Presentational Conservatism

2020 ◽  
pp. 101-127
Author(s):  
Elijah Chudnoff

Presentational Conservatism is the view that if, and only if, you have an experience that has presentational phenomenology with respect to p, then do you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. This chapter defends Presentational Conservatism and explores its epistemic implications. Once located in relation to other dogmatist and phenomenal conservative approaches to justification, the view is clarified through discussion of presentational phenomenology and motivated on the basis of reflection on cases and general epistemological considerations. If Presentational Conservatism is true, then various epistemological agendas that have been pursued in the wake of the literature on high-level perceptual content need to be reassessed. Implications for recently popular perceptual accounts of our knowledge of other minds are explored in some detail.

Author(s):  
Jan Christoph Bublitz

Whether there are intrinsic differences between different means to intervene into brains and minds is a key question of neuroethics, which any future legal regulation of mind-interventions has to face. This chapter affirms such differences by a twofold argument:. First, it present differences between direct (biological, physiological) and indirect (psychological) interventions that are not based on crude mind–brain dualisms or dubious properties such as naturalness of interventions. Second, it shows why these differences (should) matter for the law. In a nutshell, this chapter suggests that indirect interventions should be understood as stimuli that persons perceive through their external senses whereas direct interventions reach brains and minds on different, nonperceptual routes. Interventions primarily differ in virtue of their causal pathways. Because of them, persons have different kinds and amounts of control over interventions; direct interventions regularly bypass resistance and control of recipients. Direct interventions also differ from indirect ones because they misappropriate mechanisms of the brain. These differences bear normative relevance in light of the right to mental self-determination, which should be the guiding normative principle with respect to mind-interventions. As a consequence, the law should adopt by and large a normative—not ontological—dualism between interventions into other minds: nonconsensual direct interventions into other minds should be prohibited by law, with few exceptions. By contrast, indirect interventions should be prima facie permissible, primarily those that qualify as exercises of free speech. The chapter also addresses a range of recent objections, especially by Levy (in the previous chapter).


1965 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olive Anderson

It is well known that the role of public opinion in England before and during the Crimean War was almost uniquely important. It is probably equally well known that in the middle of the nineteenth century church-going and clerical prestige both reached a remarkably high level, except among the working classes. There is, thus, a strong prima facie case for supposing that the churches played a significant part in forming opinion at this critical time, offering as they did to their members interpretations of public events in accordance with their own theological outlook. Certainly such interpretations were far more in demand during the Crimean War than during the wars of either the eighteenth or the twentieth century. It is a striking fact that this was the last English war to be begun with the proclamation of a General Fast, and probably the only modern war in which military disasters prompted another General Fast. The clergy's public was remarkably large and remarkably attentive. The circulation of the religious weekly press almost approached that of the serious secular weeklies (the Athenaeum apart), while the long life of the Penny Pulpit, made up exclusively of the recent sermons of the most popular preachers of the day, reveals a substantial sermon-buying public well below the social levels which the familiar bound volumes of a single preacher's sermons suggest.


Author(s):  
Cristina I. Font-Julian ◽  
Raúl Compés-López ◽  
Enrique Orduna-Malea

The aim of this work is to determine to what extent Robert Parker has lost his influence as a prescriber in the world of wine through a webometric analysis based on a comparative analysis of Parker’s web influence and that of a competitor who represents an anthitetical vision of the world of wine (Alice Feiring). To do this, we carried out a comparative analysis for Parker’s (@wine_advocate) and Alice Feiring’s (@alicefeiring) official Twitter accounts, including a broad set of metrics (productivity, age, Social Activity, number of followees, etc.), paying special attention to specific followers’ features (age, gender, location, and bios text). The results show that Parker’s twitter profile exhibits an overall higher impact, which denotes not only a different online strategy but also a high level of engagement and popularity. The low level of shared followers by Parker and Feiring (1,898 users) offer prima facie evidence of an online gap between these followers, which can indicate the existence of a divided group of supporters corresponding with the visions that Parker and Feiring represent. Finally, special features are notice for Feiring in gender (more women followers), language (more English-speaking followers) and country (more followers from the United States).


Author(s):  
Berit "Brit" Brogaard ◽  
Elijah Chudnoff

This chapter focuses on the relationship between consciousness and knowledge, and in particular on the role perceptual consciousness might play in justifying beliefs about the external world. A version of phenomenal dogmatism is outlined according to which perceptual experiences immediately, prima facie justify certain select parts of their content, and do so in virtue of their having a distinctive phenomenology with respect to those contents. Along the way various issues are considered in connection with this core theme, including the possibility of immediate justification, the dispute between representational and relational views of perception, the epistemic significance of cognitive penetration, the question of whether perceptual experiences are composed of more basic sensations and seemings, and questions about the existence and epistemic significance of high-level content. A concluding section briefly considers how some of the topics pursued here might generalize beyond perception.


Author(s):  
Dustin Stokes

Both common sense and dominant traditions in art criticism and philosophical aesthetics maintain that aesthetic features or properties are perceived. However, there are many reasons to be sceptical of this. This chapter defends the thesis—that aesthetic properties are sometimes represented in perceptual experience—against one of those sceptical opponents who maintains that perception represents only low-level properties, and since all theorists agree that aesthetic properties are not low-level properties, perception does not represent aesthetic properties. This chapter offers a novel argument—the argument from seeing-as—against that sceptic which moves from consideration of ambiguous figures to consideration of visual art, concluding that aesthetic properties are sometimes perceived and delivers a general lesson for philosophy of perception. Contrary to extant theories of rich perceptual content, aesthetic properties are better candidates for high-level perceptual contents than standardly theorized rich contents like natural kinds.


Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Cavedon-Taylor

AbstractHow tight is the conceptual connection between imagination and perception? A number of philosophers, from the early moderns to present-day predictive processing theorists, tie the knot as tightly as they can, claiming that states of the imagination, i.e. mental imagery, are a proper subset of perceptual experience. This paper labels such a view ‘perceptualism’ about the imagination and supplies new arguments against it. The arguments are based on high-level perceptual content and, distinctly, cognitive penetration. The paper also defuses a recent, influential argument for perceptualism based on the ‘discovery’ that visual perception and mental imagery share a significant neural substrate: circuitry in V1, the brain’s primary visual cortex. Current neuropsychology is shown to be equivocal at best on this matter. While experiments conducted on healthy, neurotypical subjects indicate substantial neural overlap, there is extensive clinical evidence of dissociations between imagery and perception in the brain, most notably in the case of aphantasia.


Philosophies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Patrick Francis Bloniasz

Educational assessments, specifically standardized and normalized exams, owe most of their foundations to psychological test theory in psychometrics. While the theoretical assumptions of these practices are widespread and relatively uncontroversial in the testing community, there are at least two that are philosophically and mathematically suspect and have troubling implications in education. Assumption 1 is that repeated assessment measures that are calculated into an arithmetic mean are thought to represent some real stable, quantitative psychological trait or ability plus some error. Assumption 2 is that aggregated, group-level educational data collected from assessments can then be interpreted to make inferences about a given individual person over time without explicit justification. It is argued that the former assumption cannot be taken for granted; it is also argued that, while it is typically attributed to 20th century thought, the assumption in a rigorous form can be traced back at least to the 1830s via an unattractive Platonistic statistical thesis offered by one of the founders of the social sciences—Belgian mathematician Adolphe Quetelet (1796–1874). While contemporary research has moved away from using his work directly, it is demonstrated that cognitive psychology is still facing the preservation of assumption 1, which is becoming increasingly challenged by current paradigms that pitch human cognition as a dynamical, complex system. However, how to deal with assumption 1 and whether it is broadly justified is left as an open question. It is then argued that assumption 2 is only justified by assessments having ergodic properties, which is a criterion rarely met in education; specifically, some forms of normalized standardized exams are intrinsically non-ergodic and should be thought of as invalid assessments for saying much about individual students and their capability. The article closes with a call for the introduction of dynamical mathematics into educational assessment at a conceptual level (e.g., through Bayesian networks), the critical analysis of several key psychological testing assumptions, and the introduction of dynamical language into philosophical discourse. Each of these prima facie distinct areas ought to inform each other more closely in educational studies.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Kiverstein ◽  
Erik Rietveld

Abstract Veissière and colleagues make a valiant attempt at reconciling an internalist account of implicit cultural learning with an externalist account that understands social behaviour in terms of its environment-involving dynamics. However, unfortunately the author's attempt to forge a middle way between internalism and externalism fails. We argue their failure stems from the overly individualistic understanding of the perception of cultural affordances they propose.


Author(s):  
David P. Bazett-Jones ◽  
Mark L. Brown

A multisubunit RNA polymerase enzyme is ultimately responsible for transcription initiation and elongation of RNA, but recognition of the proper start site by the enzyme is regulated by general, temporal and gene-specific trans-factors interacting at promoter and enhancer DNA sequences. To understand the molecular mechanisms which precisely regulate the transcription initiation event, it is crucial to elucidate the structure of the transcription factor/DNA complexes involved. Electron spectroscopic imaging (ESI) provides the opportunity to visualize individual DNA molecules. Enhancement of DNA contrast with ESI is accomplished by imaging with electrons that have interacted with inner shell electrons of phosphorus in the DNA backbone. Phosphorus detection at this intermediately high level of resolution (≈lnm) permits selective imaging of the DNA, to determine whether the protein factors compact, bend or wrap the DNA. Simultaneously, mass analysis and phosphorus content can be measured quantitatively, using adjacent DNA or tobacco mosaic virus (TMV) as mass and phosphorus standards. These two parameters provide stoichiometric information relating the ratios of protein:DNA content.


Author(s):  
J. S. Wall

The forte of the Scanning transmission Electron Microscope (STEM) is high resolution imaging with high contrast on thin specimens, as demonstrated by visualization of single heavy atoms. of equal importance for biology is the efficient utilization of all available signals, permitting low dose imaging of unstained single molecules such as DNA.Our work at Brookhaven has concentrated on: 1) design and construction of instruments optimized for a narrow range of biological applications and 2) use of such instruments in a very active user/collaborator program. Therefore our program is highly interactive with a strong emphasis on producing results which are interpretable with a high level of confidence.The major challenge we face at the moment is specimen preparation. The resolution of the STEM is better than 2.5 A, but measurements of resolution vs. dose level off at a resolution of 20 A at a dose of 10 el/A2 on a well-behaved biological specimen such as TMV (tobacco mosaic virus). To track down this problem we are examining all aspects of specimen preparation: purification of biological material, deposition on the thin film substrate, washing, fast freezing and freeze drying. As we attempt to improve our equipment/technique, we use image analysis of TMV internal controls included in all STEM samples as a monitor sensitive enough to detect even a few percent improvement. For delicate specimens, carbon films can be very harsh-leading to disruption of the sample. Therefore we are developing conducting polymer films as alternative substrates, as described elsewhere in these Proceedings. For specimen preparation studies, we have identified (from our user/collaborator program ) a variety of “canary” specimens, each uniquely sensitive to one particular aspect of sample preparation, so we can attempt to separate the variables involved.


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