Political Affinities and Maneuvering of Soviet Political Elites: Heorhii Shevel and Ukraine’s Ministry of Strange Affairs in the 1970s

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 394-411
Author(s):  
Olga Bertelsen
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Political Elite ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Political Elites ◽  
Soviet Power ◽  
Central Figure ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Institution

AbstractThis article examines the goals and practices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ukraine in the 1970s, a Soviet institution that functioned as an ideological organ fighting against Ukrainian nationalists domestically and abroad. The central figure of this article is Heorhii Shevel who governed the Ministry from 1970 to 1980 and whose tactics, strategies, and practices reveal the existence of a distinct phenomenon in the Soviet Union—the nationally conscious political elite with double loyalties who, by action or inaction, expanded the space of nationalism in Ukraine. This research illuminates a paradox of pervasive Soviet power, which produced an institution that supported and reinforced Soviet “anti-nationalist” ideology, simultaneously creating an environment where heterodox views or sentiments were stimulated and nurtured.

scholarly journals Conspiracy Theories in Post-Soviet Russia

2018 ◽  
pp. 360-371 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilya Yablokov
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Political Elite ◽  
Soviet Period ◽  
Political Elites ◽  
Russian Society ◽  
Conspiracy Theories ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Russian Politics ◽  
Soviet Russia

Throughout the post-Soviet period various conspiracy theories, most of which have been anti-Western, have moved from the margins of intellectual life to the mainstream of Russian politics. The trauma of the Soviet collapse enabled political elites to offer a conspiratorial reading of the event, and use this both for the purpose of nation-building and for suppressing democratic opposition by accusing its proponents of having destroyed the Soviet Union from within. Russian political elites use conspiracy theories to tackle emerging challenges by dividing Russian society into a majority loyal to the Kremlin, and a minority which is supposedly out to destroy Russia. The state authorities, including top-ranking politicians, seem to be the main producers of this conspiracy discourse; however, they use it with great care, with much reliance on the support of intellectuals who take part both in the production and dissemination of these theories to the general public. Studying conspiracy theories in Russia provides us with a means to comprehend domestic politics and to explain the strategies of the Russian political elite on both the domestic and international levels.

Confronting Soviet Power: U.S. Policy during the Early Cold War

2012 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 151-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul C. Avey
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
The United States ◽  
Soviet Power ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Foreign Policies ◽  
Distribution Of Power

Many self-identified realist, liberal, and constructivist scholars contend that ideology played a critical role in generating and shaping the United States' decision to confront the Soviet Union in the early Cold War. A close look at the history reveals that these ideological arguments fail to explain key aspects of U.S. policy. Contrary to ideological explanations, the United States initially sought to cooperate with the Soviet Union, did not initially pressure communist groups outside the Soviet orbit, and later sought to engage communist groups that promised to undermine Soviet power. The U.S. decision to confront the Soviets stemmed instead from the distribution of power. U.S. policy shifted toward a confrontational approach as the balance of power in Eurasia tilted in favor of the Soviet Union. In addition, U.S. leaders tended to think and act in a manner consistent with balance of power logic. The primacy of power over ideology in U.S. policymaking—given the strong liberal tradition in the United States and the large differences between U.S. and Soviet ideology—suggests that relative power concerns are the most important factors in generating and shaping confrontational foreign policies.

The Soviet Union's Secret Diplomacy Concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway, 1924–1925

1994 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 459-486 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce A. Elleman
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
October Revolution ◽  
Soviet Power ◽  
The South ◽  
Soviet Authority ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Majority Control ◽  
Beijing Government

Following the october revolution, the Soviet Union regained majority control over the strategically located Chinese Eastern Railway, which ran through Manchuria, by signing two previously unpublished secret agreements: the first with the Beijing government on May 31, 1924, and the second with Zhang Zuolin's government in Manchuria on September 20, 1924. These secret agreements were signed despite the Soviet government's repeated promise that it would never resort to secret diplomacy. The Soviet Union also renewed control over the Russian-built Chinese Eastern Railway despite a 1919 Soviet manifesto promising that this railway would be turned over to China without compensation. To consolidate Soviet power over this railway, the USSR then signed the January 20, 1925, convention with Japan that recognized Japan's authority over the South Manchurian Railway in return for Japan's acquiescence to full Soviet authority over the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Reliability of the Plot Related to the Conversation with Deng Xiaoping on the Sino-Soviet Territorial Issues in the Memoirs of E. Shevardnadze

2021 ◽  
pp. 135
Author(s):  
Yinan Li
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Deng Xiaoping ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Reliable Source ◽  
History Of ◽  
Territorial Claims

In 2009, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and President of Georgia E.A. Shevardnadze published his memoirs in Russian, which contain an “explosive” plot: while visiting China in February 1989, during his meeting with Deng Xiaoping, a lengthy dispute over border and territorial issues occurred. At that time, Deng allegedly expressed his point of view that vast lands of the Soviet Union, from three to four million square kilometers, belonged to China. Chinese can wait patiently until someday the lands return to China. This content is cited in scientific works by many historians from different countries as an argument. However, there is no other evidence which can prove this recollection. Many details in it contradict the well known historical facts or are completely illogical. There is a good reason to believe that the plot in the memoirs of Shevardnadze is an incorrect recollection. It could even be considered as a made-up story. Moreover, it is possible that it was fabricated for some reasons. Hence, the plot is not worthy of being quoted as a reliable source. At the Sino-Soviet summit Deng Xiaoping did have expressed the point of view that in the past Russia and then the Soviet Union cut off millions of square kilometers of land from China, but at the same time he promised the leader of the Soviet Union that China would not make territorial claims. Since the mid-1980s Deng Xiaoping actively promoted the settlement of the Sino-Soviet border issues through negotiations, which led to the result that 99% of the border between Russia and China was delimited on a legal basis in the last years of his life. At present, the problems of the Sino-Russian border have been finally resolved long ago. There is no doubt that the scientific research and discussions on issues related to territory and borders in the history of Sino-Soviet relations can be made. However, such research and discussions should be based on reliable sources.

Regionalism or Clientelism?

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 50-71
Author(s):  
Clayton Black
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Power ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Western Historiography

Abstract This article examines the Leningrad Opposition of 1925 not so much as a regionally based schism in the party opposed to Stalin’s increasing monopoly of power, but rather as a cohesive expression of the city’s frustration with NEP and the economic hardships it imposed on the most industrialized city in the Soviet Union in the first seven years of Soviet power. Contrary to Western historiography on the Opposition, Zinoviev did not so much lead as align with the city’s leaders.

Troubleshooters, Political Machines, and Moscow's Regional Control

Slavic Review ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 347-358
Author(s):  
John Willerton ◽  
William Reisinger
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Political Stability ◽  
Economic Life ◽  
Soviet Power ◽  
Regional Control ◽  
Political Reforms ◽  
Political Machines ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
National Leaders

Since the beginning of Soviet power, national leaders have been concerned with controlling the diverse regions that make up the Soviet Union. They have used many means, including coercion, to extend their influence over the localities. Lower-level party officials, especially regional first secretaries, have been crucial links between the national regime and the periphery. These officials juggle a complex set of political and economic responsibilities and must safeguard a region's political stability, while applying national directives. They oversee the economic life of their bailiwick and attempt to enhance its productivity. Recruiting and elevating these lower-level officials is critical to maintaining national influence in the regions; the 1988-1990 political reforms have not changed this method.

Holy War Redux: The Crusades, Futures of the Past, and Strategic Logic in the “Clash” of Religions

PMLA ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 126 (2) ◽  
pp. 422-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geraldine Heng
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Seventh Century ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Political Scientist ◽  
War On Terrorism ◽  
Clash Of Civilizations ◽  
The West ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Osama Bin Laden

[G]reat devastation [was] inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist alliance. …—World Islamic Front[T]here is a Zionist Crusader war on Islam. … I call on mujahedin and their supporters … to prepare for long war against the Crusader plunderers. …—Osama Bin Laden, “Bin Laden”This war is fundamentally religious. … the most ferocious, serious, and violent Crusade campaign against Islam ever since the message was revealed to Muhammad. …—Osama Bin Laden, “West”[T]his Crusade, this war on terrorism, is gonna take a while.—George W. BushThis is no less than a clash of civilizations—the … reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.—Bernard Lewis, “Roots”In a lead 1990 article for the atlantic monthly, bernard lewis, a well-known historian of islamic studies, conjured the catchphrase “clash of civilizations” to narrate what he saw as fundamental relations of enmity between Islamicate societies and the countries of “the West”—“the West” being shorthand for polities that bear the legacies of Christendom, the Crusades, and the European Enlightenment—since the seventh-century emergence of Islam. Three years later, Samuel Huntington, a well-known political scientist, picked up Lewis's theme and, in an article for Foreign Affairs, embroidered it into a theory of global relations to fill what Huntington saw as the political vacuum that had materialized after the cold war's closure (“Clash”). (In 1945–90, the rhetoric of civilizational clash seemed to have been adequately, if temporarily, filled by superpower contests between the United States and the Soviet Union and their allies/surrogates.)

scholarly journals Science Diplomacy and Soviet-American Academic and Technical Exchanges

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 398-408
Author(s):  
Olga Krasnyak
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Science Diplomacy ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
American Academic

Summary The 1958 Lacy-Zarubin agreement on cultural, educational and scientific exchanges marked decades of people-to-people exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite the Cold War tensions and mutually propagated adversarial images, the exchanges had never been interrupted and remained unbroken until the Soviet Union dissolved. This essay argues that due to the 1958 general agreement and a number of co-operative agreements that had the status of treaties and international acts issued under the authority of the US State Department and the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the exchanges could not proceed without diplomatic supervision. This peculiarity puts academic and technical exchanges specifically into the framework of science diplomacy, which is considered a diplomatic tool for implementing a nation state’s foreign policy goals determined by political power.

An Average Azeri Village (1930): Remembering Rebellion in the Caucasus Mountains

Slavic Review ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 705-731 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Grant
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Rule ◽  
Soviet Power ◽  
Islamic Republic ◽  
Anthropological Perspective ◽  
The Caucasus ◽  
Cultural Logic ◽  
Men And Women ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Caucasus Mountains

In this article, Bruce Grant advocates an anthropological perspective for understanding resistance to early Soviet rule, given that not all anti-Soviet rebellions operated by the same cultural logic. Combining oral histories and archival evidence to reconstruct highly charged events in rural northwest Azerbaijan, where as many as 10,000 men and women joined to overthrow Soviet power in favor of an Islamic republic in 1930, Grant examines moral archetypes of banditry, religious frames of Caucasus life, magical mobility, and images of early nationalist struggle against communism. Exploring what it means to have been “average” in the Soviet Union of the 1930s, Grant invites readers to consider classic narrative framings of periods of great tumult.

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