Resolving the Dispute Between Ideal and Ordinary Language Approaches
This chapter addresses the long-standing dispute on logic and philosophical methodology between the so-called ideal and ordinary language schools of analytic philosophy, and proposes a resolution to it. While the ideal language school emphasizes the importance of the simplicity and exactness of concepts for philosophical clarity, the ordinary language school regards it as crucial to philosophy to clarify the concepts and the uses of natural language in their actual complexity, viewing emphasis on simplicity and exactness as misguided. For the ideal language school this, again, comes across as a dismissal of good scientific methodology. The proposed resolution draws on the later Wittgenstein’s account of idealization in logic, from the point of view of which the notion of relevance is crucial for understanding the completeness of philosophical accounts. This enables us to satisfy simultaneously the different requirements of the two schools for an adequate method, explaining how one can both meet the ideals of simplicity and exactness in logical clarification and acknowledge the complexity of the concepts and uses of natural language. The last section compares Wittgensteinian clarificatory models with Carnapian explications, and explains the benefits of the former over the latter.