National Champions, Reforms, and Industrial Policy in China

Author(s):  
Chen Li ◽  
Muyang Chen

China’s economic reforms since the late 1970s have been characterized by a combination of market-oriented transition and persistent practices of statist industrial policy. A key dimension of China’s industrial policy is to transform and consolidate the backbone of its large state-owned enterprises sector into a group of globally competitive big businesses. The rise of China’s ‘national champions’, defined here as the giant central state-controlled corporations, business groups, and financial institutions in the ‘commanding heights’ sectors, has reshaped the landscape of China’s business system. This chapter reviews the origin and evolution of China’s national champions industrial policy. It examines how the Chinese state has restructured the core assets and enterprise units from the socialist command economy into a set of large state-controlled corporations and business groups viable in a predominantly market-oriented environment. This process has been driven by continuous organizational learning and capability building at both the government and enterprise levels. The current governance regime of China’s national champions can be characterized as a networked hierarchy that interweaves multiple mechanisms of institutional bridging and reciprocal control. Despite their remarkable size and growth, China’s national champions are still at an early stage of developing their international competitiveness.

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-97
Author(s):  
Park Jungyeon ◽  
Koo Min Gyo

The once-promising offshore-plant industry in South Korea is on the verge of collapse. There are both internal and external reasons for the sudden rise and fall of this now troubled industry. This study focuses on what went wrong within the South Korean government. It examines how the offshore-plant industrial policy has been implemented since its inception in 2012. Using a modified version of Matland`s ambiguity-conflict matrix, this study explains the way in which the combination of policy goal ambiguity and organizational conflict between and within government agencies led to policy drift and failure. We find that offshore-plant industrial policy has undergone three different but related stages from symbolic to experimental to political implementation over the past five years. Varying degrees of goal ambiguity and organizational conflicts have resulted in these shifts, which in turn have resulted in the government missing opportunities to correct earlier policy errors in the next stages. This study explains the unique problems inherent in the offshore-plant industrial policy. At the same time, it reveals common problems prevalent in South Korea`s government-led industrial policy: a lack of planning, deliberation, coordination, and collaboration within the government, let alone outside of it.


2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 78
Author(s):  
M. Zainuddin

This research to analyze the impact of closure policy Teleju brothel by Pekanbaru govermentin 2010. Guidelines for works are Pekanbaru Local Regulations No. 12 of 2008 on Social Order-liness. Closure this brothel inflicts positive and negative impact for society.The research wasconducted to obtain early stage formula for the government to take action against the prostitu-tion activities. This research uses policy research approach with a qualitative method, becausein prostitution activities and prohibition by goverment is an assessment that needs to be done byanalyzing documents and unstructured interview.The results showed that after the closing of the Teleju brothel have an impact on the deploy-ment of a prostitution and affect the economy of the surrounding residents. Government seeksto tackle prostitution in Pekanbaru by moving the brothel, conduct regular raids and providetraining. The effort is considered to be less than the maximum because the handling is not basedon the root of the problem and not programmed properly. There are several causes of failure ofgovernment to overcome the prostitution problem in Pekanbaru, including: policy content isless focus on the prostitution problem, the government did not proceeds with data, lack of finan-cial support, contra productive programs between local government with the police and TNI,and the policy object is difficult to be given understanding.


1983 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niels Chr. Sidenius

ABSTRACTDanish industrial policy reflects a ‘liberalistic’ paradigm, with industrial subsidies being general rather than selective, and based on profitability. There was an increase in the number of industrial policy instruments introduced in the second half of the 1970s, and in particular there seems to have been an increase in subsidies for technological innovation. The amount of money allocated for industrial subsidies has increased, especially during the economic recession. However, Danish industrial policy can only be conceived of as a crisis response policy in a relatively diffuse way, with only a few arrangements directly targetted at firms in difficulties, whereas most aim at making the surviving firms expand, innovate and increase their exports. Similarly, with few exceptions Danish industrial policy can be seen as anticipatory only in a very general way. The administration of industrial policy is characterised by close cooperation between state, industry and labour in tripartite boards and committees that take decisions about the administration of industrial policy or advise the government. The widespread use of such tripartite bodies hampers changes in industrial policy because all partners have to acquiesce in the changes. Innovation in Danish industrial policy is likely to be a gradual process, with most existing arrangements surviving, and a desultory increase in the use of more selective measures.


1993 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Romano Dyerson ◽  
Frank Mueller

ABSTRACTAs the debate throughout the eighties has concluded, the efforts of governments to intervene at the firm level has largely been disappointing. Using two examples drawn from the British experience, Rover and Inmos, this paper offers an analysis as to why the Government has encountered difficulties when it has sought to intervene in a strategic fashion. Essentially, public policy makers lack adequate mechanisms to intervene effectively in technology-based companies. Locked out of the knowledge base of the firm, inappropriate financial control is imposed which reinforces the ‘outsider’ status of the Government. Having addressed the limitations of strategic intervention, the paper, drawing on the comparative experience of other countries, then goes on to address how this policy boundary might be pushed back in the long term.


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (03) ◽  
pp. 534-576
Author(s):  
Marcelo Bucheli ◽  
Erica Salvaj

This paper compares the corporate network strategies between multinational corporations of two different origins (United States and Spain), business groups, and state-owned enterprises in the public utility sector of a developing country going through economic and political transitions. The transitions we consider are from an import substitution industrialization model to an open market economy and from a democratic regime to a dictatorial one and back to democracy. We analyze the Chilean telecommunications sector between 1958 and 2005 and find that during a democratic regime all firms sought to build more networks with each other, while incentives decrease under an authoritarian regime. In the protectionist era, US investors built links with Chile’s corporate elite, while in times of an open economy, Spanish investors built these links with the government. State-owned corporations did not attempt to build links with other actors at any time, and business groups sought to build most networks among members of the group. Our findings challenge two commonly held assumptions: first, that open economies decrease incentives for domestic actors to build links with each other and, second, that close political regimes increase incentives to build networks among economic actors.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 160-173
Author(s):  
Fedor L. Sinitsyn

This article examines the development of social control in the Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev, who was General Secretary of the Communist Party from 1964 to 1982. Historians have largely neglected this question, especially with regard to its evolution and efficiency. Research is based on sources in the Russian State Archive of Modern History (RGANI), the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) and the Moscow Central State Archive (TSGAM). During Brezhnevs rule, Soviet propaganda reached the peak of its development. However, despite the fact that authorities tried to improve it, the system was ritualistic, unconvincing, unwieldy, and favored quantity over quality. The same was true for political education, which did little more than inspire sullen passivity in its students. Although officials recognized these failings, their response was ineffective, and over time Soviet propaganda increasingly lost its potency. At the same time, there were new trends in the system of social control. Authorities tried to have a foot in both camps - to strengthen censorship, and at the same time to get feedback from the public. However, many were afraid to express any criticism openly. In turn, the government used data on peoples sentiments only to try to control their thoughts. As a result, it did not respond to matters that concerned the public. These problems only increased during the era of stagnation and contributed to the decline and subsequent collapse of the Soviet system.


2017 ◽  
Vol 231 ◽  
pp. 685-704 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Eaton ◽  
Genia Kostka

AbstractThis article examines the so-called “central State Owned Enterprise (SOE) problem” in China's environmental governance system, namely central SOEs' defiance of environmental regulation. We present evidence showing that, in the last decade, central SOEs have been the source of a large number of serious pollution incidents and have often failed to comply with environmental guidelines and regulations. Central SOEs in the electricity generation and oil and gas industries are particularly culpable, with six firms alone accounting for 62 per cent of all 2,370 reported violations (2004–2016). We argue that a combination of “central protectionism” of state-owned national champions and insufficient regulatory capacity in the environmental bureaucracy have provided state firms under central management with both incentives and opportunities to shirk on environmental regulations. Yet, while the institutions of central protectionism are deeply rooted, countervailing forces within the complex Chinese state are also gaining momentum. In spite of the considerable regulatory challenges, officials in the environment bureaucracy display increasing resolve and ingenuity in trying to strengthen their enforcement capacity.


2003 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephan Feuchtwang

The gulf between intellectuals and peasants, in which the latter are perceived to be a drag on the modernization led by the former, is usually selfaggrandizement. When, as in China, peasants have the ambivalent status of being the base of revolution and the drag on political reform in the direction of democracy, anthropologists are in a good position to challenge the intellectuals’ pretensions. But we don’t. This article asks why, points out the ways in which we can, and then refutes the notion that Chinese peasants have no democratic tradition with an example. It is an example of self-organization around an incense burner, a religious tradition of territorial association. I put it to the test of a number of concepts of democracy, most of which it passes. But its leaders are chosen by divine selection, raising the question whether this is a form of benign charisma rather than standard electoral democracy. The institution persists into the present of the People’s Republic of China and the government of Taiwan, where it functions as a public good, a test of local loyalty, and a moral basis by which the conduct of state officials and elected representatives are judged. It is a civil institution, but now the issue is whether it will last or be soaked up by central state cultural policies. Whatever the answer, the example also throws down a challenge to anthropologists in other regions to explore ‘peasant’ self-organization and cultural resources for democracy and civil judgement.


Author(s):  
Andrian Afanasievich Borisov ◽  
Tat'yana Vladimirovna Pavlova-Borisova

This article is firs to discuss an early stage of origination of the regional cultural policy of Yakutia in the Russian Empire of the XVIII – early XX centuries. Emphasis is made on the regional community: the representatives of traditional cultures – peoples of Yakutia and representatives of Russian culture (service class, government officials, taxed estates). The subject of this research is the historical prerequisites of such policy in the region, as well as the government structures that realized its key trends. The research is carried out in the all-Russian context, namely the context of transformations that took place during the Governorate Reform of 1775, as well as further evolution of the local administrative authorities that carried out cultural policy in the region. The questions is raised on the dynamic development of cultural processes in this suburb of the Empire, where the traditional cultures influencing the representatives of Russian provincial community, simultaneously became familiarized with the cultural trends from Russia. Despite the previous perceptions on the cultural backwardness of Yakutia as an imperial suburb, the conclusion is made on the relatively successful actions of imperial authorities in this field.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document