Introduction

Diagnosis ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
Ashley Graham Kennedy

Philosophers have been writing about the practice of medicine for some time, but relatively little has been written about the practice of clinical diagnosis or the issues of evidence, ethics, and justice involved in this process. This introduction sets the stage for the philosophical analysis that takes place in the rest of the book, which combines methods of current philosophy of science and philosophy of medicine to address both issues in diagnostic reasoning and diagnostic testing in the clinical setting.

2022 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-32
Author(s):  
Karen Powell

Urological conditions have become increasingly common and early diagnosis is key to achieving better outcomes. This article discusses the importance of having a comprehensive understanding of urological disorders, having the skills to interpret relevant information, and recognising the relationships among given elements to make an appropriate clinical diagnosis.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandros Stavros Hadjiantoni

Abstract Background: Anatomical misplacement of the Electrocardiogram (ECG) electrode(s) is common, with significant impact on clinical diagnosis. Reasons are multi-faceted, with this review examining the consequential effects of misplacement to ECG morphology, diagnosis, prognosis, patient outcomes, and potential impact to patient care pathway. Objectives: This review examined the significance of misplacement, its’ commonality and ensuing effect on patient safety, accurate ECG acquisition and diagnosis, with evaluation of reasons for such misplacement.Methodology: Review of available literature was conducted using electronic databases. In-line with the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic reviews and Meta – analysis protocols (PRISMA) 2015 checklist, this review was conducted with search criteria, search terms, eligibility for inclusion/ exclusion criteria, extraction and data analysis predetermined by the authors. Keywords were arranged according to grouping of terms surrounding ECG, anatomical placement, and diagnosis. The search strategy was conducted during September/October 2019. Scoping searches were conducted alongside reference lists of included studies hand searched (Snowballing) for further relevant studies. The Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP) was used to methodically appraise papers (CASP, 2019). Screening of titles and abstracts of identified citations was performed by a single reviewer. Eligible articles then full text screened independently by two reviewers. Disagreements were discussed and resolved by a third reviewer. In instances of unclear reporting, authors were contacted to provide further information and clarity. Assessment of relevant literature and critical appraisal of primary research, pertaining to the clinical diagnosis and effects of anatomical misplacement of ECG electrodes, formulate the thematic discussion drawn by this review. Results: This review identified a plethora of causes, ranging from: operator error; lack of anatomical awareness; inaccurate assessment of anatomical landmarks; obesity; differences in anatomy/gender; levels of undress and lack of appreciation of consequences of misplacement, both modifiable and non-modifiable attributable to electrode misplacement. Clinical diagnosis can be altered owing to erroneous placement of electrodes. ECG morphology is altered due to incorrect anatomical misplacement, culminating substandard practice, a missed diagnosis or misdiagnosis and potential harm. Conclusion: Correct anatomical placement of ECG electrodes is essential to diagnosis in the clinical setting. Peer-led educational intervention with mandatory training is essential to improve practice. PROSPERO Registration Number: CRD42019152461


2019 ◽  
pp. 103-116
Author(s):  
Beth B. Hogans

Chapter 7 addresses the processes and pitfalls of evaluating, reasoning about, and attending to the needs of patients with pain. This chapter builds on Chapter 6, which addressed clinical assessment, explaining in detail the process of extracting and abstracting information from the pain narrative (clinical history or interview) to lay the foundation for a problem list and differential diagnosis. The problem list and differential diagnosis are described and contrasted so that clinicians will be comfortable with both. A clinical model explains the need for patient-centered approaches to be omnipresent but balanced with an appropriate disease-centered knowledge base that is likewise informed by understanding the patient’s healthcare-related values and motivations. A balanced approach is emphasized. The process of planning for diagnostic testing, including imaging, laboratory testing, provocative maneuvers, and targeted referrals, is described. The last section of the chapter addresses the impact and nature of cognitive and affective biases that can mitigate the effectiveness of diagnostic reasoning. A coordinated strategy to limit the negative impact of diagnostic reasoning biases is presented in a memorable way. Finally, the ethics of errors and error disclosure are discussed as well as the process of error disclosure.


1973 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-87
Author(s):  
Michael Martin

Crucial to Peter Achinstein's philosophy of science, as presented in Concepts of Science, is the concept of semantic relevance. First, the concept of semantic relevance is central to his analysis of definition and it is presupposed both in his analysis of the concepts of theory and model and in his critique of alternative analyses. Secondly, Achinstein's way of doing philosophy of science rests heavily on his analysis of semantic relevance. Philosophical analysis for Achinstein seems primarily to consist in specifying the use of certain terms. As we shall see, use and semantic relevance are, according to Achinstein, closely connected.Yet, despite the centrality of this concept in Achinstein's philosophy, I will argue that the concept has serious philosophical problems and that the use Achinstein makes of the concept is dubious. First, I will argue that the notion of semantic relevance inherits some of the traditional problems of analyticity as well as having problems of its own. In particular, I will show that given Achinstein's construal of semantic relevance it is extremely difficult if not impossible to determine the semantic relevance of a term. Secondly, I will maintain that given these problems, Achinstein is not in any way justified in using the notion of semantic relevance in his criticism of other philosophers' views and in the construction of his own.


2019 ◽  
pp. 178-209
Author(s):  
Benjamin Sheredos ◽  
William Bechtel

Philosophy of science has long focused on how scientists achieve successful explanations of a phenomenon. But much of scientific work is aimed at something more basic: successfully and coherently imagining how a phenomenon might be explained—for example, hypothesizing a mechanism that could possibly produce the phenomenon. This chapter examines the graphics and diagrams that scientists in the field of circadian biology have generated and used to externalize and stabilize their imaginative reasoning. In particular, it examines how scientists revise their graphics as they sharpen and constrain their imaginative construal of a hypothetical mechanism. This analysis examines published diagrams that reflect the community’s developing understanding of the mechanism responsible for circadian rhythms in cyanobacteria and zeroes in on unpublished graphics from a single lab as they developed one operation in the mechanism. The goal is to understand how circadian biologists rely on graphics to overcome the difficulties of imagining the complex working of hypothetical mechanisms over time. Throughout, the chapter emphasizes that pursuing imaginative success is a scientific endeavor governed by its own internal norms, distinct from the norms of successful explanation. The aim is to direct philosophical analysis to scientists’ imaginings and to encourage integrating this understudied dimension of scientific practice with traditional philosophical analysis of normativity in scientific practice.


2009 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-35
Author(s):  
Svetozar Sindjelic

The aim of this paper is to present the character and reason of the drastic change in the understanding of science that happened in the twentieth century. To do this, author describes the main points of the traditional philosophy of science: then, he argues that reason of the revolution in the philosophy of science used to be the careful philosophical analysis of the great scientific revolutions from 1905. Finally, he concludes that the consequence of mentioned analysis was a number of antagonistic views being the contemporary philosophy of science. To give a monolitic and integral presentment of this philosophy, author enumerated and explained the points shared by the majority of contemporary philosophers of science. In brief, he describes the traditional philosophy of science, the reasons of its fall, and the main tenets of the contemporary philosophy of science.


Author(s):  
Ruth Garrett Millikan

Replacing empirical concepts with unicepts has implications both for philosophical methodology and for some central matters in philosophy of science, plilosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. This chapter gives illustrations that concern the fixing of referents of naming words in a public language, the method of philosophical analysis, referential constancy of names for theoretical objects over theory change, the distinction between so-called “observational concepts” and “theoretical concepts,” and last, so-called “theory of mind.” This is a somewhat arbitrary collection of apparent implications of embracing unicepts, but the discussions of the “observation-theory” distinction and of “theory of mind” will be needed when discussing both perception and the semantics-pragmatics distinction.


2018 ◽  
pp. 36-44
Author(s):  
Erwin B. Montgomery

The practice of medicine is different from the practice of science, although some have argued that medicine must increasingly approximate science if progress in medicine is to be made. There is a myth that science medicine will eliminate uncertainty. Science can remain contingent and pending as individual patients demand action and medical decisions cannot be put in abeyance. Some extrapolate from this difference that science and medicine are fundamentally different, for example, maintaining a distinction between practical and scientific medicine. Yet medicine, practical or otherwise, still requires the use of logic and thus philosophical analysis. Indeed, on closer analysis, medical and scientific reasoning are not fundamentally different—only the consequences are different. Variations of logic to provide utility require an expanded sense of logic. However, with growing appreciation that most living biological systems are chaotic and complex, the logic used in medicine must continue to evolve.


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