Finland and the European Union

Author(s):  
Teija Tiilikainen

Finland joined the European Union together with Austria and Sweden at the beginning of 1995. At first glance, Finnish membership appeared as a rapid change of political orientation, given the inflexible policy of neutrality the country had maintained until the early 1990s. In spite of the brevity of national adaptation and consideration, the decision to follow Sweden and submit an application for EU membership was based on an overwhelming political consensus. All the major political elites, including party and interest organizations, key actors in the private sector, and the media were in favor of Finnish membership. In the referendum for EU membership in October 1994, membership was supported by 57% of the people. A stable popular support characterized the Finnish EU policy for the first 15 years of its EU membership and distinguished Finland from its Nordic neighbours in the EU. The popular approach was anchored in a perception of EU membership representing a comprehensive change from the country’s difficult position in the Cold War era to full-fledged membership in the Western community. Finland thus joined the EU’s currency union as the only Nordic member state and adopted a constructive approach toward more integration in most policy fields. It was only in the context of the economic and financial crisis of 2008–2009 that Finnish public opinion became—at least temporarily—heavily polarized by the EU question. This resembled the situation in many other EU member states. During the two decades of Finland’s EU membership, the country has experienced a Europeanization of its political system and legislation. EU membership has contributed to a further parliamentarization of Finland’s semi-presidential political system with EU affairs being designated to the powers of the government and coordination of policies taking place at the prime minister’s office. Due mainly to EU membership, the Finnish Parliament has also become an influential actor in foreign and European policies. Finland has smoothly adjusted to the EU’s policies and has become a persistent proponent of the EU’s unity in external relations. Since the first years of its EU membership, the country has been in favor of majority decisions and a stronger role played by the commission and the EP in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It has also gone through a major change in its legislation on crisis management and the tasks of defense forces to be able to better fulfill membership commitments to the EU’s security and defense policies. After the polarization of EU opinion taking place in the framework of the general elections of 2011, and leading to the emergence of an anti-EU “Finns Party” as the third-largest party in Finland, a more consensual atmosphere has recently returned with increasing levels of public support to EU membership. The Finns Party first made its way to the governmental coalition together with the two largest center-right parties in 2015, which significantly softened its EU criticism and moved its focus to an anti-immigration agenda. Finally, in 2017 the Finns Party was split into two parts with the more moderate part practically failing to establish itself in parliamentary or European elections of the spring 2019.

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 188-209
Author(s):  
Andrew S. Ross ◽  
Aditi Bhatia

The sweeping tide of populism across the globe has given rise to isolationist sentiments that call for the closing of national borders and a return to nativist roots. This has been most evident in Britain in terms of the controversial vote to exit the European Union (EU) during the 2016 referendum (to Leave or Remain) and more recently with the lead up to a general election and mounting pressure on the government to implement an exit strategy. The most vocal proponent of the “leave” movement was the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), reframing the debate on EU membership in terms of invasion and oppression. This paper focuses on precisely this discursive construction of the EU by analyzing UKIP campaign posters through application of Bhatia’s Discourse of Illusion framework on three levels: historicity (use of the past to justify the present or predict the future), linguistic and semiotic action (subjective conceptualizations of reality made apparent through metaphorical rhetoric), and degree of social impact (emergence of delineating categories through ideological narrative).


Author(s):  
Giselle Bosse

In early 2014, a series of dramatic crises in Ukraine generated headlines around the world. Most scholarly attention was placed on the tensions between the West and Russia, and the emergence of a new Cold War, especially following Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula and its military incursion in eastern Ukraine. The relations between Ukraine and the European Union (EU) have often been reduced to debates on whether the EU was to blame for the conflict, having “sleepwalked” into the Ukraine crisis by focusing on technical trade issues and failing to recognize the delicate geopolitical context. Other analysts pointed to the EU’s pursuit of regional hegemony, which has failed to recognize Russia’s legitimate geopolitical and economic interests in Ukraine. In practice, Ukraine-EU relations have been more complex and nuanced, certainly when considering that Ukraine already declared its ambition to “return to Europe” and to seek EU membership with its proclamation of independence, in 1991. Ukraine-EU relations are perhaps best understood along four levels of inquiry. The first is domestic dynamics in Ukraine. Since the end of the Cold War, all Ukrainian governments have underlined the “Europeanness” of Ukraine and have also by and large followed a pro-EU course in their foreign policies, including the government under pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych. However, Ukraine’s European choice has often been limited to foreign-policy declarations. Even the pro-European and reform-oriented governments that led Ukraine after the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2014 Maidan Square protests struggled to introduce far-reaching reforms because of the power of the “iron triangle” of oligarchic rule, corruption, and financial instability. The second line of inquiry concerns Ukraine-Russia relations. Since gaining independence, Ukraine’s strategy has been one of limited participation in Russia’s post-Soviet regional integration initiatives in order to safeguard its independence. However, Russia always used “sticks and carrots” vis-à-vis Ukraine to further its own policy objectives, ranging from offering gas-price discounts to cutting off gas supplies, imposing import bans on Ukrainian produce, and, since 2014, threatening and using the military to force Ukraine to acquiesce to its demands. A third line of inquiry is the EU’s policy toward Ukraine, based on bilateral relations and cooperation through the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership. The EU has approached Ukraine as one among several neighbors in its attempt to build a ring of well-governed countries along its borders. Although the EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe generated more interest in Ukraine, member states have consistently ruled out EU membership for Ukraine. A fourth theme of inquiry is that of EU-Russia relations in the wider international context. Throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s, the EU clearly prioritized good political and economic relations with Russia over its relationship with its neighbors in the East, including Ukraine. Even when Russia annexed Crimea and when evidence of the role of Russian forces in eastern Ukraine had become impossible to ignore, the EU struggled to find a common stance on Russia.


1998 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 419-441 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karlheinz Neunreither

IT IS NOT EASY TO CHARACTERIZE THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) AS A political system. The main comprehensive approaches have at least partly failed, and we have to admit that the EU is neither completely neo-functional, nor intergovernmental, nor pre-federal. We may call it sui generis, but this does not carry us very far.On the other hand, we continue to apply in our analyses of the EU notions which originated in classical national democratic systems. This is true not only for the structures – above all the institutions – but for the processes as well. To add to our dilemma, recent studies on policy-making show us that the EU is far less homogeneous than one might imagine and that there are substantial differences from one policy area to another. But even if the EU is mainly a negotiating system, an authority which is clearly responsible for its outcomes should nevertheless exist. In a classical parliamentary system the government and the parliamentary majority fulfil this function. The minority may mainly oppose the majority and press for alternative solutions, or it may use its influence for reaching a compromise; it is generally agreed that a structured opposition is a constituent part of a democratic political system.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-122
Author(s):  
Ewa Kaczan-Winiarska

The Austrian government is extremely sceptical about the accession negotiations which are conducted by the European Commission on behalf of the European Union with Turkey and calls for the negotiation process to end. Serious reservations of Vienna have been raised by the current political situation in Turkey under the rule of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as well as by the standards of democracy in Turkey, which differ greatly from European standards. Serious deficiencies in rule of law, freedom of speech and independence of the judiciary, confirmed in the latest European Commission report on Turkey, do not justify, from Vienna’s point of view, the continuation of talks with Ankara on EU membership. In fact, Austria’s scepticism about the European perspective for Turkey has a longer tradition. This was marked previously in 2005 when the accession negotiations began. Until now, Austria’s position has not had enough clout within the European arena. Pragmatic cooperation with Turkey as a strategic partner of the EU, both in the context of the migration crisis and security policy, proved to be a key factor. The question is whether Austria, which took over the EU presidency from 1.7.2018, will be able to more strongly accentuate its reservations about Turkey and even build an alliance of Member States strong enough to block Turkey’s accession process.


2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksander Lust

In referenda held in 2003, over 90% of Lithuanians supported joining the European Union (EU), while only two-thirds of Estonians did. Why? This article shows that Lithuanians and Estonians had different economic expectations about the EU. Most Lithuanians hoped that EU membership would help Lithuania overcome its economic backwardness and isolation. By contrast, many Estonians worried that the accession would reinforce Estonia's underdevelopment and dependency on the West. I argue that these expectations reflected the two countries' strategies of economic reform. Lithuania sold state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to their managers and continued to trade heavily with Russia, which slowed down the modernization of its economy. Estonia sold SOEs to foreigners and reoriented its trade rapidly from Russia to the West, which hurt its traditional sectors (particularly agriculture) and infrastructure.


2007 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 507-514
Author(s):  
Ivan Vuković

In this paper we researched European Union starting with the Agreement from Maastrich from year 1992, even though the European Union has a long traditional history and its origin is founded on regulations of economical integrations in Europe beginning from the 1950’s through the Roman treaty from year 1957 and the forming of the European Union Committee in year 1965. Further we follow her expansion and introduction of the European economic and monetary policy, to last, the joining perspective of Croatia. According to the Agreement from Maastrich, European Union lies on three posts: 1) Legal-political and regulative post, 2) Economical post, where the forming of European economical and monetary policy is in the first plan, especially the introducing of Euro as the unique European currency, 3) Post of Mutual foreign security policy within European Union. In that context we need to highlight the research conducted here and in European Union, including the world, regarding development of European Union and its economical, legal, political and cultural, as well as foreign diplomatic results, which are all perspectives of European Union. All the scientists and researches which were involved in exploring the development of EU with its modern tendencies and development perspective, agree that extraordinary results are achieved regards to economical, legal, political, foreign-security and diplomatic views, even tough many repercussions exist in progress of some particular members and within the EU as a whole. The biggest controversy arises in the perspective and expanding of European Union regarding ratification of the Constitution of EU from particular country members, but especially after the referendum was refused from two European countries, France and Netherlands. According to some estimates, the Constitution of EU would have difficulty to be adopted in Switzerland and some other Scandinavian countries, but also in Great Britain and other very developed countries. However the European Community and European Union were developing and expanding towards third European countries, regardless of Constitutional non-existence, where we can assume that if and when the Constitution of EU will be ratified, the EU will further develop as one of the most modern communities. This will enable economical development, especially development of European business, unique European market and free trade of goods and services, market of financial capital and labour market in free movement of labour. Being that EU has become one of the most largest dominating markets in the world, it offers a possibility to all new members to divide labour by using modern knowledge and high technology which insure economical, social and political prosperity. This results to forming a society of European countries which will guarantee all rights and freedom of development for all nations and ethnic groups. As well as, all European countries with somewhat less sovereignty, but in international relations will be stronger and significant, not only in sense of economics, but also in politics and military diplomatic relations. Therefore, Croatia has no choice and perspective if she does not join the European Union till year 2010, but until than it needs to create its strategy of economical and scientific-technological development, including demographic development, which will insure equal progress of Croatia as an equal member of European Union.


Author(s):  
Dmitrii О. Mikhalev ◽  
◽  
Egor’ A. Sergeev ◽  

The article presents a retrospective analysis of relations between the government of Italy and the European Union institutions in the context of supranational fiscal regulation in 2002–2019. The authors analyze the influence of external and internal factors on the state of public finance in Italy, note the reasons that made it difficult to meet the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact, study the main issues on the agenda in the EU-Italy relations and their evolution. The authors also come to conclusion that unlike the earlier discussions about correcting budget deficit in Italy, current focus of supranational fiscal governance is shifted to preventing it, what challenges the economic sovereignty of Italy and country’s opportunities to conduct a discretionary fiscal policy.


2021 ◽  
pp. 43-59
Author(s):  
Tomasz Dubowski

In the discussion on the EU migration policy, it is impossible to evade the issue of the relation between this policy and the EU foreign policy, including EU common foreign and security policy. The subject of this study are selected links between migration issues and the CFSP of the European Union. The presented considerations aim to determine at what levels and in what ways the EU’s migration policy is taken into account in the space of the CFSP as a diplomatic and political (and subject to specific rules and procedures) substrate of the EU’s external action.


2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. e72661
Author(s):  
Ariadna Ripoll

This conclusion to the special issue reflects on the evolution of European integration since the early 1990s in order to better understand the contested origins of the Treaty of Lisbon and the consequences the latter have had for the EU’s political system. It considers the various contributions of the special issue and shows how the Treaty emerged in an era of shifting cleavages, disputed steps towards a more political Union and rising populism. This legacy has led to more polarisation and politicisation – a phenomenon that the Treaty of Lisbon struggles to encapsulate and conciliate with the culture of consensus and compromise inherent to its institutional structures. As a result, we observe a bias towards policy stability – and even failure – that affects the legitimacy and democratic standards of the European Union. In a context of polycrisis, the difficulty to find compromises – especially in highly normative issues – leads to the de-politicisation of the EU and reinforces the gap between EU institutions and its citizens. The COVID-19 pandemic is a window of opportunity for the EU, in which to choose between integration and disintegration; between values and inaction.


2007 ◽  
Vol 41 (10) ◽  
pp. 1349-1370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Manow ◽  
Holger Döring

Voters who participate in elections to the European Parliament (EP) apparently use these elections to punish their domestic governing parties. Many students of the EU therefore claim that the party—political composition of the Parliament should systematically differ from that of the EU Council. This study shows that opposed majorities between council and parliament may have other than simply electoral causes. The logic of domestic government formation works against the representation of more extreme and EU-skeptic parties in the Council, whereas voters in EP elections vote more often for these parties. The different locations of Council and Parliament are therefore caused by two effects: a mechanical effect—relevant for the composition of the Council—when national votes are translated into office and an electoral effect in European elections. The article discusses the implications of this finding for our understanding of the political system of the EU and of its democratic legitimacy.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document