How bureaucratic leadership shapes policy outcomes: partisan politics and affluent citizens’ incomes in the American states

2018 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 305-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Berkowitz ◽  
George A. Krause
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Administrative Leadership ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Partisan Politics ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
American States ◽  
Policy Objectives ◽  
Executive Agency

AbstractWe maintain that political institutions’ policy objectives are best met under conditions when they are unified, and also when their administrative leadership is effective. We apply this argument to the understanding of how unified Democratic and Republican governments in the American states have influenced the incomes of affluent citizens. We find that affluent income gains occur under unified Republican state governments when compensation to executive agency heads is sufficiently high. These income gains are notable relative to both divided and unified partisan control of state governments. The evidence highlights the asymmetric role that bureaucratic leadership plays in attaining policy outcomes consistent with political institutions’ policy preferences, while underscoring the limits of electoral institutions to shape policy outcomes of their own accord. Efforts to lower the capacity of the administrative leadership constrain unified political institutions from converting their policy objectives into policy outcomes.

The Democratic and Republican Governors Associations and the Nationalization of American Party Politics, 1961–1968

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Anthony Sparacino
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
State Level ◽  
Partisan Politics ◽  
State Governments ◽  
National Party ◽  
Government Programs ◽  
Party Organizations ◽  
Party Building ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
American Party

Abstract This article examines the origins and early activities of the Democratic and Republican Governors Associations (DGA and RGA, respectively) from the RGA's initial founding in 1961 through the 1968 national nominating conventions. I argue that the formations of these organizations were key moments in the transition from a decentralized to a more integrated and nationally programmatic party system. The DGA and RGA represent gubernatorial concern for and engagement in the development of national party programs and the national party organizations. Governors formed these groups because of the increasing importance of national government programs on the affairs of state governments and the recognition on the part of governors that national partisan politics was having critical effects on electoral outcomes at the state level, through the reputations of the national parties. To varying extents, the governors used these organizations to promote the national parties and contributed to national party-building efforts and the development of national party brands.

The Future of the American States

1936 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Brooke Graves
Keyword(s):  
State Government ◽  
Central Government ◽  
University Of Pennsylvania ◽  
Federal System ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Columbia University ◽  
American States ◽  
The People ◽  
The Future ◽  
The University

In any consideration of the future of the states, it is desirable at the outset to recall the circumstances of their development and of their entry into the Union. When the present Constitution was framed and adopted, the states were more than a century and a half old. At that time, and for many years thereafter, it was the states to which the people gave their primary allegiance. Under the Articles of Confederation, the strength of the states was so great that the central government was unable to function; when the Constitution was framed, the people were still greatly concerned about “states' rights.” This priority of the states in the federal system continued through the nineteenth century, down to the period of the Civil War; in the closing decades of that century, state government sank into the depths in an orgy of graft and corruption and inefficiency, which resulted in a wave of state constitutional restrictions, particularly upon legislative powers.At this time, when the prestige and efficiency of the state governments were at their lowest ebb, there began to appear ringing indictments of the whole state system. Most conspicuous of these were the well known writings of Professors John W. Burgess, of Columbia University, and Simon N. Patten, of the University of Pennsylvania.

Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes, and Policy Outcomes in Mexico

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabrice Lehoucq ◽  
Gabriel L. Negretto ◽  
Francisco Javier Aparicio ◽  
Benito Nacif ◽  
Allyson Benton
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Policy Outcomes

The Political Dynamics of Bureaucratic Turnover

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 823-836 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl Dahlström ◽  
Mikael Holmgren
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Research Note ◽  
Political Control ◽  
The Political ◽  
Partisan Politics ◽  
Political Dynamics ◽  
Selection Strategies ◽  
Screening Strategies ◽  
Policy Objectives ◽  
Unique Dataset

This Research Note explores the political dynamics of bureaucratic turnover. It argues that changes in a government’s policy objectives can shift both political screening strategies and bureaucratic selection strategies, which produces turnover of agency personnel. To buttress this conjecture, it analyzes a unique dataset tracing the careers of all agency heads in the Swedish executive bureaucracy between 1960 and 2014. It shows that, despite serving on fixed terms and with constitutionally protected decision-making powers, Swedish agency heads are considerably more likely to leave their posts following partisan shifts in government. The note concludes that, even in institutional systems seemingly designed to insulate bureaucratic expertise from political control, partisan politics can shape the composition of agency personnel.

Divided Government and U.S.Trade Policy: Much Ado About Nothing?

2000 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 825-844 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Karol
Keyword(s):  
Trade Policy ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Divided Government ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Trade Policies ◽  
Trade Barriers ◽  
Party Affiliation ◽  
Consistent Effect ◽  
Much Ado About Nothing

Scholars assert that divided government impedes the liberalization of U.S. trade policy. They claim that presidents favor freer trade and will use the negotiating authority Congress delegates to them to reach agreements lowering trade barriers. Since presidents gain more support from their congressional co-partisans, less liberalization ensues under divided government. This theory rests on the premise that party is unrelated to congressional trade policy preferences beyond legislators' tendencies to support their presidential co-partisans. Yet before 1970 congressional Democrats were relatively free trading regardless of the president's party affiliation. Since then, the same has been true of Republicans. Divided government facilitates the trade policies of presidents from the protectionist party since they win more support from their “opposition” in this area. Divided government does impede the efforts of presidents from the free-trading party to liberalize. I conclude that divided government has no consistent effect on trade policy outcomes.

4. The Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policies

2020 ◽  
pp. 76-108
Author(s):  
Michael J. Hiscox
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rates ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
The Political ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
Political Analysis ◽  
Competing Demands ◽  
Domestic Sources ◽  
The Impact

This chapter examines the domestic sources of foreign economic policies. Different people in every society typically have different views about what their government should do when it comes to setting the policies that regulate international trade, immigration, investment, and exchange rates. These competing demands must be reconciled in some way by the political institutions that govern policy making. To really understand the domestic origins of foreign economic policies, we need to perform two critical tasks: identify or map the policy preferences of different groups in the domestic economy; and specify how political institutions determine the way these preferences are aggregated or converted into actual government decisions. The first task requires some economic analysis, while the second requires some political analysis. These two analytical steps put together like this, combining both economic and political analysis in tandem, are generally referred to as the political economy approach to the study of policy outcomes. The chapter then considers the impact of domestic politics on bargaining over economic issues between governments at the international level.

Who Does What Work in a Ministerial Office: Politically Appointed Staff and the Descriptive Representation of Women in Australian Political Offices, 1979–2010

2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 463-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marija Taflaga ◽  
Matthew Kerby
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Career Paths ◽  
Descriptive Representation ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Political Elites ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Systematic Data ◽  
Representation Of Women ◽  
Policy Work ◽  
First Time

Women are underrepresented within political institutions, which can (negatively) impact policy outcomes. We examine women’s descriptive representation as politically appointed staff within ministerial offices. Politically appointed staff are now institutionalised into the policy process, so who they are is important. To date, collecting systematic data on political staff has proved impossible. However, for the first time we demonstrate how to build a systematic data set of this previously unobservable population. We use Australian Ministerial Directories (telephone records) from 1979 to 2010 (a method that can notionally be replicated in advanced democratic jurisdictions), to examine political advising careers in a similar manner as elected political elites. We find that work in political offices is divided on gender lines: men undertake more policy work, begin and end their careers in higher status roles and experience greater career progression than women. We find evidence that this negatively impacts women’s representation and their later career paths into parliament.

Looking for Sex in All the Wrong Places: Press Coverage and the Electoral Fortunes of Gubernatorial Candidates

2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 519-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda L. Fowler ◽  
Jennifer L. Lawless
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Media Coverage ◽  
The Political ◽  
Press Coverage ◽  
Media Content ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Major Party ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Female Candidates ◽  
Baseline Effect

Although female candidates have achieved parity on some dimensions, political institutions remain deeply gendered in how they structure the parameters of electoral competition. We rely on a new data set of gubernatorial races from the 1990s to address the theoretical and empirical challenges created by the interaction of gender, media content, and electoral institutions. Based on an analysis of 1,365 newspaper articles for 27 contests in which a woman held a major party nomination, we uncover evidence of continuing bias in media coverage. Yet significant coefficients on candidate sex tell only part of the story. Gendered contextual factors linked to the contest and state in which candidates compete, as well as the newspapers that cover their races, also affect women's experiences on the campaign trail. The major finding, however, is the presence of a powerful baseline effect favoring male candidates that is deeply embedded in U.S. politics. All else equal, women gubernatorial candidates suffer a substantial vote deficit that results from non-observable influences. The results support the emerging consensus among feminist theorists that greater focus on the political context is likely to produce bigger scholarly payoffs than is continued attention to observable differences between male and female candidates.

scholarly journals Insider–outsider representation and social democratic labor market policy

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reto Bürgisser ◽  
Thomas Kurer
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Partisan Politics ◽  
Market Reforms ◽  
Labor Market Policy ◽  
Specific Content ◽  
Social Democratic ◽  
Market Policy ◽  
Labor Market Reforms

AbstractPostindustrialization and occupational change considerably complicate partisan politics of the welfare state. This article asks about the determinants of contemporary social democratic labor market policy. We argue that the composition of their support base is a critical constraint and empirically demonstrate that the actual electoral clout of different voter segments decisively affects policy outcomes under left government. We calculate the electoral relevance of two crucial subgroups of the social democratic coalition, labor market insiders and outsiders, in 19 European democracies and combine these indicators with original data capturing the specific content of labor market reforms. The analysis reveals considerable levels of responsiveness and demonstrates that relative electoral relevance is consistently related to policy outcomes. Social democratic governments with a stronger support base among the atypically employed push labor market reforms on their behalf—and vice versa. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of policy-making in postindustrial societies.

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