Dov Gabbay and Franz Guenthner. Handbook of Philosophical Logic, vol. IV: Topics in the Philosophy of Language. In the series Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: Reidel. 1989. Pp. xii + 722. Hfl 395,-; £112.-; US$189.00 (hardcover).

Author(s):  
Brendan S. Gillon
Author(s):  
Peter van Inwagen

David Lewis has made extremely important and influential contributions to many topics in metaphysics, philosophical logic, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of probability, rational decision theory, and ethics and social philosophy. His work on counterfactuals and the philosophy of modality has been especially influential.


This is the ninth volume of Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. As with earlier volumes, these essays follow the tradition of providing a non-sectarian and non-partisan snapshot of the subdiscipline of philosophy of religion. This subdiscipline has become an increasingly important one within philosophy over the last century, and especially over the past half century, having emerged as an identifiable subfield with this timeframe along with other emerging subfields such as the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. This volume continues the initial intention behind the series of attracting the best work from the premier philosophers of religion, as well as including work by top philosophers outside this area when their work and interests intersect with issues in the philosophy of religion. This inclusive approach to the series provides an opportunity to mitigate some of the costs of greater specialization in our discipline, while at the same time inviting wider interest in the work being done in the philosophy of religion.


Bertrand Russell. My mental development. A reprint of IX 82(1). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 1–20; also third edition, Tudor Publishing Company, New York 1951, pp. 1-20; also paper-bound reprint of the third edition, Harper Torchbooks, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, Evanston, and London, 1963, Vol. I, pp. 1-20. - Hans Reichenbach. Bertrand Russell's logic. A reprint of IX 76(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 21–54; also ibid. 1951, pp. 21-54; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 21-54. - Morris Weitz. Analysis and the unity of Russell's philosophy. A reprint of IX 77(1). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 55–121; also ibid. 1951, pp. 55-121; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 55-121. - Kurt Göde. Russell's mathematical logic. A reprint of XI 75. The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 123–153; also ibid. 1951, pp. 123-153; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 123-153. - James Feibleman. A reply to Bertrand Russell's introduction to the second edition of The principles of mathematics. A reprint of IX 77(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 155–174; also ibid. 1951, pp. 155-174; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 155-174. - G.E. Moore. Russell's “theory of descriptions.” A reprint of IX 78(1). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 175–225; also ibid. 1951, pp. 175-225; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 175-225. - Max Black. Russell's philosophy of language. A reprint of IX 78(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 227–255; also ibid. 1951, pp. 227-255; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 227-255. - Philip P. Wiener. Method in Russell's work on Leibniz. A reprint of IX 82(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 257–276; also ibid. 1951, pp. 257-276; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 257-276. - Ernest Nagel. Russell's philosophy of science. A reprint of IX 79. The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 317–349; also ibid. 1951, pp. 317-349; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 317-349. - Andrew Paul Ushenko. Russell's critique of empiricism. A reprint of IX 80. The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 385–417; also ibid. 1951, pp. 385-417; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 385-417.

1969 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 495-496
Author(s):  
Ann S. Ferebee

Dialogue ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 679-685
Author(s):  
Myles Brand

It is difficult to understand why this volume is named New Essays in the Philosophy of Mind. Some of the essays are better classified as metaphysics, some as philosophy of science, and at least one as philosophy of language. But no matter, the name of the volume is unimportant: it is the contents that count. And the contents are very interesting. The general quality of the papers is high, higher than is often found in contemporary journals. The articles all share the methodological trait of being well-argued, and perhaps it is this trait more than anything else that unifies the volume. In what follows, I shall comment briefly on two articles on action theory, and then even more briefly on the remaining six papers.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-159 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kasia M. Jaszczolt

Abstract There is no doubt that pragmatic theory and philosophy of language are mutually relevant and intrinsically connected. The main question I address in this paper is how exactly they are interconnected in terms of (i) their respective objectives, (ii) explanans – explanandum relation, (iii) methods of enquiry, and (iv) drawing on associated disciplines. In the introductory part I attempt to bring some order into the diversity of use of such labels as philosophical logic, philosophical semantics, philosophical pragmatics, linguistic philosophy, or philosophy of linguistics, among others. In the following sections I focus on philosophical pragmatics as a branch of philosophy of language (pragmaticsPPL) and the trends and theories it gave rise to, discussing them against the background of methodology of science and in particular paradigms and paradigm shifts as identified in natural science. In the main part of the paper I address the following questions: How is pragmaticsPPL to be delimited?How do pragmatic solutions to questions about meaning fare vis-à-vis syntactic solutions? Is there a pattern emerging?and, relatedly,What are the future prospects for pragmaticsPPL in theories of natural language meaning? I conclude with a discussion of the relation between pragmaticsPPL and functionalism, observing that contextualism has to play a central role in functionalist pragmatics at the expense of minimalism and sententialism.


Author(s):  
Jan Wolenski

Twardowski, one of the most distinguished of Brentano’s students, became famous for his distinction between the content and object of presentations. Twardowski, after his appointment as a professor of philosophy at the University of Lwów (Lvov), considerably limited his own philosophical research for the sake of teaching activities. He set himself an ambitious task: to create a scientific philosophy in Poland. Twardowski fully realized his aim, giving the first step towards the so-called Lwów–Warsaw School, a group of philosophers working in analytic philosophy – in particular, logic, philosophy of science, and philosophy of language. In spite of his concentration on teaching, Twardowski also made remarkable contributions to philosophy after coming to Lwów.


Philosophy ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-151

Royal Institute of Philosophy BursariesThe Royal Institute of Philosophy proposes to make available annually four bursaries of £1,000 each, to be awarded to students who are already on courses of postgraduate study (e.g. MA, MPhil, PhD, DPhil, BPhil) in British Universities.The aim of the scheme is to assist students of promise and of proven postgraduate ability to continue or complete their courses of study or dissertations. Each Bursary will last for one year and will not be renewable, although successful candidates from one year will be able to re-apply for a second bursary in a succeeding year (to a maximum of two bursaries in toto).In order to apply, a candidate must submit a CV, a 1-2 page account of his or her future research and/or programme of study and the names of two academic referees from the institution at which he or she is currently studying. At the end of their tenure of a bursary, successful candidates will be expected to make a report to the Royal Institute of Philosophy on their academic progress.Candidates will not normally be called for interview. In making the awards, the Royal Institute of Philosophy will attempt to select one candidate annually from each of the following subdivisions of philosophy:1. Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Science2. Philosophical Logic, Philosophies of Mind and Language3. Moral and Political Philosophy4. Aesthetics, Philosophy of Religion, Law and History (These areas may be treated by reference to the History of Philosophy).The bursaries will run from the beginning to the end of the academic year and will begin in September 1998. Those who wish to apply for the 1998-99 awards should submit their applications by 1 May, 1998 to the Secretary, Royal Institute of Philosophy, 14, Gordon Square, London WC1H 0AG. Those applying will be notified of the decision of the Royal Institute of Philosophy in July, 1998.


Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Flage ◽  
Kenneth Pearce

George Berkeley (b. 1685–d. 1753) was an Irish philosopher best known for his defense of immaterialism, the thesis that perceived objects are only ideas and do not exist outside the minds that perceive them (in Berkeley’s famous phrase, their esse is percipi, i.e., their being is to be perceived). This thesis was defended in Berkeley’s two most famous works, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (PHK) and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (DHP). While Berkeley scholars have traditionally focused on the arguments in metaphysics and epistemology contained in these two books written in Berkeley’s youth, more recent scholarship has given more attention to other texts and topics, including Berkeley’s later works and his contributions to philosophy of language; philosophy of religion; philosophy of science; and social, political, and economic philosophy.


2014 ◽  
Vol 106 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Radder

The article consists of three main sections, in which I successively discuss the nature and role of realization, interpretation and abstraction in experimental and observational processes. In this way, these sections address several fundamental problems in philosophy of science, ontology and epistemology, and philosophy of language. Section 1 introduces the notion of realization processes, and argues that successful realization requires causal judgments. The second section discusses the role of conceptual interpretation in experiments and observations, explains how realization and interpretation can be distinguished, and emphasizes the significance of different types and ranges of experimental and observational reproducibility. It also includes a subsection on the issue of reproducibility in contemporary social sciences and psychology. Section 3 explains how concepts are abstracted from existing realization processes, and concludes that abstraction bestows a nonlocal meaning on these extensible concepts. In addition, I discuss and criticize some rival views of abstraction and concept meaning (to wit, mentalism and localism). The article concludes with some observations on the notion of a (cognitive) trinity.In my reply, I respond to the points raised in the six commentary papers. The following issues are addressed: the place of causality in physics (Steffen Ducheyne), perception in ordinary life (Monica Meijsing), the role of reproducibility in psychology and the social sciences (Daniël Lakens, Ruud Abma), the significance and implications of conceptual innovation (Lieven Decock), and the relationship between meaning, communication and ontology (Martin Stokhof and Michiel van Lambalgen).


Author(s):  
Stephen Grimm ◽  
Michael Hannon

Understanding is a kind of cognitive accomplishment, and the objects of understanding—from people, to languages, to scientific theories, to logical proofs—are strikingly varied. As this variety suggests, debates about the nature and value of understanding occur across philosophy. In the philosophy of science, understanding is typically taken to be one of the main goods at which scientific inquiry aims; it is therefore intimately related to issues concerning scientific explanation and to debates about what it is that makes scientific inquiry distinctive. In epistemology, the interest lies in characterizing what kind of cognitive accomplishment understanding is, exactly, and how (if at all) it differs from other cognitive accomplishments such as knowledge and wisdom. In the philosophy of language, a central concern is characterizing what is involved in understanding (or grasping) linguistic items like words, sentences, or languages as a whole; similar questions about what is involved in our understanding or grasp of concepts are crucial to the philosophy of mind. Debates in additional areas will be discussed in this article, but one overarching question is whether the sort of understanding we have of scientific theories, languages, people, and the like are similar in name alone or whether they share certain essential traits. For example, one common thought is that across all of these areas understanding involves the discernment of structure of some kind. It is also commonly thought that to achieve understanding this structure must not be discerned in just any old way, but that it must be “seen” or “grasped.” Just how to understand the metaphors of “seeing” and “grasping” has been a central issue in work on understanding across disciplines.


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