Adam Smith, the Competitive Process, and the Flawed Consumer Welfare Standard

2020 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-13
Author(s):  
Warren Grimes
Keyword(s):  
Adam Smith ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Allocation Of Resources ◽  
Competitive Process ◽  
Narrow Focus ◽  
Consumer Prices ◽  
Distribution Chain ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Scottish economist Adam Smith wrote in 1776 that the collective buying and selling of individuals would result in the preferred allocation of society’s resources. That insight has endured and is the basis for the competition law goal of fostering and protecting the competitive process. That goal, with venerable roots on both sides of the Atlantic, has been sidetracked by emergence of the consumer welfare standard, which is now preeminent in competition law analysis. The narrow focus of the consumer welfare standard has led to confusion and misdirected decisions that do not adequately protect the competitive process. I point to confusion about who is the buyer and who is the seller in many transactions, and describe why that classification should, in any event, be irrelevant in applying competition law. When competition is distorted, the central goal of protecting the process and ensuring a preferred allocation of resources is undermined, regardless of the impact on the consumer. The proper welfare standard is unconcerned with where the harm occurs. The standard focuses on anticompetitive conduct at any level of the distribution chain and regardless of whether the anticompetitive effects are directed upstream at sellers or downstream at buyers. The symmetric standard is rooted in competition law decisions on both sides of the Atlantic; it is sound in theory and, compared to the consumer welfare standard, is easier to explain and apply. It more comfortably honors the broader goals of competition, including promoting entry, innovation, and choices for both entrepreneurs and consumers. I assess how this symmetric welfare standard would apply to mergers and classic predatory or exclusionary conduct. The standard offers hope of simplifying analysis and better serving ancillary goals of competition. Fostering and preserving efficiency, enhancing output, and maintaining low consumer prices are among the highly valued benefits of the competitive process, but they are not determinative. The focus must remain on the central goal of preserving the competitive process.

Is “Privacy” a Means to Protect the Competition or Advance Objectives of Innovation and Consumer Welfare?

2020 ◽  
pp. 106-124
Author(s):  
Arletta Gorecka
Keyword(s):  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Multidimensional Approach ◽  
Privacy Concerns ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Eu

The relationship between competition law and privacy is still seen as problematic with academics and professionals trying to adequately assess the impact of privacy on the competition law sphere. The chapter looks at the legal development of the EU merger proceedings to conclude that EU competition law is based on the prevailing approach and assesses decisions involving data through the spectrum of keeping a competitive equilibrium in hypothetical markets. Secondly, it considers the legal developments in the EU Member States' practice, which acknowledges the apparent intersection between the phenomena of competition law and privacy. This chapter attempts to propose that privacy concerns appear to hold a multidimensional approach on competition legal regime; nevertheless, it does not result in the need of legal changes within the remits of competition law, as the privacy concerns are already protected by the data protection and consumer protection law.

Anticompetitive Agreements

2020 ◽  
pp. 49-64
Author(s):  
David J. Gerber
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Consumer Prices ◽  
Limited Enforcement ◽  
The World ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Global Patterns ◽  
Case Based

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 examine the targets of competition law. Key questions: Why is the conduct considered harmful? How is it pursued—for example, which remedies are used? What are the incentives and obstacles in pursuing the conduct? Where is enforcement likely—global patterns? Chapter 5 answers these questions for the two types of anticompetitive agreements. The first type includes horizontal agreements—that is, agreements between competitors. These are the most commonly pursued and heavily penalized violations in the world. Where such an agreement influences a market, it necessarily restrains competition, reducing efficiency, harming consumer welfare, impinging on economic freedom, and interfering with economic development. All competition laws target them, but they also allow justifications such as the need for cooperation in research, and competition laws vary significantly in the extent to which they allow such justifications. Vertical restraints—for example, between a manufacturer and a distributor—have a very different profile. They include, for example, agreements to fix consumer prices and to divide markets. Economists call for case-based analysis to determine their effects, and often such effects are difficult to prove, so competition laws in which economic analysis is central typically face limited enforcement against them. Many other competition laws contain specific rules condemning them.

3. The goals and scope of competition and antitrust laws

2021 ◽  
pp. 28-37
Author(s):  
Ariel Ezrachi
Keyword(s):  
South Korea ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Competitive Process ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Antitrust Laws ◽  
The World ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
The Eu

‘The goals and scope of competition and antitrust laws’ evaluates the goals and scope of competition and antitrust laws. Competition laws seek to protect the competitive process in the marketplace from companies that seek to distort it. By safeguarding free and fair markets, competition laws promote consumer welfare as well as efficiencies in the marketplace. While key competition law principles are similar across the world, competition laws are not internationally uniform, but are instead customized by each jurisdiction. A comparison can be made between US Federal Antitrust Law and the EU competition law. There are also other jurisdictions that apply competition laws, including China, Japan, and South Korea.

Global Food Commodity Prices and Domestic Food Inflation: Some Insights from Morocco

New Medit ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed EL GHIN ◽  
Mounir EL-KARIMI
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate Regime ◽  
Commodity Prices ◽  
Food Prices ◽  
Consumer Prices ◽  
Floating Exchange Rate ◽  
Pass Through ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Food Inflation ◽  
Global Food ◽  
Domestic Food

This paper examines the world commodity prices pass-through to food inflation in Morocco, over the period 2004-2018, by using Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model on monthly data. Several interesting results are found from this study. First, the impact of global food prices on domestic food inflation is shown significant, which reflects the large imported component in the domestic food consumption basket. Second, the transmission effect is found to vary across commodities. Consumer prices of cereals and oils significantly and positively respond to external price shocks, while those of dairy and beverages are weakly influenced. Third, there is evidence of asymmetries in the pass-through from world to domestic food prices, where external positive shocks generate a stronger local prices response than negative ones. This situation is indicative of policy and market distortions, namely the subsidies, price controls, and weak competitive market structures. Our findings suggest that food price movements should require much attention in monetary policymaking, especially that the country has taken preliminary steps towards the adoption of floating exchange rate regime.

Interrelationship Among Competition, Diversification and Liquidity Creation: Evidence from Indian Banks

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-204
Author(s):  
Pankaj Sinha ◽  
Naina Grover
Keyword(s):  
Inverse Relationship ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Adverse Impact ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Jel Codes ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Private Banks ◽  
Indian Banks ◽  
The Impact

This study analyses the impact of competition on liquidity creation by banks and investigates the dynamics between diversification, liquidity creation and competition for banks operating in India during the period from 2005 to 2018. Using the broad and narrow measures of liquidity creation, an inverse relationship is determined between liquidity creation and competition. The study also indicates a trade-off between pro-competitive policies to improve consumer welfare and the liquidity-destroying effects of competition, and it highlights how diversification affects liquidity creation. Highly diversified banks in India create less liquidity compared with less-diversified banks, both public and private. The liquidity-destroying effects of competition is intensified among highly diversified private banks, which suggest that diversification has not moderated the adverse impact of competition. JEL Codes: G01, G18, G21, G28

scholarly journals Agricultural subsidies and global greenhouse gas emissions

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Laborde ◽  
Abdullah Mamun ◽  
Will Martin ◽  
Valeria Piñeiro ◽  
Rob Vos
Keyword(s):  
Agricultural Production ◽  
Ghg Emissions ◽  
Farming Systems ◽  
Government Support ◽  
Consumer Prices ◽  
High Emission ◽  
The Government ◽  
Agriculture And Food ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Global Emissions

AbstractAgricultural production is strongly affected by and a major contributor to climate change. Agriculture and land-use change account for a quarter of total global emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). Agriculture receives around US$600 billion per year worldwide in government support. No rigorous quantification of the impact of this support on GHG emissions has been available. This article helps fill the void. Here, we find that, while over the years the government support has incentivized the development of high-emission farming systems, at present, the support only has a small impact in terms of inducing additional global GHG emissions from agricultural production; partly because support is not systematically biased towards high-emission products, and partly because support generated by trade protection reduces demand for some high-emission products by raising their consumer prices. Substantially reducing GHG emissions from agriculture while safeguarding food security requires a more comprehensive revamping of existing support to agriculture and food consumption.

Die europäische Agrarpolitik vor dem Hintergrund der Osterweiterung

2003 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Reimar von Alvensleben ◽  
Bernhard Brümmer ◽  
Ulrich Koester ◽  
Klaus Frohberg
Keyword(s):  
Agricultural Policy ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
World Market ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Niche Markets ◽  
Member States ◽  
Regional Food ◽  
Direct Payments ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Eu

AbstractReimar von Alvensleben asks in his article whether the “Agrarwende” in Germany could be a model for Europe. He argues that the new agricultural policy (the so-called “Agrarwende”), which has been proclaimed and implemented after the German BSE crisis 2000/2001, adds new problems to the already existing problems of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The strategy of improving international competitiveness of German agriculture by promoting the niche markets for organic food, animal-friendly produced food and regional food is unrealistic and thus neglecting the problem of improving the competitiveness of 85−90% of German agriculture. The criterion of ecological efficiency (How to achieve ecological goals at lowest costs?) is totally neglected in agricultural environmental policy. The strategy of implementing environmental and animal welfare standards by the market mechanism will not lead to reasonable results because of perception distortions of the consumers. As a consequence of distorted perception of food risks by politicians, cost of risk prevention are too high and/or safety and health standards in other less spectaculous areas are too low. For these reasons he concludes that the “Agrarwende” in Germany cannot be regarded as a model for Europe, especially not for Eastern Europe.Bernhard Brümmer and Ulrich Koester write in their paper that the Eastern Enlargement of the EU will have significant implications for governance of the CAP. The evolution of the CAP has led to a permanent increase in the intensity of regulation, although the rate of external protection has declined. Past experience - mainly revealed by the European Court of Auditors - has evidenced many irregularities and even fraud as a by-product of the CAP. Governance problems are due to badly designed policies, which demand control of even individual farms and give the member countries, administrative regions (which are supposed to implement the policies on the local scale) and the individual farms themselves incentives to breach the rules. In their view governance problems will certainly increase in the enlarged EU. The new member countries have a weaker administrative capacity and are subject to more corruption than the present EU countries. Adequate policy reaction should lead to fundamental changes of the CAP.Klaus Frohberg argues that in its Mid Term Review the EU-commission proposes a change in the most important instruments of the CAP. Direct payments and intervention prices belong to this group. In his paper the impact of these changes is discussed. Direct payments shall become decoupled from production and be summarised into a single payment to farmers. In addition, the right of these transfers shall be made tradable independent of a simultaneous exchange of land. With regard to the intervention prices they shall be reduced as to approach world market levels. Assuming that the Member States will confirm the proposals the CAP is expected to improve considerably. Allocation and transfer efficiency will increase, consumer welfare will go slightly up, taxpayers will be little if at all affected and the EU can defend its position in the negotiations of the ongoing WTO round. These advantages accrue to the current as well as to the new Member States. In spite of the improvements the CAP still needs to be enhanced in some areas such as the market organisation of sugar and milk.

Anticompetitive Effects in EU Competition Law

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Ibáñez Colomo
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Time Variable ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competitive Disadvantage ◽  
Probability Threshold ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Freedom Of Action

Abstract This article examines the meaning and scope of the notion of anticompetitive effects in EU competition law. It does so by bringing together several strands of the case law (and this across all provisions, namely Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and merger control). The analysis is structured around a framework that considers the main variables that shape the notion in practice: the time variable (actual or potential effects); the dimensions of competition and the counterfactual; the meaning of effects and the probability threshold (plausibility, likelihood, certainty). The exercise shows that it is possible to discern a concrete meaning to the notion of anticompetitive effects. Some central questions, including the role and operation of the counterfactual and the threshold of effects, have already been answered by the Court of Justice. In particular, it has long been clear that anticompetitive effects amount to more than a mere competitive disadvantage and/or a limitation of a firm’s freedom of action. The impact on equally efficient firms’ ability and/or incentive to compete would need to be established. At the same time, some open questions and some potential areas of friction (relating, inter alia, to stakeholders’ tendency to conflate appreciability and effects) remain. These are also discussed.

Implications of Price Matching in Supply Chain Negotiation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weixin Shang ◽  
Gangshu (George) Cai
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Price Matching ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Multiple Buyers ◽  
Wholesale Pricing

Problem definition: Few papers have explored the impact of price matching negotiation (PM), in which a channel matches its price with the resulting wholesale price bargained by another channel, on firms’ performances, consumer welfare, and social welfare, with and without supply chain coordination. Academic/practical relevance: Negotiation has been widely seen in determining both uniform and discriminatory wholesale prices, which affect outcomes of competitive supply chain practices. Methodology: To characterize the PM mechanism, we use game theory and Nash bargaining theory to compare PM with simultaneous negotiation (SN) through a common-seller two-buyer differentiated Bertrand competition model. Results: Our analysis reveals that PM can benefit the seller but hurt all buyers, which is at odds with some fair wholesale pricing clauses intending to protect buyers. Under coordination with side payments, however, all firms can conditionally benefit more from PM than from SN. Despite firms’ gains, PM leads to less consumer utility and social welfare compared with SN, unless the second buyer in PM is considerably less powerful than the first buyer. Coordination further worsens PM’s negative impact on consumer utility and social welfare. Moreover, the existence of a spot market can increase the wholesale price in PM, hurting buyers, consumers, and society. Furthermore, the qualitative results about PM remain robust under an alternative disagreement point for PM, multiple buyers, and other extensions. Managerial implications: This paper delivers insights on when price matching in supply chain wholesale price negotiation can benefit a seller, buyers, consumers, and society in a variety of scenarios. It advocates how managers can use PM to their own advantages and provides rationale to decision makers for policy regulations regarding wholesale pricing.

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