Part 4 Constitutionalism and Separation of Powers, 4.3 The Separation of Powers in a Fragmented State: The Case of Lebanon

Author(s):  
Koch Cordelia

This chapter analyzes the Lebanese Constitution in the light of consociational democracy. It begins with an overview on the political system to highlight the formal consensus requirements based on affiliation with one of the main religious groups in the country. It examines the evolution of confessional power-sharing, which is supplemented by the traditional family-based feudal lord system. It then explores the historical interplay of state-building, civil wars, and existing political frictions which still contribute to what the Lebanese Constitution is about today. Next, the chapter outlines the constitutional development regarding consociational democracy, emphasizing the different consensus-mechanisms now incorporated in the written constitution. This shows how the Lebanese political system diverges from the classical Montesquieu system and creates its own separation of powers through consensus mechanisms.

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 250-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thibaut Jaulin

No major citizenship reform has been adopted in Lebanon since the creation of the Lebanese citizenship in 1924. Moreover, access to citizenship for foreign residents does not depend on established administrative rules and processes, but instead on ad hoc political decisions. The Lebanese citizenship regime is thus characterized by immobilism and discretion. This paper looks at the relationship between citizenship regime and confessional democracy, defined as a system of power sharing between different religious groups. It argues that confessional democracy hinders citizenship reform and paves the way to arbitrary naturalization practices, and that, in turn, the citizenship regime contributes to the resilience of the political system. In other words, the citizenship regime and the political system are mutually reinforcing.


2019 ◽  
pp. 148-157
Author(s):  
BEHAR SELIMI

The political system of Kosovo belongs to the power sharing democracies. Indeed, it has all the characteristics of Consociational Democracy. In addition to that, minority veto rights are absolute and go above the aims of this type of democracy. As it is designed in current Constitutional arrangements, even a single word of Constitution can’t be changed without minorities’ vote. This is different from other Consociational Democracies, where minorities are entitled with selected veto power only regarding their vital interests, but they cannot block constitutional decision-making. Since Kosovo is among the youngest countries worldwide, this constitutional provision can be a heavy obstacle even in the state building efforts of majority.  Therefore, in this article we will try to explain in depth this constitutional arrangement versus principles of sharing power systems and versus similar democracies in the region and wider. The doctrinal constitutional interpretation, descriptive and comparative methods are the main pillars of research methodology.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (10) ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Emad Wakaa Ajil

Iraq is one of the most Arab countries where the system of government has undergone major political transformations and violent events since the emergence of the modern Iraqi state in 1921 and up to the present. It began with the monarchy and the transformation of the regime into the republican system in 1958. In the republican system, Continued until 2003, and after the US occupation of Iraq in 2003, the regime changed from presidential to parliamentary system, and the parliamentary experience is a modern experience for Iraq, as he lived for a long time without parliamentary experience, what existed before 2003, can not be a parliamentary experience , The experience righteousness The study of the parliamentary system in particular and the political process in general has not been easy, because it is a complex and complex process that concerns the political system and its internal and external environment, both of which are influential in the political system and thus on the political process as a whole, After the US occupation of Iraq, the United States intervened to establish a permanent constitution for the country. Despite all the circumstances accompanying the drafting of the constitution, it is the first constitution to be drafted by an elected Constituent Assembly. The Iraqi Constitution adopted the parliamentary system of government and approved the principle of flexible separation of powers in order to achieve cooperation and balance between the authorities.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (58) ◽  
pp. 9-24
Author(s):  
Dariusz Skrzypiński

The article provides an analysis of PiS1. actions with respect to the judiciary. PiS is the ruling party in Poland since 2015. It implemented very deep institutional reforms and took intensive communication measures of propaganda-like discrediting nature which brought significant political consequences. Firstly, the principles of rule of law and separation of powers were breached leading to a departure from standards of liberal democracy. Secondly, very strong polarisation of attitudes occurred in the society and legal elites with respect to the introduced reforms, causing politicisation of the judiciary and confrontation inside the judiciary between those in favour and those against the government’s actions.


Author(s):  
Michael A. Bailey ◽  
Forrest Maltzman

Justices have considerable latitude to pursue either their personal preferences or their personal visions of the law. The danger is that the Court gets so far out of line from the rest of the political system that we see fundamental institutional showdowns that threaten the independence of the judiciary, such as the Court-packing controversy in the 1930s. If the elected branches influence justices, however, they can keep the Court in check, thereby attenuating such risks. This chapter tests whether the Court systematically yields to the elected branches. In particular, it examines whether individual justices vote differently when the constraints imposed by the executive and legislative branches are likely to be at their strongest. It focuses on the two versions in the literature: one in which the Court is constrained only on statutory cases and the other in which the constraint extends to all cases, including constitutional cases.


2020 ◽  
pp. 0308518X2094852
Author(s):  
Miles Kenney-Lazar ◽  
SiuSue Mark

Since the mid- to late- 1980s, Laos and Myanmar (Burma) have gradually and unevenly opened their economies to capitalist relations of accumulation. Both countries have done so by granting state land concessions to private capital for resource extraction and land commodification projects, particularly since the early 2000s. Yet, resource capitalism has manifested in distinct ways in both places due to the ways in which capital has interacted with unique pre-capitalist political-economic and social relations as well as the diverse political reactions of Lao and Myanmar people to capitalist transformations. In this paper, we analyze such differences through a conceptualization of ‘variegated transitions’, an extension of the variegated capitalism framework, which investigates the political economic transitions towards capitalism in marginalized, resource extractive countries of the Global South. In Myanmar, the transition from military to democratic rule has been marked by protests and land occupations combined with center-periphery fragmentation and ongoing civil wars, all of which have led to a heavily contested process of land concession granting. In contrast, a stable, comparatively centralized political system in Laos that restrains popular protest has enabled an expanding regime of land concessions for resource extraction projects, albeit hemmed in at the edges by sporadic, localized forms of resistance and appeals to the state.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-215
Author(s):  
Masataka Kimura

This article explores ways to realize minority over-representation through elections without pre-determination, and presents new options in designing electoral systems for consociational democracy. Specifically, the article considers seat-cap imposition and regressive representation, which are compatible with the principle of self-determination in deciding what ethnic groups should participate in power sharing, to overcome pre-determination-related problems in consociationalism. The pertinent questions to be discussed include how minority over-representation can be justified, how it can be balanced with the principle of ‘one person, one vote, one value’, and how to prevent possible collusive strategies by parties to artificially increase seats.


Author(s):  
Margit Bussmann

A major challenge for countries that emerge from civil war is the stabilization of the post-conflict order in a way that fighting does not break out again. Recent empirical and theoretical work on the resolution of civil wars and on the duration of peace strongly rely on the bargaining framework of war emphasizing information asymmetries and commitment problems as main reasons for why in some states civil wars recur repeatedly, whereas in other societies a conflict ends and a transition to a peaceful society is successful. The length of peace spells depends partly on information about the distribution of power that became available during the conflict, captured by the duration and intensity of the fighting as well as the type of conflict ending. Information problems are more relevant at earlier stages and with regard to the initiation of negotiations. In finding bargaining deals and securing their implementation, the conflict parties have to overcome commitment problems. The literature has investigated in more detail third-party security guarantees and power-sharing arrangements as mechanisms to get conflict parties to credibly commit to and adhere to a negotiated agreement. Recently, empirical research moved beyond the conclusion of peace agreements to the study of their implementation. Particular challenges for a peaceful order are the demobilization of ex-combatants, which is aggravated by time-inconsistency problems, the timing of elections, and the redistribution of economic resources. Finally, solutions become more difficult in multiparty conflicts and if the armed groups are fragmented.


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