Sense of Agency and Sense of Control Measure

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Shyam Sundar ◽  
Eun Go ◽  
Hyang-Sook Kim ◽  
Bo Zhang
2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-99
Author(s):  
Valentina Petrolini

Disorders of agency could be described as cases where people encounter difficulties in assessing their own degree of responsibility or involvement with respect to a relevant action or event. These disturbances in one’s sense of agency appear to be meaningfully connected with some mental disorders and with some symptoms in particular—i.e. auditory verbal hallucinations, thought insertion, pathological guilt. A deeper understanding of these experiences may thus contribute to better identification and possibly treatment of people affected by such disorders. In this paper I explore disorders of agency to flesh out their phenomenology in more detail as well as to introduce some theoretical distinctions between them. Specifically, I argue that we may better understand disorders of agency by characterizing them as dimensional. In §1 I explore the cases of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations (AVH) and pathological guilt and I show that they lie at opposite ends of the agency spectrum (i.e. hypoagency versus hyperagency). In §2 I focus on two intermediate cases of hypo- and hyper- agency. These are situations that, despite being very similar to pathological ones, may be successfully distinguished from them in virtue of quantitative factors (e.g. duration, frequency, intensity). I first explore the phenomenon of mind wandering as an example of hypoagency, and I then discuss the phenomenon of false confessions as an example of hyperagency. While cases of hypoagency exemplify situations where people experience their own thoughts, bodies, or actions as something beyond their control, experiences of hyperagency provide an illusory sense of control over actions or events.


2004 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 725-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fredric D. Wolinsky ◽  
Stacie M. Metz ◽  
William M. Tierney ◽  
Kathleen W. Wyrwich ◽  
Ajit N. Babu ◽  
...  

This study investigated the short-term stability of the 1991 Mirowsky-Ross 2 × 2 Index of the Sense of Control. From an ongoing longitudinal study, 304 subjects were randomly selected for test-retest interviews occurring 1 to 4 days after their regularly scheduled first follow-up interview. Test-retest reliability was assessed at the item level using percent agreement and weighted kappa. At the scale score level, reliability was assessed with the intraclass correlation coefficient ( ICC). ICCs were also calculated within categories of demographic, socioeconomic, psychosocial, and functional status characteristics. There was moderate to substantial item-level agreement (mean weighted kappa = .51; weighted kappa range =.38 to .66). At the scale score level there was substantial agreement ( ICC =.71). No appreciable differences in ICC values were found in the demographic, socioeconomic, psychosocial, and functional comparisons of status characteristics. Thus, this sense of control measure has acceptable test-retest reliability and is appropriate for use in longitudinal research.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 206-212
Author(s):  
Lidiia Oryshchyn-Buzhdyhan ◽  

Sense of control over life events which happen in everyday life (personal and social) can play a role of a self-defence mechanism in stress situations that occurs in a crisis society. The research suggests that process of searching ways and methods to take control over stress events not only is a process of psychological adaptation to unusual stress situation but also is a natural instinct is presented in everyone. Interestingly, there is a lack of empirical studies of subjective sense of being in control and indicators of sense of personal control among young Ukrainians. The purpose of this article is to investigate indicators of sense of control factors’ distribution in two independent study of young Lviv citizens. The study uses established metrics called «subjective control measure». Two studies were conducted for proper assessment of working hypothesis. 90 participants of different sexes, aged from 14 to 35, who work and study in Lviv, took part in the first study. 68 female and male participants aged from 16 to 17, who were students of Lviv secondary school № 2, took part in the second study. The null hypothesis suggests that participants from the first and second study will have different subjective sense of control factors’ distribution. Factor analysis of the first study (2016) participants highlighted the following sense of control factors: measure of personal presentation in control, control factors for outside social world, methods of upbringing (education) and life principles, quality of implementation controls, future without obeying, pedantic control, democratic control, external presentation control, work process management control. In the second study (2017), factor analysis showed the following six sense of control indicators: structured progressive control, perfection business control, external presentation control, work accuracy control, over control, parental control. Next steps for the study will be the analysis of sense of control in participants of different ages on the basis of the improved «subjective control measure».


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vince Polito ◽  
Andrew Roberts ◽  
Michael Connors ◽  
Amanda Barnier

Agency is the subjective sense of control we have over our actions. According to an influential model, this arises when the predicted sensory effects of movements match actual sensory feedback. Consistent with this, previous research found that mechanically manipulating the sensory consequences of actions creates the illusion that they are externally-produced. Across three experiments, we aimed to develop a hypnotic analogue and clarify specific components of hypnosis that contribute to alterations in agency. We compared different suggestions based on clinical impairments whist varying the hypnotisability of subjects and the presence of a hypnotic induction. We found that suggestions designed to model self-monitoring deficits increased perceived involuntariness of actions; these effects were stronger in high hypnotisable participants and after an induction; and could not be explained by demand characteristics alone. These results highlight the capacity of hypnosis to alter sense of agency and model deficits associated with clinical conditions using hypnosis.


Author(s):  
Marieke Liem

Chapter ten delves deeper into the factors the interviewees mentioned as key to staying out. These included aging out of crime, a healthy fear for the conditions of parole, and self-efficacy, or having a sense of choice and control over one’s life. Non-incarcerated interviewees, as opposed to re-incarcerated individuals, reflected a strong sense of agency in their narrative. The process of desistance is thus not the result of societal forces, as emphasized by life-course theorists. Nor does it seem to be a resolution of an individual to change, as the vast majority of interviewees said that they underwent a transformation leading to a better version of themselves. What seems to be crucial for lifers in being successful in staying out on parole is a combination of social support structures, having regained a sense of control, and a strong awareness of the restraints that govern their day-to-day life.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanna Helen Trnka

This paper draws from interviews with 21 young New Zealanders, ages 16-24, to examine how health apps shape young people’s experiences of themselves as agentive subjects in relation to their physical and mental wellbeing. Focusing on the intended and unintended effects of health apps, I examine how digital care technologies recast the spatiality and temporality of healthcare, enabling new ways of constituting and tracking health, expanding possibilities of interactive exchanges with others, and redistributing a sense of agency and control. In many ways, the forms of self-governance that health apps engender are no different from other moves to promote increased self-responsibility that are cultivated as part of advanced liberalism. However, I argue that by collapsing the spatial and temporal relations of technology use, health apps not only heighten opportunities for adopting self-responsibility, but also, as many young people attest, promote the feeling that there is no escaping from them. The result is that for many young people having a sense of control and responsibility over their health comes to be calibrated against not only the inherent inter-sociality of care (i.e. young people’s desires to both give and receive care to and from others), but also the health and fitness “demands” seemingly made upon them by technology itself.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manja Engel ◽  
Vivien Ainley ◽  
Manos Tsakiris ◽  
H. Chris Dijkerman ◽  
Anouk Keizer

The need to feel in control is central to anorexia nervosa (AN). AN patients tend to use dysfunctional behaviour to feel a sense of control. The sense of control in AN has only been studied through self-report. The aim of this study is to investigate an implicit sense of control, the sense of agency (SoA), in AN patients, recovered AN (RAN) patients and HC. We hypothesized that AN patients would exhibit a lower SoA compared to RAN patients and HC. Furthermore, we expected that state-anxiety would negatively predict SoA, and that this would be more prominent in AN patients, as studies have shown that SoA can be influenced by negative emotional states. The SoA was measured with the intentional binding task and state-anxiety levels through a questionnaire. Results showed no differences in SoA between groups. Findings did show that AN patients had significantly higher state anxiety scores compared to RAN patients and HC, and RAN patients had higher state anxiety scores compared to HC. However, state anxiety was not a significant predictor of SoA. We did not find any evidence of differences in SoA between groups. Further studies should focus on specific aspects of the need for control in AN by, for example, by manipulating (un)certainty in these paradigms.


2020 ◽  
Vol 73 (11) ◽  
pp. 1784-1795 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alice Pailhès ◽  
Gustav Kuhn

We often fall victim of an illusory sense of control and agency over our thoughts and actions. Magicians are masters at exploiting these illusions, and forcing techniques provide a powerful way to study apparent action causation—the illusion that our action caused the outcome we get. In this article, we used the Criss-Cross force to study whether people can tell the difference between an action which had an impact on the outcome they get and one which has no impact. In the Criss-Cross force, participants are asked to cut to a card, and while they are genuinely free to cut the cards at any position, the cut does not affect the card they are given (i.e., they always get the top card). We investigate the psychological processes that underpin the success of this force. Experiment 1 ( N = 60) showed that participants cannot tell the difference between a forced and a controlled outcome. Experiment 2 ( N = 90) showed that contrary to common magicians’ knowledge, misdirection does not play a role in the success of the force. Finally, Experiment 3 ( N = 60) suggests that rather than misdirection, an attribute substitution error explains why people fail to understand that their action does not have an impact on the outcome they get. Debriefing also shows the importance of participants’ expectations in the perception of the trick, as well as the role of prediction of the outcome in participants’ sense of agency over the events.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amit Regev Krugwasser ◽  
Yoni Stern ◽  
Nathan Faivre ◽  
Eiran Vadim Harel ◽  
Roy Salomon

The Sense of Agency (SoA), our sensation of control over our actions, is a fundamental mechanism for delineating the Self from the environment and others. SoA arises from implicit processing of sensorimotor signals as well as explicit higher-level judgments. Psychosis patients suffer from difficulties in the sense of control over their actions and accurate demarcation of the Self. Moreover, it is unclear if they have metacognitive insight into their aberrant abilities. In this pre-registered study, we examined SoA and its associated confidence judgments using an embodied virtual reality paradigm in psychosis patients and controls. Our results show that psychosis patients not only have a severely reduced ability for discriminating their actions but they also do not show proper metacognitive insight into this deficit. Furthermore, an exploratory analysis revealed that the SoA capacities allow for high levels of accuracy in clinical classification of psychosis. These results indicate that SoA and its metacognition are core aspects of the psychotic state and provide possible venues for understanding the underlying mechanisms of psychosis, that may be leveraged for novel clinical purposes.


2008 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Leahy

Abstract Educating students and informing clinicians regarding developments in therapy approaches and in evidence-based practice are important elements of the responsibility of specialist academic posts in universities. In this article, the development of narrative therapy and its theoretical background are outlined (preceded by a general outline of how the topic of fluency disorders is introduced to students at an Irish university). An example of implementing narrative therapy with a 12-year-old boy is presented. The brief case description demonstrates how narrative therapy facilitated this 12-year-old make sense of his dysfluency and his phonological disorder, leading to his improved understanding and management of the problems, fostering a sense of control that led ultimately to their resolution.


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