Islam and the World

Author(s):  
Thomas B. Pepinsky ◽  
R. William Liddle ◽  
Saiful Mujani

Recent scholarship on Islam and world politics asks how Muslims relate with the United States, but has conceived of foreign policy preferences in simplistic, pro- or anti-US terms. This chapter examines how Islamic revivalism shapes foreign policy attitudes in Indonesia, introducing a flexible methodology for capturing both the multidimensionality and nonexclusivity of Indonesian Muslims’ views of the West, the Muslim World, East Asia, and Southeast Asia. It shows that pious Muslims in Indonesia are not more likely to be anti-US; they are, rather, more likely to hold cosmopolitan worldviews. These findings are inconsistent with a “clash of civilizations” view of Islamic revivalism in Indonesia. Instead, they support an alternative perspective of Islamic revivalism as marked by modernity and cosmopolitanism rather than fundamentalism or particularism.

2001 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 593-609 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Ned Lebow ◽  
Robert Kelly

Fifth century Greeks distinguished between hegemonia (legitimated leadership) and arkhe (control). Thucydides employed this distinction to track the changing nature of the Athenian Empire during the Peloponnesian War, and the ways in which a diminishing concern for balancing self-interest against justice corroded Athenian authority, made survival of the empire increasingly problematic and encouraged the disastrous expedition to Sicily. The Melian Dialogue—often cited by realists to justify a power-based approach to foreign policy—is intended to symbolize this decay. Building on our analysis of Thucydides, we examine the British, Soviet and American experiences with hegemony. A striking feature of the contemporary American situation is the extent to which American leaders claim hegemonia but deny any interest in arkhe. Rightly or wrongly, much of the rest of the world has the reverse perception. This seeming contradiction has important implications for US foreign policy and world politics more generally.


Author(s):  
A. A. Vershinin ◽  
A. V. Korolkov

he spate of violence all over the world including the West makes us to pay attention to the factor of force in world politics. During the past decades Western countries tried to reduce the problem of force to the discussion about so-termed soft power. As a result they were not politically and morally ready to the outbreaks of the use of force in its traditional meaning. This fact to large extent explains their pained reaction to the foreign policy of the Russian Federation and the ups and downs of their politics in regard to China.


2003 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 605-620 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noam Chomsky

Many studies of world politics fail to take evidence seriously or consider basic moral truisms (for example, that the standards we apply to others we must apply to ourselves). This commentary illustrates these assessments in relation to two subjects which have attracted much interest in the West recently – terrorism and just war to combat terrorism. The evidence shows that the United States has engaged extensively in terrorism and that application of just war principles would entitle the victims of that terrorism to use force against the United States to defend themselves if the United States is accorded that right.


1994 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 132-135
Author(s):  
Mohammed M. Karabal

Every phase of American foreign policy has found its supporters inAmerican academia. The Cold War had its famous academicians who notonly justified American foreign policy at that time but later becameprominent decisionmakers. Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Baezinski arestill remembered as successful academicians who became policymakers.However, only one prominent scholar has been able to survive the ColdWar with his credibility intact while maintaining his influence on Americanforeign policy: Samuel P. Huntington.In his recent article on "The Clash of Civilizations" (Foreign Afsairs77:3), Huntington attempts to predict the scenario of the New WorldOrder that will have to be dealt with by the West. He then seeks to influencenot only American foreign policy, but that of the entire West. Hisopening argument is that the old topology of conflict will be replaced byconflicts of civilizations. The world will be divided according to existingcivilizations (i.e., western, Islamic, Confucianist, Hindu, Buddhist, LatinAmerican, and possibly African). He then MITOWS the list of enemies totwo civilizations: Confucianism and Islam. This short commentary willconcentrate on the reasons behind Huntington's article in order to uncoverthe decay that is eating away at the beautiful face of the West.The Supremacy of Western CivilizationFrom the beginning, Huntington attempts to convince the reader thatthe West represents a homogeneous culture. In addition, he infers that itsculture and civilization is desired because it is superior and therefore naturalfor it to dominate. Here, he lacks the necessary credibility to providea reason for such supremacy. Such a worldview is not new, for the samementality helped to form similar justifications for westem colonialism:"civilizing mission" and the "white man's burden" are the predecessorsto Huntington's arguments.Indirectly, Huntington calls upon the nonwestem world &I join westemcivilization. He assumes that some nonwestem civilizations might acceptwestem dominance faster and easier than others. The obstacles forjoining, which are most difficult for Islamic and Confucian societies, canbe traced to their cultures. He argues that such societies will not only rejectwestem civilization, but that they will develop their own economicand military capabilities through cooperation with each other. But whyshould he nonwestem world "join" the West, especially when "join," inHuntington's dictionary, means "dependent" or "servant" of the West, not ...


Author(s):  
Paul J. Bolt ◽  
Sharyl N. Cross

The Conclusion reviews the volume’s major themes. Russia and China have common interests that cement their partnership, and are key players in shaping the international order. Both seek better relations with the West, but on the basis of “mutual respect” and “equality.” While the relationship has grown deeper, particularly since 2014, China and Russia are partners but not allies. Thus, their relationship is marked by burgeoning cooperation, but still areas of potential competition and friction. Russia in particular must deal with China’s growing relative power at the same time that it is isolated from the West. While the Russian–Chinese relationship creates challenges for the United States and Europe and a return of major power rivalry, there is also room for cooperation in the strategic triangle comprising China, Russia, and the West. Looking ahead, the world is in a period of dramatic transition.


2001 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marjule Anne Drury

The past two decades have seen an efflorescence of works exploring cultural anti-Catholicism in a variety of national contexts. But so far, historians have engaged in little comparative analysis. This article is a first step, examining recent historical literature on modern British and American anti-Catholicism, in order to trace the similarities and distinctiveness of the turn-of-the-century German case. Historians are most likely to be acquainted with American nativism, the German Kulturkampf, continental anticlericalism, and the problems of Catholic Emancipation and the Irish Question in Britain. Many of the themes and functions of anti-Catholic discourse in the West transcended national and temporal boundaries. In each case, the conceptualization of a Catholic ‘other’ is a testament to the tenacity of confessionalism in an age formerly characterized as one of inexorable secularization. Contemporary observers often agreed that religious culture—like history, race, ethnicity, geography, and local custom—played a role in the self-evident distinctiveness of peoples and nations, in their political forms, economic performance, and intellectual and artistic contributions. We will see how confessionalism remained a lens through which intellectuals and ordinary citizens, whether attached or estranged from religious commitments, viewed political, economic, and cultural change.


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gubara Hassan

The Western originators of the multi-disciplinary social sciences and their successors, including most major Western social intellectuals, excluded religion as an explanation for the world and its affairs. They held that religion had no role to play in modern society or in rational elucidations for the way world politics or/and relations work. Expectedly, they also focused most of their studies on the West, where religion’s effect was least apparent and argued that its influence in the non-West was a primitive residue that would vanish with its modernization, the Muslim world in particular. Paradoxically, modernity has caused a resurgence or a revival of religion, including Islam. As an alternative approach to this Western-centric stance and while focusing on Islam, the paper argues that religion is not a thing of the past and that Islam has its visions of international relations between Muslim and non-Muslim states or abodes: peace, war, truce or treaty, and preaching (da’wah).


2021 ◽  
pp. 932-950
Author(s):  
Vladislav Vyacheslavovich Emelyanov

Every few decades, the world order changes due to various geopolitical, economic and other circumstances. For example, as a result of globalization, the world order has undergone significant changes in the last forty years. Globalization has led to the destruction of the postwar world order, as well as to world leadership by the United States and the West. However, in recent decades, as a result of globalization, the U.S. and the West began to cede their leadership to developing countries, so there is now a change in the economic structure of relations in the world system. Today the center of economic growth is in the East, namely in Asia. There are no new superpowers in the world at the moment, but the unipolar world will cease to exist due to the weakening of the U. S. leadership, which will lead to a change in the world order. A new leader, which may replace the U. S., will not have as wide range of advantages as the USA has. Most likely, the essence of the new order will be to unite the largest countries and alliances into blocks, for example, the USA together with the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the EU, etc. The article outlines forecasts of GDP growth rates as well as the global energy outlook; analyzes the LNG market as well as the impact of the pandemic on the global oil and gas market; and lists the characteristics of U. S. geopolitics.


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