Rationality and risk-taking in Russia’s first Chechen War: toward a theory of cognitive realism

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-210
Author(s):  
Jason J. Morrissette

This article seeks to establish a better scholarly understanding of former Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s decision to launch an ill-planned, risky, and ultimately disastrous invasion of the breakaway republic of Chechnya in 1994. Examining the decision-making environment that led up to the invasion, I conclude that while neorealism provides an adequate explanation for Yeltsin’s motives in this case, the decisions that he made in pursuit of these goals do not reflect the logic of rational utility maximization commonly associated with neorealist theory. Instead, I suggest that prospect theory – based on the idea that decision-makers tend to be risk averse when confronted with choices between gains while risk acceptant when confronted with losses – offers significantly more explanatory insight in this case. Thus, the article offers further support for an alternative theoretical approach to international relations that some scholars have termed ‘cognitive realism’, incorporating neorealist motives with a more empirically accurate perspective on the decision-making processes undertaken in pursuit of these motives.

2018 ◽  
Vol 374 (1766) ◽  
pp. 20180138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Bossaerts ◽  
Nitin Yadav ◽  
Carsten Murawski

Modern theories of decision-making typically model uncertainty about decision options using the tools of probability theory. This is exemplified by the Savage framework, the most popular framework in decision-making research. There, decision-makers are assumed to choose from among available decision options as if they maximized subjective expected utility, which is given by the utilities of outcomes in different states weighted with subjective beliefs about the occurrence of those states. Beliefs are captured by probabilities and new information is incorporated using Bayes’ Law. The primary concern of the Savage framework is to ensure that decision-makers’ choices are rational . Here, we use concepts from computational complexity theory to expose two major weaknesses of the framework. Firstly, we argue that in most situations, subjective utility maximization is computationally intractable, which means that the Savage axioms are implausible. We discuss empirical evidence supporting this claim. Secondly, we argue that there exist many decision situations in which the nature of uncertainty is such that (random) sampling in combination with Bayes’ Law is an ineffective strategy to reduce uncertainty. We discuss several implications of these weaknesses from both an empirical and a normative perspective. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Risk taking and impulsive behaviour: fundamental discoveries, theoretical perspectives and clinical implications’.


2005 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 713-736
Author(s):  
Louis Constans

This paper attempts to clarify the basic issues underlying the discussion of citizens' participation in public decision-making on energy policy and projects. It questions the assumption that such participation is possible, and recalls that energy policy is at present, at least in the French context, an area of conflict between government and various interest groups. It warns of possible misunderstandings due to the lack of an agreed definition of participation. Three major points are made in this connection. The first is that the usual instruments of citizens' participation in decision-making (public inquiries, parliamentary debates, etc.) have, for a number of technical and institutional reasons, become largely irrelevant as regards energy matters — as indeed in several other areas of policy. The second is that decision-making on energy policy and projects really allows for very little freedom of choice on the part of decision-makers : such freedom rarely goes beyond the setting of time-frames for the achievement of goals imposed by circumstances. Finally, it is suggested that invocation of the ideals of democracy is unhelpful : what is realistically possible amounts only to a greater openness and objectivity in decision-making processes aimed at giving citizens, not an illusory power to decide themselves or to block decisions by policy-makers, but the capacity to forewarn the latter about public feelings on energy issues.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 457-477
Author(s):  
Özgür Özdamar ◽  
Okhan Ercİyas

Abstract The Cyprus problem is one of the most protracted and complex conflicts in the world. This article uses poliheuristic (PH) theory to analyze Turkey's decision-making during the Cyprus crises of 1964, 1967, and 1974. We utilize the PH model (Mintz 1993, 2004) and its method to systematically examine the decision-making process and outcomes during the three crises. We present primary evidence from governmental archives and secondary from media sources. The two hypotheses derived from the PH literature are supported by evidence. Results confirm Turkish decision-makers employed two-stage decision-making during each crisis. In the first stage, Turkish leaders followed the noncompensatory rule and eliminated options that could incur losses. In the second stage, their calculations were more in line with expected utility maximization. Implications of the case study in terms of PH model, foreign policy analysis, and international relations theory are discussed in the conclusion.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan K Beasley ◽  
Andrew R Hom

Abstract While international relations scholarship has taken a “temporal turn,” foreign policy decision-making (FPDM) research reveals little explicit theoretical attention to time. Time is an important aspect of several prominent frameworks, yet these either fail to make explicit their conception of time or fail to reflect upon the implications of their temporal assumptions and understandings. We address this lacuna by developing a timing perspective on FPDM. We present the central features of this perspective, including the nature of timing agency, temporal motivations, the timing of decision-making processes, and timing as a foreign policy tool. Illustrated with empirical examples, we show how timing plays out in FPDM and helps to shed new light on our understanding of crises and ways decision-makers may grapple with them. We conclude by considering the theoretical and empirical benefits and challenges of bridging FPDM with theoretical approaches to time.


2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 89-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Khalifa Al-Farsi ◽  
Ramzi EL Haddadeh

Information technology governance is considered one of the innovative practices that can provide support for decision-makers. Interestingly, it has become increasingly a de facto for organizations in seeking to optimise their performance. In principle, information technology governance has emerged to support organizations in the integration of information technology (IT) infrastructures and the delivery of high-quality services. On the other hand, decision-making processes in public sector organisations can be multi-faceted and complex, and decision makers play an important role in implementing technology in the public sector. The aim of this paper is to shed some light on current opportunities and challenges that IT governance is experiencing in the context of public sector services. In this respect, this paper examines the factors influencing the decision-making process to fully appreciate IT governance. Furthermore, this study focuses on combining institutional and individual perspectives to explain how individuals can take decisions in response to institutional influences.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva D. Regnier ◽  
Joel W. Feldmeier

General Eisenhower’s decisions to postpone and, one day later, to launch the “D-Day” invasion of Normandy are a gripping illustration of sequential decisions under uncertainty, suitable for any introductory decision analysis class. They’re also the archetypal example of weather-sensitive decision making using a forecast. This paper develops a framework for analyzing weather-sensitive decisions with a focus on the less-familiar strategic decisions that determine how forecasts are produced and what operational alternatives are available so that decision makers can extract value from forecasts. We tell the story of the decisions made in the months before D-Day regarding how to set up the forecasting process and the myriad decisions implicating nation-level resources that prepared Allied forces not just to invade, but to hold open that decision until the last possible hour so that Eisenhower and his staff could use the critical forecasts. Finally, we overview the current state of the weather-forecasting enterprise, the current challenges of interest to decision analysts, and what this means for decision analysts seeking opportunities to help the weather enterprise improve forecasts and to help operational decision makers extract more value from modern weather forecasts.


Author(s):  
S. Ring

This chapter describes the activity-based methodology (ABM), an efficient and effective approach to-ward development and analysis of DoD integrated architectures that will enable them to align with and fully support decision-making processes and mission outcomes. ABM consists of a tool-independent disciplined approach to developing fully integrated, unambiguous, and consistent DODAF Operational, System, and Technical views in supporting both “as-is” architectures (where all current elements are known) and “to-be” architectures (where not all future elements are known). ABM enables architects to concentrate on the Art and Science of architectures—that is identifying core architecture elements, their views, how they are related together, and the resulting analysis used for decision-making purposes. ABM delivers significant architecture development productivity and quality gains by generating several DoDAF products and their elements from the core architecture elements. ABM facilitates the transition from integrated “static” architectures to executable “dynamic” process models for time-dependent assessments of complex operations and resource usage. Workflow steps for creating integrated architecture are detailed. Numerous architecture analysis strategies are presented that show the value of integrated architectures to decision makers and mission outcomes.


2009 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Albert Boonstra ◽  
Bert de Brock

The past few years, many organizations have been using the Internet in quite arbitrary and experimental ways. This phase, which can be considered as a period of learning and experimentation, has created a need for a more systematic approach to the identification, the ordering and the assessment of e-business options. It is the objective of this paper to address this need by presenting a methodology that aims at supporting management in using alternative e-business applications in the first stage of the decision-making process. Figure 1 shows how a systematic decision-making process can be organized by using e-business options. The steps are based on Simon’s intelligence, design, and choice trichotomy (Simon, 1960). First, alternative e-business options have to be identified and ordered. Then the possible options have to be assessed and selected. After this stage the selected opportunities have to be specified and designed. Next, implementation, operation, maintenance, and evaluation may follow. In Figure 1 this is called the “formal life cycle”. We will apply the word “e-business option” referring to the possibility to use an electronic network for a business purpose. An e-business opportunity is defined here as an assessed and selected e-business option. In practice, different intermediate feedback activities, interrupts, delays and adjustments are often necessary to reconsider earlier steps (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Théorêt, 1976). This is—among other reasons—because decision-making processes of this kind take place in dynamic environments and decisions are made in political contexts (Pettigrew, 2002). Moreover, participants in decision-making processes are often lacking the necessary information to make well-considered decisions right from the start (Miller, Hickson, & Wilson, 1996). In Figure 1 these activities are called “intermediate feedback”.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Cristofaro ◽  
Pier Luigi Giardino ◽  
Luna Leoni

The personal trait called Core Self-Evaluations (CSE) has been receiving increasing attention from behavioral strategy scholars due to its ability to predict job performance and to explain some facets of decision-making processes. However, despite previous studies hypothesizing that managers with high values of CSE are intuitive thinkers, beyond any doubt of their capacities and that they significantly lead to positive results for their organization, no one has empirically investigated these assumptions. This gap can be substantiated by the following research question: “How do high Core Self-Evaluations influence team decision-making processes?”. Answering it provides insights on how the evaluations that decision makers make about situations (and the consequent actions that are implemented) highly depend on decision makers’ inner traits and their effect on cognition. To fill this gap, 120 graduate students—divided into groups of four—took part in a simulation game and were asked to make decisions acting the role of General Manager of a small-sized manufacturing firm. Tests aimed at identifying the CSE and intuitive/reflecting thinking approach of participants were administered; moreover, the performance resulting from their decision-making processes and their estimation of reached results were collected. Results show that an average level of CSE is preferable to balance intuitive and reflective thinking, as well as avoiding overconfidence bias and reaching the best performance possible. This work suggests that there is a huge misattribution in considering a high level of CSE as being beneficial for decision-making processes and consequent performance.


Water Policy ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 824-843 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashok Subramanian ◽  
Bridget Brown ◽  
Aaron T. Wolf

This study reviews the experience of cooperation in five international river basins, focusing on the perceptions of risks and opportunities by country decision makers responding to a specific prospect of cooperation, and the effects of risk reduction and opportunity enhancement on the cooperation process. We explore the following five categories of risk: Capacity and Knowledge; Accountability and Voice; Sovereignty and Autonomy; Equity and Access; and Stability and Support. We surmise that risk perception plays a key and less understood role in decision-making processes over shared rivers cooperation, and conclude that countries and third parties can best achieve sustainable cooperation when long-term investments are made in risk reduction. We also point to areas for further study to better understand the motivations for cooperation.


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