IS TRADING WITH CHINA DIFFERENT? SELF-INTEREST, NATIONAL PRIDE, AND TRADE PREFERENCES

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Wei-Ting Yen ◽  
Kristine Kay ◽  
Fang-Yu Chen

Abstract Despite increasing economic integrations with China, worries exist in China's neighboring countries about China's implicit political intention. Do people view trading with China differently? In this article, we incorporate the political context of trade agreements by showing that trade with partners who come with political costs is less likely to be supported. Using a nationally representative survey experiment from Taiwan, we find that trading with China garners less support than trading with Japan or Malaysia, and nationalism suppresses self-interest when the proposed trading partner is China. We show that national attachment, which is neither a proxy for political identification nor a proxy for national chauvinism, becomes a stronger predictor of trade preferences toward China. While the political tension between China and Taiwan is unique, many countries see at least one other country posing a negative externality. Our finding suggests strongly identified nationalists would oppose engaging with a hostile outsider regardless of their self-interest.

2009 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward D. Mansfield ◽  
Diana C. Mutz

AbstractAlthough it is widely acknowledged that an understanding of mass attitudes about trade is crucial to the political economy of foreign commerce, only a handful of studies have addressed this topic. These studies have focused largely on testing two models, both of which emphasize that trade preferences are shaped by how trade affects an individual's income. The factor endowments or Heckscher-Ohlin model posits that these preferences are affected primarily by a person's skills. The specific factors or Ricardo-Viner model posits that trade preferences depend on the industry in which a person works. We find little support for either of these models using two representative national surveys of Americans. The only potential exception involves the effects of education. Initial tests indicate that educational attainment and support for open trade are directly related, which is often interpreted as support for the Heckscher-Ohlin model. However, further analysis reveals that education's effects are less representative of skill than of individuals' anxieties about involvement with out-groups in their own country and beyond. Furthermore, we find strong evidence that trade attitudes are guided less by material self-interest than by perceptions of how the U.S. economy as a whole is affected by trade.


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim-Lee Tuxhorn

AbstractDo consumer and producer considerations influence support for future trade agreements and, if so, how? Prior research has pitted self-interest-based explanations of trade preferences against perception-based explanations, finding limited empirical support for the self-interest hypothesis. Instead of treating perceptions and self-interest as competing explanations, we construct a theoretical model with perceptions of trade as a mediating factor linking self-interest and support for prospective free trade agreements (FTAs). Using new survey data collected by the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, we examine how two distinct forms of self-interest (consumer and producer considerations) can indirectly shape attitudes toward the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). We find that the impact of respondents' income level (proxying producer considerations) and their recognition of the price-lowering effect of international trade (proxying consumer considerations) on support for the TPP are largely mediated by perceptions of trade. Together the findings suggest a middle ground between the two sides of the self-interest debate.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne-Sophie Hacquin ◽  
Sacha Altay ◽  
Emma de Araujo ◽  
Coralie Chevallier ◽  
Hugo Mercier

A safe and effective COVID-19 vaccine is our only hope to decisively stop the spread of the SARS-CoV-2. But a vaccine will only be fully effective if a significant share of the population agrees to get it. Five consecutive surveys of a large, nationally representative sample (N = 1000 for each wave) surveyed attitudes towards a future COVID-19 vaccine in France from May 2020 to October 2020. We found that COVID-19 vaccine refusal has steadily increased, reaching an all-time high with only 23% of participants willing to probably or certainly take a future COVID-19 vaccine in September 2020. Vaccine hesitant individuals are more likely to be women, young, less educated, to vote at the political extremes, to be dissatisfied with the government’s response to the COVID-19 crisis, and to feel less at risk of COVID-19. The reasons why French people would refuse to take the COVID-19 vaccine are similar to those offered for other vaccines, and these reasons are strikingly stable across gender, age and educational level. Finally, most French people declare they would not take the vaccine as soon as possible but would instead rather wait or not take it at all.


Author(s):  
Tracey Raney

This paper is about the ways that citizens perceive their place in the political world around them, through their political identities. Using a combination of comparative and quantitative methodologies, the study traces the pattern of citizens’ political identifications in the European Union and Canada between 1981 and 2003 and explains the mechanisms that shape these political identifications. The results of the paper show that in the EU and Canada identity formation is a process that involves the participation of both individuals and political institutions yet between the two, individuals play a greater role in identity construction than do political institutions. The paper argues that the main agents of political identification in the EU and Canada are citizens themselves: individuals choose their own political identifications, rather than acquiring identities that are pre-determined by historical or cultural precedence. The paper makes the case that this phenomenon is characteristic of a rise of ‘civic’ identities in the EU and Canada. In the European Union, this overarching ‘civic’ identity is in its infancy compared to Canada, yet, both reveal a new form of political identification when compared to the historical and enduring forms of cultural identities firmly entrenched in Europe. The rise of civic identities in both the EU and Canada is attributed to the active role that citizens play in their own identity constructions as they base their identifications on rational assessments of how well political institutions function, and whether their memberships in the community will benefit them, rather than on emotional factors rooted in religion or race. In the absence of strongly held emotional identifications, in the EU and Canada political institutions play a passive role in identity construction by making the community appear more entitative to its citizens. These findings offer new theoretical scope to the concept of civic communities and the political identities that underpin them. The most important finding presented in the paper is that although civic communities and identities are manufactured by institutions and political elites (politicians and bureaucrats), they require thinking citizens, not feeling ones, to be sustained.   Full text available at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v2i4.179


Author(s):  
Sarah Blodgett Bermeo

This chapter introduces the role of development as a self-interested policy pursued by industrialized states in an increasingly connected world. As such, it is differentiated from traditional geopolitical accounts of interactions between industrialized and developing states as well as from assertions that the increased focus on development stems from altruistic motivations. The concept of targeted development—pursuing development abroad when and where it serves the interests of the policymaking states—is introduced and defined. The issue areas covered in the book—foreign aid, trade agreements between industrialized and developing countries, and finance for climate change adaptation and mitigation—are introduced. The preference for bilateral, rather than multilateral, action is discussed.


2021 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Giancarlo Visconti

ABSTRACTVoters’ ideological stances have long been considered one of the most important factors for understanding electoral choices in Chile. In recent years, however, the literature has begun to call this premise into question, due to several changes in the Chilean political landscape: the current crisis of representation, the high programmatic congruence between the two main coalitions, the decline in the political relevance of the dictatorship, and the rise of nonprogrammatic electoral strategies. In addition to these transformations, Chile switched to voluntary voting in 2012. This article studies whether ideology still informs electoral choices in Chile in an era of voluntary voting. It implements a conjoint survey experiment in low-to-middle-income neighborhoods in Santiago, where voters would be expected to be less ideological. It shows that candidates’ ideological labels are crucial for understanding the electoral decisions of a large part of the sample, particularly among likely voters.


Author(s):  
Omar García-Ponce ◽  
Thomas Zeitzoff ◽  
Leonard Wantchekon

Abstract Are individuals in violent contexts reluctant to tackle corruption for fear of future violence? Or does violence mobilize them to fight corruption? We investigate these questions looking at the effects of fear and violence stemming from the Mexican Drug War on attitudes toward corruption. We conducted two surveys before the 2012 Mexican presidential election. First, as part of a nationally representative survey, we find a positive correlation between fear of violence and willingness to accept corruption in exchange for lower levels of violence. To disentangle causal effects, we conducted a follow-up survey experiment in Greater Mexico City where we manipulated fear over the Drug War. We find that individuals within this context are not easily scared. Those who received a common fear-inducing manipulation do not report higher levels of fear and are less willing to tolerate corruption. Conversely, we find strong evidence that individuals who have been victims of crime are more likely to report both higher levels of fear and willingness to accept corruption if it lowers violence. Our findings suggest that voters are more strategic and resilient in the face of violence than many extant theories of political behavior suggest.


2021 ◽  
pp. 106591292110072
Author(s):  
Michael Tesler

This article argues that the unusually large and persistent association between Islamophobia and opposition to President Obama helped make attitudes about Muslims a significant, independent predictor of Americans’ broader partisan preferences. After detailing the theoretical basis for this argument, the article marshals repeated cross-sectional data, two panel surveys, and a nationally representative survey experiment, to test its hypotheses. The results from those analyses show the following: (1) attitudes about Muslims were a significantly stronger independent predictor of voter preferences for congress in 2010–2014 elections than they were in 2004–2008; (2) attitudes about Muslims were a significantly stronger independent predictor of mass partisanship during Obama’s presidency than they were beforehand; and (3) experimentally connecting Obama to Democratic congressional candidates significantly increased the relationship between anti-Muslim sentiments and Americans’ preferences for Republican congressional candidates. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of these results for American politics in the Trump era.


Author(s):  
Frederik Juhl Jørgensen ◽  
Mathias Osmundsen

Abstract Can corrective information change citizens’ misperceptions about immigrants and subsequently lead to favorable immigration opinions? While prior studies from the USA document how corrections about the size of minority populations fail to change citizens’ immigration-related opinions, they do not examine how other facts that speak to immigrants’ cultural or economic dependency rates can influence immigration policy opinions. To extend earlier work, we conducted a large-scale survey experiment fielded to a nationally representative sample of Danes. We randomly expose participants to information about non-Western immigrants’ (1) welfare dependency rate, (2) crime rate, and (3) proportion of the total population. We find that participants update their factual beliefs in light of correct information, but reinterpret the information in a highly selective fashion, ultimately failing to change their policy preferences.


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