scholarly journals The effects of reputation on inequality in network cooperation games

2021 ◽  
Vol 376 (1838) ◽  
Author(s):  
Milena Tsvetkova
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Biology ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Behaviour ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Ample Evidence ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Network Cooperation ◽  
Large Groups ◽  
Simple Heuristics

In the last several decades, ample evidence from across evolutionary biology, behavioural economics and econophysics has solidified our knowledge that reputation can promote cooperation across different contexts and environments. Higher levels of cooperation entail higher final payoffs on average, but how are these payoffs distributed among individuals? This study investigates how public and objective reputational information affects payoff inequality in repeated social dilemma interactions in large groups. I consider two aspects of inequality: excessive dispersion of final payoffs and diminished correspondence between final payoff and cooperative behaviour. I use a simple heuristics-based agent model to demonstrate that reputational information does not always increase the dispersion of final payoffs in strategically updated networks, and actually decreases it in randomly rewired networks. More importantly, reputational information almost always improves the correspondence between final payoffs and cooperative behaviour. I analyse empirical data from nine experiments of the repeated Trust, Helping, Prisoner's Dilemma and Public Good games in networks of ten or more individuals to provide partial support for the predictions. Our research suggests that reputational information not only improves cooperation but may also reduce inequality. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

scholarly journals Honesty and dishonesty in gossip strategies: a fitness interdependence analysis

2021 ◽  
Vol 376 (1838) ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhui Wu ◽  
Szabolcs Számadó ◽  
Pat Barclay ◽  
Bianca Beersma ◽  
Terence D. Dores Cruz ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Foundation ◽  
Perfect Match ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Simple Rule ◽  
Formal Models ◽  
Partial Match ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Conflicting Interests

Gossip, or sharing information about absent others, has been identified as an effective solution to free rider problems in situations with conflicting interests. Yet, the information transmitted via gossip can be biased, because gossipers may send dishonest information about others for personal gains. Such dishonest gossip makes reputation-based cooperation more difficult to evolve. But when are people likely to share honest or dishonest gossip? We build formal models to provide the theoretical foundation for individuals' gossip strategies, taking into account the gossiper's fitness interdependence with the receiver and the target. Our models across four different games suggest a very simple rule: when there is a perfect match (mismatch) between fitness interdependence and the effect of honest gossip, the gossiper should always be honest (dishonest); however, in the case of a partial match, the gossiper should make a choice based on their fitness interdependence with the receiver and the target and the marginal cost/benefit in terms of pay-off differences caused by possible choices of the receiver and the target in the game. Moreover, gossipers can use this simple rule to make optimal decisions even under noise. We discuss empirical examples that support the predictions of our model and potential extensions. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

scholarly journals Understanding self and others: from origins to disorders

2016 ◽  
Vol 371 (1686) ◽  
pp. 20150066
Author(s):  
Caroline Catmur ◽  
Emily S. Cross ◽  
Harriet Over
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Evolutionary Biology ◽  
Social World ◽  
Action Perception ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Central Concept ◽  
Diverse Range ◽  
Intergroup Interaction ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Behaviours

In order to interpret and engage with the social world, individuals must understand how they relate to others. Self–other understanding forms the backbone of social cognition and is a central concept explored by research into basic processes such as action perception and empathy, as well as research on more sophisticated social behaviours such as cooperation and intergroup interaction. This theme issue integrates the latest research into self–other understanding from evolutionary biology, anthropology, psychology, neuroscience and psychiatry. By gathering perspectives from a diverse range of disciplines, the contributions showcase ways in which research in these areas both informs and is informed by approaches spanning the biological and social sciences, thus deepening our understanding of how we relate to others in a social world.

scholarly journals The development of individual differences in cooperative behaviour: maternal glucocorticoid hormones alter helping behaviour of offspring in wild meerkats

2019 ◽  
Vol 374 (1770) ◽  
pp. 20180117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Dantzer ◽  
Constance Dubuc ◽  
Ines Braga Goncalves ◽  
Dominic L. Cram ◽  
Nigel C. Bennett ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Maternal Effects ◽  
Early Life ◽  
Evolutionary Medicine ◽  
Cooperative Behaviour ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Offspring Fitness ◽  
Pregnant Females ◽  
Suricata Suricatta ◽  
Parental Fitness ◽  
Helping Behaviour

The phenotype of parents can have long-lasting effects on the development of offspring as well as on their behaviour, physiology and morphology as adults. In some cases, these changes may increase offspring fitness but, in others, they can elevate parental fitness at a cost to the fitness of their offspring. We show that in Kalahari meerkats ( Suricata suricatta ), the circulating glucocorticoid (GC) hormones of pregnant females affect the growth and cooperative behaviour of their offspring. We performed a 3-year experiment in wild meerkats to test the hypothesis that GC-mediated maternal effects reduce the potential for offspring to reproduce directly and therefore cause them to exhibit more cooperative behaviour. Daughters (but not sons) born to mothers treated with cortisol during pregnancy grew more slowly early in life and exhibited significantly more of two types of cooperative behaviour (pup rearing and feeding) once they were adults compared to offspring from control mothers. They also had lower measures of GCs as they aged, which could explain the observed increases in cooperative behaviour. Because early life growth is a crucial determinant of fitness in female meerkats, our results indicate that GC-mediated maternal effects may reduce the fitness of offspring, but may elevate parental fitness as a consequence of increasing the cooperative behaviour of their daughters. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Developing differences: early-life effects and evolutionary medicine’.

scholarly journals Networks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review

2021 ◽  
Vol 376 (1838) ◽  
Author(s):  
Károly Takács ◽  
Jörg Gross ◽  
Martina Testori ◽  
Srebrenka Letina ◽  
Adam R. Kenny ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Identity Formation ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Field Studies ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Shared Information ◽  
Network Topologies

Reputation has been shown to provide an informal solution to the problem of cooperation in human societies. After reviewing models that connect reputations and cooperation, we address how reputation results from information exchange embedded in a social network that changes endogenously itself. Theoretical studies highlight that network topologies have different effects on the extent of cooperation, since they can foster or hinder the flow of reputational information. Subsequently, we review models and empirical studies that intend to grasp the coevolution of reputations, cooperation and social networks. We identify open questions in the literature concerning how networks affect the accuracy of reputations, the honesty of shared information and the spread of reputational information. Certain network topologies may facilitate biased beliefs and intergroup competition or in-group identity formation that could lead to high cooperation within but conflicts between different subgroups of a network. Our review covers theoretical, experimental and field studies across various disciplines that target these questions and could explain how the dynamics of interactions and reputations help or prevent the establishment and sustainability of cooperation in small- and large-scale societies. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

scholarly journals Gossip and competitive altruism support cooperation in a Public Good game

2021 ◽  
Vol 376 (1838) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesca Giardini ◽  
Daniele Vilone ◽  
Angel Sánchez ◽  
Alberto Antonioni
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Partner Choice ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Group Competition ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Competitive Altruism

When there is an opportunity to gain a positive reputation, individuals are more willing to sacrifice their immediate self-interest. Partner choice creates opportunities for competitive altruism, i.e. individuals compete to be regarded as more generous and to be chosen for future partnerships. Tests of the competitive altruism hypothesis have focused so far on reputation based on direct observation, whereas the role of gossip has not been theoretically and empirically addressed. Partner choice can create an incentive to cooperate and to send truthful messages, but it can also work in the opposite direction. In order to understand the consequences of partner choice on cooperation and gossip, we designed an experimental study in which participants played a sequence of Public Goods games and gossip rounds. In our two treatments, we observed that cooperation increased when there was an opportunity to be selected, but also that cooperators sent more honest messages than defectors, and that this strategy was prevalent in the treatment in which inter-group competition was implemented. We also found evidence that participants detached themselves from the information more often when lying. Taken together, our study fills a theoretical and empirical gap by showing that partner choice increases both cooperation and honesty of gossip. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

scholarly journals The Price equation as a bridge between animal breeding and evolutionary biology

2020 ◽  
Vol 375 (1797) ◽  
pp. 20190360 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Bijma
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Biology ◽  
Genetic Effect ◽  
Price Equation ◽  
Response To Selection ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Heritable Variation ◽  
Indirect Genetic Effect ◽  
Trait Distribution ◽  
The Social ◽  
Genetic Standard Deviation

The genetic response to selection is central to both evolutionary biology and animal and plant breeding. While Price's theorem (PT) is well-known in evolutionary biology, most breeders are unaware of it. Rather than using PT, breeders express response to selection as the product of the intensity of selection ( i ), the accuracy of selection ( ρ ) and the additive genetic standard deviation ( σ A ); R = iρσ A . In contrast to the univariate ‘breeder's equation’, this expression holds for multivariate selection on Gaussian traits. Here, I relate R = iρσ A to PT, and present a generalized version, R = i w ρ A , w σ A , valid irrespective of the trait distribution. Next, I consider genotype–environment covariance in relation to the breeder's equation and PT, showing that the breeder's equation may remain valid depending on whether the genotype–environment covariance works across generations. Finally, I consider the response to selection in the prevalence of an endemic infectious disease, as an example of an emergent trait. The result shows that disease prevalence has much greater heritable variation than currently believed. The example also illustrates that the indirect genetic effect approach moves elements of response to selection from the second to the first term of PT, so that changes acting via the social environment come within the reach of quantitative genetics. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Fifty years of the Price equation’.

scholarly journals Darwin's Galápagos finches in modern biology

2010 ◽  
Vol 365 (1543) ◽  
pp. 1001-1007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arhat Abzhanov
Keyword(s):  
Natural Selection ◽  
Evolutionary Biology ◽  
Charles Darwin ◽  
Niche Partitioning ◽  
Morphological Diversity ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Modern Biology ◽  
Wide Audience ◽  
Darwin's Finches ◽  
Darwin’S Finches

One of the classic examples of adaptive radiation under natural selection is the evolution of 15 closely related species of Darwin's finches (Passeriformes), whose primary diversity lies in the size and shape of their beaks. Since Charles Darwin and other members of the Beagle expedition collected these birds on the Galápagos Islands in 1835 and introduced them to science, they have been the subjects of intense research. Many biology textbooks use Darwin's finches to illustrate a variety of topics of evolutionary theory, such as speciation, natural selection and niche partitioning. Today, as this Theme Issue illustrates, Darwin's finches continue to be a very valuable source of biological discovery. Certain advantages of studying this group allow further breakthroughs in our understanding of changes in recent island biodiversity, mechanisms of speciation and hybridization, evolution of cognitive behaviours, principles of beak/jaw biomechanics as well as the underlying developmental genetic mechanisms in generating morphological diversity. Our objective was to bring together some of the key workers in the field of ecology and evolutionary biology who study Darwin's finches or whose studies were inspired by research on Darwin's finches. Insights provided by papers collected in this Theme Issue will be of interest to a wide audience.

scholarly journals Asymmetry, division of labour and the evolution of ageing in multicellular organisms

2021 ◽  
Vol 376 (1823) ◽  
pp. 20190729 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ido Pen ◽  
Thomas Flatt
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Biology ◽  
Germ Line ◽  
Division Of Labour ◽  
Cellular Damage ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Unequal Distribution ◽  
Eusocial Insects ◽  
Unicellular Organisms ◽  
Multicellular Organisms

Between the 1930s and 1960s, evolutionary geneticists worked out the basic principles of why organisms age. Despite much progress in the evolutionary biology of ageing since that time, however, many puzzles remain. The perhaps most fundamental of these is the question of which organisms should exhibit senescence and which should not (or which should age rapidly and which should not). The evolutionary origin of ageing from a non-senescent state has been conceptually framed, for example, in terms of the separation between germ-line and soma, the distinction between parents and their offspring, and—in unicellular organisms—the unequal distribution of cellular damage at cell division. These ideas seem to be closely related to the concept of ‘division of labour' between reproduction and somatic maintenance. Here, we review these concepts and develop a toy model to explore the importance of such asymmetries for the evolution of senescence. We apply our model to the simplest case of a multicellular system: an organism consisting of two totipotent cells. Notably, we find that in organisms which reproduce symmetrically and partition damage equally, senescence is still able to evolve, contrary to previous claims. Our results might have some bearing on understanding the origin of the germ-line–soma separation and the evolution of senescence in multicellular organisms and in colonial species consisting of multiple types of individuals, such as, for example, eusocial insects with their different castes.This article is part of the theme issue ‘Ageing and sociality: why, when and how does sociality change ageing patterns?'

Competitive gossip: the impact of domain, resource value, resource scarcity and coalitions

2021 ◽  
Vol 376 (1838) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole H. Hess ◽  
Edward H. Hagen
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Methods ◽  
Resource Scarcity ◽  
Social Resources ◽  
Social Competition ◽  
Resource Value ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Sorority Women ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Human Primate

Those with better reputations often obtain more resources than those with poorer reputations. Consequently, gossip might be an evolved strategy to compete for valuable and scarce material and social resources. Influenced by models of non-human primate competition, we test the hypotheses that gossip: (i) targets aspects of reputation relevant to the domain in which the competition is occurring, (ii) increases when contested resources are more valuable, and (iii) increases when resources are scarcer. We then test hypotheses derived from informational warfare theory, which proposes that coalitions strategically collect, analyse and disseminate gossip. Specifically, we test whether: (iv) coalitions deter negative gossip, and (v) whether they increase expectations of reputational harm to competitors. Using experimental methods in a Mechanical Turk sample ( n = 600), and survey and ego network analysis methods in a sample of California sorority women ( n = 74), we found that gossip content is specific to the context of the competition; that more valuable and scarcer resources cause gossip, particularly negative gossip, to intensify; and that allies deter negative gossip and increase expectations of reputational harm to an adversary. These results support social competition theories of gossip. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

Cooperating to show that you care: costly helping as an honest signal of fitness interdependence

2021 ◽  
Vol 376 (1838) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pat Barclay ◽  
Rebecca Bliege Bird ◽  
Gilbert Roberts ◽  
Szabolcs Számadó
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Model ◽  
Honest Signal ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Know How ◽  
Honest Signals ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
Helping Behaviour ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Signalling Systems

Social organisms often need to know how much to trust others to cooperate. Organisms can expect cooperation from another organism that depends on them (i.e. stake or fitness interdependence), but how do individuals assess fitness interdependence? Here, we extend fitness interdependence into a signalling context: costly helping behaviour can honestly signal one's stake in others, such that those who help are trusted more. We present a mathematical model in which agents help others based on their stake in the recipient's welfare, and recipients use that information to assess whom to trust. At equilibrium, helping is a costly signal of stake: helping is worthwhile for those who value the recipient (and thus will repay any trust), but is not worthwhile for those who do not value the recipient (and thus will betray the trust). Recipients demand signals when they value the signallers less and when the cost of betrayed trust is higher; signal costs are higher when signallers have more incentive to defect. Signalling systems are more likely when the trust games resemble Prisoner's Dilemmas, Stag Hunts or Harmony Games, and are less likely in Snowdrift Games. Furthermore, we find that honest signals need not benefit recipients and can even occur between hostile parties. By signalling their interdependence, organisms benefit from increased trust, even when no future interactions will occur. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

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