scholarly journals Kant's Liberalism: A Reply to Rolf George

Dialogue ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-210 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leslie Green
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Civil Liberties ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Liberal Tradition ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The Law

In his thoughtful paper, “The Liberal Tradition, Kant, and the Pox”, Rolf George joins the venerable argument about whether Kant should be accounted friend or foe of liberals. But this is not just a rehearsal of the debate over the compatibility of the Old Jacobin's defense of civil liberties and government by consent with his notoriously unpleasant doctrines of the absolute duty to obey the law or his ruthlessly retributive view of punishment. George advances the debate by suggesting that elements of Kant's moral theory are deeply incompatible with liberalism. And this is particularly striking when liberals like John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin and Robert Nozick are quick to invoke Kant's name in defense of their own views. The attraction of Kant for these modern (and American) liberals is clear, for they hold individualistic moral theories and they reject utilitarianism. But, if George is right, there are aspects of Kant's thought which make him an unsuitable mascot.

Contemporary Political Philosophy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Will Kymlicka
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Charles Taylor ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Liberal Egalitarianism ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
The Many ◽  
Michael Sandel

Contemporary Political Philosophy has been revised to include many of the most significant developments in Anglo-American political philosophy in the last eleven years, particularly the new debates on political liberalism, deliberative democracy, civic republicanism, nationalism, and cultural pluralism. The text now includes two new chapters on citizenship theory and multiculturalism, in addition to updated chapters on utilitarianism, liberal egalitarianism, libertarianism, socialism, communitarianism, and feminism. The many thinkers discussed include G. A. Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, William Galston, Carol Gilligan, R. M. Hare, Catherine Mackinnon, David Miller, Philippe Van Parijs, Susan Okin, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, John Roemer, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer, and Iris Young.

In What Sense must Socialism be Communitarian?

1989 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 51-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Miller
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Relationships ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Thought ◽  
Social Practices ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
The Social ◽  
Contemporary Liberalism ◽  
Liberal Thought

This paper stands at the confluence of two streams in contemporary political thought. One stream is composed of those critics of liberal political philosophy who are often described collectively as ‘communitarians’. What unites these critics (we shall later want to investigate how deep their collegiality goes) is a belief that contemporary liberalism rests on an impoverished and inadequate view of the human subject. Liberal political thought – as manifested, for instance, in the writings of John Rawls, Robert Nozick, and Ronald Dworkin – claims centrally to do justice to individuality: to specify the conditions under which distinct individuals, each with his own view about how life should be lived, can pursue these visions to the best of their ability. But, the critics claim, liberalism is blind to the social origins of individuality itself. A person comes by his identity through participating in social practices and through his affiliation to collectivities like family and nation. An adequate political philosophy must attend to the conditions under which people can develop the capacity for autonomy that liberals value. This, however, means abandoning familiar preoccupations of liberal thought – especially the centrality it gives to individual rights – and looking instead at how social relationships of the desired kind can be created and preserved. It means, in short, looking at communities – their nature and preconditions.

scholarly journals A CATEGORIA DO DIREITO NA ÓTICA DO AGIR COMUNICATIVO: UMA ARMADURA PARA O SENTIDO DA AÇÃO NOS LIMITES DA LINGUAGEM

2010 ◽  
Vol 29 (94) ◽  
pp. 221
Author(s):  
Delamar Dutra
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Communicative Rationality ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Forms Of Life ◽  
The Law ◽  
Philosophy Of Right ◽  
Ways Of Life

A racionalidade comunicativa implica num poder de questionamento infinito sobre todas as proposições, com o objetivo de chegar a um consenso, a um entendimento. Ela instaura um processo discursivo sem garantias, falível, implicando, também, na medida em que se desvincula de formas de vida tradicionais, apenas uma fraca força motivacional, não garantindo força a um agir motivado por ela, como era o caso da razão prática tradicional. Assim, estamos condenados a não poder sair da absoluta liberdade e indeterminação da linguagem e da argumentação e somos, por conseqüência, condenados a compreender a realidade a partir daquilo que aí é estatuído. O presente trabalho visa a demonstrar como, dentro desse contexto, o mundo vivido, as instituições e, principalmente, o direito têm a função de amortizar as instabilidades de tais formas de vida no que concerne à ação. Assim, descortina-se porque a moral comunicativa remete ao direito complementarmente e como, por outro lado, fornece uma explicação plausível enquanto filosofia do direito.Abstract: The communicative rationality implies a power of doubting all the propositions, aiming to obtain a consensus among the agents. It creates, however, a discursive process without any guaranty of being successful. Since this process is objenot related to traditional ways of life, it implies a weak motivational force, which does not offer the sufficient moral strength to action, as it was the case in traditional practical reason. We are left in the absolute freedom and the indetermination of language and argumentation. Consequently, we are left to understand the reality through language. This paper aims to demonstrate how the lebenswelt, the institutions and the law reduce the instabilities of that forms of life, concerning action. Then, the communicative moral theory can offer us a convincing explanation about the philosophy of right.

Welfare Rights in the Liberal Tradition

1990 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 10-11
Author(s):  
Thomas A. Horne
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Civil Liberties ◽  
Government Programs ◽  
The West ◽  
Welfare Rights ◽  
Liberal Tradition ◽  
Welfare Measures ◽  
The Relationship

It was hardly surprising that John Rawls' argument that a liberal political theory had to include a commitment to welfare rights was quickly countered by Robert Nozick's contention that welfare rights were incompatible with liberalism's devotion to freedom and private property. This controversy over the relationship between state funded welfare and liberty, especially the liberty to acquire property, has been and is still part of the politics of all advanced industrial nations, including America. As a matter of political fact, however, the welfare interpretation of liberalism has been triumphant. Government programs to alleviate suffering, to increase economic opportunities available to the poor, and to redistribute wealth go hand in hand with representation and civil liberties in virtually all of the advanced industrial nations of the West. That this has occurred, I want to argue here, is entirely consistent with the mainstream of the liberal tradition and ought to be presented that way to students.The distinction between classical or libertarian liberalism and welfare or the new liberalism emerged at the end of the nineteenth century in England. From the start this distinction was politically charged, meant to imply that the welfare measures enacted particularly during the second Gladstone administration represented a treasonous repudiation of the liberal tradition. Herbert Spencer's The Man Versus the State (1884), little read now but enormously influential then, was most important to spreading this view.

From the Nature of Persons to the Structure of Morality

2001 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 531-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Noggle
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Claim ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
True Nature ◽  
Human Motivation ◽  
Norman Daniels ◽  
Moral Theories

Intuitionism—in some form or another—is the most widely recognized and thoroughly discussed method of justification for moral theories. It rests on the claim that a moral theory must not deviate too much from our pre-theoretical moral convictions (or at least those that we are prepared to hold on reflection). In some form or another, this methodology goes back at least as far as Aristotle, and has been discussed, refined, and defended by such contemporary philosophers as John Rawls and Norman Daniels.There is, however, another methodology for constructing and defending moral theories. It draws on premises about human nature or the nature of persons to support conclusions about the nature and structure of morality. This method—which I will call the nature to morality methodology—evaluates a moral claim or moral theory on the basis of its relation to some (alleged) facts about the kind of beings we are. For brevity, I will use the term ‘nature-claims’ to refer to claims about human nature or the nature of persons, and the term ‘nature-facts’ to refer to true nature-claims. The nature-claims that have been used to support or criticize various moral theories include claims about human motivation, personal identity, the human soul, and the conceptual features of personhood or rational agency.

scholarly journals EPISTEMOLOGIA MORAL COERENTISTA EM RAWLS

2011 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denis Coitinho Silveira
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Decision Procedure ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Law Of Peoples ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
The Law

Meu principal objetivo neste artigo é analisar o problema da justificação moral para John Rawls a partir dos textos A Theory of Justice (TJ, IX, § 87), Political Liberalism (PL III, § 2), Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (JF I, § 9), The Law of Peoples (LoP I, § 1), “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics” (ODPE), “The Independence of Moral Theory” (IMT), “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical” (JFPnM). Minha intenção é a de caracterizar a teoria da justiça como equidade como um sistema coerentista de justificação que conta com uma epistemologia coerentista holística, uma teoria do contrato social que introduz uma ontologia social e uma estratégia pragmatista na teoria contratualista. No escopo deste trabalho, analisarei as características da epistemologia coerentista holística pressuposta e de como ela resolve os problemas de regresso epistêmico, dogmatismo, dualismo, assimetria e circularidade.

Concern, Respect, and Cooperation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Garrett Cullity
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Fundamental Principle ◽  
Simple Set ◽  
Collective Activity ◽  
Complexity Results ◽  
Concern For Others ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Moral Responsibilities

Three things often recognized as central to morality are concern for others’ welfare, respect for their self-expression, and cooperation in worthwhile collective activity. When philosophers have proposed theories of the substance of morality, they have typically looked to one of these three sources to provide a single, fundamental principle of morality—or they have tried to formulate a master-principle for morality that combines these three ideas in some way. This book views them instead as three independently important foundations of morality. It sets out a plural-foundation moral theory with affinities to that of W. D. Ross. There are major differences: the account of the foundations of morality differs from Ross’s, and there is a more elaborate explanation of how the rest of morality derives from them. However, the overall aim is similar. This is to illuminate the structure of morality by showing how its complex content is generated from a relatively simple set of underlying elements—the complexity results from the various ways in which one part of morality can derive from another, and the various ways in which the derived parts of morality can interact. Plural-foundation moral theories are sometimes criticized for having nothing helpful to say about cases in which their fundamental norms conflict. Responding to this, the book concludes with three detailed applications of the theory: to the questions surrounding paternalism, the use of others as means, and our moral responsibilities as consumers.

Taking Children’s Human Rights Seriously

2020 ◽  
pp. 48-69
Author(s):  
Michael Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Children's Rights ◽  
Popular Media ◽  
Children’S Rights ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Philosophical Discussion ◽  
Persuasive Argument ◽  
The Law ◽  
Deficit View

Despite the development of the children’s rights movement, human rights scholarship continues to overlook the rights of children. Even those like Ronald Dworkin, who proclaim the need to take rights seriously, are curiously silent, even ambivalent, when it comes to children. This inattention often forces advocates of children’s rights to the margins of human rights scholarship. In the few places where serious philosophical discussion of children’s rights does take place, the analysis intends to diminish the value of rights for children. These critics are not malevolent, and typically want what is best for children, but they do not think it can be accomplished through a children’s rights agenda. This chapter lays out a persuasive argument for a children’s rights agenda, or, for taking children’s rights seriously. Drawing from philosophy, history, literature, popular media, and of course the law, this chapter argues against the conventional deficit view underlying most arguments against the recognition of children’s rights and makes a case for the importance of children’s rights where rights are the currency in use.

scholarly journals Creation of Technical Conditions for Use or Infringement – The Meanders of the Warehouse Keeper’s Liability in Light of CJEU Judgment C-567/18 Coty Germany

2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 265-282
Author(s):  
Krystyna Szczepanowska-Kozłowska
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Literal Meaning ◽  
Property Right ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Property Law ◽  
Industrial Property ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The Law ◽  
Trademark Use

AbstractOne form of industrial property right infringement is stocking for the purpose of offering or marketing. This form of infringement appears both in EU legal acts on trademarks or designs, as well as in national regulations, including those concerning patents. What is specific to stocking when compared to other activities comprising the stipulated exclusivity of the holder of industrial property rights is the fact that the literal meaning of “stocking” does not explain whether the infringing party or the warehouse keeper is the entity that places the goods in storage. The structure of industrial property rights as absolute rights would theoretically permit the view that the law is violated by both the entity that accepts the goods for storage and the entity that places such goods in storage. To determine if there is an infringement, it must be established what the goods being stocked are further intended for. It is not without significance that the finding of an infringement of industrial property rights does not depend on fault or awareness. From the point of view of the industrial property law regime, it is difficult to find arguments against this understanding of infringement by stocking. Since the offeror of goods infringing industrial property rights may be held liable even if the goods have not yet been manufactured, it is conceivable that the entity accepting such goods for stocking is also liable. This interpretation of the concept of stocking would certainly correspond to the absolute nature of liability for infringement.In a recent judgment the CJEU confirmed that the warehouse keeper who, on behalf of a third party, stores goods which infringe trademark rights only creates the technical conditions for trademark use by this third party provided that the warehouse keeper is not aware of that infringement. The CJEU also confirmed that only the person who decides about the purpose of storing the goods can be treated as an infringer. However, the CJEU did not respond to the question regarding whether the warehouse keeper could be treated as an infringer if it pursues the aims of storing the goods at the request of the entity that put the goods into storage.

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