scholarly journals Cooperación en los dilemas sociales / Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Carlos Aguado Franco ◽  
David De las Heras Camino
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Second Person ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Relative Value ◽  
Chicken Game ◽  
Assurance Game

ABSTRACTSocial dilemmas are situations in which individual rationality leads to collective irrationality. Prisoner's Dilemma is the best-known game depicting situations of this sort, but there are other such games. Two other games can be created by switching the relative value of the outcomes: the Assurance Game and the Chicken Game. Whereas mutual cooperation is the goal for the Prisoner's Dilemma Game and the Assurance Game, that is not necessarily the case for the Chicken Game; if one person can provide a joint benefit, then it may make no sense for the second person to duplicate the effort. In the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, cooperation may arise as an equilibrium outcome. If the game result is infinitely repeated, cooperation may be a Nash equilibrium although both players defecting always remains an equilibrium. Multiple-person social dilemmas are examined.RESUMENLos dilemas sociales, esas situaciones en las que la racionalidad individual lleva a una irracionalidad colectiva, se han planteado generalmente en la literatura económica, de una manera comprensible e intuitiva, a través del “dilema del prisionero”, si bien existen otros juegos que presentan también la forma de dilemas sociales. En efecto, partiendo de un dilema del prisionero, y modificando ligeramente los valores relativos de los pagos, podemos encontrar dos tipos de juegos diferentes: el de coordinación o seguro y el juego del “gallina”. Los distintos modelos dependerán de los supuestos que se realicen acerca de la situación analizada, lo que conducirá a extraer, lógicamente, conclusiones muy diferentes. Además, aunque la mutua cooperación es la meta clara tanto para el “dilema del prisionero” como para el juego de coordinación, esto no necesariamente se cumple para el “juego del gallina”; si una persona puede producir ese beneficio común, no tiene sentido que el otro duplique los esfuerzos. En efecto, en este tipo de juegos, los equilibrios de Nash en estrategias puras se producen en aquellas situaciones en las que uno coopera y el otro no lo hace. Aunque el análisis de los dilemas sociales, a través del dilema del prisionero bipersonal ayuda a arrojar luz sobre el asunto, parece oportuno profundizar la investigación en dos aspectos: la consideración de un horizonte temporal superior a una única partida, y la incorporación de un número de participantes en el juego mayor que dos, lo que presenta interesantes dificultades conceptuales.

scholarly journals Process R&D investment and social dilemmas

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Ramsza ◽  
Adam Karbowski ◽  
Tadeusz Platkowski
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Competitive Behavior ◽  
Bargaining Process ◽  
Entry Cost ◽  
Chicken Game ◽  
Medium Level ◽  
D Investment

AbstractWe consider a coopetitive game model of firms’ behavior in process R&D with entry cost. We compare the competitive behavior of firms in R&D with the R&D coopetition scenario. In R&D coopetition, firms engage in a bargaining process to reach a binding R&D agreement. We find that R&D competition can lead to a prisoner’s dilemma or a chicken game between market rivals. The possibility of entering a binding R&D agreement resolves the above social dilemmas associated with the firms’ competitive behavior. In turn, under R&D coopetition, for a medium level of R&D entry cost, firms may enter a trust dilemma, but it is a beneficial scenario in comparison with the corresponding R&D competition outcome.

Lesser Antilles Lines: The Island of San Huberto (A)

2010 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
James V. Gelly ◽  
Phillip E. Pfeifer
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Equilibrium Price ◽  
Lesser Antilles ◽  
Caribbean Island ◽  
Price Leadership ◽  
Price War

In this case, the situation is a classic duopoly. Two shipping firms are in a price war over the market for containerized shipping to and from a small Caribbean island. The case presents a table of contributions to both firms as a function of their prices. This table serves as a basis by which the class can explore the concepts of Nash equilibrium, price leadership, and prisoner’s dilemma. It is also available with the case as a student spreadsheet (QA-0355X). See also “Lesser Antilles Lines (B)” (UVA-QA-0641) and “Lesser Antilles Lines (C)” (UVA-QA-0670).

A Continuous Dilemma

2012 ◽  
Vol 102 (1) ◽  
pp. 337-363 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Friedman ◽  
Ryan Oprea
Keyword(s):  
Continuous Time ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Variable Number ◽  
Grid Size ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Data Support ◽  
Approach Zero ◽  
Median Rate

We study prisoners' dilemmas played in continuous time with flow payoffs accumulated over 60 seconds. In most cases, the median rate of mutual cooperation is about 90 percent. Control sessions with repeated matchings over eight subperiods achieve less than half as much cooperation, and cooperation rates approach zero in one-shot sessions. In follow-up sessions with a variable number of subperiods, cooperation rates increase nearly linearly as the grid size decreases, and, with one-second subperiods, they approach continuous levels. Our data support a strand of theory that explains how capacity to respond rapidly stabilizes cooperation and destabilizes defection in the prisoner's dilemma. (JEL C72, C78, C91)

Emergence of Cooperation in Public Goods Problems

2008 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-61
Author(s):  
Dalibor Roháč
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
The Public ◽  
Weakest Link ◽  
Game Of Chicken ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Assurance Game ◽  
The Difference

Abstract In this paper, we discuss several issues related to public goods provision. Unlike many Austrians, we do not think that the concept of public goods - or of collective action - is an inherently flawed idea, even though we reject the alleged welfare implications of public goods theory, as proposed by orthodox public finance literature. We then argue that the structure of a generic public goods problem is more a game of chicken or an assurance game than a prisoner's dilemma and that this has important implications with regard to the plausibility of cooperative outcomes. Namely, when the public goods problem has the weakest-link structure and can be represented as an assurance game, then the cooperative outcome will be self-enforcing. In many cases, the public goods problems can be transformed into weakest-link games or different mechanisms can be found to ensure cooperation. We also discuss the difference between a public goods problem and collusion. We assert that, unlike public goods problems, collusive agreements have the structure of a prisoner's dilemma. Overall, our paper suggests that there are reasons to be optimistic about stability and efficiency of stateless societal orders.

scholarly journals Punishment Effect of Prisoner Dilemma Game Based on a New Evolution Strategy Rule

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Dehui Sun ◽  
Xiaoliang Kou
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
External Factor ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Strategy ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Evolution Game ◽  
Stability Of Structure ◽  
Cooperation Structure

We discuss the effect of the punishment in the prisoner’s dilemma game. We propose a new evolution strategy rule which can reflect the external factor for both players in the evolution game. In general, if the punishment exists, the D (defection-defection) structure (i.e., both of the two players choose D-D strategy) which is the Nash equilibrium for the game can keep stable and never let the cooperation emerge. However, if a new evolution strategy rule is adopted, we can find that the D-D structure can not keep stable and it will decrease during the game from the simulations. In fact, the punishment mainly affects the C-D (cooperation-defection) structure in the network. After the fraction of the C-D structure achieved some levels, the punishment can keep the C-D structure stable and prevent it from transforming into C-C (cooperation-cooperation) structure. Moreover, in light of the stability of structure and the payoff of the individual gains, it can be found that the probability which is related to the payoff can affect the result of the evolution game.

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