scholarly journals Creativity and security as a cultural recipe for entrepreneurship

Author(s):  
Tomasz Mickiewicz ◽  
Anneli Kaasa

Abstract We posit that societal cultural values of creativity and security are associated with the likelihood that a person will engage in a business start-up. Creativity supports the opportunity identification and security the opportunity exploitation aspects of entrepreneurship. In contrast, both emphasis on performance and acceptance of risk-taking may not play the role that is typically assumed. To verify our hypotheses we construct a multilevel dataset, combining Global Entrepreneurship Monitor individual-level data with country-level data from the World Values Survey. We use a multilevel logit model to address the hierarchical structure of our data. We found that odds of start-up engagement are higher if people in a society value security, yet also appreciate thinking up new ideas and being creative. Our results support McCloskey's distinction between aristocratic and bourgeois values, and John and Storr's proposition that different cultural traits support different aspects of entrepreneurship.

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 237802312110313
Author(s):  
Landon Schnabel

This study proposes and explores a new fertility determinant: societal secularism. Using country-level data from multiple sources ( n = 181) and multilevel data from 58 countries in the World Values Survey ( n = 83,301), the author documents a strong negative relationship between societal secularism and both country-level fertility rates and individual-level fertility behavior. Secularism, even in small amounts, is associated with population stagnation or even decline absent substantial immigration, whereas highly religious countries have higher fertility rates that promote population growth. This country-level pattern is driven by more than aggregate lower fertility of secular individuals. In fact, societal secularism is a better predictor of highly religious individuals’ fertility behavior than that of secular individuals, and this pattern is largely a function of cultural values related to gender, reproduction, and autonomy in secular societies. Beyond their importance for the religious composition of the world population, the patterns presented in this study are relevant to key fertility theories and could help account for below-replacement fertility.


Author(s):  
Horst Feldmann

AbstractUsing data on 48 countries, this paper finds that people in economically freer countries care more about education. This is probably mainly because economic freedom enables them and their children to achieve higher returns to education. The magnitude of the estimated effect is substantial. The paper combines individual-level data from the World Values Survey with country-level data on economic freedom and other relevant factors. It controls for all relevant characteristics of survey respondents as well as for potentially confounding country-level characteristics. It also addresses potential endogeneity of economic freedom.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Landon Schnabel

This study proposes and explores a new fertility determinant: societal secularism. Using country-level data from multiple sources (N=181) and multilevel data from 58 countries in the World Values Survey (N=83,301), I document a strong negative relationship between societal secularism and both country-level fertility rates and individual-level fertility behavior. Secularism, even in small amounts, is associated with population stagnation or even decline, whereas highly religious countries have higher fertility rates that promote population growth. This country-level pattern is driven by more than aggregate lower fertility of secular individuals. In fact, societal secularism is a better predictor of highly religious individuals’ fertility behavior than that of secular individuals, and this pattern is largely a function of cultural values related to gender, reproduction, and autonomy in secular societies. Beyond their importance for the religious composition of the world population, the patterns presented in this study are relevant to key fertility theories and could help account for below-replacement fertility.


Author(s):  
Shuai Li ◽  
Xinyang Hua

AbstractSeveral ecological studies of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) have reported correlations between group-level aggregated exposures and COVID-19 outcomes. While some studies might be helpful in generating new hypotheses related to COVID-19, results of such type of studies should be interpreted with cautions. To illustrate how ecological studies and results could be biased, we conducted an ecological study of COVID-19 outcomes and the distance to Brussels using European country-level data. We found that, the distance was negatively correlated with COVID-19 outcomes; every 100 km away from Brussels was associated with approximately 6% to 17% reductions (all P<0.01) in COVID-19 cases and deaths in Europe. Without cautions, such results could be interpreted as the closer to the Europe Union headquarters, the higher risk of COVID-19 in Europe. However, these results are more likely to reflect the differences in the timing of and the responding to the outbreak, etc. between European countries, rather than the ‘effect’ of the distance to Brussels itself. Associations observed at the group level have limitations to reflect individual-level associations – the so-called ecological fallacy. Given the public concern over COVID-19, ecological studies should be conducted and interpreted with great cautions, in case the results would be mistakenly understood.


Author(s):  
Martin Vinæs Larsen

AbstractDoes the importance of the economy change during a government's time in office? Governments arguably become more responsible for current economic conditions as their tenure progresses. This might lead voters to hold experienced governments more accountable for economic conditions. However, voters also accumulate information about governments' competence over time. If voters are Bayesian learners, then this growing stock of information should crowd out the importance of current economic conditions. This article explores these divergent predictions about the relationship between tenure and the economic vote using three datasets. First, using country-level data from a diverse set of elections, the study finds that support for more experienced governments is less dependent on economic growth. Secondly, using individual-level data from sixty election surveys covering ten countries, the article shows that voters' perceptions of the economy have a greater impact on government support when the government is inexperienced. Finally, the article examines a municipal reform in Denmark that assigned some voters to new local incumbents and finds that these voters responded more strongly to the local economy. In conclusion, all three studies point in the same direction: economic voting decreases with time in office.


2017 ◽  
Vol 57 (6) ◽  
pp. 1150-1190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saurav Pathak ◽  
Etayankara Muralidharan

This article explores the extent to which income inequality and income mobility—both considered indicators of economic inequality and conditions of formal regulatory institutions (government activism)—facilitate or constrain the emergence of social entrepreneurship. Using 77,983 individual-level responses obtained from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) survey of 26 countries, and supplementing with country-level data obtained from the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum, our results from multilevel analyses demonstrate that country-level income inequality increases the likelihood of individual-level engagement in social entrepreneurship, while income mobility decreases this likelihood. Further, income mobility negatively moderates the influence of income inequality on social entrepreneurship, such that the condition of low income mobility and high income inequality is a stronger predictor of social entrepreneurship. We discuss implications and limitations of our study, and we suggest avenues for future research.


2018 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 301-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maksim Rudnev ◽  
Aleksandra Savelkaeva

This article takes a postmodernization perspective on support for the right to euthanasia by treating it as an expression of a process of value change, as a preference for quality over quantity of life. Using the data from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey, this study attempts to answer the question of whether the mass support for the right to euthanasia is an expression of autonomy values rather than just a function of a low religiosity. Multilevel regressions demonstrate that both traditional religiosity and autonomy values have a high impact at the individual level, while at the country level only the effects of traditional religiosity are significant. Autonomy values have stronger association with attitudes to euthanasia in countries with higher levels of postmaterialism. Multilevel path analysis demonstrates that the effect of religiosity is partially and weakly mediated by the values of autonomy at both levels. Although religiosity was found to have a much stronger impact, the independent effect of autonomy values suggests that mass support for the right to euthanasia is a value-driven preference for quality over quantity of life. We conclude by suggesting that the fall in traditional religiosity might emphasize the role of values in moral attitudes regulation.


2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 319-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christel Kesler ◽  
Irene Bloemraad

Abstract. This article is an attempt to qualify existing evidence that increasing diversity is detrimental to a vibrant civil society. We focus specifically on immigration-generated diversity, and argue that while it may have negative effects on some specific civic and political outcomes in some contexts, these effects vary widely across advanced democracies. Our argument rests on analysis of a cross-national, cross-sectional time-series dataset that brings together individual-level World Values Survey data with country-level variables. With these data, we track within-country changes over time in trust and engagement. We show that immigration can have a negative effect on social trust, organizational membership and political engagement, but that institutional arrangements shape this relationship in systematic ways. In more economically equal societies and in more multicultural countries (where cultural minorities are recognized and accommodated), the negative effects of immigration on trust and engagement are mitigated or even reversed. We conclude that there is no general link between immigration-generated diversity and collective-mindedness. Rather, the direction and strength of the relationship depend on institutional and policy contexts.Résumé. Cet article vise à nuancer les preuves existantes que la diversité croissante porte préjudice à une société civile dynamique. Nous nous concentrons particulièrement sur la diversité produite par l'immigration. Nous soutenons que même si elle peut exercer une influence négative sur quelques indices dans certains contextes, ces effets varient considérablement selon le pays examiné parmi les démocraties avancées. Notre argument repose sur l'analyse d'un ensemble de données multinational, transversal et longitudinal qui rassemble des données au niveau individuel du World Values Survey avec des variables au niveau des pays. Au moyen de ces données, nous examinons les changements survenus à l'intérieur des pays, au fil du temps, sur le plan de la confiance et de l'engagement. Nous montrons que l'immigration peut avoir un effet négatif sur la confiance sociale, l'adhésion à des organisations et l'engagement politique, mais que les arrangements institutionnels influencent cette relation de manières systématiques. Dans les sociétés plus économiquement égales et dans les pays plus multiculturels (où les minorités culturelles sont reconnues et accommodées), les effets négatifs de l'immigration sur la confiance et l'engagement sont atténués, voire inversés. Nous concluons qu'il n'y a aucun lien général entre la diversité produite par l'immigration et l'esprit collectif. La direction et la force de la relation entre les deux dépendent plutôt des politiques et des contextes institutionnels.


2015 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadine M Schöneck

Advanced modernity is regarded as an era of time obsession and people in modernized societies seem to live harried lives. Leading time sociologists like Hartmut Rosa adopt a modernization–critical stance and ascribe an accelerated pace of life and frequent time scarcity to socioeconomic and technological advancement. According to these protagonists of the “acceleration debate,” time becomes increasingly precious due to severely changed conditions of work and private life. Against this background it can be assumed that many people may suffer from an unsatisfactory work–life balance. This study uses individual-level data from the fifth round of the European Social Survey (fielded in 2010/11) as well as suitable country-level data capturing key features of advanced modernity to empirically test assumptions arising from the “acceleration debate.” Results from multilevel analyses of 23 European countries provide some confirmation of these assumptions. While most macro indicators for 2010 reflecting a certain stage of development are uninfluential, a country's degree of globalization matters, and moreover growth rates of crucial macro indicators signaling paces of development exert an impact on people's work–life balance in the assumed direction: In countries with accelerations in terms of economic development, coverage of households with internet access and numbers of new cars working people show a significantly greater inclination toward an unsatisfactory work–life balance. Aside from results at the country-level individual-level determinants and group-specific differences of work–life balance under different conditions of advanced modernity are presented. This study's two main findings—(1) paces of development matter more than stages of development and (2) assumptions arising from the “acceleration debate” receive some empirical support—are thoroughly reflected on and discussed.


2007 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-567 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Bernhard ◽  
Ekrem Karakoç

The literature on civil society in postcommunist regimes highlights its weakness as compared with civil society in other democracies. In this article the authors make a general argument on how different patterns of antecedent dictatorship affect the development of civil society across a range of democracies. They examine the slow emergence of two behaviors associated with a robust civil society—participation in organizational life and in protest—and explain variation across countries as a function of regime history. They draw their individual-level data from the World Values Survey and analyze the behavior of over forty-one thousand citizens from forty-two democracies. Using methods of hierarchical linear modeling to control for both national-level and individual-level factors, the authors find that different types of dictatorship and variation in their duration produce different negative legacies for the development of civil society.


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