The role of language in the dual process theory of thinking

2002 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
pp. 684-685
Author(s):  
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans ◽  
David E. Over
Keyword(s):  
Dual Process ◽  
Critical Feature ◽  
Domain Specific ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Psychological Evidence ◽  
System 2 ◽  
Explicit Representations ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Verbal Processes ◽  
System 1

Carruthers’proposals would seem to implicate language in what is known as System 2 thinking (explicit) rather than System 1 thinking (implicit) in contemporary dual process theories of thinking and reasoning. We provide outline description of these theories and show that while Carruthers’characterization of non-verbal processes as domain-specific identifies one critical feature of System 1 thinking, he appears to overlook the fact that much cognition of this type results from domain-general learning processes. We also review cognitive psychological evidence that shows that language and the explicit representations it supports are heavily involved in supporting System 1 thinking, but falls short of supporting his claim that it is the medium in which domain-general thinking occurs.

Freud's dual process theory and the place of the a-rational

2003 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 527-528 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda A. W. Brakel ◽  
Howard Shevrin
Keyword(s):  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Rational System ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
System 2 ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
System 1 ◽  
Evolutionary Fitness

In this commentary on Stanovich & West (S&W) we call attention to two points: (1) Freud's original dual process theory, which antedates others by some seventy-five years, deserves inclusion in any consideration of dual process theories. His concepts of primary and secondary processes (Systems 1 and 2, respectively) anticipate significant aspects of current dual process theories and provide an explanation for many of their characteristics. (2) System 1 is neither rational nor irrational, but instead a-rational. Nevertheless, both the a-rational System 1 and the rational System 2 can each have different roles in enhancing evolutionary fitness. Lastly, System 1 operations are incorrectly deemed “rational” whenever they increase evolutionary fitness.

scholarly journals Pre-Clerkship Medical Students’ Experiences and Perspectives of System 1 and System 2 Thinking: A Qualitative Study

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 34
Author(s):  
William Sanders ◽  
Douglas McHugh
Keyword(s):  
Medical Students ◽  
Qualitative Study ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Clinical Information ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Structured Interviews ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
System 2 ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
System 1

Dual-process theories may be invoked to explain how physicians interact with, interpret, and draw inferences from clinical information. Stanovich and West’s model articulates two kinds of thinking—intuitive-based System 1 and analytical-based System 2—which have been under-investigated with physicians in training. This qualitative study explored pre-clerkship medical students’ retrospective perspectives and experiences of System 1 and System 2 thinking via 12 semi-structured interviews and abductive, progressive focusing. Participants identified patient interactions, clinical note writing, knowledge synthesis, problem list and differential diagnosis generation, evaluating evidence, and critical appraisal of literature as pre-clerkship opportunities to engage in System 1 or System 2 thinking. Six major themes emerged from analysis of participants’ interview transcripts: cognitive processes, deliberate practice, learning environment: being alone or being together, stickiness factor, biases and heuristics, and prior experience of attaining competence. Participants valued the anticipated role that System 1 and System 2 thinking will play in their future practice, and experienced nascent, self-regulated development of these cognitive processes during the pre-clerkship phase of their education without formal feedback or coaching from clinician preceptors. Pre-clerkship curricula should further embrace low-stakes, incremental teaching on metacognition and continuous monitoring of knowledge processing as a key competency for physician learners.

Influence of Experience on the Thought Process of Clinical Psychologists: An Analysis from the Dual-Process Theories Framework

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana M. Nieto ◽  
María R. Villarejo
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Reasoning ◽  
Clinical Psychologists ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Two Systems ◽  
System 2 ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
System 1 ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
Different Levels

Abstract In the course of their work, psychologists must make judgments and complex decisions, skills that are part of clinical reasoning. Recent models approach the analysis of such process using the dual-process theories framework. This study provides an assessment of the two systems, System 1 and System 2, in forty-five clinical psychologists with different levels of experience (novices, intermediates and experts) with the purpose of exploring their level of activation and evolution throughout such stages of expertise. According to the results, clinical psychologists mainly activate System 2, M = 70.91, SD = 6.71, than System 1, M = 60.49, SD = 3.78; $ {F}_{\left(1,\kern0.5em 41\right)}=7.99;p<.01;{\upeta}^2=.163, $ when performing their clinical duties. However, no significant changes have been observed regarding the preferential use of thinking Systems 1 or 2 throughout the experience, both systems are used in a similar way in the different levels of expertise analyzed, with an increase of System 2 at the intermediate level of expertise. The results are analyzed in terms of intermediate effect and discussed focusing on the unremitting need for System 2 in psychologist work given the idiosyncratic characteristics of each case requiring treatment in the area of psychology and on the relationship of the two systems in clinical reasoning.

scholarly journals Argumentation, rationality, and psychology of reasoning

2015 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 135 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Godden
Keyword(s):  
Dual Process ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Psychology Of Reasoning ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
System 2 ◽  
The Common ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
The Relationship

This paper explicates an account of argumentative rationality by articulating the common, basic idea of its nature, and then identifying a collection of assumptions inherent in it. Argumentative rationality is then contrasted with dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality prevalent in the psychology of reasoning. It is argued that argumentative rationality properly corresponds only with system-2 reasoning in dual-process theories. This result challenges the prescriptive force of argumentative norms derives if they derive at all from their descriptive accuracy of our cognitive capacities. In response, I propose an activity-based account of reasoning which retains the assumptions of argumentative rationality while recontextualizing the relationship between reasoning as a justificatory activity and the psychological states and processes underlying that activity.

A Dynamic Dual Process Model of Intertemporal Choice

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adele Diederich ◽  
Wenjia Joyce Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Process Model ◽  
Intertemporal Choice ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Dual Process Model ◽  
Qualitative And Quantitative ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
System 1

Abstract Dual process theories of decision making describe choice as the result of an automatic System 1, which is quick to activate but behaves impulsively, and a deliberative System 2, which is slower to activate but makes decisions in a rational and controlled manner. However, most existent dual process theories are verbal descriptions and do not generate testable qualitative and quantitative predictions. In this paper, we describe a formalized dynamic dual process model framework of intertemporal choice that allows for precise, experimentally testable predictions regarding choice probability and response time distributions. The framework is based on two-stage stochastic process models to account for the two postulated systems and to capture the dynamics and uncertainty involved in decision making. Using quasi closed form solutions, we illustrate how different factors (timing of System 1, time constraint, and preferences in both systems), which are reflected in the model parameters, influence qualitative and quantitative model predictions. Furthermore, we show how an existing static-deterministic model on intertemporal choice can be implemented in the framework allowing for testable predictions. The proposed framework can bring novel insights into the processes underlying intertemporal choices.

scholarly journals Three levels of naturalistic knowledge

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Stephens
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Memory ◽  
Conceptual Knowledge ◽  
Procedural Knowledge ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Long Term Memory ◽  
Cognitive Ethology ◽  
System 2 ◽  
System 1 ◽  
Level Of Analysis

A recent naturalistic epistemological account suggests that there are three nested basic forms of knowledge: procedural knowledge-how, conceptual knowledge-what, and propositional knowledge-that. These three knowledge-forms are grounded in cognitive neuroscience and are mapped to procedural, semantic, and episodic long-term memory respectively. This article investigates and integrates the neuroscientifically grounded account with knowledge-accounts from cognitive ethology and cognitive psychology. It is found that procedural and semantic memory, on a neuroscientific level of analysis, matches an ethological reliabilist account. This formation also matches System 1 from dual process theory on a psychological level, whereas the addition of episodic memory, on the neuroscientific level of analysis, can account for System 2 on the psychological level. It is furthermore argued that semantic memory (conceptual knowledge-what) and the cognitive ability of categorization are linked to each other, and that they can be fruitfully modeled within a conceptual spaces framework.

scholarly journals The psychology of diagnostic error

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 91-98
Author(s):  
L. Zwaan
Keyword(s):  
Diagnostic Errors ◽  
Diagnostic Error ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Diagnostic Process ◽  
Cognitive Errors ◽  
System 2 ◽  
System 1 ◽  
Analytic Reasoning

Diagnostic errors in medicine occur frequently and the consequences for the patient can be severe. Cognitive errors as well as system related errors contribute to the occurrence of diagnostic error, but it is generally accepted that cognitive errors are the main contributor. The diagnostic reasoning process in medicine, is an understudied area of research. One reason is because of the complexity of the diagnostic process and therefore the difficulty to measure diagnostic errors and the causes of diagnostic error. In this paper, I discuss some of the complexities of the diagnostic process. I describe the dual-process theory, which defines two reasoning modes, 1. a fast, automatic and unconscious reasoning mode called system 1, and a slow and analytic reasoning mode called system 2. Furthermore, the main cognitive causes of diagnostic error are described.

scholarly journals Of two minds or one? A registered replication of Rydell et al. (2006)

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Heycke ◽  
Sarah Marie Gehrmann ◽  
Julia M. Haaf ◽  
Christoph Stahl
Keyword(s):  
Impression Formation ◽  
Evaluative Conditioning ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Target Person ◽  
Implicit Measures ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Reliability And Robustness ◽  
Selective Influence ◽  
Behavioral Information

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is proposed as a mechanism of automatic preference acquisition in dual-process theories of attitudes (Gawronski &amp; Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell &amp; McConnell, 2006). Evidence for the automaticity of EC comes from studies claiming EC effects for subliminally presented stimuli. An impression-formation study by Rydell and colleagues (2006) showed a selective influence of briefly presented primes on implicitly measured attitudes, whereas supraliminally presented behavioral information about the target person was reflected in explicit ratings. This finding is considered one of the strongest pieces of evidence for dual process theories (Sweldens, Corneille, &amp; Yzerbyt, 2014), and it is therefore crucial to assess its reliability and robustness. The present study presents two registered replications of the Rydell et al. (2006) study. In contrast to the original findings, the implicit measures did not reflect the valence of the subliminal primes in both studies.

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