God and the EU: Faith in the European Project Edited by Jonathan Chaplin and Gary Wilton Routledge, Abingdon, 2016, xvi + 290 pp (hardback £90) ISBN: 978-1-1389-0863-5 - Christian Churches in European Integration Sergei A Mudrov Routledge, Abingdon, 2016, 192 pp (hardback £95) ISBN: 978-1-4724-7481-0

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 246-248
Author(s):  
Christopher Hill
Author(s):  
Catherine E. De Vries

Public contestation regarding European integration is becoming increasingly important for the future of the European project. While traditionally European Union (EU) scholars deemed public opinion of minor importance for the process of European integration, public support and scepticism is now seen as crucial for the survival of the European project. One important reason for this change in perspective is the increasing politicization of the EU in domestic politics. In recent years, a burgeoning literature on public contestation concerning European integration has developed. Students of public opinion in the EU have primarily focused their attention on the explanations of fluctuations in support and scepticism. This work stresses both interest- and identity-based explanations showing that support for European integration increases with skill levels and more inclusive identities. Less attention has been given to the conceptualization of the precise nature of public opinion and its role in EU politics. When it comes to the politicization of European integration and its effects on public opinion, many scholarly contributions have aimed to explore the conditions under which EU attitudes affect voting behavior in elections and referendums. Yet, the way in which public opinion affects policy making and responsiveness at the EU level has received much less scholarly attention. This suggests that more work needs to be undertaken to understand the conditions under which public contestation of the EU constrains the room to maneuver of domestic and European elites at the EU level, and the extent to which it poses a challenge to, or opportunity for, further integrative steps in Europe. Only by gaining a better understanding about the ways public opinion limits the actions of domestic and European elites or not at the EU level, will scholars be able to make predictions about how public opinion might affect the future of the European project.


Author(s):  
Marlene Wind

Doomsdays preachers suggested that Brexit and Trump would mean the end of the liberal world order as we know it and thus the end of the EU. The research presented here suggests the opposite. Not only have Europeans turned their back to populism by voting yes to reforms and pro-EU-parties and governments in different member states over the past months, but Brexit and Trump also seems to have given a complete new momentum to the European project. This chapter demonstrates why Brexit cannot be generalized to the rest of the continent but is the result of a complicated and special British conception of what it means to be a sovereign state in the twenty-first century. Moreover, and paradoxically, surveys show that the greatest fear among Europeans today is not more European integration but right wing populism and European disunion.


Jus Cogens ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Massimo Fichera

AbstractThe question addressed by this article is whether a form of constituent power exists at the EU level. It is argued that European integration has not suppressed the idea of people as constituent power. Instead, the idea of ‘people’ has been constructed through the discourses of security and rights. Ever since the early stages of European integration, the security and rights discourses have consisted in the articulation of a meta-constitutional rationale, which is here called the ‘security of the European project’, i.e. a form of political morality that is pursued by the EU as a polity over time and aims at its own survival. Security and rights discourses have contributed to constructing two ideas of ‘people-as-constituent-power’. The first idea is that of ‘mobile people’, i.e. people exercising EU free movement rights. The second idea is that of ‘peoples’ in the plural, conceived as States and citizens at the same time. Nevertheless, these discourses are characterised by a certain degree of ambiguity and have been unrolling as if the development of the EU polity was a mere technical, neutral matter. This state of affairs cannot continue: the European project has always been a political project, and, as integration reaches its more advanced stages, the time has come to disclose its political nature and address conflict openly.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 20-36
Author(s):  
Joshua Chung

  The European project was founded on the advancement of liberal democracy where the rule of law and respect for human rights have a central place. In a period of ‘instability’ in the Union where organisational changes to national judiciaries have raised fears over rule of law backsliding amongMember States threatening the functioning of the EU’s legal order, the main aim of this article is to explore the operationalisation of the rule of law as a founding value of the EU and its connection to European integration. To demonstrate that there is a developing jurisprudence in the EU legal order towards increased justiciability ofthe rule oflaw. The article in part 2 examines the proposition that the operationalisation of the rule of law and European integration is linked to a substantive rights based conception of the rule of law as a basis for the jurisprudential shift. Part 3 looks at the normative arguments for protecting the rule of law in the EU. Finally, Part 4 analyses the operationalisation of the rule of law in the jurisprudence of the CJEU, in which it is argued there is three lines of argumentation for the operationalisation of the rule of law in the case law of the CJEU.


2021 ◽  
pp. 211-225
Author(s):  
Nathalie Tocci

In his In Defence of Europe, Loukas Tsoukalis posits that globalization and European integration are two sides of the same coin. Both are premised on the gains in peace and prosperity to be reaped by openness and interdependence. Hence, the twin crises of globalization and European integration are not merely closely intertwined; their fundamentally similar natures mean the latter has been unable to control the excesses of the former. Moreover, the European project has been undergirded by an international liberal order resting on US hegemony. As that order has started to crack, with the USA unable and unwilling to sustain the system that it was decisive in establishing, and other global powers challenging its core norms, the EU’s vulnerabilities are coming to the fore. For decades, the EU has pursued its internal and international policies insulated from geopolitical encroachments. Today, Europeans find themselves exposed to the vulnerabilities of asymmetric interdependence, lacking not the capabilities but rather the psychological predisposition and political willingness to act together. Appreciating this predicament, several European leaders have called for European sovereignty, power, and autonomy. Underpinning these slogans is the recognition that if Europeans are to stand up to Trump, Putin, and Xi, and manage the epochal challenges stemming from demography, climate change, and the digital age, they can only do so together. This chapter concludes by outlining what European sovereignty and autonomy may mean, notably in the economic, digital, and defence fields, and why meeting the challenge of autonomy is existential for the European project.


Author(s):  
Baldur Thorhallsson

Iceland’s European policy is a puzzle. Iceland is deeply embedded in the European project despite its non-EU membership status. Iceland is a member of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) (1970), the European Economic Area (EEA) (1994), and Schengen (2001). Moreover, Iceland applied for membership in the European Union (EU) in 2009. Nonetheless, the Icelandic political elite have been reluctant to partake in the European integration process. They have hesitated to take any moves toward closer engagement with Europe unless such a move is seen as necessary to deal with a crisis situation. Decisions to engage with the European project have not been made based on outright economic and political preferences. They have primarily been based on economic or political necessity at times when the country has faced a deep economic downturn or its close neighboring states have decided to take part in European integration. The country has essentially been forced to take part in the project in order to prevent crises from emerging or to cope with a current crisis situation. For instance, in 2009, Iceland unexpectedly applied for membership in the EU after the collapse of its economy nine months earlier. However, four years later, after a swift economic recovery and after Iceland having been “betrayed” by the EU in the so-called Ice-save dispute with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the accession process was put on hold. The EU was no longer seen as an economic and political savior. Iceland’s close relationships with its powerful neighboring states, the United States and the United Kingdom, have also had considerable influence on the country’s European policy. Iceland’s membership in the EFTA, the EEA, and Schengen was largely dictated by the Nordic states’ decisions to join the organizations and because of crisis situations their lack of membership would have meant for Iceland were it to be left out. Moreover, the decision by the United Kingdom to leave the Union has firmly frozen Iceland’s accession process and contributed to increased criticism of the transfer of autonomy from Reykjavik to Brussels that takes place with the EEA Agreement. Furthermore, many at the right of center in Icelandic politics do not see any security reasons for joining the EU, as Iceland’s defense is guaranteed by a bilateral defense treaty with the United States and membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). European debates about partial and full participation in the European project have led to harsh opposition in Althingi (the National Parliament), deep divisions in society at large, and public protests. Opposition has been driven by an overwhelming focus on sovereignty concerns. The political discourse on sovereignty and self-determination prevails except when the country is faced with a crisis situation. To prevent a crisis from emerging or to deal with a current crisis, Icelandic politicians reluctantly decide to take partial part in the European project. They are determined to keep autonomy over sectors of primary political importance, sectors that are close to the heart of the nation, those of agriculture and fisheries.


Author(s):  
Johann P. Arnason

Different understandings of European integration, its background and present problems are represented in this book, but they share an emphasis on historical processes, geopolitical dynamics and regional diversity. The introduction surveys approaches to the question of European continuities and discontinuities, before going on to an overview of chapters. The following three contributions deal with long-term perspectives, including the question of Europe as a civilisational entity, the civilisational crisis of the twentieth century, marked by wars and totalitarian regimes, and a comparison of the European Union with the Habsburg Empire, with particular emphasis on similar crisis symptoms. The next three chapters discuss various aspects and contexts of the present crisis. Reflections on the Brexit controversy throw light on a longer history of intra-Union rivalry, enduring disputes and changing external conditions. An analysis of efforts to strengthen the EU’s legal and constitutional framework, and of resistances to them, highlights the unfinished agenda of integration. A closer look at the much-disputed Islamic presence in Europe suggests that an interdependent radicalization of Islamism and the European extreme right is a major factor in current political developments. Three concluding chapters adopt specific regional perspectives. Central and Eastern European countries, especially Poland, are following a path that leads to conflicts with dominant orientations of the EU, but this also raises questions about Europe’s future. The record of Scandinavian policies in relation to Europe exemplifies more general problems faced by peripheral regions. Finally, growing dissonances and divergences within the EU may strengthen the case for Eurasian perspectives.


2020 ◽  
pp. 102-105
Author(s):  
A. A. Prykhodko

The article analyzes the theoretical and practical aspects of the anti-corruption policy of Ukraine in the context of European integration. Considered that corruption has long been perceived in the EU as a negative phenomenon requiring systematic, strategic and concerted action of a transboundary and transnational character and, in general, a threat to the rule of law. The author concluded that Ukraine will continue to be perceived by a third world country as long as anti-corruption measures are duplicated from one strategic document to another. The anti-corruption strategy of Ukraine should be an early, strategic and systematic tool for the eradication of corruption and the formation of public justice in the context of zero tolerance for such phenomena. Now this is a set of normatively fixed declarative slogans that are consistent with international standards, but are not achievable in practical terms due to the lack of state strategic planning in advance. The new anti-corruption strategy must necessarily include a broad interpretation of all the concepts used in it, including the term “anti-corruption policy”. Taking into account the recommendations of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly, the author’s vision of the term “anti-corruption policy” has been formed, as a set of principles, tasks, goals and principles of implementation of law-making and law-enforcement activity of public administration within the protection of human and civil rights and freedoms a state implemented by a system of methods, means and measures to combat corruption in priority areas and in accordance with anti-corruption standards and on the basis of transnational national and cross-border cooperation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-37
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Kustra-Rogatka

Summary The paper deals with the changes in the centralized (Kelsenian) model of constitutional review resulting from a state’s membership of the EU, which unequivocally demonstrates the decomposition of the classic paradigm of constitutional judiciary. The main point raised in the paper is that European integration has fundamentally influenced on the four above-mentioned basic elements of the Kelsenian model of constitutional review of legislation, which are the following: the assumption of the hierarchical construction of a legal system; the assumption of the supreme legal force of the constitution as the primary normative act of a given system; a centralised model of reviewing hierarchical conformity of legal norms; coherence of the system guaranteed by a constitutional court’s power to declare defectiveness of a norm and the latter’s derogation. All its fundamental elements have evolved, i.e. the hierarchy of the legal system, the overriding power of the constitution, centralized control of constitutionality, and the erga omnes effect of the ruling on the hierarchical non-conformity of the norms. It should be noted that over the last decade the dynamics of these changes have definitely gained momentum. This has been influenced by several factors, including the “great accession” of 2004, the pursuit of formal constitutionalization of the EU through the Constitutional Treaty, the compromise solutions adopted in the Treaty of Lisbon, the entry into force of the Charter, and the prospect of EU accession to the ECHR. The CJEU has used these factors to deepen the tendencies towards decentralization of constitutional control, by atomising national judicial systems and relativizing the effects of constitutional court rulings within national legal systems. The end result is the observed phenomenon, if not of marginalisation, then at least of a systemic shift in the position of constitutional courts, which have lost their uniqueness and have become “only ones of many” national courts.


Author(s):  
Natalia Popova

The concept of Europeanization has become quite fashionable in EU studies in recent years. It is often used for the analysis of the relations between the EU and non-member states. The aim of the article is to examine the possibilities of its application in explaining the relationship between the EU and Ukraine. The structure of the article is as follows: firstly, the concept of Europeanization is defined considering such two disputable issues as distinguishing among concepts of Europeanization and European integration as well as Europeanization and EU-ization. Next, the evolution of the theoretical research of Europeanization and definition of this concept are analyzed. Two main mechanisms of Europeanization (conditionality and socialization) are examined. The author considers main approaches to the analysis of the "external" Europeanization emphasizing the concept of "external governance". Three groups of factors which influence the effectiveness of Europeanization are briefly analyzed. And finally, the peculiarities of application of the Europeanization concept to the Ukraine-EU relations are outlined. Keywords: EU, Ukraine, Europeanization, EU-ization, ‘external’ Europeanization, conditionality, socialization, concept of ‘external governance’


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