scholarly journals Optimal Battery Recycling Strategy for Electric Vehicle under Government Subsidy in China

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4855 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuan Shao ◽  
Xudong Deng ◽  
Qiankai Qing ◽  
Yajuan Wang

Motivated by the increasing environmental concerns about the used electric vehicle batteries in China, an electric vehicle manufacturer’s battery recycling strategy under government subsidy was studied. A consumer utility function was used to capture consumer environmental awareness associated with battery recycling and the game-theoretical approach was applied to analyze the interaction between the government and the manufacturer. It was found that, with an exogenous government subsidy, the manufacturer either recycles all the batteries, or it does not recycle any batteries if the impact of the recycling scale on costs is unremarkable; otherwise, the manufacturer recycles some used batteries when the benefit from recycling is moderate. Interestingly, an increased subsidy causes the manufacturer’s battery recycling rate to decrease if the subsidy is sufficiently large. When the government subsidy is endogenously, either full recycling, no recycling, or partial recycling can still arise. The optimal battery recycling rate and social welfare are lower in a non-cooperative game than in a cooperative game if the benefit from recycling is relatively low. The main findings were numerically justified with realistic subsidy data in China. The numerical results indicate: (1) the optimal battery recycling rate locates in a closed interval from 0 to 1 given an exogenous or an endogenous government subsidy, and it decreases with the subsidy when the subsidy is not less than 50% of the production cost of electric vehicle; (2) the social welfare first increases to a maximum value and then decreases as the subsidy increases; and (3) the optimal battery recycling rate increases significantly and the social welfare is improved when there is cooperation between the government and the manufacturer.

Author(s):  
Kai Liu ◽  
Chuanxu Wang

Abstract With the rapid development of new energy vehicles (NEVs), the recycling and reuse of retired power batteries has attracted extensive attention from the society and scholars. In this paper, we establish a closed-loop supply chain model composed of the government, one power battery supplier and one NEV manufacturer. Based on game theory, considering whether the battery supplier encroaches on the power battery recycling channel, we study the optimal decisions of the government and supply chain members under different government subsidy policies (no subsidy, subsidy for the NEV manufacturer and subsidy for consumers) and their impact on profits and social welfare. The results show that, whether the battery supplier encroaches on the recycling channel or not, compared with the no subsidy policy, subsidy for the NEV manufacturer is more conducive to the improvement of enterprise profits and social welfare. In addition, whether the battery collection quantity is constrained by the NEV sales quantity, when the recycling channel cost is lower than a certain threshold, the encroachment is always beneficial to the battery supplier. When the recycling channel cost is within a certain threshold range, the encroachment will achieve a win–win situation; otherwise, win–lose. When the recycling channel cost is higher than a certain threshold, the encroachment behavior has no impact on the NEV manufacturer and the battery supplier. Finally, we investigate the impact of key parameters on the enterprise profits and social welfare through numerical experiments. We also find that the environmental awareness of consumers have significant impacts on social welfare.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine V Talbot ◽  
Pam Briggs

Abstract People with dementia can experience shrinkage of their social worlds, leading to a loss of independence, control and reduced well-being. We used ‘the shrinking world’ theory to examine how the COVID 19 pandemic has impacted the lives of people with early to middle stage dementia and what longer-term impacts may result. Interviews were conducted with 19 people with dementia and a thematic analysis generated five themes: the forgotten person with dementia, confusion over government guidance, deterioration of cognitive function, loss of meaning and social isolation, safety of the lockdown bubble. The findings suggest that the pandemic has accelerated the ‘shrinking world’ effect and created tension in how people with dementia perceive the outside world. Participants felt safe and secure in lockdown but also missed the social interaction, cognitive stimulation and meaningful activities that took place outdoors. As time in lockdown continued, these individuals experienced a loss of confidence and were anxious about their ability to re-engage in the everyday practises that allow them to participate in society. We recommend ways in which the government, communities and organisations might counteract some of the harms posed by this shrinking world.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.


2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Adweeti Nepal ◽  
Santa Kumar Dangol ◽  
Anke van der Kwaak

Abstract Background The persistent quality gap in maternal health services in Nepal has resulted in poor maternal health outcomes. Accordingly, the Government of Nepal (GoN) has placed emphasis on responsive and accountable maternal health services and initiated social accountability interventions as a strategical approach simultaneously. This review critically explores the social accountability interventions in maternal health services in Nepal and its outcomes by analyzing existing evidence to contribute to the informed policy formulation process. Methods A literature review and desk study undertaken between December 2018 and May 2019. An adapted framework of social accountability by Lodenstein et al. was used for critical analysis of the existing literature between January 2000 and May 2019 from Nepal and other low-and-middle-income countries (LMICs) that have similar operational context to Nepal. The literature was searched and extracted from database such as PubMed and ScienceDirect, and web search engines such as Google Scholar using defined keywords. Results The study found various social accountability interventions that have been initiated by GoN and external development partners in maternal health services in Nepal. Evidence from Nepal and other LMICs showed that the social accountability interventions improved the quality of maternal health services by improving health system responsiveness, enhancing community ownership, addressing inequalities and enabling the community to influence the policy decision-making process. Strong gender norms, caste-hierarchy system, socio-political and economic context and weak enforceability mechanism in the health system are found to be the major contextual factors influencing community engagement in social accountability interventions in Nepal. Conclusions Social accountability interventions have potential to improve the quality of maternal health services in Nepal. The critical factor for successful outcomes in maternal health services is quality implementation of interventions. Similarly, continuous effort is needed from policymakers to strengthen monitoring and regulatory mechanism of the health system and decentralization process, to improve access to the information and to establish proper complaints and feedback system from the community to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of the interventions. Furthermore, more study needs to be conducted to evaluate the impact of the existing social accountability interventions in improving maternal health services in Nepal.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 663-673
Author(s):  
Lulu Liu

Objectives: Starting from the tobacco economy, this paper studies the “surge phenomenon” of macro-economy in developing countries. Methods: This paper studies the impact of tobacco industry on Anhui economy by using the relevant theories of industrial economics, econometrics and regulatory economics, combined with the actual situation of tobacco industry. Based on the analysis of the overall development of tobacco industry, this paper empirically analyzes the relationship between tobacco industry and Anhui economic growth. This paper combs the relevant literature of the existing research results of this theory. Combined with the special fact that government investment accounts for a large proportion in China’s current economic construction, this paper redefines the hypothesis of the investor in the theory of principles. On this basis, the expected equilibrium results of enterprise investment decision-making under government led and market led modes are compared and analyzed by using incomplete information static game model. Results: When the output value of tobacco industry increases by 1%, it will drive the GDP to increase by 0.373%. Secondly, by comparing the economic benefits of tobacco with the social costs of tobacco, it is found that with the economic development, the social costs caused by tobacco increase year by year, but the economic benefits are slightly greater than the social costs. The difference between the two is also increasing year by year. Conclusion: In the context of tobacco control, we should fully consider the advantages and disadvantages of developing the tobacco industry. Under the excessive intervention of the government, the manifestation of the surge phenomenon is more intense, and the final consequence of overcapacity is more serious than that under the market-oriented mode..


Urban Studies ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 56 (6) ◽  
pp. 1113-1128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masatomo Suzuki ◽  
Yasushi Asami

With a simple model of land use and market arbitrage, this paper investigates the impact of population decline – when existing homeowners compete to attract a small number of new residents – on homeownership and land use. We show that, if a strictly positive cost is required for ownership abandonment, selling used houses is impossible in the periphery, while leasing is possible. We also show that only long-life-quality houses, which require a larger initial investment and sustain greater utility for longer than conventional ones, attract new residents to the periphery. Social welfare may decrease, because the government has to maintain the slowly shrinking, less densely inhabited urban area.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (22) ◽  
pp. 12446
Author(s):  
Kelei Xue ◽  
Guohua Sun ◽  
Yuyan Wang ◽  
Shuiye Niu

Green product design is a vital measure to support sustainable development in a circular economy era. This paper studies the multi-product pricing and green product design strategies under different supply chain structures and government subsidy strategies. Considering different channel leadership, we establish the centralized (C), manufacturer-led (MS), and retailer-led (RS) supply chain models, respectively. By applying a game-theoretical approach, corresponding equilibrium pricing, green product design, and government subsidy decisions under different supply chain structures are obtained. Through comparison and numerical analysis, we find that: (1) the different subsidy strategies of the government have an important impact on green product development. When the government provides a uniform subsidy strategy, a RS supply chain can bring greener product, more market demands, more profit, and more social welfare; (2) when the government provides a differentiated subsidy strategy, MS and RS supply chain structures can bring greener product and more market demand than the centralized supply chain. They can also bring the same social welfare and the same product to the green design level. However, the MS supply chain structure can bring more profit for the firm; (3) the consumers’ green awareness positively impacts the design and development of green product. Therefore, it is beneficial for the firm to adopt reasonable measures to boost the environmental awareness of consumers in order to realize the sustainable development of our society.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (5) ◽  
pp. 513-524
Author(s):  
Junlong Chen ◽  
Yajie Wang ◽  
Jiali Liu

This paper sets up an industry competition model consisting of two upstream enterprises and two downstream enterprises. Then we rely on the model to explore how non-regulation and different regulatory policies (maximizing the total profits of the upstream enterprises, the social welfare of the upstream industry or the overall social welfare) affect the following factors: the excess capacity, enterprise profits, consumer surpluses, social welfare in the upstream and downstream enterprises and the overall social welfare. The following conclusions are drawn from our research. First, whether and how the government regulates the capacity choice greatly affect the equilibrium outcomes, as well as the welfare distribution among the upstream enterprises, downstream enterprises, and consumers. The specific effects are dependent on market demand and enterprise cost. Second, the government should formulate its regulatory policies on capacity choice based on the overall social welfare of the entire supply chain. If the government aims to maximize the profits of the upstream enterprises, the social welfare of the downstream industry will be negatively affected. Third, excess capacity does not necessarily suppress social welfare. Under certain conditions, the worst scenario of excess capacity may occur under the pursuit of the maximal overall social welfare. Excess capacity may arise from various causes, rather than market competition or government regulation alone. Excess capacity cannot be attributed solely to government failure. These conclusions have some significance for optimizing capacity regulation policies.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Yanjin Cheng ◽  
Hao Hao ◽  
Shipeng Tao ◽  
Yanjun Zhou

Regulating and supervising the energy vehicle (EV) power battery recycling market, improving the utilization rate of EV power battery recycling, and guaranteeing the safety and control of all aspects of recycling treatment require the establishment of an effective traceability system. The decentralization and tamper-proof characteristics of the blockchain can ensure the safety and reliability of relevant data while realizing traceability management. This study establishes the Stackelberg game model to compare and analyze the effects of different government mechanisms on the profits of each subject before and after participating in power battery traceability management. The study further uses the model to explore strategies to improve the enthusiasm of EV power battery recycling subjects to participate in traceability management. The results show that (1) the participation of each recycling subject in EV power battery blockchain traceability can help move more spent power batteries into formal recycling channels; (2) the government should adopt appropriate mechanisms to promote its participation in EV power battery blockchain traceability, the best result being when the government adopts a subsidy mechanism for consumers; and (3) the profit of the EV power battery manufacturer is inversely proportional to the target recycling rate set by the government. Furthermore, the pursuit of a very high target recycling rate is not conducive to the normal implementation of initial EV power battery blockchain traceability management. Therefore, it is crucial for the government to set a reasonable target recycling rate.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 23-28
Author(s):  
Cucu Solihah

The commitment in building Indonesia as a prosperous country gives consequence to the role of government in prospering the community. It is conducted by empowering the programs having potency of financial sources for developing this state. Beside the tax as the financial source of state development, the government enforces the policy of zakat management.  The policy is the act number 23 in 2011 concerning zakat management in which the fund derives from the national / regional budget. In this case, the national or regional zakat council manages the zakat management. It is expected, it can help the process of state development and be a media in improving the social welfare as one of the government’s roles


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