scholarly journals Sustainable integrated and pricing decisions for two-echelon supplier-retailer supply chain of growing Items

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mukunda Choudhury ◽  
Gour Chandra Mahata
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Growth Pattern ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Clean Environment ◽  
Growing Items ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Cost Factors

In today's market, supply chain players have to cooperate mutually for extra benefits, long lasting paybacks, and to control carbon emission for a clean environment. In this study, a two-echelon sustainable supply chain model with a supplier-retailer scenario is considered to investigate the overlooked area of growing items and reducing carbon emissions. These joint effects will benefit the firms for interim financing as well as minimize carbon emission for a clean environment. The main task for the supplier is to breed new-born animals with respect to a biologic growth pattern, then slaughters them and controls the carbon emission to maintain the sustainability. The supplier then delivers the slaughtered items to the retailer where it is used as final products to satisfy customers demand and also experienced deterioration during the inventory replenishment cycle. Carbon emission is considered due to transportation of slaughtered items to the retailer. The main goal of this paper is to analyze the model under decentralized and centralized chain structures and in the centralized case profit-sharing contract is incorporated as the cooperation tool. The model has been solved with an analytic solution approach to obtain the global optimum solution. Sensitivity analysis is carried out to investigate the impact of different input parameters. The results support the claim that centralized chain structure can provide the partners with more benefits if an appropriate coordination mechanism is applied. Moreover, it is shown that the unit purchasing cost of each echelon has a significant effect on the profit in comparison to the other cost factors. Finally the results reveal that the supplier's inventory cycle is more dependent on the growth pattern rather than external cost factors.

scholarly journals A Green Closed-Loop Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism Based on Third-Party Recycling

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (19) ◽  
pp. 5335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiafu Su ◽  
Chi Li ◽  
Qingjun Zeng ◽  
Jiaquan Yang ◽  
Jie Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
The Impact

Taking an environment-friendly green closed-loop supply chain as the research object, this work established a two-stage closed-loop supply chain game model. Considering the influence of the environmental protection input on the whole supply chain, there are different decisions among the participants in the supply chain, and the different choices will have impacts on the benefits of the whole supply chain when manufacturers select a closed-loop supply chain model of third-party recycling. Hence, this work compared and analyzed the impact of centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making on the returns and pricing strategies of each participant. Finally, an optimized cooperative mechanism decision model considering a cost profit sharing contract was further designed. The model is conducive to obtaining the maximum profit value in centralized decision-making and avoids the negative impact of a “double marginal effect” on supply chain income in decentralized decision-making, and finally, improves the overall coordination and profit of a green closed-loop supply chain. The numerical examples are conducted to verify the effectiveness and practicality of the proposed models. This work provides a helpful decision support and guidance for enterprises and the government on the used products recycling decisions to better manage the green closed-loop supply chain.

scholarly journals Mathematical model of the feedback between global supply chain disruption and COVID-19 dynamics

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Xingyu Li ◽  
Amin Ghadami ◽  
John M. Drake ◽  
Pejman Rohani ◽  
Bogdan I. Epureanu
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Model ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Care Delivery ◽  
Global Supply Chain ◽  
Economic Losses ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Supply Chain Disruption ◽  
Disease Networks ◽  
Resource Allocation Strategy ◽  
The Impact

AbstractThe pandemic of COVID-19 has become one of the greatest threats to human health, causing severe disruptions in the global supply chain, and compromising health care delivery worldwide. Although government authorities sought to contain the spread of SARS-CoV-2, by restricting travel and in-person activities, failure to deploy time-sensitive strategies in ramping-up of critical resource production exacerbated the outbreak. Here, we developed a mathematical model to analyze the effects of the interaction between supply chain disruption and infectious disease dynamics using coupled production and disease networks built on global data. Analysis of the supply chain model suggests that time-sensitive containment strategies could be created to balance objectives in pandemic control and economic losses, leading to a spatiotemporal separation of infection peaks that alleviates the societal impact of the disease. A lean resource allocation strategy can reduce the impact of supply chain shortages from 11.91 to 1.11% in North America. Our model highlights the importance of cross-sectoral coordination and region-wise collaboration to optimally contain a pandemic and provides a framework that could advance the containment and model-based decision making for future pandemics.

scholarly journals Simulation Research on Information-Sharing Value of Two-Level Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Xiaheng Zhang ◽  
Zekai Lin ◽  
Lin Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Performance Evaluation ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Simulation Research ◽  
Incentive Effect ◽  
Actual Evaluation ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
And Performance ◽  
The Impact

In the two-stage supply chain model, the incentive effect to the supplier’s sharing of demand information and performance evaluation and the effect of various parameters on the incentive effect of the supply chain are studied through a multiagent simulation model constructed for the purpose. It is found that the incentive coefficient of demand information-sharing degree, the number of selected suppliers, the order allocation coefficient, and the order proportion are positively related to the incentive effect of demand information sharing. So, the greater the demand information sharing is, the greater the impact of these parameters on the incentive effect is. Based on the demand information sharing, the supplier performance evaluation rules are shared, and when the actual evaluation rules are inconsistent with the supplier’s expectations, the incentive effect is further enhanced. Other parameters do not affect the incentive effect of demand information sharing and performance evaluation rule sharing.

scholarly journals Strategies for Capital Constrained Timber and Carbon Sink Supply Chain under the Cap-and-Trade Scheme

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (11) ◽  
pp. 4380
Author(s):  
Xinyue Yang ◽  
Ye Song ◽  
Mingjun Sun ◽  
Hongjun Peng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Sink ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Stackelberg Model ◽  
Emission Rights ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Reduction Costs

We consider a capital constrained timber and carbon sink supply chain under the cap-and-trade scheme, where the forest company produces timber and carbon sink. We consider two subsidy modes: financing subsidy to the carbon sink forests and financing subsidy to the manufacturer’s emission reductions. We apply a Stackelberg model and mainly consider the impact of subsidies on the profits and the strategies of the supply chain members. The results show that when the government gives a financing subsidy to the carbon sink forests, it is conducive to promoting the expansion of carbon sink forests, as well as the enhancement of the forest company’s profit. However, a larger supply of carbon sinks generates a lower price, which leads to the manufacturer reducing the technical emission reduction level and purchasing more carbon emission rights instead. On the other hand, when the manufacturer receives a financing subsidy for the technical emission reduction costs, its production becomes cleaner than before, and the profits of the forest company and the manufacturer increase.

scholarly journals The Impact of RFID Investment on Complex Product in Three-Level Assembly Supply Chain

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Xu ◽  
Zhaotong Lian ◽  
Xifan Yao
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Stackelberg Games ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Complex Product ◽  
Coordination Model ◽  
Technology Investment ◽  
The Impact

Motivated by the complex product with the feature about error-prone assembly system and supply chain inventory inaccuracy, this paper elaborates on the impact of information technology investment on complex product by establishing a three-stage supply chain model involving two suppliers, one manufacturer, and retailer which carried out Stackelberg games. In addition, it not only compares the manufacturer and the retailer’s optimal decision and maximum profit under the situation of the information asymmetry and free information sharing, but also analyzes their market behavior and changes in market performance. Meanwhile, it points out that the downstream in supply chain masters more information about market demands compared to the upstream one. The optimal cost threshold values of technology investment are also examined both for the centralized and the decentralized scenarios utilizing quantitative and modeling methods. By analyzing and comparing the optimal profit with or without investment on information technology, it establishes a supply chain coordination model which boosts the application of information technology. At the same time, it offers the conditions on which the upstream and downstream enterprises can coordinate with one another. The results of this paper have contributed significantly to making the price and ordering decisions on whether RFID should be adopted among members of the supply chain. Finally, we present numerical analyses, and several extensions of the model are considered as well.

scholarly journals Decision Optimization and Interest Coordination of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Embedded by Two-Echelon Logistics Service Providers under the Dominance of Retailer

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Jianjun Zhang ◽  
Daning Xing
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Sensitivity Coefficient ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making

Taking the dual-channel supply chain embedded by two-echelon logistics service providers as the research object, this paper studies the optimal decisions of each decision maker under the centralized and decentralized decision-making mode led by the retailer. Based on the decentralized decision-making mode, an improved coordination mechanism of residual profit sharing is designed to realize the interest coordination, in which the bargaining power of all participants is fully considered. The results show that, under the decentralized decision-making mode, the profit of FLSP increases first and then decreases as the sensitivity coefficient of cross-service level increases, while the profits of other decision makers and the supply chain system decrease with the increase of sensitivity coefficient of cross-service level. The relative size of the price sensitivity coefficient of online and offline channel has an inconsistent impact on the profit of FLSP, while it has a consistent impact on the profits of other decision makers. The profit of FLSP fluctuates greatly with changes in the sensitivity coefficient, and it is difficult to be guaranteed in the entire supply chain system. On this basis, an improved coordination mechanism of residual profit sharing is designed. The results show that, after the introduction of bargaining power coefficient of the Nash negotiation model, the variation coefficient of the profits of all decision makers is smaller after coordination, and the profit growth rates are more uniform.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Competing Retailers under Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism and Asymmetric Information

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiao-qing Zhang ◽  
Xi-gang Yuan ◽  
Da-lin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Recovery Rate ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Weee Recycling ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Decentralized Model

In manufacturer-led closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with two competing retailers, the retailer-1 recycles WEEE whose fixed recycling cost is asymmetric information. Using dynamics game theory and principal-agent theory, three dynamic game models are built including (1) benchmark model without reward-penalty mechanism (RPM); (2) decentralized model with carbon emission RPM; (3) decentralized model with carbon emission RPM and recovery rate RPM. This paper discusses the influence of RPM and retailers competition on the CLSC and members benefits. The results show that (1) the carbon emission RPM increases retail price, but decreases the WEEE recycling motivation usually. On the contrary, the recovery rate RPM guides WEEE recycling and lowers the retail price effectively. (2) In any case, the retailer-1’s profit is higher than that of the retailer-2; apparently it suggests that the retailer recycling WEEE gains competitive advantages. Furthermore, both the recovery rate RPM and retailers competition are beneficial to improve the competitive advantage. The relationship between two retailers’ retail price is affected by many complicated factors. (3) The WEEE buyback price and WEEE recovery rate with high fixed recycling cost (H-type) are always higher than that of low fixed recycling cost (L-type), respectively, which means that the H-type fixed recycling cost has scale advantages; the greater the reward-penalty intensity and the fiercer the competition, the more obvious the scale advantages under certain condition. (4) The retailers’ competition can not only guide WEEE recycling but also improve retailers’ profits. Meanwhile, the impact of competition on the manufacturer is related to RPM, but the fierce competition decreases the manufacturer’s profit.

Research on Supply Chain Profit Coordination Mechanism Based on JIT Lot-Splitting

2013 ◽  
Vol 694-697 ◽  
pp. 3466-3471
Author(s):  
Qin Lv
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Saving ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Total Cost ◽  
Lot Splitting ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Stackelberg Leader

A supply chain profit coordination mechanism based on JIT lot-splitting, which involves a two stage supply chain consisted of a supplier and a buyer, is discussed. Based on the bargaining power of supplier, the profit coordination with and without incentives are respectively explored. For the total cost minimizations of buyer and supplier separately, two stage stackelberg leader-follower game models, in which buyer is the leader and supplier is the follower, are established. Supplier applies JIT delivery to reduce buyer’s cost and the total cost of the supply chain via dividing buyer’s order per batch into some batches to deliver. Finally, a numerical example and a simulation analysis are given and the impact of the variation of relative parameters on the total cost saving of buyer, supplier and system is discussed. In addition, the efficiency of game decision on the basis of JIT lot-splitting is proved.

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