The One True religion in the Military

Author(s):  
James E. Parco ◽  
Barry S. Fagin
Keyword(s):  
The One ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 50-55
Author(s):  
P. Degens

When I first moved to Coffs Harbour in 1972, I quickly became aware of the problems facing Aboriginal children in the school and community. Now, ten years later, seems a good time to review the position.Statistically there have been changes. The Aboriginal population in Coffs Harbour Shire is 1.6% of the total population, namely: males 200, females 194, total 394.The new Tyalla Primary which opened next to Orara High in 1978 has 29 Aboriginal pupils, while the Aboriginal population of Orara High itself has increased from 10 to 31 students (2 being in Year 11) in keeping with this school’s growth from only Years 7 – 9 in 1973, to a full secondary school by 1976.It appears that attitudes among teachers and white children have polarised. There are the ‘hawks’ and the ‘doves’. When these terms were invented during the Eisenhower years in the U.S.A., it was easy to tell a ‘hawk’ from a ‘dove’. The ‘hawks’ were those who favoured warlike measures and confrontation, while the ‘doves’ were those who wanted peace talks and mutual disarmament. These days it has become difficult to differentiate in the military aviary but in this educational issue there seems to be a marked line of division. On the one hand there are those who condemn as ‘racist’ any special programs of financial aid to assist Aboriginal children, ‘the hawks’, and on the other those who blame a white-dominated society for the problems Aboriginal children face, ‘the doves’.


Author(s):  
Marco Jowell

The army has been a central part of Rwanda’s political system from the precolonial period until the early 21st century and is intrinsically part of the construction and politics of the state. Civil–military relations in Rwanda demonstrate not only the central features of transitioning a rebel group to a national defense sector but also how some states construct their armed forces after a period of mass violence. Since the civil war and genocide in the early 1990s, the Rwandan military has been the primary actor in politics, the economy, and state building as well as in regional wars in central Africa and the Great Lakes region. Practical experiences of guerrilla insurgency and conflict in Uganda and Rwanda, postconflict military integration, and the intertwining of political and economic agendas with the ruling party have shaped civil–military relations in Rwanda and have been central to how the Rwandan defense sector functions. Contemporary Rwandan civil–military relations center around the two elements of service delivery and control, which has resulted in the development of an effective and technocratic military in terms of remit and responsibilities on the one hand, and the creation of a politicized force of coercion on the other hand. The military in Rwanda therefore reflects the pressures and dynamics of the wider state and cannot be separated from it. The Rwandan army is thus a “political army” and is part and parcel of the political structures that oversee and govern the Rwandan state.


Artifex Novus ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 58-75
Author(s):  
Anna Sylwia Czyż

ABSTRAKT Sprowadzone do Wilna między 1616 a 1618 r. benedyktynki utworzyły niewielką i skromnie uposażoną wspólnotę. Ich sytuacja zmieniła się w 1692 r., kiedy to dzięki bogatym zapisom Feliksa Jana Paca mogły wystawić murowany kościół konsekrowany w 1703 r. Hojność podkomorzego litewskiego nie była przypadkowa, bowiem do wileńskich benedyktynek wstąpiły jego córki Sybilla i Anna, jedyne potomstwo jakie po sobiepozostawił. Z nich szczególne znaczenie dla dziejów klasztoru miała Sybilla (Magdalena) Pacówna, która w 1704 r. została wybrana ksienią. Nie tylko odnowiła ona życie wspólnoty, ale stała się również jedną z najważniejszych postaci ówczesnego Wilna. Po pożarze w 1737 r. Sybilla Pacówna energicznie przystąpiła do odbudowy klasztoru i kościoła, którą kończyła już jej następczyni Joanna Rejtanówna. Wzniesioną wówczas według projektu Jana Krzysztofa Glaubitza fasadę ozdobiono stiukowo-metalową dekoracją o indywidualnie zaplanowanym programie ideowym odwołującym się i do tradycji zakonnej i rodowej – pacowskiej. W fasadzie wyeksponowano ideały związane z życiem benedyktyńskim sytuując je wśród aluzji o konieczności walki na płaszczyźnie ducha i ciała, włączając w militarną symbolikę także konieczność walki z wrogami Kościoła i ojczyzny oraz charakterystyczną dla duchowości benedyktyńskiej pobożność związaną z krzyżem w typie karawaka oraz zOpatrznością Bożą. Jednocześnie przypominano o bogactwie powołań w klasztorze benedyktynek wileńskich przyrównując mniszki do lilii. Porównanie to dzięki obecności w fasadzie herbu Gozdawa (podwójna lilia) oraz powszechnego w XVII i XVIII w. zwyczaju określania Paców „Liliatami” można było odnosić także do ich rodu, w tym do zasłużonej dla klasztoru ksieni Sybilli. Tak mocne wyeksponowanie fundatorów było nie tylko chęciąupamiętnia darczyńców, ale wraz z całym architektonicznym i plastycznym wystrojem świątyni wiązało się z koniecznością stworzenia przeciwwagi dla nowego i prężnie rozwijającego się pod patronatem elity litewskiej klasztoru Wwizytek w Wilnie. Przy tym charakter dekoracji fasady kościoła pw. św. Katarzyny wpisuje się w inne fundacje Paców: kościół pw. św. Teresy i kościół pw. śś. Piotra i Pawła będąc ostatnią ważną inicjatywą artystyczną rodu w stolicy Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego. SUMMARY The Benedictines, who had been brought to Vilnius between 1616 and 1618, formed a small and modest community. Thanks to the generous legacy of Feliks Jan Pac, in 1692 their situation changed as they could erect a brick church, which was then consecrated in 1703. The generosity of the Lithuanian chamberlain was not a coincidence; his two daughters, Sybilla and Anna, the only offspring he left, had joined the Benedictine Sisters in Vilnius. Sybilla (Magdalena) Pac, who became an abbess in 1704, was particularly important for the history of the monastery. Not only did she renew the community life, but she also became one of the most important personalities of the then Vilnius. After the fire in 1737 Sybilla Pac vigorously started rebuilding the monastery and the church, which was completed by her successor, Joanna Rejtan. The facade which was then erected after Johann Christoph Glaubitz’s design was adorned with stucco and metal decorations with a perfectly devised ideological programme which referred to the tradition of the order and to the one of the Pac family. The facade presented ideals connected with the Benedictine life, which placed them among the hints of having to fight at the level of spirit and body, incorporating among the military symbols also the need to fight the enemies of the Church and the state, and the typical for the Benedictine spirituality piety connected with the Caravaca cross and the Divine Providence. At the same time, it reminded of the Benedictine vocations comparing nuns to lilies. This comparison, due to the presence of the Gozdawa coat-of-arms (double lilie) and the common nickname of the Pac family in the 17th and 18th cc. “the Liliats”, could also apply to their lineage, including the abbess Sybilla and her services to the monastery. Exposing founders in such an emphatic way was not only the will to immortalise them, but was also, together with the entire architectural and artistic decor of the church, connected with the need to counterbalance the new and dynamicallydeveloping Visitation Monastery in Vilnius. At the same time, the nature of the facade decoration of the Church of St. Catherine is in line with other foundations of the Pac family: St Theresa’s Church and the St Peter and St Paul Church, and was the last significant artistic initiative of the family in thecapital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019, 21/4 (Volume 2019/issue 21/4) ◽  
pp. 75-94
Author(s):  
MARJAN HORVAT

The main theme of the paper is the Concept of Military Leadership in the Slovenian Armed Forces, which currently represents the highest substantive and guiding normative act in the field of military leadership in the Slovenian Armed Forces (hereinafter referred to as the SAF). Due to the enormous importance of this field in working with people and the aim of influencing the change of the concept, the paper analysed and compared the concepts of military leadership in other selected armed forces and looked for similarities and divergences, especially in two segments - substantive and normative. On the one hand, we have shown the substantive obsolescence and inadequate normative rank of the Concept of Military Leadership in the Slovenian Armed Forces and, on the other hand, the necessity of substantive updating with concrete proposals and arguments for the development of the Doctrine of Military Leadership in the SAF. Key words Leadership, armed forces, Concept of Military Leadership in the SAF


2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (71) ◽  
pp. 43-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Filip Ejdus

Abstract Serbia is the only state in the Western Balkans that is not seeking NATO membership. In December 2007, Serbia declared military neutrality and in spite of its EU membership aspirations, developed very close relations with Moscow. The objective of this paper is threefold. First, I argue that in order to understand why Serbia declared military neutrality, one has to look both at the discursive terrain and domestic power struggles. The key narrative that was strategically used by mnemonic entrepreneurs, most importantly by the former Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica, to legitimize military neutrality was the trauma of NATO intervention in 1999 and the ensuing secession of Kosovo. In the second part of the paper, I discuss the operational consequences of the military neutrality policy for Serbia's relations with NATO and Russia, as well as for military reform and EU accession. Finally, I spell out the challenges ahead in Serbia's neutrality policy and argue that its decision makers will increasingly be caught between pragmatic foreign policy requirements on the one hand and deeply entrenched traumatic memories on the other.


The Somali militant Islamist and proto-state insurgent organization known as “Al-Shabaab” (Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen in Arabic and Xarakada Mujaahidiinta Al Shabaab in Somali) is a group with multiple layers of identity. Ranging from the local and national to the regional and transnational, it is a group whose multifaceted self-perception and public portrayals have been some of its greatest sources of endurance since its emergence in 2006. On the one hand, Al-Shabaab’s ideology, goals, and membership are grounded in the domestic Somali context, though it has been able to localize and establish networks of sympathizers and recruits in neighboring East African states, including in Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda. On the other hand, Al-Shabaab is also the official East African affiliate of the transnational militant Islamist group al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab first emerged publicly in 2006 as the most radical faction within the military wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU succeeded in forming a coalition that led to the establishment of an environment of both relative law and order as well as economic stabilization. When, in 2006, the Ethiopian military invaded Somalia and occupied parts of the country to prop up the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the ICU collapsed. Al-Shabaab emerged as an independent group spearheading a growing insurgency against Ethiopian military forces and, later, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeepers. Beginning in 2008, as Al-Shabaab started to rapidly capture territory, it pursued the establishment of civil-governing mechanisms in areas it controlled. These mechanisms and institutions included a judiciary, police force (the Jaysh al-Hisba), a military wing (the Jaysh al-Usra), and offices of taxation, political affairs and clan relations, education, religious affairs and missionary propagation (daʿwa), health services, agriculture, and social services and charity programs, including a drought and humanitarian relief committee. Alongside its domestically rooted identity, Al-Shabaab also has a transnational, globalist aspect to its organizational identity and is an official affiliate of al-Qaeda, with its leadership having pledged allegiance to the group publicly in February 2012, an oath accepted by al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri. As of 2021—and despite national, bilateral, and multilateral efforts to combat it—Al-Shabaab continues to operate as both an insurgency and a proto-state power, controlling and governing wide swathes of land within the southern, central, and western parts of the country. This article seeks to provide an overview of the best literature available on the history, evolution, activities, and multifaceted identity of Al-Shabaab as an organization with local/domestic Somali, regional East African, and transnational/globalist markers. While existing literature on the group is heavily focused on security issues, more-recent studies have also begun to pay more attention to other aspects of the group, including its proto-state governance and engagement with domestic Somali and local dynamics in other East African countries.


2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-120
Author(s):  
Andrea Győrffy ◽  
Ákos Jozwiak

Public health belongs to the “One Health” umbrella. As military veterinary medicine evolved, it became embedded in national security. Many armed forces still have active veterinary services, both regular and reserve components. The military veterinarian can serve as an interface between civilians and civil organizations, can handle complex and interdisciplinary cases. Introducing the “One Health” concept both in practice and education has encountered many difficulties. Over time, “One Health” has been judged to be a “buzz word” in civilian areas; however, it is a weighty concept. Its importance is pronounced in military areas where practicing along One Health principles were present before the appearance of the term itself. Nevertheless, military “One Health” has not penetrated into the overwhelming “One Health” literature. Emphasizing the military aspects of One Health not only reveals an obscure corner but might help to regain the proper importance of the “One Health” concept.


Author(s):  
Carlos Pérez Pineda

The 1969 conflict between Honduras and El Salvador signaled the weakening of the Central American economic integration process; marked an end to an era of economic growth, industrialization, and political openness; and inaugurated a new chapter, characterized by growing political polarization and violence. There is a prevailing consensus about the significance that this conflict had as a breaking point and historical turnaround. The roots of the crisis between both states, commercial partners and members of a regional political-military alliance, lie in the drastic changes introduced by the Honduran government in its migratory and agrarian policies. These changes sought to contain the massive migration from El Salvador and to reduce by all means necessary, including by violent dispossession, the Salvadoran presence in Honduras. A ferocious anti-Salvadoran media campaign preceded and accompanied the massive expulsion of Salvadorans. Alarmed by the destabilizing effect that a return en masse of poor Salvadoran peasants could bring to the country, and facing an intransigent Honduran government, the leadership in El Salvador decided to resolve the conflict through war. Once this began, both countries mobilized their military forces for over one hundred hours of bloody fighting in July 1969. Although neither country won a decisive victory on the battlefield, at the moment the ceasefire was imposed the military situation amply favored El Salvador. The political, economic, military, and diplomatic consequences of the war had a profound impact during the 1970s and beyond the signing of the peace agreement early in the 1980s. On the one hand, the recounting of the war, full of falsifications and half-truths, continues to play an important role in Honduran nationalism. On the other hand, for Salvadorans the war is an almost forgotten memory.


2021 ◽  
pp. 344-369
Author(s):  
Thomas A. Guglielmo

Chapter 9 looks at what happened to the US military’s white-nonwhite lines as American troops moved overseas during World War II. Nonblack minorities faced both bright and blurry white-nonwhite lines when deployed abroad. At times, the military remained determined to uphold distinctions between whites, on the one hand, and Asian Americans, Latin Americans, and Native Americans, on the other. This determination, evident in everything from military justice proceedings to promotion patterns, stemmed primarily from long-standing civilian investments in these distinctions and in response to the vicious race war in the Pacific with Japan. At the same time, overseas service also witnessed the continued blurring of white-nonwhite lines—the transformation of “Mexicans,” “Puerto Ricans,” “Indians,” “Filipinos,” “Chinese,” and even “Japanese” into whites’ buddies and brothers, comrades and fellow Americans, deepening a process that had begun on the home front. While this overseas blurring often emanated from day-to-day battlefield bonding, it was America’s military leaders and commanders who largely made it possible. In doing so, they narrowed the white-nonwhite divide, but also deepened the black-white one in the process.


2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mely Caballero-Anthony ◽  
Belinda Chng

AbstractThe devastating cyclone that hit Myanmar in May 2008 and the lack of immediate action on the part of the military junta to respond to the humanitarian crises triggered not only international dismay but renewed debates on the utility of the R2P. But given the lack of international consensus on the R2P on the one hand, and the urgency to act to provide humanitarian relief and protection on the other, this paper argues that it is about time that a R2P variant be explored—if indeed the ultimate objective of the R2P is the protection and promotion of human security. This paper therefore examines the idea of a R2P-Plus that is responsive to different kinds of human security threats, such as those caused by intentional state neglect in times of natural disasters, and sensitive to the political context in Asia. The notion of a R2P-Plus is aimed at finding convergence between the advocates of the strict interpretation of the R2P and those who argue for an R2P that is more attuned to the realities of Asia.


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