Heuristics and Biases in Political Decision Making

Author(s):  
Celine Colombo ◽  
Marco R. Steenbergen

Heuristics have rapidly become a core concept in the study of political behavior. The term heuristic stems from the ancient Greek heuriskein, which means “to discover.” In psychology and political science, the term is used to describe cognitive shortcuts in decision making under uncertainty. The key idea is that decision makers with limited time, information, or resources use such shortcuts, thereby bypassing a certain amount of information to reach appropriate decisions. In this sense, heuristics contrast with classical rational choice. Using heuristics allows efficient decision making but can lead to biases, errors, and suboptimal decisions. Heuristics allow decision makers to draw inferences, to fill in information gaps, and to form an impression of the decision at hand. Indeed, they may be the only way to come to grips with uncertainty, especially when a decision is urgent. In political science, the concept of heuristics, originating in mathematics, economics, and psychology, has long been hailed as a possible remedy to citizens’ lack of political knowledge. Citizens participate in democratic decisions, but these decisions often pose high cognitive and informational demands. Ideally, citizens with little information about a political issue or about a candidate could use heuristics in order to reach decisions resembling those of their more well-informed peers. More recently, however, the possible biases introduced by reliance on heuristics, in particular partisan bias and a lack of consideration of different alternatives, has received more attention. Moreover, some studies show that heuristics can be used most efficiently by voters who are relatively well informed and highly interested in politics. The question of whether, or under which circumstances, heuristics can be a useful tool for democratic decision making has not yet been answered conclusively.

2017 ◽  

Politics is about conflict, struggle, decision-making, power and influence. But not every conflict and not every situation in which power is exercised is widely regarded as politics. A football coach who decides to leave a player on the bench because he has given him a bit of lip, is exerting power, and there is conflict here, too. However, few people would consider this a political issue. The same applies to a mother who quarrels with her adolescent daughter about going to a house party, a schoolteacher who gives a student detention, and so on. But if we were to limit our understanding of politics to official decisions that are taken by governments, in parliaments or on municipal councils, we would fail to recognise the political meaning of trade unions, lobbyists, protest groups, corporations and other more-or-less organised groups that influence collective decision-making.


2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 124-148
Author(s):  
Eryan Ramadhani

Abstract The study of political decision-making cannot exclude the actors involved in the process. Neither can it disregard the interplay between decision-makers and political institution where they operate. This article aims to explain how perception of survival affects decision-making by focusing on leaders, specifically by analysing Benigno S. Aquino III’s leadership (2010–2016). Built on political psychology, I will show that motivation to maintain power may bias leaders’ reasoning leading to suboptimal decision. Accountability can help leaders mitigate bias, or de-bias, by stimulating their use of cognitive complexity. But the same effort may backfire and make leaders resort to heuristics instead. Where leaders end up in the cognitive spectrum depends on the types of audiences to whom they feel accountable: core (the ruling elites and loyal voters) and external (the opposition and its supporters) audiences. Preoccupation with core audiences can make leaders downplay the opposition challenge. Furthermore, leaders’ perceived understanding of their support base may be erroneous. The result is overconfidence in their perception of survival. I argue that President Aquino’s misperception of survival was rooted in his belief that (1) Filipinos would like to have his legacy continued and that (2) his popularity would help his successor Manuel Araneta Roxas II win the 2016 presidential race. This overconfidence turned out to be detrimental. Roxas’s electoral loss to Rodrigo Duterte put an end to the Daang Matuwid, President Aquino’s good governance platform.


Author(s):  
Charles A. Miller

The “sunk costs fallacy” is a popular import into political science from organizational psychology and behavioral economics. The fallacy is classically defined as a situation in which decision-makers escalate commitment to an apparently failing project in order to “recoup” the costs they have already sunk into it. The phenomenon is often framed as a good example of how real decision-making departs from the assumption of forward-looking rationality which underpins traditional approaches to understanding politics. Researchers have proposed a number of different psychological drivers for the fallacy, such as cognitive dissonance reduction, and there is experimental and observational evidence that it accurately characterizes decision-making in certain contexts. However, there is significant skepticism about the fallacy in many social sciences, with critics arguing that there are better forward-looking rational explanations for decisions apparently driven by a desire to recoup sunk costs – among them reputational concerns, option values and agency problems. Critics have also noted that in practical situations sunk costs are informative both about decision makers’ intrinsic valuation for the issue and the prospects for success, making it hard to discern a separate role for sunk costs empirically. To address these concerns, empirical researchers have employed a number of strategies, especially leveraging natural experiments in certain non-political decision making contexts such as sports or business, in order to isolate the effects of sunk costs per se from other considerations. In doing so, they have found mixed support for the fallacy. Research has also shown that the prevalence of the sunk costs fallacy may be moderated by a number of factors, including the locus of decision-making, framing, and national context. These provide the basis for suggestions for future research.


Author(s):  
Yotam Shmargad ◽  
Samara Klar

The field of political science is experiencing a new proliferation of experimental work, thanks to a growth in online experiments. Administering traditional experimental methods over the Internet allows for larger and more accessible samples, quick response times, and new methods for treating subjects and measuring outcomes. As we show in this chapter, a rapidly growing proportion of published experiments in political science take advantage of an array of sophisticated online tools. Indeed, during a relatively short period of time, political scientists have already made huge gains in the sophistication of what can be done with just a simple online survey experiment, particularly in realms of inquiry that have traditionally been logistically difficult to study. One such area is the important topic of social interaction. Whereas experimentalists once relied on resource- and labor-intensive face-to-face designs for manipulating social settings, creative online efforts and accessible platforms are making it increasingly easy for political scientists to study the influence of social settings and social interactions on political decision-making. In this chapter, we review the onset of online tools for carrying out experiments and we turn our focus toward cost-effective and user-friendly strategies that online experiments offer to scholars who wish to not only understand political decision-making in isolated settings but also in the company of others. We review existing work and provide guidance on how scholars with even limited resources and technical skills can exploit online settings to better understand how social factors change the way individuals think about politicians, politics, and policies.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anubha Taneja Mukherjee

Decision making is an inherently complicated procedure, which by its very nature requires the decision-maker to co-opt all the stakeholders concerned. The procedure of decision-making may vary from country to country, depending on its size, culture, history and special demographic circumstances. Around the world, key decision-makers include the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. While the distribution of powers between these three may vary in tandem with their relation to each other, their roles remain the same. While the legislature enacts laws for its citizens, the executive, popularly known as the government, implements these laws and while doing so promulgates policies that are in alignment with the said laws. Mostly, the executive is also authorised to promulgate some laws of its own. The judiciary, on the other hand, comes into the picture when there is a dispute with regard to such laws. It also steps in on its own at times. While settling such disputes, the judiciary also ends up setting what we know as precedents, which also become a part of the legal fabric of a society. In a nutshell, these three are the key decision makers in any country. As mentioned above, while making decisions, these authorities are mostly required to co-opt all the stakeholders concerned, thereby making decision making a consultative process. These stakeholders include think tanks, research bodies, media and most importantly the affected party. The reason for having such a consultative procedure in place is that the decision makers are not experts in every subject or issue that comes their way. For instance, when a need to promulgate a national policy on thalassemia presents itself to a certain government, whether it be owing to media reportage or representations from the civil society, the decision makers will look towards people considered to be the experts in the subject to come forward and be a part of the policy making. One could say that this sounds like an ideal situation where the government actually invites people concerned with thalassemia to come forward and share views about it for the purpose of policy making. It is, however, true! It is as true for India as it is for any developed country. What we must ensure then is that the government or the decision maker considers us, the patients, as the experts. While it does sound obvious that those impacted with the disorder would be the ones with the first-hand knowledge about the disorder, the very fact that there is a topic in this conference on the role of patients in decision making speaks volumes about the distance that remains to be covered by the patients of thalassemia as far as participation in decision-making is concerned. With the massive strides in the field of medical science and the unflinching support of organisations like Thalassemia International Federation (TIF), we have now reached the stage where we must step out of the victim mode and represent ourselves before the decision-makers, whether by forming Patients Advocacy Groups or otherwise. One may take cue from various associations around the world. Global HD Organisations are a good example. They are known to have got together to give patients a voice in clinical research. The most popular strategy for reaching out to the decision makers is to unite, engage, and partner both in private meetings and consultative fora like events, task forces and projects. “Unite, Engage & Partner” can therefore be the most successful mantra for engaging with the decision makers. Talking of examples of advocacy and participation by patients, while there are numerous examples in Europe and North America of the power of patient advocacy so much so that patients are on the same level as doctors when it comes to voicing opinions in policy making, TIF on an international level has created since 2009 the Expert Patients Programme, and is now moving forward in giving patients a voice through its educational platform. Recently, India also launched its first Thalassemia Patients Advocacy Group (PAG) in the august presence of the Deputy Chief Minister of the capital of the country. The India PAG has seven patients from the fields of law, psychology, education and IT. The Group is already involved with the government on the formulation of the National Thalassemia Policy. This is a great start and this should give enough and more encouragement to thalassemics across the world to UNITE, ENGAGE AND PARTNER in the process that impacts them the most – decision-making!


Author(s):  
Pascal D. König ◽  
Georg Wenzelburger

AbstractThe promise of algorithmic decision-making (ADM) lies in its capacity to support or replace human decision-making based on a superior ability to solve specific cognitive tasks. Applications have found their way into various domains of decision-making—and even find appeal in the realm of politics. Against the backdrop of widespread dissatisfaction with politicians in established democracies, there are even calls for replacing politicians with machines. Our discipline has hitherto remained surprisingly silent on these issues. The present article argues that it is important to have a clear grasp of when and how ADM is compatible with political decision-making. While algorithms may help decision-makers in the evidence-based selection of policy instruments to achieve pre-defined goals, bringing ADM to the heart of politics, where the guiding goals are set, is dangerous. Democratic politics, we argue, involves a kind of learning that is incompatible with the learning and optimization performed by algorithmic systems.


Author(s):  
Wissam Saleh Abdul-Hussein Jassim Al-Rub

The Iranian Constitution of 1979 and the amendment of 1989 considered the Supreme Leader of the Iranian Islamic Revolution the most powerful institution in influence and presence in the political system. The guide, directly or indirectly, through the agencies operating under his administration, and here we say that the political vision of the wali al-Faqih governs its authority over all the perceptions of decision-makers in their formulation and implementation of strategic decisions that achieve the goals of the Iranian regime at home and abroad.


2011 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 321-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHAN KARLSSON SCHAFFER

AbstractRecently, theorists have sought to justify transnational democracy by means of the all-affected principle, which claims that people have a right to participate in political decision-making that affects them. I argue that this principle is neither logically valid nor feasible as a way of determining the boundaries of democratic communities. First, specifying what it means to be affected is itself a highly political issue, since it must rest on some disputable theory of interests; and the principle does not solve the problem of how to legitimately constitute the demos, since such acts, too, are decisions which affect people. Furthermore, applying the principle comes at too high a cost: either political boundaries must be redrawn for each issue at stake or we must ensure that democratic politics only has consequences within an enclosed community and that it affects its members equally. Secondly, I discuss three possible replacements for the all-affected principle: (a) applying the all-affected principle to second-order rules, not to decisions; (b) drawing boundaries so as to maximise everyone's autonomy; (c) including everyone who is subject to the law. I conclude by exploring whether (c) would support transnational democracy to the extent that a global legal order is emerging.


1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 553-566 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Mintz ◽  
Nehemia Geva ◽  
Steven B. Redd ◽  
Amy Carnes

Previous studies of political decision making have used only “static” choice sets, where alternatives are “fixed” and are a priori known to the decision maker. We assess the effect of a dynamic choice set (new alternatives appear during the decision process) on strategy selection and choice in international politics. We suggest that decision makers use a mixture of decision strategies when making decisions in a two-stage process consisting of an initial screening of available alternatives, and a selection of the best one from the subset of remaining alternatives. To test the effects of dynamic and static choice sets on the decision process we introduce a computer-based “process tracer” in a study of top-ranking officers in the U.S. Air Force. The results show that (1) national security decision makers use a mixture of strategies in arriving at a decision, and (2) strategy selection and choice are significantly influenced by the structure of the choice set (static versus dynamic).


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