Estimating the locations of voters, politicians, policy outcomes, and status quos on a common scale

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
James Coleman Battista ◽  
Michael Peress ◽  
Jesse Richman
Keyword(s):  
State Government ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Measurement Problem ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Elected Officials ◽  
Tax Policies ◽  
Legislative Bargaining ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Common Scale ◽  
Underlying Mechanisms

Abstract How well are voters represented and what explains how well voters are represented? Answering these questions requires unpacking the mechanisms by which voters choose elected officials and elected officials implement policies. Though spatial theories of voting and legislative bargaining provide a broad framework for understanding these mechanisms, testing these theories involves a measurement problem where multiple political actors and outcomes must be located. We develop a technique for estimating policy outcomes, status quo locations, the ideology of elite political actors, and the ideology of voters, on a common scale. Using our new estimates, we demonstrate a similar level of incongruence for tax policies and spending policies. The incongruence arises for different reasons however—tax policies are over-responsive to the position of the median voter. Contrarily, spending policies are under-responsive and barely correlated with the position of the median voter. In examining the underlying mechanisms for policy change, we find that while the positions of elected officials over-respond to the median voter, the changing composition of state government has little immediate impact on policy. Instead, policy outcomes respond to long-term trends in the composition of government.

Voting Equilibria Under Proportional Representation

2014 ◽  
Vol 108 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
SEOK-JU CHO
Keyword(s):  
Median Voter ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Main Concern ◽  
Policy Outcome ◽  
Equilibrium Concept ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Robust Equilibrium

This article studies the consequences of strategic voting by outcome-oriented voters in elections under proportional representation (PR). I develop a model of elections under PR, in which voters choose among an arbitrary finite number of parties, and the policy outcome is determined in a postelection bargaining stage. I use a new solution concept, robust equilibrium, which greatly mitigates the well-known problem of indeterminate predictions in multicandidate competition. Applying the equilibrium concept to the model, I find that PR promotes representation of small parties in general, even when voters are strategic. However, the median voter plays a critical role in shaping policy outcomes, which reflects the majoritarian nature of parliamentary policy making rules. Thus, PR may not be incompatible with the majoritarian vision of representative democracy if voters’ main concern is policy outcomes.

How do policy transfer mechanisms influence policy outcomes in the context of authoritarianism in Vietnam?

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hang Duong
Keyword(s):  
Best Practices ◽  
Policy Change ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Policy Transfer ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
National Context ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Authoritarian State ◽  
Convergence And Divergence ◽  
Transfer Mechanisms

The literature on policy transfer shows that it may result in simultaneous policy convergence and policy divergence. However, little is known about how such results happen when transferring from multiple and possibly contrasting sources. This study finds that civil service reforms in Vietnam’s merit-based policies are influenced by both western and Asian models of meritocracy. This makes them both closer to universal ‘best practices’ and at the same time sharpens the distinctiveness of Vietnam’s policy. The calculations of political actors in combination with the context of a one-party authoritarian state have led to policy transfer through mechanisms of translation and assemblage which brings about a hybrid of convergence and divergence. This study enhances understanding of policy transfer in the context of Asian authoritarianism. In finding hybridity in transfer outcomes in this national context, the article shows the uniqueness of resultant policy change and develops an analytical framework for the influence of policy transfer on policy outcomes.

Law, Politics, and Democracy in the Twenty-first Century

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 357-362
Author(s):  
J. Mitchell Pickerill
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Political Process ◽  
First Century ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Political Processes ◽  
Law And Politics ◽  
Law And Courts ◽  
The Us

Political scientists have long rejected the old law and politics dichotomy and recognize instead that law and court decisions are inherently political in numerous ways. Still, courts are not the same as executive and legislative institutions, and law is not simply a synonym for politics or policy. Law and courts are distinct and yet connected to political processes and policy outcomes in complex and nuanced ways. The question for law and courts scholars, then, is how and why do political actors (with seemingly increasing frequency) turn to law and the judiciary to influence public policy, and what are the impacts of infusing law and courts into the US political process? The three recent books under review help to answer these questions.

Correlates of Influence in Local Government: An Exploratory Investigation

1976 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 356-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin S. Rallings
Keyword(s):  
Socioeconomic Status ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Middle Class ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Elected Officials ◽  
Local Council ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Organizational Behaviour ◽  
Exploratory Investigation ◽  
Leadership Influence

Over a number of years, and with concerns as far apart as democratic theory and organizational behaviour, many commentators have studied the patterns of recruitment in local government and the contents of the job that elected officials take upon themselves. Most of these analyses have convincingly shown a tendency for political actors to possess a higher average socioeconomic status than the population from which they are drawn. One student is explicit in saying that ‘politics is a middle-class job and the training appropriate for middle-class jobs is also a training for politics’. What has not, however, been subject to such extended consideration is the question of differences among groups of legislators themselves. This Note attempts to restore the balance by reporting briefly on a limited and exploratory investigation of patterns of leadership/influence in one Scottish local council.

Institutions and attribution of responsibility outside the electoral context: a look at French semi-presidentialism

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathieu Turgeon ◽  
Éric Bélanger
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Institutional Arrangement ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Economic Conditions ◽  
Elected Officials ◽  
Political Responsibility ◽  
Attribution Of Responsibility ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Political Events

Some institutional arrangements may be undesirable for democracy by obscuring which political actors are to be held responsible for failed or successful policies and bad or good macroeconomic performances. Much of the work in the area has focused on whether institutions affect the ‘clarity of political responsibility’ and the ability of voters to punish or reward, in turn, governments and elected officials. Not much has been said, however, about the assignment of responsibility outside the electoral context, for a broad range of policy areas. This paper explores these questions in the context of French semi-presidentialism. It demonstrates that the French public is surprisingly quite responsive to the demands imposed by their political system by adjusting reasonably well their evaluations of both actors of the executive in light of major political events and changes in the economic conditions when the circumstances clearly indicate which of the two is ‘in charge’. At other times, however, this particular institutional arrangement obscures instead political responsibility.

Partisan agenda control in the US house: A theoretical exploration

2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 555-570 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffery A Jenkins ◽  
Nathan W Monroe
Keyword(s):  
Agenda Setting ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Voter Model ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Agenda Control ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Party Government ◽  
The Us ◽  
Median Voter Model ◽  
Party Members

While a number of scholars have focused on the importance of partisan agenda control in the US House, few have examined its uneven consequences within the majority party. In this paper, we explore ‘counterfactual’ utility distributions within the majority party, by comparing policy outcomes under a party-less median voter model to policy outcomes under party-based positive and negative agenda control models. We show that the distribution of policy losses and benefits resulting from agenda control are quite similar for both the positive and negative varieties. In both cases, moderate majority-party members are made worse off by the exercise of partisan agenda control, while those to the extreme side of the majority-party median benefit disproportionately. We also consider the benefit of agenda control for the party as a whole, by looking at the way changes in majority-party homogeneity affect the summed utility across members. Interestingly, we find that when the distance between the floor and majority-party medians decreases, the overall value of positive and negative agenda control diminishes. However, we also find support for the ‘conditional party government’ notion that, as majority-party members’ preferences become more similar, they have an increased incentive to grant agenda-setting power to their leaders.

scholarly journals Influence of Politics on Accountability of Health Professionals in Bangladesh: An Analysis of the Quality of Health Service Delivery

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-82
Author(s):  
Mohammad Shafiqul Islam
Keyword(s):  
Health Service ◽  
Service Delivery ◽  
Health System ◽  
Healthcare Delivery ◽  
Health Service Delivery ◽  
Elected Officials ◽  
Political Commitment ◽  
Healthcare Provision ◽  
Administrative Authority ◽  
Political Actors

This study explored the role and responsibility of elected officials including political actors and addressed the factors of politics, decentralisation, bureaucratic management, and political commitment to understanding accountability in health service delivery. This study used qualitative case studies for which a total of 68 in-depth interviews and five focus group discussions were conducted in two areas of rural and urban Bangladesh. The findings show that political actors have poor commitment to improving accountability and healthcare delivery. The elected officials are not interested in organising regular meetings and they are even reluctant to organise a health service committee to make health officials accountable. The opposition political parties have no participation in health service organisations as the existing political culture does not allow it. Moreover, elected officials have a limited administrative authority because of an inadequate decentralised health system that leads to poor accountability and inadequate healthcare delivery. Further, bureaucrats want to capture power and are unwilling to decentralise the health system. The policy recommendation includes the decentralisation of healthcare provision and increased participation of elected representatives in a decentralised system. Abbreviations: ADP – Annual Development Plan; MP – Member of Parliament; NGO – Non Government Organisation; UHC – Upazilia Health Complex; UP – Upazilia Parishad.

scholarly journals From Backwaters to Major Policymakers: Policy Polarization in the States, 1970–2014

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 416-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob M. Grumbach
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Public Policy ◽  
State Government ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Socioeconomic Outcomes ◽  
Party Control ◽  
State And Local ◽  
Policy Variation

Political scientists often characterize state and local governments as marginal and highly constrained in policymaking. However, I suggest that in recent decades state governments have moved from the margins to the center of partisan battles over the direction of U.S. public policy. Across 16 issue areas, I investigate interstate policy variation, policy differences across states, and policy polarization, the changing relationship between party control of state government and policy outcomes. Since the 1970s, interstate variation has increased such that an individual’s tax burden, right to obtain an abortion, and other relationships to government are increasingly determined by her state of residence. Policy polarization increases dramatically after 2000 in 14 of the 16 areas. I show that party control increasingly predicts socioeconomic outcomes in the polarized area of health care, but not in the nonpolarized area of criminal justice.

The Adoption of Web 2.0 by the State Government

2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Ahn ◽  
Michael Berardino
Keyword(s):  
Web 2.0 ◽  
State Government ◽  
New Technology ◽  
Political Stability ◽  
Political Support ◽  
Political Factors ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Approval Rating ◽  
The Government ◽  
High Level

The emergence of Web 2.0 introduced a new potential in e-government which empowers citizens to share information and mobilize spontaneously online, and enables citizens to communicate directly with the government and its elected officials while significantly lowering some of the traditional barriers of e-government adoption such as the lack of financial resources and technical expertise in government. This paper examined the pattern of Web 2.0 adoption on state web portals to identify key factors influencing its adoption. The results suggest that while the potential of the new technology is immense, its adoption is constrained by a number of political factors. In particular, the authors find that there is disinclination toward adopting Web 2.0 by incumbent governors while the technology was favored by governors who are newly elected into their office. Moreover, there was disinclination toward the new technology by governors with high approval rating while those with low approval rating sought to adopt them. Our findings point to a perception by governors about Web 2.0 as a powerful and effective instrument of communication but, at the same time, politically risky, creating disincentive to adopt the technology by governors with established political support. There is a “more to lose” mentality about Web 2.0 by political actors with high level of political support while “less to lose” by those with thin political support. This research sketches a picture of Web 2.0 adoption in government where political instability and newcomers facilitates the use of Web 2.0 increasing dialogue and communication with citizens while higher levels of political stability and support reduces the use of Web 2.0, diminishing the channel of communication created by the new technology.

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