No creativity in legal translation?

Babel ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 355-368 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sieglinde E. Pommer

Whereas translating is generally considered to be a creative activity, mentioning this in the context of legal translation is, rather paradoxically, widely frowned upon despite the fact that the ­incongruency of legal systems makes finding exact equivalents particularly difficult in legal texts. Convinced that in fact translating the law requires taking insightful judgments, detecting interesting alternatives, coming up with novel ways to communicate ideas, and finding useful ­solutions to complex problems, the author examines the dynamic concept of creativity and redefines its meaning with regard to legal translation.

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 69-88
Author(s):  
Joanna WOŹNIAK

Terms and Phrases of Latin origin have been incorporated into the contempo-rary Continental and Anglo-Saxon legal systems. Latin borrowings are a sign of the common cultural and social origin of European countries. Most of the bor-rowings have been adapted on the phonetic, morphological and grammatical level. Others, like Latin proverbs, terms and phrases retained their original pronunciation and orthography.The main goal of this article is to discuss the essence of Latinisms, in particular their place in the contemporary linguistics and their function in legal texts. In the second part the article presents the results of the analysis of the Latin struc-tures, used in Polish and German legal texts, available in the Eur-lex databases. The research is aimed not only at comparing the occurrence of Latin terms, phrases or proverbs in legal documents, but also at showing the way of their introducing to the text and discussing the consequences of their usage for the understanding of the law.


Author(s):  
Hanne Grøn

It is impossible to set up standards of translation performance and equivalence which will apply to any legal translation because the "languages of law" are as varied as the cases that reach the courts every day. Moreover, the translation of legal texts is often complicated by the lack of exact lexical equivalents in the TL's own legal system so that a transfer involves a high amount of "creative production". Obviously this production should be based on a profound extra-linguistic knowledge of both legal systems involved to avoid the pitfalls which the difference in conceptual meaning necessarily entails. Thus research into the TL's substantive law must be the first requirement in any legal translation context.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 65-84
Author(s):  
Paweł BIELAWSKI

The focus of this paper is centered on the translation of German and Polish court names. Based on a thorough analysis of the translation terms used in legal literature and dictionaries, the author concludes that the court names are often being translated in a way that makes it impossible for the reader to correctly identify the institution in question, thus undermining the comprehensibility of the target texts significantly.Pointing to the differences between the court systems of Germany and Poland, the author contemplates whether the dissimilarities between two institutions from different legal systems need always to be marked in the translation. On the basis of the comparative law theory, the meaning features essential for both legal communication and legal translation are identified and presented.In the next part, the author examines how to translate the court names so that the institution at issue is instantly recognizable in the target text. As a result, three comprehensive translation techniques are proposed.The presented translation techniques shall contribute to improving the comprehensibility of legal texts, and constitute an alternative to the  descriptive translation of these institutions.


Author(s):  
Janny H.C. Leung

This chapter assesses the challenges in producing multilingual legal texts, especially where these texts are supposed to be equally authentic. The first of these challenges is translation. The risk is that a failure to achieve translation equivalence compromises legal certainty. Equivalence aside, there are also deeper political tensions in the process of legal translation: power struggles among speakers of the source and target language may be reflected in translation strategies adopted. Apart from translating the law, the legislature also needs to revise drafting procedures to ensure that different language versions of the law are consistent with one another, and that they respect linguistic equality where it is emphasized by the law. Where the new official language has not developed a legal vocabulary and a formal register, further linguistic engineering may be necessary. Sometimes ideological engineering is also called for.


Author(s):  
Servais Martial Akpaca

The aim of this paper is to make an inventory of the problems that translators encounter when they translate the documents issued by a specific African human rights court. More specifically translating at the ACHPR requires the knowledge of legal language and familiarity with a particular type of legal texts as well as competence in human rights conventions and charters and general translation skills. In an attempt to address these issues, this paper adopts a threefold approach, namely a historical approach recalling some legal systems and traditions upheld by courts, a theoretical approach throwing light on some key concepts and a lexical approach that makes it possible to extract legal terms from texts issued by the court and match them with their equivalents in the target language. The result of this research work is that legal translation is a specialised area due to the legal terms and systems involved in it. Unlike other specialised areas where the link between the signifier and the signified is fixed, in legal translation, the signified may be inflected due to differences between legal systems. Finding an equivalent for a legal term in another legal system or in a target language may beat times difficult and even impossible.


2017 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 355-363
Author(s):  
Weronika Szemińska

Abstract The purpose of the article is to present the innovative concept of a dictionary of equivalents, a reference work designed specifically for translators of legal texts. The article describes the features of legal terminology which render legal translation particularly difficult, such as polysemy and synonymy as well as incongruence among legal systems. Then it proposes a classification and labelling system of equivalents which ought to be offered in a terminographic reference work for legal translators.


2020 ◽  
Vol XI (33) ◽  
pp. 189-205
Author(s):  
Igor Lakić

Teaching translation of legal texts into English at the postgraduate level at the Faculty of Philology (formerly at the Institute of Foreign Languages), University of Montenegro, started in 2004. At this study programme, students face for the first time challenges of translating legal texts. Although they occasionally translate some legal texts at the undergraduate level, this is the first time that they study legal translation in a systematic way. This certainly produces some challenges, that may be mainly observed on two levels: (1) syntactic level, where some students produce English sentences that are literal translations of Montenegrin sentences; bearing in mind syntactic differences in the languages, this sometimes leads to a loss of meaning or distorted meaning in translations; and (2) lexical level, where there are differences in the English and Montenegrin legal systems, which certainly requires caution in translation; it is possible to identify some inconsistencies in using legal terminology because some Montenegrin concepts cannot be always simply transferred into English without looking more deeply into the legal systems. The paper discusses the notions of formal fidelity vs. fidelity to the “uniform intent” of the text (Šarčević, 1997) or what Hatim and Munday (2004) refer to as literal and free translation. These notions are crucial for my discussion of causes of errors in my students’ translations.


2002 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-100
Author(s):  
Raffaele Caterina

“A system of private ownership must provide for something more sophisticated than absolute ownership of the property by one person. A property owner needs to be able to do more than own it during his lifetime and pass it on to someone else on his death.”1 Those who own things with a long life quite naturally feel the urge to deal in segments of time. Most of the owner's ambitions in respect of time can be met by the law of contract. But contract does not offer a complete solution, since contracts create only personal rights. Certain of the owner's legitimate wishes can be achieved only if the law allows them to be given effect in rem—that is, as proprietary rights. Legal systems have responded differently to the need for proprietary rights limited in time. Roman law created usufruct and other iura in re aliena; English law created different legal estates. Every system has faced similar problems. One issue has been the extent to which the holder of a limited interest should be restricted in his or her use and enjoyment in order to protect the holders of other interests in the same thing. A common core of principles regulates the relationship between those who hold temporary interests and the reversioners. For instance, every system forbids holder of the possessory interest to damage the thing arbitrarily. But other rules are more controversial. This study focuses upon the rules which do not forbid, but compel, certain courses of action.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 465-488
Author(s):  
Thomas M.J. Möllers

AbstractThe Europeanisation of domestic law calls for a classical methodology to ‘update’ the established traditions of the law. The relationship between European directives and national law is difficult, since directives do apply, but European legal texts need to be implemented into national law. Whilst directives are not binding on private individuals, there is no direct third-party effect, but only an ‘indirect effect’. This effect is influenced by the stipulations of the ECJ, but is ultimately determined in accordance with methodical principles of national law. The ECJ uses a broad term of interpretation of the law. In contrast, in German and Austrian legal methodology the wording of a provision defines the dividing line between interpretation and further development of the law. The article reveals how legal scholars and the case-law have gradually shown in recent decades a greater willingness to shift from a narrow, traditional boundary of permissible development of the law to a modern line of case-law regarding the boundary of directive-compliant, permissible development of the law.


1972 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Watson

It is a commonplace that Rome's greatest contribution to the modern world is its law. Whether this is strictly true or not, Roman law is certainly the basis of the law of Western Europe (with the exception of England and Scandinavia), of much of Africa including South Africa, Ethiopia and in general the former colonies of countries in continental Europe, of Quebec and Louisiana, of Japan and Ceylon and so on. Perhaps even more important for the future is that International law is very largely modelled, by analogy, on Roman law. Just think of the perfectly serious arguments of a few years ago as to whether outer space (including the moon and planets) were res nullius or res communes and whether they were, or were not, susceptible of acquisition by occupatio. This persistence of Roman law has had undesirable consequences. First, Roman law as an academic subject has got into the hands of lawyers whose love of technicalities has frightened off classical scholars who tend not to use the legal sources. Secondly, scholars of antiquity, since Roman law is left well alone, have also been reluctant to look at other ancient legal systems. So have lawyers since these other systems have no ‘practical” value. Thirdly, following upon these but worse still, the usefulness of Roman law for later ages, coupled with its enforced isolation from other systems of antiquity, has often led to an exaggerated respect for it, and to its being regarded as well-nigh perfect, immutable, fit for all people. Many in “the Age of Reason” were ready to regard Roman law as “the Law of Reason”.


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