Energy Issues in the Context of the Regime Transition of Post-Soviet Eurasia: National and International Dimension

2010 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 325-336
Author(s):  
Anastassia Obydenkova

In political science, democracy is generally associated with high levels of economic development. However, some scholars note that this is true only as long as economic development is not based on possession of rich energy resources. Many resource-rich states are nondemocratic regimes. This is sometimes called the “resource curse.” This means that “natural resource abundance may stimulate rent-seeking behavior that, together with highly concentrated bureaucratic power, induces corruption in the economy and hence lowers the quality of institutions.” It also means that “resource wealth itself may harm a country's prospects for development” and that “oil and mineral wealth tends to make states less democratic.”

Author(s):  
Michael L. Ross

This article considers the debate over the “resource curse” (i.e., whether too much natural-resource wealth is harmful for developing countries) along with the debate about the mechanisms and conditions that likely generate the reported problems. After reviewing the literature on the resource curse, this article discusses the ways that scholars define “natural resources.” It then analyzes research on how resource wealth affects democracy, the quality of government institutions, and the incidence of violent conflict. It cites evidence showing that petroleum wealth, in particular, seems to have at least three harmful effects: to make authoritarian regimes more durable, to increase certain types of corruption, and to foster the onset of violent conflict in low- and middle-income countries, particularly when this form of mineral wealth is found in the territory of marginalized ethnic groups.


Author(s):  
Jędrzej George Frynas

Historically, a key purpose of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) has been to help manage and minimize a range of negative economic and political consequences of natural resource wealth, often lumped together as the “resource curse.” This chapter asks to what extent SWFs—specifically “resource funds”—can mitigate the resource curse. It discusses the available empirical evidence for the effectiveness of resource funds as well as the relationship between societal governance and the effectiveness of resource funds. The available findings suggest that wider societal governance is of significantly greater importance for tackling the resource curse than the existence of a resource fund. Bad governance in a country prevents even the most transparent and robust resource funds from becoming an effective policy instrument. Conversely, resource funds can be successful in countries with effective societal institutions such as sound fiscal rules, good quality of government budget documentation, free civil society and independent media.


1999 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-322 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael L. Ross

How does a state's natural resource wealth influence its economic development? For the past fifty years, versions of this question have been explored by both economists and political scientists. New research suggests that resource wealth tends to harm economic growth, yet there is little agreement on why this occurs. This article reviews a wide range of recent attempts in both economics and political science to explain the “resource curse.” It suggests that much has been learned about the economic problems of resource exporters but less is known about their political problems. The disparity between strong findings on economic matters and weak findings on political ones partly reflects the failure of political scientists to carefully test their own theories.


Author(s):  
Moises Arce ◽  
Adrian Siefkas

The bulk of the existing literature on the resource curse emphasizes the pervasive and negative outcomes that are typically associated with a country’s abundance of natural resources, such as poor governance, low levels of economic development, civil war, and dictatorship. The worldwide correlation between natural resource wealth and autocratic governance is well-known, and scholars have tried to explain this outcome in a variety of ways. One explanation is rentier state theory, which argues that resource wealth inhibits the growth of civil society because resource (oil) rents allow governments to relieve social pressures through a mix of low taxes and patronage spending. Oil rents thus undermine citizens’ motivation to mobilize, demand representation, or hold political leaders accountable. However, while much of the resource curse literature focuses on the adverse effects of oil wealth, oil makes up only one portion of extractive industries. A growing comparative political economy literature focuses on resource extraction (e.g., precious metals like gold and silver; base metals like copper; and energy resources like coal and uranium) and explains why it leads to conflict among local populations, corporations, and national governments. The extraction of these resources has the opposite effect of oil in that it tends to generate political activity as opposed to political apathy or quiescence. By political activity, we mean the different mobilizations and collective action strategies of challengers near the extractive frontier. While the literature treats this political activity as conflict, it is nonetheless distinct from the resource–civil war debate from the resource curse literature. Case studies and quantitative research support the observation that mineral wealth leads to conflict. The quantitative literature examines the variation of resource (mineral) conflicts cross-nationally and subnationally. Some studies have examined the relationship between mineral wealth and conflict; other studies have explored the relationship between geo-referenced extractive areas and conflict. Mineral extraction is different from oil extraction in terms of the labor intensity of extraction processes, the state ownership of the resource, and the amount of revenue each resource generates. Conflicts over mineral wealth can occur at different stages along the commodity chain: the point of resource access (e.g., when agricultural producers and extractive industries clash over land and water use), the extraction stage itself (e.g., when extractive industries are expanded), the processing and transportation of oil and minerals, and the waste management stage (e.g., the failure of tailing dams or oil pipelines). This comparative political economy literature has also begun to explore the consequences of conflicts, which can result in different political interactions between local communities and corporations, the extension of consultation rights as well as other participatory practices at the grassroots level.


Liquidity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 142-152
Author(s):  
Mukhaer Pakkanna

Political democracy should be equivalent to the economic development of the quality of democracy, economic democracy if not upright, even the owner of the ruling power and money, which is parallel to force global corporatocracy. Consequently, the economic oligarchy preservation reinforces control of production and distribution from upstream to downstream and power monopoly of the market. The implication, increasingly sharp economic disparities, exclusive owner of the money and power become fertile, and the end could jeopardize the harmony of the national economy. The loss of national economic identity that makes people feel lost the “pilot of the state”. What happens then is the autopilot state. Viewing unclear direction of the economy, the national economy should clarify the true figure.


2014 ◽  
pp. 88-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Syunyaev ◽  
L. Polishchuk

We study the impact of Russian regional governors’ rotation and their affiliation with private sector firms for the quality of investment climate in Russian regions. A theoretical model presented in the paper predicts that these factors taken together improve “endogenous” property rights under authoritarian regimes. This conclusion is confirmed empirically by using Russian regional data for 2002—2010; early in that period gubernatorial elections had been canceled and replaced by federal government’s appointments. This is an indication that under certain conditions government rotation is beneficial for economic development even when democracy is suppressed.


2007 ◽  
pp. 4-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Polterovich ◽  
V. Popov ◽  
A. Tonis

This paper compares various mechanisms of resource curse leading to a potentially inefficient use of resources; it is demonstrated that each of these mechanisms is associated with market imperfections and can be "corrected" with appropriate government policies. Empirical evidence seems to suggest that resource abundant countries have on average lower budget deficits and inflation, and higher foreign exchange reserves. Besides, lower domestic fuel prices that are typical for resource rich countries have a positive effect on long-term growth even though they are associated with losses resulting from higher energy consumption. On top of that resource abundance allows to reduce income inequalities. So, on the one hand, resource wealth turns out to be conducive to growth, especially in countries with strong institutions. However, on the other hand, resource abundance leads to corruption of institutions and to overvalued real exchange rates. On balance, there is no solid evidence that resource abundant countries grow more slowly than the others, but there is evidence that they grow more slowly than could have grown with the right policies and institutions.


2008 ◽  
pp. 120-132
Author(s):  
K. Arystanbekov

Kazakhstan’s economic policy in 1996-2007, its character and the degree of responsibility, the correlation between economic development and balance of current accounts are considered in the article. Special attention is paid to the analysis of their macroeconomic efficiency. It is concluded that in conditions of high rates of economic growth in Kazahkstan in 2000-2007 the net profits of foreign investors are 10-11% of GDP every year. The tendency of negative balance of current accounts in favor of foreign investors is also analyzed.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 652-661
Author(s):  
Sh.Ch. Soyan ◽  
V.K. Sevek ◽  
R.S. Taibyl

Subject. This article deals with the issues of determining the level of financial literacy of the population of the Tyva Republic. Objectives. The article aims to analyze the level of financial literacy of the population of the Tyva Republic and identify factors that cause the financial illiteracy rates. Methods. For the study, we used a questionnaire method within a sociological survey. Results. The article presents results of the sociological survey of respondents and highlights the main reasons for the financial illiteracy of the majority of the population of the Tyva Republic. Conclusions. The results obtained can be taken into account when developing the area's socio-economic development programmes improving the quality of life of the population.


Author(s):  
La Duc Minh ◽  
Nguyen Thi Hao ◽  
Vu Thi Thuy

Ethnic affairs play an important role in socio of ethnic groups’ solidarity, assurance of security and national defense stability. In -economic development, maintenanceorder to improve the quality of ethnic affairs, it is practical to carry out postgraduate training of officer implementing ethnic affairs using state budget with the aim of encouraging and enhancing officer quality to satisfy high-quality human resource in international integration.


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