scholarly journals Imagining Mechanisms with Diagrams

2019 ◽  
pp. 178-209
Author(s):  
Benjamin Sheredos ◽  
William Bechtel

Philosophy of science has long focused on how scientists achieve successful explanations of a phenomenon. But much of scientific work is aimed at something more basic: successfully and coherently imagining how a phenomenon might be explained—for example, hypothesizing a mechanism that could possibly produce the phenomenon. This chapter examines the graphics and diagrams that scientists in the field of circadian biology have generated and used to externalize and stabilize their imaginative reasoning. In particular, it examines how scientists revise their graphics as they sharpen and constrain their imaginative construal of a hypothetical mechanism. This analysis examines published diagrams that reflect the community’s developing understanding of the mechanism responsible for circadian rhythms in cyanobacteria and zeroes in on unpublished graphics from a single lab as they developed one operation in the mechanism. The goal is to understand how circadian biologists rely on graphics to overcome the difficulties of imagining the complex working of hypothetical mechanisms over time. Throughout, the chapter emphasizes that pursuing imaginative success is a scientific endeavor governed by its own internal norms, distinct from the norms of successful explanation. The aim is to direct philosophical analysis to scientists’ imaginings and to encourage integrating this understudied dimension of scientific practice with traditional philosophical analysis of normativity in scientific practice.

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-33
Author(s):  
Natalia I. Kuznetsova ◽  

The article shows that cultural-historical epistemology erroneously puts forward the thesis of a global crisis in the sphere of modern epistemology and philosophy of science. The key error of such a diagnosis is rooted in the confusion of basic concepts. In the development of epistemological studies, the period of the last decades of the twentieth century, which was called the “descriptive turn”, is very important. In the philosophy of science, the task was set to reflect the real practice of scientific research. This has been successfully carried out in a number of works by Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend, Latour and others. The task of building universal norms of scientific research has faded into the background. In this regard, the subjects of "methodology of science", on the one hand, and "epistemology" and "philosophy of science", on the other hand, were distinguished. The formulation of norms and standards for scientific research has become the task of methodology. Describing scientific practice, including scientific revolutions, has become the task of the professional history of science. The philosophical understanding of the processes of historical evolution, the identification of the laws of the development of science has become the subject of the philosophy of science. Epistemology, in turn, is called upon to consider the phenomenon of knowledge not only in science, but also more broadly – in a variety of historical and cultural contexts. In modern studies in the field of epistemology and philosophy of science, case studies are important, as they provide invaluable empirical material for philosophical generalizations. As for the construction of universal standards for scientific work, such a task, as Feyerabend showed, seems to be impossible. Moreover, the universal methodological standard does not allow discovering the uniqueness of scientific research situations.


2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Myriam Juda ◽  
Mirjam Münch ◽  
Anna Wirz-Justice ◽  
Martha Merrow ◽  
Till Roenneberg

Abstract: Among many other changes, older age is characterized by advanced sleep-wake cycles, changes in the amplitude of various circadian rhythms, as well as reduced entrainment to zeitgebers. These features reveal themselves through early morning awakenings, sleep difficulties at night, and a re-emergence of daytime napping. This review summarizes the observations concerning the biological clock and sleep in the elderly and discusses the documented and theoretical considerations behind these age-related behavioral changes, especially with respect to circadian biology.


This collection brings together new and important work by both emerging scholars and those who helped shape the field on the nature of causal powers, and the connections between causal powers and other phenomena within metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind. Contributors discuss how one who takes causal powers to be in some sense irreducible should think about laws of nature, scientific practice, causation, modality, space and time, persistence, and the metaphysics of mind.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 174-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
TYLER HILDEBRAND

AbstractThis article is concerned with the relationship between scientific practice and the metaphysics of laws of nature and natural properties. I begin by examining an argument by Michael Townsen Hicks and Jonathan Schaffer (‘Derivative Properties in Fundamental Laws,’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2017) that an important feature of scientific practice—namely, that scientists sometimes invoke non-fundamental properties in fundamental laws—is incompatible with metaphysical theories according to which laws govern. I respond to their argument by developing an epistemology for governing laws that is grounded in scientific practice. This epistemology is of general interest for non-Humean theories of laws, for it helps to explain our epistemic access to non-Humean theoretical entities such as governing laws or fundamental powers.


Author(s):  
V. P. ALEKSEEV ◽  
E. O. AMON

Famous Russian geologist N.A. Golovkinsky published 150 years ago an important scientific work, where the phenomenon of lateral  displacement (movement) of homogeneous lithological layers  («slide» over time) was asserted. This created the most significant  prerequisites for the fundamental facial law: the layers, lying nearby,  were formed in the same sequence vertically. The law was  formulated a little later by A.A. Inostrantsev, and later  «rediscovered» by J. Wal- ter. The ideas, developed by N.A.  Golovkinsky, subsequently found the application in the study of  geological cyclicity, and currently in the booming seismic  stratigraphy. The creative improvement and continuation of  theoretical positions  contained in the Golovkinsky’s work allowed to  advance a method of facially-cyclic analysis, which has been  success- fully used in the study of many coal-bearing strata, and is  currently used for coal-free deposits of the West Siberian oil and gas  basin. Methodically, they develop an understanding of causality and  correspond to the principles of synergetic world-view. The main  content of these ideas remains relevant in the light of new realities  of cognitive process (nonlin-ear science, endovision).


Diagnosis ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
Ashley Graham Kennedy

Philosophers have been writing about the practice of medicine for some time, but relatively little has been written about the practice of clinical diagnosis or the issues of evidence, ethics, and justice involved in this process. This introduction sets the stage for the philosophical analysis that takes place in the rest of the book, which combines methods of current philosophy of science and philosophy of medicine to address both issues in diagnostic reasoning and diagnostic testing in the clinical setting.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus I. Eronen

Abstract Psychiatric disorders are studied at multiple levels, but there is no agreement on how these levels are related to each other, or how they should be understood in the first place. In this paper, I provide an account of levels and their relationships that is suited for psychopathology, drawing from recent debates in philosophy of science. Instead of metaphysical issues, the focus is on delivering an understanding of levels that is relevant and useful for scientific practice. I also defend a pragmatic approach to the question of reduction, arguing that even in-principle reductionists should embrace pluralism in practice. Finally, I discuss the benefits and challenges in integrating explanations and models of different levels.


2020 ◽  
pp. 074873042095333
Author(s):  
Shaon Sengupta ◽  
Thomas G. Brooks ◽  
Gregory R. Grant ◽  
Garret A. FitzGerald

The COVID-19 pandemic has necessitated novel approaches and collaborative efforts across multiple disciplines. It is known that various aspects of our physiology and response to pathogens are under tight clock control. However, the assimilation of circadian biology into our clinical and research practices is still evolving. Using a focused review of the literature and original analyses of the UK Biobank, we discuss how circadian biology may inform our diagnostic and therapeutic strategies in this pandemic.


1980 ◽  
Vol 239 (6) ◽  
pp. G542-G542
Author(s):  
S. S. Rothman

Page G391: S. S. Rothman. “Passage of proteins through membranes—old assumptions and new perspectives.” Page G391: left column, lines 4–5 should read: This is not merely a convenience, but an assumption central to the scientific endeavor. Page G394: left column, lines 29–34 should read: If we were to prevent or diminish the movement of fluid away from the site of secretion, enzyme secretion should continue unabated if it is accounted for by an exocytosislike process, and as a consequence the concentration of enzyme in the duct system should rise over time.


2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henk W. de Regt

Abstract In recent years, scientific understanding has become a focus of attention in philosophy of science. Since understanding is typically associated with the pragmatic and psychological dimensions of explanation, shifting the focus from explanation to understanding may induce a shift from accounts that embody normative ideals to accounts that provide accurate descriptions of scientific practice. Not surprisingly, many ‘friends of understanding’ sympathize with a naturalistic approach to the philosophy of science. However, this raises the question of whether the proposed theories of understanding can still have normative power. In this paper I address this question by examining two theories of scientific understanding: Jan Faye’s pragmatic-rhetorical theory and my own contextual theory of scientific understanding. I argue that both theories leave room for normativity, despite their naturalistic tendencies. The normative power of my contextual theory is illustrated with a case study of the chemical revolution.


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