Shaking Hands with the Internal Enemy: Democracy and Civil Conflict Settlement

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 845-856
Author(s):  
Omer Zarpli

Abstract How does regime type affect the likelihood of negotiated settlements that end civil conflicts? A limited number of previous studies have offered divergent theories and mixed findings about whether democracy is an asset or a liability. I draw these disparate findings together and present a novel theory on why leaders under fully democratic and autocratic regimes may have a particularly difficult time in peacemaking, and how leaders in anocratic (hybrid) regimes are more likely to be successful in reaching negotiated settlements. Thus, I hypothesize that the relationship between regime type and the likelihood of conflict-resolution is inverted U-shaped. I test this hypothesis using data on all internal conflicts between 1946 and 2014, and find empirical support. The findings suggest that even if anocracies are more prone to the outbreak of civil wars as has been proposed by previous studies, they are also better at settling these conflicts.

2021 ◽  
pp. 002234332110246
Author(s):  
Casey Crisman-Cox

There is a long-running disagreement about how regime type affects a country’s ability to project resolve. Specifically, there is an open question about whether being a democracy helps or hurts a country’s reputation for resolve. I consider this question by directly estimating a state’s reputation for resolve using a unified theoretical and statistical approach. To be precise, I derive an empirical model from a dynamic game of continuous-time bargaining where each side fights in order to build a reputation for resolve. I then fit this model using data on the duration and termination of civil conflicts between 1946 and 2009. I find that while governments tend to have stronger reputations for resolve than the rebels they face, democracies are seen as much less likely to be resolved both prior to and during conflict than their autocratic counterparts. Likewise, democracies are more likely to end a conflict by making a policy change in favor of the rebels than autocracies. Despite these differences, both democracies and autocracies experience a discrete increase in their reputations for resolve once conflict begins, with democracies receiving a much larger boost. As such, these findings contrast with a large literature on democratic credibility theory, while simultaneously providing evidence consistent with some of the logic behind democratic credibility theory.


2020 ◽  
pp. 002200272095041
Author(s):  
Heather Elko McKibben ◽  
Amy Skoll

How do different types of external intervention affect the likelihood of a negotiated settlement in civil conflicts? Drawing on the negotiation literature, which shows that the nature of the parties’ “best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA)” influences the bargaining process between them, we argue different types of intervention affect governments’ and rebel groups’ BATNAs in different ways. This, in turn, affects the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. To test this argument, we address the fact that interventions are nonrandom, and that characteristics of civil conflicts that lead to different types of intervention also influence the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. We therefore use a two-stage statistical model. The first stage predicts the likelihood of different types of intervention, and drawing on those results, the second stage analyzes the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. The results provide insights into how different types of intervention affect civil conflict outcomes.


Author(s):  
Gray Christine

This chapter focuses on the law concerning the use of force and intervention in internal conflicts such as civil wars. The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations (General Assembly Resolution 2625) spelled out the content of the prohibition of the use of force in civil conflicts: every state has the duty not to foment, finance, incite, or tolerate subversive, terrorist, or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state and the duty not to interfere in civil strife in another state. The International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case and in Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo confirmed that these provisions of the Declaration on Friendly Relations were declaratory of customary international law. The chapter shows that in most cases of forcible intervention in a civil war it is not the interpretation but the application of the law that leads to difficulty.


Author(s):  
Nicolas Berman ◽  
Mathieu Couttenier ◽  
Raphael Soubeyran

Abstract We investigate how variations in soil productivity affect civil conflicts. We first present a model with heterogeneous land in which variations in input prices (fertilizers) affect appropriable rents and the opportunity costs of fighting. The theory predicts that spikes in input prices increase the likelihood of conflicts through their effect on income and inequality, and that this effect is magnified when soil fertility is naturally more heterogeneous. We test these predictions using data on conflict events covering all Sub-Saharan African countries at a spatial resolution of 0.5 $\times$ 0.5 degree latitude and longitude over the 1997–2013 period. We combine information on soil characteristics and worldwide variations in fertilizer prices to identify local exogenous changes in input costs. As predicted, variations in soil productivity triggered by variations in fertilizer prices are positively associated with conflicts, especially in cells where land endowments are more heterogeneous. In addition, we find that the distribution of land fertility both within and across ethnic groups affects violence, and that the effect of between-group heterogeneity in soil quality is magnified in densely populated areas. Overall, our findings imply that inequality in access to fertile areas—an issue largely neglected in the literature dealing with the roots of Sub-Saharan African civil wars—constitutes a serious threat to peace at the local level.


2002 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 363-377
Author(s):  
Patrick M. Regan

In this article, I discuss the implications of thinking about conflict management in terms of long and short-term outcomes. In particular, I focus on the role of third-party interventions in civil conflicts and how military interventions can affect the terms of negotiated settlements. I argue that military interventions can be effective if you judge success in terms of short-term outcomes, but even then, there are more or less-effective strategies. After articulating different metrics for considering short-term success, I outline a framework for thinking about how the intervention strategy will influence the duration of a civil conflict, in part by linking battlefield conditions to negotiated outcomes. I conclude by discussing some of the implications of linking military interventions to diplomatic efforts when negotiating a settlement.


2011 ◽  
Vol 37 (5) ◽  
pp. 2627-2650 ◽  
Author(s):  
ZEYNEP TAYDAS ◽  
JASON ENIA ◽  
PATRICK JAMES

AbstractThe purpose of this article is to review major theoretical arguments with regard to the causes of civil war and identify problems associated with the conceptual juxtaposition of opportunity versus grievance that predominates in the field. While they are critical aspects of conflict processes, perception of opportunity and grievance as two mutually competing explanations or separate categories ultimately can limit, rather than facilitate, our understanding of civil conflicts. For example, we show that not all motives can be designated easily as deriving from one or the other. In addition, the existing dichotomous framework masks other important questions about the way that collective action is achieved in some circumstances and not others or the way that some factors seem to generate grievances at one stage, perhaps, but then an opportunity at another orvice versa. Thus the priority should be to develop an integrated, comprehensive approach that can account for fundamental aspects of complex conflict processes. We conclude by providing suggestions for future research on civil conflict.


Author(s):  
Adrian Florea

Empirical research on civil war onset has been largely dominated by two approaches: a correlational or “correlates of civil war” approach which seeks to identify country-level characteristics associated with a higher likelihood of civil war outbreak, and a bargaining approach which starts from the assumption that warfare is costly and which views civil conflict as a by-product of bargaining failures. Correlational and bargaining studies of internal conflict onset have reached an analytical plateau because they fail to specify the precise mechanisms that yield civil warfare instead of a different type of violent or nonviolent outcome. An alternative, contentious framework is advanced for studying civil war onset. This framework situates the conflict event within a larger cycle of contention and specifies the mechanisms through which civil conflict is most likely to occur. According to this contentious perspective, civil wars are commonly produced by the combination of one structural condition—a state crisis of authority and/or legitimacy—and the interdependent effect of two mechanisms—radicalization and militarization. Through theory development and vignettes from a handful of civil war cases, the article makes the case that the contentious approach holds promise for elucidating how exactly civil conflicts break out. Despite holding initial explanatory power, the contentious theory of civil war onset advanced herein awaits more systematic empirical testing.


Author(s):  
Reed M. Wood

Contemporary civil conflicts frequently impose disproportionate costs of civilian populations. By some estimates, roughly 90% of conflict causalities were combatants in the wars of the early 20th century, but by the end of the century nearly 90% of causalities were civilians. While scholars have spent decades examining phenomena such as genocide and terrorism, they have only recently begun to systematically examine the causes, consequences, and potential solutions to the more general occurrence of civilian victimization during intra-state armed conflict. What is civilian victimization, and how does it differ from other forms of political violence? Is it possible to differentiate between “collateral damage” and intentional civilian targeting during civil conflicts? While virtually all conflicts impose significant costs on civilians, those costs vary tremendously across armed conflicts. Moreover, while collateral damage is an unfortunately common feature of warfare, violence perpetrated against civilians often includes massacres, bombings of civilian targets with negligible military value, summary executions, ethnic cleansing, and other forms of intentional attacks on noncombatants. Yet, these practices are comparatively more common during some wars, in some areas, or by some groups. This variation suggests that while all internal conflicts are violent, certain characteristics of actors, the conflict spaces, and/or the patterns of interactions between rebels, the government they challenge, and civilians within the conflict zone explain why some conflicts produce greater levels of abuse against civilians than do others. Do similar factors explain both government-sponsored civilian victimization and violence committed by non-state actors during civil conflict? A cursory review of available data clearly demonstrates that both state and non-state forces often engage in high levels of civilian victimization. In general, the existing evidences suggest that the motives for state and non-state actor violence are similar. However, key differences in the nature of institutional and organizational arrangements suggest that rebels and governments experience different types of constraints on their ability to act on their motives. How can the international community effectively respond in order to reduce the severity of civilian victimization in ongoing conflicts? This important policy question has produced a range of conflicting answers; however, the most recent scholarship on the topic suggests that both United Nations peacekeeping operations—particularly when they include a strong mandate for civilian protection and a robust military force—and international condemnation (“naming and shaming”) can effectively reduce the magnitude of intentional violence against civilians.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 205316801877055 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Braithwaite ◽  
Luna B. Ruiz

Women participated as combatants in almost 40% of civil conflicts that occurred between 1979 and 2009. We offer a novel argument about the effect of female combatants upon the outcomes of the civil conflicts that they join. Groups that recruit female combatants are more likely to achieve victory in their conflicts than are groups that do not recruit female combatants. However, when rebel groups rely upon forced recruitment, they risk undermining the benefits associated with female combatants, lowering their likelihood of victory relative to that of the government. We test this conditional argument using multinomial logistic regression models on a sample of 194 rebel groups globally from 1979 to 2009. We find that female participation appears to decrease the likelihood of government victory in civil wars; this effect holds primarily in instances in which female participation could plausibly be thought of as voluntary. Forced female participation, by contrast, appears to increase the likelihood of a government victory.


2018 ◽  
Vol 72 (1) ◽  
pp. 215-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca H. Best ◽  
Sarah Shair-Rosenfield ◽  
Reed M. Wood

Policy makers and scholars have shown increased interest in gendered approaches to peacemaking, even as evidence of women’s impact on peace processes has remained unclear. In this paper, we explore the influence of gender diversity among decision-making elites on the outcome of ongoing civil conflicts. Specifically, we argue that increased female representation within the national legislature increases the likelihood that a conflict terminates in a negotiated settlement. However, the impact of legislative female representation on conflict termination is conditioned by the power of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive, suggesting that gender diversity exerts a greater impact in states with more authoritative legislatures. We evaluate our hypotheses using data on the manner of conflict termination and the proportion of women in national legislatures between 1945 and 2009. Our results show support for the central argument, suggesting that increasing female representation within legislative bodies increases the likelihood of war termination via negotiated settlement.


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