Managing International - Civil Militarized Conflicts (I-CMC): Empirical Patterns

Civil Wars ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Paul F. Diehl ◽  
Andrew P. Owsiak ◽  
Gary Goertz
2021 ◽  
Vol 07 (03) ◽  
pp. 2150012
Author(s):  
Sahar Farid Yousef

More than one-quarter of the world’s population lives in water-scarce areas, while most countries share at least one transboundary river. If water scarcity is this prevalent, should we expect riparian countries to fight over the water allocation of shared rivers? To answer this question, I develop a modified one-shot three-stage river-sharing game where countries can resort to force to solve their water allocation problem. Using backward induction, I solve for the probability of the downstream country initiating conflict against the upstream country and the likelihood of the latter responding with force to the former’s hostile actions. I test the model empirically using a set of all upstream–downstream riparian dyads with available data from AQUASTAT and the Correlates of War Project for the years 1960–2010. The main contribution of this paper is that it demonstrates how upstream and downstream riparian countries differ in their decision to use force against the other country when experiencing water scarcity. I find that water scarcity increases the likelihood of the downstream country initiating the conflict, but it has no effect on the upstream country’s likelihood of responding with force. If history is a predictor of the future, then the results imply that as more riparian countries become water-scarce, militarized conflicts between upstream and downstream countries are likely to increase, especially if there is heterogeneity in water availability between the riparian dyad.


Author(s):  
Andrew A Szarejko

Abstract The question of whether war can ever truly be accidental has been the subject of much academic debate. To provide my own answer to this question, I use an oft-ignored part of US history—the so-called Indian Wars between Native nations and an expanding United States. Specifically, this research innovation makes use of three militarized conflicts of the nineteenth century—the Black Hawk War (1832), the Cayuse War (1847–1855), and the Hualapai War (1865–1870)—to provide evidence that war can indeed occur accidentally. I conclude that IR scholars should be less confident in asserting that accidental war does not happen and that this possibility counsels restraint for policy-makers, especially in emerging domains of conflict.


2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (4) ◽  
pp. 757-780 ◽  
Author(s):  
ETEL SOLINGEN

Although turmoil characterized both the Middle East and East Asia in the two decades following World War II, the two regions looked dramatically different at the dawn of the twenty-first century. Since 1965 the incidence of interstate wars and militarized conflicts has been nearly five times higher in the Middle East, as was their severity, including the use of ballistic missiles and chemical weapons. By contrast, declining militarized conflict and rising intraregional cooperation has replaced earlier patterns in East Asia. There are no systematic efforts explaining this contrast betweenBella Levantinaand an evolvingPax Asiatica. This article traces these diverging paths to competing domestic models of political survival. East Asian leaders pivoted their political control on economic performance and integration in the global economy, whereas Middle East leaders relied on inward-looking self-sufficiency, state and military entrepreneurship, and a related brand of nationalism. I examine permissive and catalytic conditions explaining the models' emergence; their respective intended and unintended effects on states, military, and authoritarian institutions; and their implications for regional conflict. The final section distills conceptual and methodological conclusions.


Author(s):  
Erik Voeten

Today's liberal international institutional order is being challenged by the rising power of illiberal states and by domestic political changes inside liberal states. Against such a backdrop, this book offers a broader understanding of international institutions by arguing that the politics of multilateralism has always been based on ideology and ideological divisions. The book develops new theories and measures to make sense of past and current challenges to multilateral institutions. It presents a straightforward theoretical framework that analyzes multilateral institutions as attempts by states to shift the policies of others toward their preferred ideological positions. It then measures how states have positioned themselves in global ideological conflicts during the past seventy-five years. Empirical chapters illustrate how ideological struggles shape the design of international institutions, membership in international institutions, and the critical role of multilateral institutions in militarized conflicts. The book also examines populism's rise and other ideological threats to the liberal international order. It explores the essential ways in which ideological contestation has influenced world politics.


2020 ◽  
pp. 002190962097057
Author(s):  
Akbar Khan

I employ Steps-to-War theory to analyze interstate wars in the Middle East by adding an additional escalating step: state sponsorship of non-state actors. Remarkably, however, the present scholarship completely overlooks a comprehensive assessment of the impacts and roles of state-sponsored terrorism on escalation of interstate militarized conflicts. None of the conflict studies focuses on state-sponsored terrorism and escalation of interstate conflict. This gap still exists despite a remarkable growth in the conflict literature. This article argues that the Steps-to-War thesis is a useful framework for understanding why states end up fighting wars by answering the questions: How does state-sponsored terrorism escalate interstate conflict? And how does each step intertwine with other steps and make war more likely? This paper’s primary argument is that state-sponsored terrorism increases the likelihood of war by providing another escalating step in conjunction with other steps and, therefore, aligns with Steps-to-War theory, and is one of the leading escalating factors. Ultimately, this article argues that this claim has a solid basis, and the Middle Eastern cases vividly demonstrate the escalatory ability of state-sponsored terrorism because state-sponsored terrorism interacts with and reinforces other escalating factors.


2009 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 39-59
Author(s):  
Hyung Min Kim

Classical liberals such as Immanuel Kant have argued that expanding political participation and increasing economic interdependence would promote peace among states. The purpose of this paper is to use a game theoretical method to explore both pillars of the “liberal peace” hypothesis, one of the most frequently studied determinants of the onset of militarized conflicts. The paper focuses on two important contributions from related literature: Crescenzi's (2000) proposition that the linkage between economic interdependence and political conflict is unstable or more complex than the current theory of international bargaining suggests and Fearon's (1994) argument that relative audience costs (either domestic or international) matter in the international crisis situation (a political “war of attrition”). After revising Crescenzi's (2000) economic exit model using Fearon's (1994) audience cost argument, four different equilibriums in the international bargaining model emerged: the economic exit equilibrium, the constraint equilibrium, the bargaining power equilibrium, and the escalation equilibrium. This paper also provides seven examples of the bargaining game to demonstrate how these four equilibriums emerged.


2011 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hyung Min Kim ◽  
Deokro Lee ◽  
Richard C. Feiock

2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (Fall 2021) ◽  
pp. 95-118
Author(s):  
Şener Aktürk

How compatible is Turkey’s grand strategy with the grand strategies of global great powers? This article briefly summarizes principles of Turkish grand strategy, both from a descriptive and normative point of view, and then proceeds to outline and compare the grand strategies of five great powers that are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). While there are some observable conflicts between Turkey and the French, Russian, and American proxies in Syria, Libya, and the Caucasus, there are no outstanding militarized conflicts between Turkey and the British proxies. China is also positioned against Turkey in several international conflicts including Syria, and the intense persecution of Turkic Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang adds another dimension of latent Chinese-Turkish conflicts. The article provisionally concludes that the Turkish grand strategy seems to be most compatible, or least incompatible, with the British grand strategy, followed by the U.S. grand strategy, among the five permanent members of the UNSC, whereas Turkish and French and especially Russian grand strategies seem particularly incompatible.


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