scholarly journals Some problems with the lexical status of nondefault inflection

1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
pp. 1025-1025 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Indefrey
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Data ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Lexical Frequency ◽  
Lexical Status ◽  
Differential Effects

Clahsen's characterization of nondefault inflection as based exclusively on lexical entries does not capture the full range of empirical data on German inflection. In the verb system differential effects of lexical frequency seem to be input-related rather than affecting morphological production. In the noun system, the generalization properties of -n and -e plurals exceed mere analogy-based productivity.

A- and B-site doping effect on physicochemical properties of Sr2−xBaxMMoO6 (M = Mg, Mn, Fe) double perovskites — candidate anode materials for SOFCs

2016 ◽  
Vol 09 (04) ◽  
pp. 1641002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kun Zheng ◽  
Konrad Świerczek
Keyword(s):  
Physicochemical Properties ◽  
Solid Oxide Fuel Cells ◽  
Anode Materials ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Solid Oxide ◽  
Double Perovskites ◽  
Reducing Conditions ◽  
Redox Stability ◽  
Very High

In this work, we evaluate the physicochemical properties of Sr[Formula: see text]BaxMMoO6 (M [Formula: see text] Mg, Mn, Fe) double perovskites as alternative anode materials for solid oxide fuel cells, for which the effect of substitution of strontium by barium in a full range of compositions is studied. The crystal structure, microstructure, characterization of transport properties (electrical conductivity, Seebeck coefficient) and oxygen content as a function of temperature, as well as chemical stability in oxidizing and reducing conditions are discussed. Fe- and Mo-containing Sr[Formula: see text]BaxFeMoO6 oxides show very high total conductivities with values of 100–1000 S[Formula: see text][Formula: see text]cm[Formula: see text], while Sr[Formula: see text]BaxMgMoO6 present good redox stability.

scholarly journals Aristotelian Moral Psychology and the Situationist Challenge

2015 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 262-277
Author(s):  
Adam M. Croom
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Human Behavior ◽  
Empirical Data ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Personal Characteristics ◽  
Developmental Science ◽  
Psychological Studies

Abstract For some time now moral psychologists and philosophers have ganged up on Aristotelians, arguing that results from psychological studies on the role of character-based and situation-based influences on human behavior have convincingly shown that situations rather than personal characteristics determine human behavior. In the literature on moral psychology and philosophy this challenge is commonly called the “situationist challenge,” and as Prinz (2009) has previously explained, it has largely been based on results from four salient studies in social psychology, including the studies conducted by Hartshorne and May (1928), Milgram (1963), Isen and Levin (1972), and Darley and Batson (1973). The situationist challenge maintains that each of these studies seriously challenges the plausibility of virtuous personal characteristics by challenging the plausibility of personal characteristics more generally. In this article I undermine the situationist challenge against Aristotelian moral psychology by carefully considering major problems with the conclusions that situationists have drawn from the empirical data, and by further challenging the accuracy of their characterization of the Aristotelian view. In fact I show that when properly understood the Aristotelian view is not only consistent with empirical data from developmental science but can also offer important insights for integrating moral psychology with its biological roots in our natural and social life.

scholarly journals Bearing the Brunt of Structural Inequality: Ontological Labor in the Academy

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruthanne Crapo ◽  
Ann J Cahill ◽  
Melissa Jacquart
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Data ◽  
Thick Description ◽  
Structural Inequality ◽  
Marginalized Groups

Empirical data show that members of underrepresented and historically marginalized groups in academia undertake many forms of undervalued or unnoticed labor. While the data help to identify that this labor exists, they do not provide a thick description of what the experience is like, nor do they offer a framework for understanding the different kinds of invisible labor that are being undertaken. We identify and analyze a distinct, undervalued, and invisible labor that the data have left unnamed and unmeasured: ontological labor, the work required to manage one’s identity and body if either or both do not fit into academic structures, norms, and demands. We argue that ontological labor efforts should be understood as a form of labor. We then provide a characterization of ontological labor, detailing the labor as navigating one’s obligations to give and managing entitlements to take. We also highlight the ontological labor that takes place through instances of resistance, such as through complaint or refusals.

Ontology I: From Brain to World–Brain Relation

2018 ◽  
pp. 239-268
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Data ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Relational View ◽  
Time And Space ◽  
The World ◽  
Ontological Dimension ◽  
World Brain ◽  
Mental Properties ◽  
The Brain

How can we account for the brain’s existence and reality? I now shift my focus from the empirical (Part I and II) context in the previous chapters to the ontological dimension. Specifically, I focus on an “ontology of brain” as part of a wider “philosophy of brain” (Northoff 2004). Based on the empirical data, I argue that the brain’s existence and reality is based on structure and relation rather than elements like properties. This makes possible to determine the brain’s existence and reality by world-brain relation rather than physical or mental properties within the brain itself. That is well compatible with ontic structural realism (OSR). More specifically, the world-brain relation can be understood in spatiotemporal terms entailing what I describe as “spatiotemporal ontology”. Time and space are here no longer understood in observational terms, e.g., “observational time and space”, but rather as relational in the sense of OSR, i.e., “relational time and space”. Taken together, I ontologically characterize the brain by world-brain relation presupposing relation and structure as in OSR. This amounts to a “relational view” of the brain in our “ontology of brain”. Such relational view of the brain’s existence and reality can be specified by “relational time and space” (as I say) as distinguished from “observational time and space”. That opens the door for a novel ontological characterization of consciousness in the terms of world-brain relation and OSR – this shall be the focus in the next chapter.

Two myths of representational measurement

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-52
Author(s):  
Eran Tal
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Data ◽  
Qualitative Structure ◽  
Numerical Representations

Abstract Axiomatic measurement theories are commonly interpreted as claiming that, in order to quantify an empirical domain, the qualitative structure of data about that domain must be mapped to a numerical structure. Such mapping is supposed to be established independently, i.e., without presupposing that the domain can be quantified. This interpretation is based on two myths: that it is possible to independently infer the qualitative structure of objects from empirical data, and that the adequacy of numerical representations can only be justified by mapping such qualitative structures to numerical ones. I dispel the myths, and show that axiomatic measurement theories provide an inadequate characterization of the kind of evidence required to detect quantities.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document