Government Supply and Government Production Failure: A Framework Based on Contestability

1990 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aidan R. Vining ◽  
David L. Weimer

ABSTRACTA complete conceptual framework for policy analysis requires a theory of government supply and government production failure to complement the well-developed theory of market failure provided by welfare economics. Charles Wolf has made an important start by attempting to draw parallels between market failures and the manifestations of government supply failures. This article provides a more useful analytical framework for government supply failure in two important ways. First, it draws on several perspectives from the economics of organization to sketch both normative and positive theories of government supply. Second, it uses the positive theory of government supply behavior to make direct comparisons with the traditional market failures. It concludes with some implications of the framework for assessing the potential gains from privatization.

1990 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 9-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne O Krueger

By the 1970s and early 1980s, governments in most developing countries were mired down in economic policies that were manifestly unworkable. Whether market failures had been present or not, most knowledgeable observers concluded that there had been colossal government failures. In many countries, there could be little question but that government failure significantly outweighed market failure. This essay focuses on insights relating directly to government behavior affecting economic activity and economic growth in developing countries. It briefly examines each of the following questions: 1) What is “the government”? 2) What is the comparative advantage of government? 3) What are the dynamics of government intervention? 4) Can a positive theory of political behavior be formulated that will help explain when and how alternative policies will evolve in the political arena?


2021 ◽  
pp. 133-159
Author(s):  
Ángel Martín Oro

In this paper, we present a critical analysis of the standard market failure theory, one of the most important pillars of economic interventionism. This theory justifies state interference when markets do not produce so-called optimal outcomes; being based on two fundamental concepts of neoclassical welfare economics, namely, Pareto efficiency and perfect competition. The main criticism is directed at the theoretical framework in which is based on, through the contributions of the Austrian School of Economics. To accomplish that, after revising the basics of the market failure theory, we will put forward an alternative concept of efficiency, as well as questioning the suitability of the perfect competitive model. Next, we will reconsider theoretically the traditional market failures, that is, monopolies, public goods and externalities’ problems. This analysis is accompanied by historical cases that illustrate our criticism. Key words: Market failure, welfare economics, efficiency, imperfect competition, public goods, externalities. JEL codes: B53, D60, H00. Resumen: En este trabajo se realiza un análisis crítico de la teoría tradicional de los fallos del mercado, uno de los pilares más importantes del intervencionismo económico. Esta teoría vendría a justificar la interferencia estatal en los casos en que el mercado no produce resultados óptimos; estando apoyada en dos conceptos fundamentales en la economía del bienestar neoclásica: la eficiencia paretiana y el modelo de competencia perfecta. La principal crítica se realizará al marco teórico en el que se inserta, a partir de las aportaciones de la Escuela Austriaca de Economía. Para ello, tras describir a grandes rasgos la teoría de los fallos del mercado, expondremos un concepto alternativo de eficiencia, y nos cuestionaremos la validez teórica del modelo perfectamente competitivo. A continuación, reconsideraremos desde un punto de vista teórico los fallos del mercado tradicionales, esto es: monopolios, bienes públicos y externalidades. Este análisis se acompañará de casos históricos que ilustren y apoyen nuestra crítica. Palabras clave: Fallos del mercado, economía del bienestar, eficiencia, competencia imperfecta, bienes públicos, externalidades. Códigos JEL: B53, D60, H00.


1996 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian E. Dollery ◽  
Andrew C. Worthington

Conventional economic analysis of public policy has been traditionally conducted in the conceptual context of the theory of market failure. The resultant analytical framework enabled analysts to assess the economic efficiency of market outcomes, and prescribe appropriate government intervention where necessary. No corresponding theoretical structure existed to facilitate an equivalent investigation into the economic efficiency of nonmarket outcomes. However, quite distinct from public choice theory, a normative theory of government failure has emerged to form a conceptual analogue to the market failure paradigm. At present this embryonic theory of government failure has three strands: Wolf’s theory of nonmarket failure, Le Grand’s theory of government failure, and Vining and Weimer’s theory of government production failure. The present paper evaluates the extent to which this seminal literature can assist in the design of rational public policy processes.


2004 ◽  
pp. 94-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Shastitko

Various ways of state participation in the mechanisms of transaction management are considered in the article. Differences between compensation and elimination of the market failures are identified. Opportunities and risks of non-regulatory alternatives usage as a mean of market failure compensation are described. Based on classification of goods correlated to relative cost of their useful characteristics evaluation (search, experience, merit) questions of institutional alternatives in three areas (political, financial and commodity) are examined.


Author(s):  
Lubomira Radoilska

This chapter explores four kinds of skepticism about autonomy in general and its applicability to psychiatric ethics in particular. It is argued that although there are valuable lessons to be learnt from each of these skeptical challenges, their overall contribution is best understood in terms of friendly correctives to an autonomy-centered normative and conceptual framework instead of viable alternatives to it. The first four sections each provide a logical reconstruction of a distinct skeptical line of reasoning about autonomy and expand on its implications for psychiatric ethics: skepticism about personal autonomy; skepticism about autonomy as an agency concept; vulnerability-grounded skepticism about autonomy; and paternalism-friendly skepticism about autonomy. The fifth section identifies and explores the underlying presuppositions that motivate the previously discussed forms of skepticism about autonomy, and the sixth reflects on the significance of psychiatric ethics for rebutting skepticism about autonomy and developing a new, more promising positive theory.


Legal Theory ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
João Alberto de Oliveira Lima ◽  
Cristine Griffo ◽  
João Paulo A. Almeida ◽  
Giancarlo Guizzardi ◽  
Marcio Iorio Aranha

Abstract At the core of Hohfeld's contribution to legal theory is a conceptual framework for the analysis of the legal positions occupied by agents in intersubjective legal relations. Hohfeld presented a system of eight “fundamental” concepts relying on notions of opposition and correlation. Throughout the years, a number of authors have followed Hohfeld in applying the notion of opposition to analyze legal concepts. Many of these authors have accounted for Hohfeld's theory in direct analogy with the standard deontic hexagon. This paper reviews some of these accounts and extends them employing recent developments from opposition theory. In particular, we are able to extend application of opposition theory to an open conception of the law. We also account for the implications of abandoning the assumption of conflict-freedom and admitting seemingly conflicting legal positions. This enables a fuller analysis of Hohfeld's conceptual analytical framework. We also offer a novel analysis of Hohfeld's power positions.


Author(s):  
A. Y. Pluiko

The article analyses the manifestations of a market failure problem revealed during the economic crisis in the euro area, namely business cycles, market inability to ensure money circulation and avoid inflation. It is shown that the cyclicity of economic development has revealed in various degrees of economic contraction and different rates of its recovery. These differences have been exacerbated by the new procyclical factors emerged from the transition to a single currency. As for money circulation the crisis has almost no impact on the single currency functioning: the euro has maintained its position on the world market and properly performed money functions in the domestic. The goal to achieve economic development without inflation in the euro area generally has been solved successfully by the European Central Bank (ECB). However, due to the fact that the ECB in its monetary policy does not pay sufficient attention to the increased inflation in small and relatively poor countries, the crisis has been more acute in them than in large countries with low inflation. The goals of ensuring money circulation and avoiding inflation can be settled more effectively in the euro area in case of more tight coherence in economic policy and strengthening of supranational mechanisms of economic governance.


2021 ◽  
pp. 135581962110556
Author(s):  
Viola Burau ◽  
Ellen Kuhlmann ◽  
Loni Ledderer

Objective Good governance of integrated care is key to better health care, but we know little about how professions can help make this happen. Our aim is to introduce a conceptual framework to analyse how professions contribute to the governance of integrated care, and to apply the framework to a secondary analysis of selected case studies from Denmark. Methods We developed a framework, which identified the what, how and why of the contribution professions make to the governance of integrated care. We included five qualitative Danish studies, using coordination as an indicator of integrated care. We adopted a thematic approach in our analysis, combining deductive and inductive elements. Results Health professions engage in highly diverse activities, which fall into closely connected clusters of more formal or more informal coordination. Professions apply many different adaptive mechanisms at different levels to fit coordination into local contexts. Professions are driven by interlocking rationales, where a common focus on patients connects organizational and professional concerns. Conclusions Our analytical framework emerges as a useful tool for analysis. The contribution of professions to the governance of integrated care needs greater attention in health policy implementation as it can promote more effective governance of integrated care.


Author(s):  
Ayse Kok

This chapter presents various reasons for the insufficiency of externalities in terms of the inference of market failure with regard to the field cybersecurity policy, which is claimed to be necessary for government intervention. The main argument of this chapter is that cybersecurity market failures are much smaller than initially assumed, and as a result, more harm might be done by trying to correct them through naïve government regulation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 95-115
Author(s):  
Hervé Crès ◽  
Mich Tvede

An even more holistic approach to the problem is adopted by looking at how collective decision-making impacts the choices and characteristics of individual agents, e.g. their shareholdings, their beliefs about economic prospects, or even their preferences. The thesis is that individual characteristics shape collective choices and are at the same time shaped by them, forming a duality between persons and groups. The analysis is deployed on the network of affiliation of investors to firms. Indeed, suppose the Pareto principle holds at both the collective and individual levels, then a full agreement between all agents occurs within a cluster of investors and firms, despite potentially severe market failures—the ‘single thought’ theorem. Efficiency results from the endogeneity of individual characteristics, yet the theorem is strikingly strong and clear-cut. An analysis of what it takes for the Pareto principle to hold is proposed in each of the three contexts of market failure.


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