scholarly journals LATYNIZMY W TEKSTACH PRAWNYCH I PRAWNICZYCH – UJĘCIE KONTRASTYWNE POLSKO-NIEMIECKIE

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 69-88
Author(s):  
Joanna WOŹNIAK
Keyword(s):  
European Countries ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Social Origin ◽  
Legal Documents ◽  
Legal Texts ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Way

Terms and Phrases of Latin origin have been incorporated into the contempo-rary Continental and Anglo-Saxon legal systems. Latin borrowings are a sign of the common cultural and social origin of European countries. Most of the bor-rowings have been adapted on the phonetic, morphological and grammatical level. Others, like Latin proverbs, terms and phrases retained their original pronunciation and orthography.The main goal of this article is to discuss the essence of Latinisms, in particular their place in the contemporary linguistics and their function in legal texts. In the second part the article presents the results of the analysis of the Latin struc-tures, used in Polish and German legal texts, available in the Eur-lex databases. The research is aimed not only at comparing the occurrence of Latin terms, phrases or proverbs in legal documents, but also at showing the way of their introducing to the text and discussing the consequences of their usage for the understanding of the law.

Voices of Spectators and Audience Power

Pólemos ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Biet
Keyword(s):  
Social Relationship ◽  
The Other ◽  
Long Period ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Common ◽  
Dramatic Action ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Voice ◽  
The Way

AbstractTheatre and law are not so different. Generally, researchers work on the art of theatre, the rhetoric of the actors, or the dramaturgy built from law cases or from the questions that the law does not completely resolve. Trials, tragedies, even comedies are close: everybody can see the interpenetration of them on stage and in the courts. We know that, and we know that the dramas are made with/from/of law, we know that the art the actors are developing is not so far from the art of the lawyers, and conversely. In this paper, I would like to have a look at the action of the audience, at the session itself and at the way the spectators are here to evaluate and judge not only the dramatic action, not only the art of the actors, not only the text of the author, but also the other spectators, and themselves too. In particular, I will focus on the “common judgment” of the audience and on its judicial, aesthetic and social relationship. The spectators have been undisciplined, noisy, unruled, during such a long period that theatre still retains some prints of this behaviour, even if nowadays, the social and aesthetic rule is to be silent. But uncertainty, inattention, distraction, contradiction, heterogeneity are the notions which characterise the session, and the judgments of the spectators still depend on them. So, what was and what is the voice of the audience? And with what sort of voice do spectators give their judgments?

Defaming the Dead

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Herzog
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
Dead Person ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Dead ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Way

If you defame the dead, even someone who recently died, tort law does not think that’s an injury: not to the grieving survivors and not to the dead person. This book argues that defamation is an injury to the recently dead. It explores history, including the shaping of the common law, and offers an account of posthumous harm and wrong. Along the way, it offers a sustained exploration of how we and the law think about corpse desecration.

scholarly journals Better to Explain or to Testify? The Position of the Accused as a Source of Oral Evidence in a Criminal Trial in a Comparative Perspective

2021 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 47-77
Author(s):  
Hanna Kuczyńska
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Criminal Trial ◽  
Comparative Perspective ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Present Evidence ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Different Shapes ◽  
The Common ◽  
Oral Evidence

In this article the position of the accused as a source of personal evidence in three different European legal systems: Poland, Germany, and England, will be presented. This analysis will be oriented to understand the way of functioning of the two different models of giving statements of fact by the accused at a criminal trial. The main difference is that in the common law model of criminal trial the accused may only present evidence by testifying as a witness speaking about what happened, whereas in the continental model the accused gives a specific personal type of evidence (that in the Anglo-Saxon literature is rather described as “oral evidence”) that is known as explanations. From this differentiation several consequences arise: among others, the possibility of presenting untruthful explanations and presenting many versions of events in the continental model which have to be assessed by the judges. At the same time, the same right of the accused to silence and not to give incriminating evidence applies in both models of criminal trial – however, in two different shapes and with different types of limitations.

scholarly journals RZYMSKA SOCIETAS A PARTNERSHIP SYSTEMU COMMON LAW

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 151
Author(s):  
Ewa Dziuban
Keyword(s):  
Early Stage ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Similar Solution ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Legal Form ◽  
Exact Answer ◽  
Outer World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Way

ROMAN SOCIETAS AND THE COMMON LAW PARTNERSHIPThe construction of roman societas in comparison with the common law partnership was the subject of authors inquiry. The idea was to find whether these two contracts, being created in a very different time and situation, with ages of various experiences between them, could, in some way, resemble. In other words - is that possible that the similar aim of the contracts determined the shape of the legal form?Both constructions were analysed stressing their most significant points.The comparison was led due to the pattern established by the author, created to make it more readable.As a result every characteristic was composed of the following parts:1. description of the contract’s nature;2. types of the contract;3. inner relations between partners;4. societas/partnership in relation to outer world;5. dissolving the contract.On this basis author examined the findings.The pointed conclusions seemed to provide a very interesting start for further inquiries. The reason for this is, as it occurred, that between two legal systems, existing in separate ages and conditions, with settled opinion on their incompatibility, more than few similarities can be found.Author did not give a straight answer to the question why these similarities really exist. In fact she provides at least two possible explanations without prejudice.Actually to give a more exact answer deeper studies shall be undertaken. However even at this very early stage it can be said, that both constructions, even though so faraway in various dimensions from each other, developed compatible solutions on their way to find the best idea how the goal can be achieved. And this goal, as it occurred from the contracts’ nature, seemed to be analogous.Is the similar solution a question of reception? Or maybe both systems parallel found the way, which occurred to be the best and, in the same time, convergent? Maybe the catalogue of best solutions is closed and sooner or later every system shall come to it?These questions must be asked. Even if or especially that the answers are neither easy nor immediate.Author finished this first stage of her studies leaving them open but with the reservation that inquiry will be continued.

Obligations from Artifacts

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian H. Bix
Keyword(s):  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Coordination Problems ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Recent Approach ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Way

A persistent question in modern legal philosophy is whether or how (human-created) legal rules and legal systems can produce moral obligations for citizens. Contemporary theorists have sought answers to this problem in the ideas of conventions, coordination problems, and plans. Some theorists argue that the law—that all legal rules—create general and at-least-presumptive moral obligations; others argue that the law, at best, occasionally triggers pre-existing moral obligations—some legal rules creating moral obligations for some people. This chapter explores the issue of how and when law creates moral obligations, and also considers a more recent approach to the nature of law which has raised doubts regarding whether the law is in fact artifactual in the way most theorists (and most citizens) believe.

scholarly journals A Comparative Study of Absolute Liability Offense in Iran and the UK

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 135
Author(s):  
Seyed Mohammad Mousavi ◽  
Arash Babaei ◽  
Shamsollah Khatami ◽  
Yousef Jafarzadi
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Study ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Objective Measure ◽  
Legal Texts ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Uk ◽  
First Time

<p>One characteristic of the force of law in the country, the integrity of the rules in all areas of all aspects of creation into account the distinction between crime and the crime and failed or incomplete in acts of crime and crime as the withdrawal. In this respect the rules on penalties culpability in the crime has been proposed that the content of the crime with absolute responsibility of these categories has manifested. Under the Articles 144 and 145 of the Latest version Islamic criminal law (2013), Create unintentional offenses, subject to verification of the fault committed. In crimes ranging from quasi-intentional unintentional deviation as retaliation book rules apply. Legislator to commit a fault, the reason for the error is considered criminal, which has always been considered an objective measure and a ruler (in Article 145), while the common law under subsection (1) "criminal law to crimes" adopted 1981 crime start as the offense is punishable total. This study showed that certain similarities between the laws. In this context, the two internal laws and the common law can be found, in which the underlying offense of absolute liability is not fixed in the courts. Always treat judges and lawyers in the face of legal texts are not consistent because of the lack of transparency and clarity of the rules. In particular, in the common law, when a crime for the first time in cour t, and a warrant has been issued about it in terms of predicting the law and with regard to the interpretation of judges, procedural difference is more tangible.</p>

Convergence or Divergence in Text and Context? Reflections on Constitutional Preambles in the Constitution-making Exercises of Post-independence Cameroon and Post-apartheid South Africa

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Ngambu Wanki
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
South Africa ◽  
African Country ◽  
The United States ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Per Se ◽  
The Law ◽  
Western Nations ◽  
Constitution Making

In this article, I attempt to establish the need for the convergence of the spirit of the law—the Preamble—and the letter of the law—the provisions of the Constitution of Cameroon contained in its articles. First, I adduce prototypes or archetypes of ‘Jacobin constitutionalism’ and Anglo-Saxon-style constitutionalism as benchmarks through which I evaluate the extent to which the spirit and letter of the law of the Constitution of Cameroon have been converged. Having established the incongruence of the Preamble with these prototypes, I have referred to the Constitution of post-apartheid South Africa as a fitting paradigm that entrenches modern constitutionalism against which the Preamble to the Cameroon Constitution can be compared, revisited and revised. South Africa has been selected based on the view that, as another African country, it would serve as a more appropriate benchmark for reviewing the Preamble to the Cameroon Constitution than those of the United States, France or other Western nations, which might result instead in a skewed logic. Also, both countries have similar legal systems and historical experiences. A juxtaposition of the two constitutional preambles vividly exposes the lapses in the Cameroon example. As a result, I have suggested that the Cameroon Constitution be amended for the purposes of reviewing its Preamble to bring it into line with the conventional requirements of democratic preambles and to transform the formal demands of the Preamble as tangible demands placed on a government through entrenched provisions. Reasons have been advanced in support of the necessity for including preambulatory clauses in a constitution without which the intent of the constitution per se would be deferred.

No creativity in legal translation?

Babel ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 355-368 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sieglinde E. Pommer
Keyword(s):  
Legal Systems ◽  
Creative Activity ◽  
Complex Problems ◽  
Legal Translation ◽  
Legal Texts ◽  
The Law

Whereas translating is generally considered to be a creative activity, mentioning this in the context of legal translation is, rather paradoxically, widely frowned upon despite the fact that the ­incongruency of legal systems makes finding exact equivalents particularly difficult in legal texts. Convinced that in fact translating the law requires taking insightful judgments, detecting interesting alternatives, coming up with novel ways to communicate ideas, and finding useful ­solutions to complex problems, the author examines the dynamic concept of creativity and redefines its meaning with regard to legal translation.

Discretion and Security: Excluding Evidence under Section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984

1990 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
C.J.W. Allen
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Rule Of Thumb ◽  
The Common ◽  
Political Compromise ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Of Evidence ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
The Way

Among rules of law Karl Llewellyn noted at one extreme the “rule-of-thumb, in which the flat result is articulated, leaving behind and unexpressed all indication of its reason”. At the other extreme was “the way of principle, in which the reason is clearly and effectively articulated, and that articulation is made part of the very rule”. The vice of principle, he observed, “can be a vaporish vagueness, and the techniques of its effective formulation are not easy to isolate for communication and use”. Partly for this reason, partly perhaps because of its origin in a last-minute political compromise, section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 at first confounded attempts to predict the manner of its application. One commentary suggested that it was “of no practical use”; there were dicta in the Court of Appeal to the effect that it did “no more than to re-state the power which judges had at common law before the Act of 1984 was passed”. A leading work on the law of evidence expressed the view that the sub-section was “cast in terms of such vagueness and generality as to furnish little guidance to the court”. There has been some development since those early days. It now seems clear that the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is to be regarded as a codifying Act which has to be looked at on its own wording. Section 78(1), therefore, does not merely re-state the position at common law. It is also clear that in its operation it overlaps section 76 and, through section 82(3), some of the common law. Section 78(1) may be applied in a variety of situations, with or without the presence of some element of impropriety in the way in which the evidence was obtained. Basic questions about its operation nevertheless remain.

TOLERANCE OF INCOHERENCE IN LAW, GRADED SPEECH ACTS AND ILLOCUTIONARY PLURALISM

Legal Theory ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 214-249
Author(s):  
Oren Perez
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Speech Acts ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Lexical Semantic ◽  
Inferential Model ◽  
Conflicting Demands ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Way

AbstractOne of the most difficult challenges of mature legal systems is the need to balance the conflicting demands of stability and flexibility. The demand for flexibility is at odds with the principle of impartiality, which is considered a cornerstone of the rule of law. In the present article, I explore the way in which the law copes with this dilemma by developing the idea of tolerance of incoherence. I argue that tolerance of incoherence emerges from the interplay between the inferential and lexical-semantic rules that determine the meaning of legal speech acts. I base this argument on an inferential model of speech acts, which I develop through a discussion of graded speech acts, and on the idea that the use of speech acts is governed by multiple and potentially conflicting conventions. I show how this tolerance allows the law to resolve the tension between dynamism and traditionality, and discuss its sociological and moral implications.

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