scholarly journals MINORITY VETO RIGHTS IN KOSOVO’S DEMOCRACY

2019 ◽  
pp. 148-157
Author(s):  
BEHAR SELIMI

The political system of Kosovo belongs to the power sharing democracies. Indeed, it has all the characteristics of Consociational Democracy. In addition to that, minority veto rights are absolute and go above the aims of this type of democracy. As it is designed in current Constitutional arrangements, even a single word of Constitution can’t be changed without minorities’ vote. This is different from other Consociational Democracies, where minorities are entitled with selected veto power only regarding their vital interests, but they cannot block constitutional decision-making. Since Kosovo is among the youngest countries worldwide, this constitutional provision can be a heavy obstacle even in the state building efforts of majority.  Therefore, in this article we will try to explain in depth this constitutional arrangement versus principles of sharing power systems and versus similar democracies in the region and wider. The doctrinal constitutional interpretation, descriptive and comparative methods are the main pillars of research methodology.

Author(s):  
Mirsad Karić

This paper outlines the theoretical underpinnings of the consociational power-sharing approach and its presence in the political system of the post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina. The power-sharing framework used in this study provides insights into the theory of consociationalism as a power-sharing approach and tries to contribute to our understanding of the presence and relevance of this model to the Bosnian political system. The consociational framework emphasises the role of the political elites in providing the political stability and economic prosperity in the heterogeneous societies. It has four main features: grand coalition, proportional representation, segmental autonomy and mutual veto. The functioning and performance of this model depends, to a large extent, on factors that are conducive to elite cooperation. These factors are: population size, balance of power among segments, multiparty system, segmental isolation, nature of social cleavages, overarching loyalties and tradition of elite accommodation. This paper shows that all features of consociationalism exist in the post-Dayton Bosnian political system. However, grand coalitions are always made after the elections and mainly for the distribution of positions in the executive bodies of state apparatus and without any strategic platform and goals to be achieved and accounted for, agreed in advance. Proportionality has been mainly replaced with the parity-giving rise to imbalanced representation in state institutions. Segmental autonomy has been misconceived and veto power has been used to block all legislation beneficial to the state.


1973 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 332-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
Léon Dion

THE DIVERSIFICATION IN THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION AND the growth of the political system have increased the number of instances of decision-making and intensified the relations between social and political forces. Parties and pressure groups are not enough in themselves to channel the interests, ideologies, and stresses, originating in the social system, into the political system. Nevertheless, during the last forty years, other, less familiar channels have broadened considerably and of these it is what we call the consultative councils which have made the greatest impact. So much has their importance grown in recent years that they must be considered as a mechanism of systemic interaction, comparable in weight to those of the pressure groups or parties. The consultative councils have, in fact, become a major cog in the political system and any attempt to exclude them is doomed to failure.


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 250-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thibaut Jaulin

No major citizenship reform has been adopted in Lebanon since the creation of the Lebanese citizenship in 1924. Moreover, access to citizenship for foreign residents does not depend on established administrative rules and processes, but instead on ad hoc political decisions. The Lebanese citizenship regime is thus characterized by immobilism and discretion. This paper looks at the relationship between citizenship regime and confessional democracy, defined as a system of power sharing between different religious groups. It argues that confessional democracy hinders citizenship reform and paves the way to arbitrary naturalization practices, and that, in turn, the citizenship regime contributes to the resilience of the political system. In other words, the citizenship regime and the political system are mutually reinforcing.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-166
Author(s):  
Yukako Sakabe Tanaka

Why do some political groups choose to remain militant when they have the opportunity to transform into political parties or become members of state organs? By scrutinizing the power-sharing negotiations held before a country’s first election, this article argues that the group that leads the negotiations faces the challenge of accepting or declining the policy proposed by its counterpart who poses a threat of violence. Even if the counterpart proposes policy that is acceptable to the leading faction, fulfilling the commitment in regard to the political deal is another challenge for the leading faction. Such challenges often fail and consequently cause violence. In contrast, some counterparts can successfully transform themselves into non-violent political agencies regardless of whether they make compromises in policies or not. Third parties can play a vital role in avoiding violence by influencing actors’ decision-making or enhancing the leading faction’s ability to achieve its commitment. The article illustrates this argument by presenting a formal model and then testing the model by examining the case of Timor-Leste. It suggests specific conditions required for negotiations under which armed groups transform into peaceful actors when introduction of democracy and state-building are ongoing.


1975 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 397-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Z. Paltiel

ANALYSTS OF THE ISRAELI POLITICAL SYSTEM HAVE COMMONLY attributed the stability of the polity to factors closely associated with the role played by the various Israeli parties in the state's economic and social life, and/or to the existence of a dominant, institutionalized state-building party. The consociational approach ought to help to clarify those factors which have maintained the stability of the coalition system which has governed the state of Israel since its establishment in 1948 and whose roots may be traced back as far as 1933 and even earlier.The consociational model and the theory of elite accommodation have been elaborated in an effort to explain the maintenance of continuing political stability in what at first glance would appear to be societies deeply divided along social, economic, ethnic, religious and ideological lines. Political stability in fragmented societies from this standpoint rests on the overarching commitment of the political elites to the preservation and maintenance of the system and their readiness to cooperate to this end.


Author(s):  
D. B. Grafov

The article is about how pro-Israel and pro-China interest groups try to lobby on the ground of Capitol, White House and executive branch. The study of the lobbying results is based on «General theory of action» T. Parsons. It is concluded that for lobbying interests the main point will be the representation of the interests in the political and public spaces and the creating of advocacy and lobbying infrastructure. The ability of the Israeli lobby to achieve the goal can be explained, firstly, by political inclusion in the decision-making process, and, secondly, by almost axiomatic representation Israel interests through the national interests of the United States. The Israeli lobby can be considered as the religious lobby. It can use the possibilities of Jewish religious organizations in grass root action. Also this gives the opportunity to avoid the requirements of the LDA. From the point of view of the theory of Talcott Parsons, the success of the Israeli lobby is the cause of the action of a large number of actors that may form in large groups. Another advantage of the Israeli lobby is the ability of its members to get relevant information about the current situation in different spheres of political life in the U.S. The objective of the present study was to reveal the ways in which China lobby succeeds. The influence of China lobby on decision-making process in the United States can be explained through strong economic ties between American corporations and the Chinese market. When lobbying China uses numerous Chinese Diaspora in many States, as well as trying to interest of the former high-ranking American officials, granting them special privileges for doing business in China. In comparison to the Israeli lobby, the Chinese lobby has weaknesses. Chinese interest groups are not included in the political system of the USA and this is the disadvantage of the Chinese way of lobbying. Unlike Israel lobby Chinese one is external. The interests of the chinese pressure groups do not coincide with American national interests. Their actors are not rooted in the American political system.


Author(s):  
Renáta Mikešová ◽  
Tomáš Kostelecký

Election laws regulate the number of deputies who are elected in individual electoral districts, and set them in relation to the population, respectively to the number of voters participating in elections in individual regions. Elected deputies could thus be regarded as political representatives of citizens living in electoral districts. However, under systems of proportional representation, current deputies represent the ideology of the party to which they belong rather than the region. Nevertheless, it makes sense to study the spatial distribution of the places of origin and residence of members of parliament and their changes over time, because it suggests much about the political system and the system of representative democracy in the country. The spatial distribution of places of residence of candidates and elected members indicates not only the territorial proportionality and geographic representativeness, but also the shifting centers of political power. The analysis clearly confirms the gradual decentralization and regionalization of political power in the country, which stands in contrast to the centralization of power in the economy, this latter trend apparent from the concentration of economic management and decision-making in the largest cities, especially in Prague.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sulfia Andika ◽  
Egi Saputra ◽  
Dista Setya Ningsih ◽  
Sarabila Sarabila ◽  
Alimas Jonsa

Aceh as a special autonomous region according to the mandate contained in the Aceh Government Law (UUPA) No. 11 of 2006 which gives authority to Aceh,one of which can form a local party and regional regulations (qanun) themselves. The specificity of Aceh is the result of reconciliation between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian Government in an effort to resolve endless conflicts. After a conflict resolution effort is realized, to supervise and participate in carrying out the cousre of the UUPA the GAM ex-combatants are now participating in politics which is a better alternative in seeking justice and the rights of the people of Aceh. Therefore, this study aims to find out how much the influence of former GAM combatants on politics in Aceh and the indicators used to enter the political system in Aceh, especially in the districts of West Aceh and Nagan Raya. The methodology used in this study is the qualitative research methodology, with the descriptive approach expected in this study the results found are, in the form of conclusions and suggestions that can build both for former GAM combatants and for the community in their involvement in political implementation in Aceh. Keyword: Influence, Combatants, Aceh


Author(s):  
Koch Cordelia

This chapter analyzes the Lebanese Constitution in the light of consociational democracy. It begins with an overview on the political system to highlight the formal consensus requirements based on affiliation with one of the main religious groups in the country. It examines the evolution of confessional power-sharing, which is supplemented by the traditional family-based feudal lord system. It then explores the historical interplay of state-building, civil wars, and existing political frictions which still contribute to what the Lebanese Constitution is about today. Next, the chapter outlines the constitutional development regarding consociational democracy, emphasizing the different consensus-mechanisms now incorporated in the written constitution. This shows how the Lebanese political system diverges from the classical Montesquieu system and creates its own separation of powers through consensus mechanisms.


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