Naturalism and the Grounding Metaphor

Author(s):  
Anjan Chakravartty

This chapter develops the notion of degrees of metaphysical inference, giving content to a number of widely used but only vaguely specified metaphors regarding what it could mean to “naturalize” metaphysical inferences by “grounding” them in scientific knowledge, and what it could mean to “derive” ontological conclusions from scientific work, or use such work as a “constraint” on ontological theorizing. It examines the prospects of demarcating scientific ontology from non-scientific, philosophical ontologically, the nature of a priori presuppositions and inferences and their possible roles in this demarcation, and the idea of naturalizing metaphysical inferences. In conclusion, it considers whether there is, in fact, anything like an objective distinction to be made between genuinely theorizing and merely speculating about ontology.

Author(s):  
Сергей Александрович Лебедев ◽  
Сергей Николаевич Коськов

В статье излагается содержание двух базовых концепций неклассической философии и методологии науки: конвенционалистской и консенсуалистской теории природы научного знания и научной истины. Каждая из них является альтернативой двум основным парадигмам классической философии и методологии науки: эмпиризму (позитивизму) и рационализму. С точки зрения конвенционализма научное знание не есть ни описание чистого опыта, ни его обобщение. Но оно не является также и результатом некой априорной интуиции и чистого разума. Согласно конвенционализму научное знание - это система доказательной информации, исходные принципы которой имеют характер условных, конвенциональных истин. Отсюда следует, что любая истина в науке не категорична, а условна и имеет форму «если, то». Консенсуалистская концепция природы научного знания возникла в философии науки второй половины XX в. Она была, с одной стороны, обобщением конвенционализма, а с другой - его отрицанием. Если в конвенционализме основным субъектом научного познания является отдельный ученый, то в консенсуалистской эпистемологии таким субъектом является социальный субъект - научное сообщество. Научное познание имеет принципиально коллективный характер как в плане его получения в силу разделения научного труда, так и в плане его легитимации и оценки. Последние операции всегда являются результатом консенсуса научного сообщества. The article examines the content of two basic conceptions of non-classical philosophy and methodology of science: the conventionalist and consensual theory of the nature of scientific knowledge. Each of them is an alternative to the two main paradigms of classical philosophy and the methodology of science: empiricism (positivism) and rationalism. From the point of view of conventionalism, scientific knowledge is neither a description of pure experience nor a generalization of it. But it is also not the result of some a priori intuition and pure reason. According to conventionalism, scientific knowledge is a system of evidence-based information, the initial principles of which have the character of conditional, conventional truths. It follows that any truth in science is not categorical, but conditional and has the form «if, then». The consensual concept of the nature of scientific knowledge emerged in the philosophy of science of the second half of the twentieth century. It was, on the one hand, a generalization of conventionalism; on the other, a negation of it. If in conventionalism the main subject of scientific knowledge is an individual scientist, then in consensual epistemology such a subject is a social subject - the scientific community. Scientific knowledge has a fundamentally collective character, both in terms of its acquisition by virtue of the division of scientific work, and in terms of its legitimization and evaluation. The latest operations are always the result of a consensus of the scientific community.


2022 ◽  
pp. 467-482
Author(s):  
Stéphane Le Lay ◽  
Jean Frances

This chapter shows that, contrary to what some researchers claim, setting up the conditions for a “playful environment” is not so simple, in particular when it comes to organizing a new competition for the popularization of science (MT180®). In fact, we will see that popularization does not fit so easily into the “playful environment” desired by the organizers due to the gamified nature of the approach, which gradually colonizes the initial desire to present one's scientific work and pushes some participants to exaggerate their results in order to go as far as possible in the competition. It is therefore feared that the gamification of scientific work, while compatible with neoliberal expectations, will in fact lead to the production of bad science. The question then arises as to whether the need to turn researchers into effective communicators with a view to building the “knowledge society” advocated by international institutions can be achieved through gamified approaches, with the risk of creating an ever-greater distance between (real) scientific knowledge and citizens.


Author(s):  
Luiza Beth Nunes Alonso ◽  
Jean Sallantin ◽  
Edilson Ferneda ◽  
Dominique Luzeaux

This article focuses on the efficiency of scientific knowledge involved in the context of managing a particular socio-environmental as that composed by Amazon. In a first part, we introduce the actual tools used to create and disseminate knowledge among scientists and to stakeholders. In the second part, we give a structural framework, concerning the co-construction of an interdisciplinary scientific knowledge on a specific geographical region. This structural framework, which is as mathematical object "free of context", provides a contextual efficiency of scientific work when it combines multi-disciplinarity, interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity.


2012 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerzy Kosiewicz

Abstract The considerations included in the article are the result of several years of teaching general methodology for doctoral studies at Josef Pilsudski University of Physical Education in Warsaw.The presented text consists of two basic parts. The first includes reminiscences and associated methodological resentment. The second presents a wide panorama of standpoints concerning functions and kinds of hypotheses, their role and significance in contemporary research programs of formal, empirical (connected with natural sciences and biology), and humanities nature. Sketchy and encyclopaedic interpretations, presented in the context of commentaries by the author of this paper, thereby dominate.The aim of the first part is to draw attention to some methodological mistakes which often appear and which have become common in some academic milieus to such a degree that some intervention and postulatory correction, referring to Polish and Western methodological literature, is advisable. These shortcomings are connected, among other things, with the structure of the scientific work, with the formulation and application of hypotheses, with relations taking place between the general methodology and specialized methodologies, kinds and types of research work, with reliability of information on sources of creative information, as well with the category of verification in its relation, on the one hand, to confirmation and corroboration, and on the other hand, to testing, checking, falsification, and terms close in meaning to the last one.The abovementioned resentment results, first of all, from the fact that the authors discussed in the first part usually insist on erroneous solutions, negating a priori, without becoming acquainted with the literature on the subject or making attempts to explain or initiate a methodological argument referring to sources and studies.That resentment is significant, among other things, in the causal sense - that is, because of the fact that, firstly, it justifies and substantiates the need for a statement presenting controversial questions in a content-related and formal way. Secondly, because thanks to such (that is, cognitive-emotional) introduction, the whole argument - not only in the first, but also in the second part - is much more interesting. It is saturated with authenticity. Many readers know the figures mentioned and are familiar with their - sometimes too insouciant (sometimes not very reliable) - attitudes to important issues from the field of research methods. It is also interesting why the people cited make mistakes. Hence, it is also advisable to look at a wider methodological context of justification (included in the much longer second part) dedicated to perhaps the most thorough characteristics of the hypothesis in the literature on the subject, which is available to the author. Without presentation of the controversial issues in the first part, the second part, more important from the methodological viewpoint, might be omitted by a considerable proportion of readers. In that part attention is paid mainly to issues concerning working, initial, zero, primary, introductory, directing, gradual, auxiliary, ad hoc auxiliary, bridge, futile and true, dangerous and safe, quite natural and neutral, individual and general, complete and incomplete, deep, strong, probabilistic and non-probabilistic (that is, deterministic), related, falsifying, basic, psychological, metaphysical and materialist hypotheses, as well as those concluding ones - that is, those constituting the final effect of definite (concluded here and now) research; hence, those which have undergone verification, confirmation, corroboration or modification as those which predict and explain a given research problem in the best possible way.


2017 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-82
Author(s):  
Radmila Jovanovic

After the appearance of non-Euclidian geometries, Kant?s apriorism regarding geometry was seriously put in question. Poencar? challenged both apriorism and empricism, claiming that the question of ?true geometry? of our phisical world has no meaning. His position became known as conventionalism. Logical positivists recognised the importance of understanding the nature of conventional elements in our scientific knowledge, especially after the appearence of the general relativity theory, but their positions differe concerning their role. While Schlick accepted the term ?conventions? when speaking of basic elements of physics, young Rajhenbah called those elements ?relativistic a priori?, arguing that Kant?s doctrine can be accomodated even to the new relativistic physics. After an important correspondence between two philosophers, they astonishingly agreed that their dispute is purely terminological. I want to analyse their postions and to argue that this diagnosis was in fact mistaken.


2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Dipendra Raj Pandeya

<p><span>Our Science and scientific explorations are integral components in the process of research and development. Therefore, keeping abreast of recent scientific knowledge and development is an imper proceativess of a professional scientist. Scientific literature such as publications are among the most popular ways to update and up-skill one’s knowledge in a particular area. One can either become a consumer of scientific publication as a reader or s/he could also contribute to the body of literature through academic publications in quality peer-reviewed journals. </span></p><p><span>Having contributed to academic writing as an author is like your passport to your scientific community, not only to share your knowledge but also to gain professional recognition. Your contribution to publication also helps disseminate your new and foremost findings or techniques among scientific and academic communities. In order to be an accomplished scientist, one needs to have good scientific writing skills and be able to express the scientific knowledge effectively and efficiently to the scientific/academic community. </span></p><p><span>Before you start writing, it is important that you should be aware of the main goals of your publication. Your research should answer the relevant questions of the involved field and should arouse interest in the readers. Furthermore, the researcher should also know whether the research and findings of the work are publishable at the given point or not. If the answers are ticked off positively, then the researcher can start preparing the manuscript. Most research papers are based upon the IMRaD format. The word IMRaD stands for the initial letters of the words Introduction (I), Methods (M), Results (R), and Discussion (D). The Introduction describes the scope and purpose of the research in the light of recent information on the existing research; the Methods explain how the analysis was done; the Results section reports your audience to know what the investigation showed; and the Discussion section should explain the significance of the new information provided by your study and suggestions for future studies. . The IMRaD structure has been followed by a progressively increasing number of academic journals and has been the basis for most researches. It is a very effective approach as it facilitates the literature review and lets the readers understand the research more logically.</span></p><p><span>Good scientific writing with the methodical approach is not the only criteria for getting published in scientific journals. For publishing in a particular journal, it's very important to follow the author guidelines. Every journal has a particular format of writing and it is expected that the particular journal is going to publish the articles in the same particular format. This is very important for the journal to be consistent in all the publications. </span></p><p><span>In addition, writing a good research article can seem challenging at first, however, if a researcher plans it properly, the challenge becomes interesting. Your research may conclude with meaningful answers to the unanswered questions in a particular scientific field and serve as a stimulus for further studies in the future. Well-written papers get published more frequently and can easily attract the attention of the readers. They are highly read, recommended as well as cited. Reviewers are more willing to review a well written research article and give favorable comments to improve the quality of the study. The authors should make every effort to implement the proper use of correct grammar. Poor language quality, including errors in grammar, spelling mistakes, typographical errors could delay the publication or lead to outright rejection of the paper.</span></p><p><span>Ultimately, the readers of your scientific manuscript are your primary examiners. They are going to examine the details of all the appropriate components of your study: purpose, background and rationale, strategies, results|, discussion and conclusions. . The elements of good scientific publishing must certainly be clear, precise, and logical. Finally, scientific work is incomplete until the results are disseminated to the larger community. Thus, effective scientific writing will create information exchange, to improve knowledge progress, ideas and improve your colleague's future work. </span></p><div><span><br /></span></div>


Author(s):  
Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik

It has been claimed that decisions concerning scientific research topics and the publication of research results are purely methodological, and that any moral considerations refer only to research methods and uses of acquired knowledge. The arguments advanced in favor of this view appeal to the moral neutrality of scientific knowledge and the intrinsic value of truth. I argue that neither is valid. Moreover, I show three cases where a scientist’s decision to begin research clearly bears moral relevance: (1) when starting an inquiry would create circumstances threatening some non-cognitive values; (2) when achieving a certain piece of knowledge would threaten the existence of the individual’s private sphere; and (3) when there are reasons to think that humankind is not prepared to accumulate some knowledge. These cases do not prove the existence of some intrinsically ‘morally forbidden topics,’ but show that the moral permissibility of any given inquiry is not a priori guaranteed but needs to be judged in the same way that its methodological soundness is judged. Judgments concerning research topics have both methodological and moral aspects and these two cannot be separated under the threat of distorting science. Making such judgments requires knowledge not only of scientific methodology, but also of its social and philosophical implications. Philosophy is necessary in order to do good science.


Semiotica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (233) ◽  
pp. 159-177
Author(s):  
Martin Švantner

AbstractIn this study I compare the work of two scholars who are important for contemporary research into the history of semiotics. The main goal of the study is to describe specific rhetorical/figurative forms and structures of persuasion between two epistemological positions that determine various possibilities in the historiography of semiotics. The main question is this: how do we understand two important metatheoretical forms of descriptions in the historiography of semiotics or the history of sign relations? The first perspective is semiology and its corollary, “structuralism,” as presented in Michel Foucault’s The Order of Things. This perspective prefers to consider history as a set of ruptures (i). The second position explores the possibility of the historical development of semiotic consciousness as presented in the works of John N. Deely (ii). The main aim of this study lies in the exploration of these two different epistemological bases – divergent bases for developing specific understandings of interconnections that hold between between semiotics, semiosis and historical processes. A goal of this paper is to demonstrate the limits and advantages of these two paradigmatic positions. The positions in question are “meta-theoretical” in the following senses such that: (i) the historical episteme is taken to be an a priori determinant of all sign-operations in a given era and is also the semiologic grid through which Foucault approaches every mode of scientific knowledge (from “science” to “economy” and beyond); (ii) the quasi-Hegelian development of semiotic consciousness based on a conception of the sign considered as a triadic ontological relation. The latter is Deely’s guiding meta-principle, through which the history of semiotics can be articulated, examined and evaluated.


Author(s):  
Anjan Chakravartty

Armed with the framework for thinking about naturalized metaphysics given in the previous chapters, this chapter turns to a case study in the metaphysics of science. By considering a case in some detail, various aspects of the prior framework are exemplified in a concrete way. The example considered comes from a popular arena of discussion in contemporary metaphysics of science: the attribution of a specific kind of property, dispositional properties, in giving interpretations of scientific work and practices such as explanation. The appeal to dispositional properties represents a case study of how some have attempted to use scientific knowledge and practice as a starting point or inspiration for ontological theorizing—one in which answers to certain questions, such as what stands in need of explanation and what is genuinely explanatorily powerful, figure centrally.


Author(s):  
Anastasia Marinopoulou

This chapter focuses mostly on the epistemological thought of Pierre Bourdieu and Gilles Deleuze in terms of their persistence in constructing an epistemological understanding of social practice that is free from the burdens of dialectics, reason and rationality.The main bone of contention for structuralism, and soon afterwards, if not concurrently, for poststructuralism, remains the understanding of theory as the bearer of practice or the prioritization of practice instead of theory.In this chapter, I argue that no matter how hard the structuralists and poststructuralists try to avoid dealing with scientific dialectics, or as much as they merely reject it, their thinking still remains within the confines of dialectics. This is especially the case with regard to theory and practice, or the potential of the sciences to realize truth and adopt a certain methodology that relates scientific work to truth.Following parallel lines of evolution, structuralism and poststructuralism relate to a phenomenological perspective on the sciences that intends to reveal a more rigorous science, which is achieved either a priori, as in Husserl, or a posteriori, as in ethnomethodology. Furthermore, structuralism emphasizes the relations of structural elements within a systemic formation, be that of a social, political or scientific nature.


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