Philosophical Theology and Evolutionary Anthropology

Author(s):  
Martin Breul

Summary Being one of most influential anthropologists of contemporary times, Michael Tomasello and his groundbreaking evolutionary approach to a natural history of human beings are still to be received by theological anthropology. This article aims at evaluating the prospects and limitations of Tomasello’s natural history of human ontogeny from a philosophical and theological perspective. The major advantages of Tomasello’s approach are a new conceptual perspective on the mind-brain problem and a possible detranscendentalization of the human mind which leads to an intersubjectively grounded anthropology. At the same time, evolutionary anthropology struggles with the binding force of moral obligations and the human ability to interpret one’s existence and the world in a religious way. This article thus offers a first theological inventory of Tomasello’s account of evolutionary anthropology which praises its prospects and detects its limitations.

1859 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 381-457 ◽  

The necessity of discussing so great a subject as the Theory of the Vertebrate Skull in the small space of time allotted by custom to a lecture, has its advantages as well as its drawbacks. As, on the present occasion, I shall suffer greatly from the disadvantages of the limitation, I will, with your permission, avail myself to the uttermost of its benefits. It will be necessary for me to assume much that I would rather demonstrate, to suppose known much that I would rather set forth and explain at length; but on the other hand, I may consider myself excused from entering largely either into the history of the subject, or into lengthy and controversial criticisms upon the views which are, or have been, held by others. The biological science of the last half-century is honourably distinguished from that of preceding epochs, by the constantly increasing prominence of the idea, that a community of plan is discernible amidst the manifold diversities of organic structure. That there is nothing really aberrant in nature; that the most widely different organisms are connected by a hidden bond; that an apparently new and isolated structure will prove, when its characters are thoroughly sifted, to be only a modification of something which existed before,—are propositions which are gradually assuming the position of articles of faith in the mind of the investigators of animated nature, and are directly, or by implication, admitted among the axioms of natural history.


Author(s):  
Emanuele Castrucci

The human mind has phased out its traditional anchorage in a natural biological basis (the «reasons of the body» which even Spinoza’s Ethics could count on) – an anchorage that had determined, for at least two millennia, historically familiar forms of culture and civilisation. Increasingly emphasising its intellectual disembodiment, it has come to the point of establishing in a completely artificial way the normative conditions of social behaviour and the very ontological collocation of human beings in general. If in the past ‘God’ was the name that mythopoietic activity had assigned to the world’s overall moral order, which was reflected onto human behaviour, now the progressive freeing of the mind – by way of the intellectualisation of life and technology – from the natural normativity which was previously its basic material reference opens up unforeseen vistas of power. Freedom of the intellect demands (or so one believes) the full artificiality of the normative human order in the form of an artificial logos, and precisely qua artificial, omnipotent. The technological icon of logos (which postmodern dispersion undermines only superficially) definitively unseats the traditional normative, sovereign ‘God’ of human history as he has been known till now. Our West has been irreversibly marked by this process, whose results are as devastating as they are inevitable. The decline predicted a century ago by old Spengler is here served on a platter....


2021 ◽  
pp. 81-103
Author(s):  
James A. Harris

‘Religion' discusses Hume’s various treatments of religion, particularly in the essay ‘Of Miracles’, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, and ‘The Natural History of Religion’. Hume's earlier writings show some interesting implications for religion, including A Treatise of Human Nature and the essay ‘Of National Characters’. Looking at ‘Of Miracles’ shows that Hume’s theme was not the possibility of miracles as such, but rather the rational grounds of belief in reports of miracles. Considering the Dialogues emphasizes the distinction between scepticism and atheism. Meanwhile, ‘Natural History’ emphasizes Hume’s interest in the dangerous moral consequences of monotheism. What is the future for religion? Perhaps Hume was unlikely to have supposed that his writings would do anything to reduce religion’s hold on the vast majority of human beings.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (5) ◽  
pp. 610-627
Author(s):  
Oren Ergas

This paper locates the main challenge for education in cosmopolitanism within the nature of education when interpreted as a “mind-making process.” Based on this interpretation, education is currently a process that shapes non-cosmopolitan minds, for the practices generally associated with it habituate the human mind to see “reality” through contingent social narratives. The aspiration of education in cosmopolitanism to cultivate “a sense of feeling at home and caring for the world,” requires practices that also liberate the mind from the contingencies of the social narratives into which it happens to be born. For such purpose, education requires an ethical meta-narrative, which applies to all human beings and appeals to a mutual human language. Following calls for embracing a pluralistic epistemology in policy making, this paper proposes the interdisciplinary field of contemplative studies that focuses on the understanding of the embodied mind, as a point of origin for considering education as such and education in cosmopolitanism in particular. Mindfulness is then interpreted as one possible practical pedagogy based on which we can practice detachment from the contingency of social narratives by cultivating grounded-ness in the non-contingency of pre-conceptual embodied first-person experience.


Author(s):  
Yiftach Fehige

Summary Thomas Nagel has proposed a highly speculative metaphysical theory to account for the cosmological significance that he claims the human mind to have. Nagel argues that the mind cannot be fully explained by Darwinian evolutionary theory, nor should theological accounts be accepted. What he proposes instead is an explanation in terms of cosmological non-purposive teleological principles. Our universe awakens to itself in each and every individual consciousness. What comes to light in a pronounced manner when consciousness arises, are the mental aspects of the stuff that the universe is made of. These mental aspects are always concurrently present with the physical aspects of the basic elements that constitute the universe. This paper situates Nagel’s cosmology in the context of discussions of the relationship between modern science and Christian theology. It focuses on the history of modern science’s efforts to locate the origins of humanity. The aim of the paper is to present a qualified “Lutheran” reading of Nagel’s theory of the cosmological significance of the human mind. This will unearth strong reasons to think that Nagel’s cosmology is less secular than it claims to be.


Author(s):  
Pascual F. Martínez-Freire

The mind is a collection of various classes of processes that can be studied empirically. To limit the field of mental processes we must follow the criteria of folk psychology. There are three kinds of mind: human, animal and mechanical. But the human mind is the paradigm or model of mind. The existence of mechanical minds is a serious challenge to the materialism or the mind-brain identity theory. Based on this existence we can put forward the antimaterialist argument of machines. Intelligence is a class of mental processes such that the mind is the genus and the intelligence is a species of this genus. The capacity to solve problems is a clear and definite criterion of intelligence. Again, like in the mind, the human intelligence is the paradigm of the intelligence. There are also three kinds of intelligence: human, animal and mechanical. Searle’s Chinese room argument is misleading because Searle believes that it is possible to maintain a sharp distinction between syntax and semantics. The reasonable dualism in the brain-mind problem defends the existence of brain-mental processes, physical-mental processes, and nonphysical-mental (spiritual) processes. Constitution of the personal project of life, self-consciousness and free volitions are examples of spiritual processes. Usually the intelligence has been considered the most important quality of human beings, but freedom, or the world of free volitions, is a more specific quality of human beings.


Author(s):  
Richard C. Allen

David Hartley’s Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations (1749) offers an inclusive study of human beings, one that brings together neuro-physiology, cognitive and moral psychology, and theology. According to Hartley, the ‘frame’ of body and brain grounds consciousness, so that mind is not something separate from body. Experiences of happiness and suffering combine to shape a person’s evolving sense of self, and this self may grow into awareness of our duty to act always out of love. Expectations of one’s place in the vastness of time help bring this growth about, for these put into perspective the pleasures and pains of the present moment. ‘Association’ is the central principle unifying Hartley’s Observations on Man At the end of the first volume, Hartley makes a bold statement: if an organism ‘could be endued with the most simple kinds of sensation, [it] might also arrive at all that intelligence of which the human mind is possessed’ (17949, vol. 1: Conclusion). Just as association can account for the ‘mind’ of a jellyfish, so also can the theory account for the forms of intelligence that go into living complete human lives. Association first names the physiological processes that generate ideas, and then the psychological processes by which perceptions, emotions, and thoughts fuse or break apart. These processes involve mastering the skilled (‘decomplex’) actions that fill our daily lives, as well as the acts by which the self forms and transforms, as we grow in sympathy, ‘theopathy’ and the moral sense.


2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-90
Author(s):  
Emeline McClellan ◽  

This article argues that De trinitate advocates a process of “reading” God through metaphor. For Augustine, as for Plotinus, human beings understand God (to the degree that this is possible) not by analyzing him rationally but by seeing him through the metaphor of the human mind. But unlike Plotinus, Augustine claims that the imago dei, with its triadic structure of memory, understanding, and will, serves as metaphor only to the extent that it experiences Christ’s redemptive illumination. The act of metaphor is a kind of interior “reading” during which the mind reads the imago dei as a mental text, interprets this text through Christ’s aid, and is simultaneously transformed into a better image.


Author(s):  
Michael Zuckert

This chapter reviews Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self. The book displays Taylor’s mastery not only of the history of philosophy, but of theology, poetry, and art. He also shares Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s commitment to synthesizing competing and conflicting elements of the culture. Unlike Hegel, however, Taylor does not see philosophy as the highest and truest expression of the human mind or spirit; rather he sees the artists—the poets most especially—as the ones who “can put us in contact with” what we as living and thinking humans need to be in contact with. This chapter examines Taylor’s arguments as articulated in Sources of the Self, especially his view that human beings are self-interpreting and self-misinterpreting animals and that self-interpretation has ontological significance. It also considers what Taylor identifies as a “phenomenology” of human action, his theory of morality and identity, and his concept of the “punctual self.”


Author(s):  
Richard Samuels

The objective of the article is to discuss the evolution, hypothesis, and some the more prominent arguments for massive modularity (MM). MM is the hypothesis that the human mind is largely or entirely composed from a great many modules. Modules are functionally characterizable cognitive mechanisms that tend to possess several features, which include domain-specificity, informationally encapsulation, innateness, inaccessibility, shallow outputs, and mandatory operation. The final thesis that comprises MM mentions that modules are found not merely at the periphery of the mind but also in the central regions responsible for such higher cognitive capacities as reasoning and decision-making. The central cognition depends on a great many functional modules that are not themselves composable into larger more inclusive systems. One of the families of arguments for MM focuses on a range of problems that are familiar from the history of cognitive science such as problems that concern the computational tractability of cognitive processes. The arguments may vary considerably in detail but they share a common format. First, they proceed from the assumption that cognitive processes are classical computational ones. Second, given the assumption that cognitive processes are computational ones, intractability arguments seek to undermine non-modular accounts of cognition by establishing the intractability thesis.


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