events ◽  
Event Based

Countries with short histories of nationhood often resort to sport to (re-)invent a national identity. This study uses the nationalizing nationalism and social identity frameworks to examine whether hosting a major event such as the European basketball championship for men influenced national identification in Slovenia. Readers of the Slovenian public service website were surveyed at three points in time to determine changes in patriotism, nationalism, internationalism, and smugness in relation to the EuroBasket 2013. Results indicate the almost complete absence of influence on the population as a whole. Nationalistic attitudes did not change after the event based on the respondents’ gender and physical activity levels, and only high school graduates displayed an increase in smugness in the week following the competition. Significant differences were found with regard to live and televisual exposure to the event as spectators scored significantly higher on patriotism, nationalism (only TV viewers), and smugness, but not internationalism scales. While hosting this tournament did not contribute to nationalizing nationalism or nation-building, despite the national government’s assertion otherwise, even moderate exposure to it fed patriotism. Links between sport events and nationalistic attitudes are discussed in further detail and should inform researchers of sport events and patriotism especially in new democracies.

Interlocking Elites in Southeast Asia

2003 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 249-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Case
Keyword(s):  
Southeast Asia ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Political Regimes ◽  
Outcomes Analysis ◽  
Common Mode ◽  
Intermediate Regime ◽  
Structural Forces ◽  
Colonial Legacies

AbstractAnalysts make much of the diversity of Southeast Asia's political regimes. However, the region also displays a mounting preponderance of pseudoand fuller democracies, as well as a common mode of transition where fuller democratization has taken place. This analysis argues that these "intermediate" regime categories can be partly ascribed to common, though countervailing factors of colonial legacies, structural forces, some faint cultural residues, and new globalized influences. Next, it explores the conditions in which changes may take place from pseudo-democracy to more fully democratic outcomes. Analysis turns finally to the ways in which despite this weakening of leadership, elites regain enough vitality that while transitions may go forward, they have been able to collaborate in limiting the quality of the new democracies that have emerged.

Economic Origins of Electoral Support for Authoritarian Successors

2007 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 362-388 ◽  
Author(s):  
Byong-Kuen Jhee
Keyword(s):  
Economic Performance ◽  
Economic Voting ◽  
Authoritarian Regime ◽  
Economic Conditions ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Democratic Transitions ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Knee Jerk ◽  
The Past ◽  
Electoral Support

This study explores how economic performance prior to democratic transitions affects the fate of successors to authoritarian rulers in new democracies. It investigates 70 founding election outcomes, finding that successful economic performance under an authoritarian regime increases the vote share of successors. It also finds that the past economic performance of authoritarian rulers decreases the likelihood of government alternation to democratic oppositions. Interim governments that initiate democratic transition, however, are neither blamed nor rewarded for economic conditions during transition periods. This study concludes that electorates are not myopic and that economic voting is not a knee-jerk reaction to short-term economic performance in new democracies.

scholarly journals How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries

2008 ◽  
Vol 98 (5) ◽  
pp. 2203-2220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adi Brender ◽  
Allan Drazen
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Growth Rates ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Economic Conditions ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Budget Deficits ◽  
Large Panel

We test whether good economic conditions and expansionary fiscal policy help incumbents get reelected in a large panel of democracies. We find no evidence that deficits help reelection in any group of countries independent of income level, level of democracy, or government or electoral system. In developed countries and old democracies, deficits in election years or over the term of office reduce reelection probabilities. Higher growth rates over the term raise reelection probabilities only in developing countries and new democracies. Low inflation is rewarded by voters only in developed countries. These effects are both statistically significant and quite substantial quantitatively. (JEL D72, E62, H62, O47)

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