scholarly journals How to Alleviate Rent-Seeking Behaviour in Performance Appraisal of Government-Paid PPP Projects? Tripartite Evolutionary Game Approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Junna Lv ◽  
Tong An ◽  
Xi-ya Tan ◽  
Qing Zou
Keyword(s):  
Performance Appraisal ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Public ◽  
Private Investor ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
Overall Performance ◽  
Reward And Punishment

Performance appraisal is a key link in the performance payment mechanism of government-paid Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects. As the performance appraisal of PPP projects is highly professional and complex, it is usually necessary to introduce a third-party performance appraisal institution to evaluate the project outputs of the private investor. However, driven by economic rent, the private investor has the incentive to seek rent from the third party in the performance appraisal process, leading to the low overall performance level of PPP projects and the inability to achieve the PPP performance appraisal goal effectively. To explore how to avoid rent-seeking in performance appraisal and improve the overall performance of government-paid PPP projects, a tripartite evolutionary game model between the behaviour, third party, and the public sector has been constructed. Based on the evolutionary game model, this study analyses the evolutionary stability of each player's strategy, discusses the influence of various factors on the strategy selection of the three-party, and further analyses the stability of the equilibrium point of the three-party game system. The findings reveal that the public sector can slow down the rent-seeking behaviour of the private sector by setting up a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism. The design of a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism must meet the following conditions: (1) the sum of the reward and punishment of all parties is greater than the speculative income; (2) the amount of performance fee withheld for the private investor is greater than the difference between the project operating cost saved and the speculation cost. The research provides technical support for the design of the performance appraisal mechanism of government-paid PPP projects.

scholarly journals Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Coal Mining Safe Production Supervision under the Chinese Central Government’s Reward and Punishment Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Kui Zhou ◽  
Qi Wang ◽  
Junnan Tang
Keyword(s):  
Coal Mining ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Safe Production ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
Reward And Punishment

In recent years, although coal mine accidents in China have decreased, they still occur frequently. Most previous studies on the evolutionary game of safety mining are limited to a focus on system dynamics and two-party game problems and lack a spatial graphic analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of coal mining enterprises, local governments, and central governments. As our method, a payment matrix of participants and replicated dynamic equations is established, and we also implement parameter simulation in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in safe coal mining. Specifically, (1) intensifying rewards and penalties for coal mining enterprises and local governments will help encourage coal mining enterprises to implement safe production measures and local governments to implement central government safety supervision policies. However, increased rewards will reduce central government’s willingness to adopt incentive strategies. (2) The central government’s reward for coal mining enterprises’ safe production must be greater than the increased cost of safe production to encourage enterprises to implement such production. Economic incentives for local governments must be greater than the benefits of rent-seeking; only then will local governments choose to strictly implement supervision policies. (3) Increasing sales revenue and rent-seeking costs of coal mining enterprises can also encourage them to implement safe production. Therefore, a well-designed reward and punishment mechanism will change the behaviour of coal enterprises and improve the probability of safe production. The research presented in this paper further works on improving safe coal mining production and designing reasonable reward and punishment mechanisms.

scholarly journals Evolutionary game analysis of environmental pollution control under the government regulation

2022 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kui Zhou ◽  
Qi Wang ◽  
Junnan Tang
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Incentive Strategies ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Reward And Punishment

AbstractThis paper studied a tripartite evolutionary game of stakeholders in environmental pollution control. Most previous studies on this issue are limited to a focus on system dynamics with two-party game problems and lack a spatial analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study, which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of sewage enterprises, governments and the public. We establish a payment matrix and replicator equations as our method, and we also implement parameter simulations in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in environmental pollution control. Specifically: intensifying rewards and penalties will help encourage sewage enterprises to meet the discharge standard and the public to participate in pollution control action. However, increased rewards will reduce government's willingness to adopt incentive strategies; Government's reward for public's participation in the action must be greater than the increased cost of participation; Reducing the cost of sewage enterprise can also encourage them to implement standard emissions. The research presented in this paper further improves standard emissions and designs reasonable reward and punishment mechanism.

scholarly journals Research on the Collaborative Application of BIM in EPC Projects: The Perspective of Cooperation between Owners and General Contractors

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Chengshuang Sun ◽  
Min Wang ◽  
Fengyong Zhai
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Simulation ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Dynamic Method ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
Game Model ◽  
General Contractors ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
Reducing Costs ◽  
Collaborative Application

As an effective way to reduce costs and increase efficiency of EPC projects, BIM technology has drawn a lot of attention in numerous countries. Existing studies have failed to reveal the BIM decision-making mechanisms of owners and general contractors in EPC projects in a dynamic method. This study investigates the underlying logic of the collaboration application of BIM by analyzing the dynamic behaviors of owners and general contractors based on evolutionary game model. The results show that the most effective suggestions to promote the BIM collaboration application in EPC projects are “increasing the proportion of BIM application initially strategies,” “increasing incremental revenue of BIM collaborative application,” “reducing costs of BIM collaboration application,” “avoiding excessive hitchhiking,” and “establishing reasonable reward and punishment mechanism.” On the basis of numerical simulation to illustrate the influence of the different initial strategies and parameters on the final decision in different situations, five solutions were proposed for the effective BIM collaboration application between owners and general contractors. This article can facilitate researchers pondering the dynamics of collaboration among stakeholders in projects, and it can also facilitate participants picking up proper strategies for improved collaboration.

scholarly journals Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model for Public Health Emergencies

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Zhiqi Xu ◽  
Yukun Cheng ◽  
Shuangliang Yao
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Health Emergency ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Negative Behaviors ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Health Emergencies ◽  
Theoretical Support ◽  
Safety And Health

Public health emergencies are more related to the safety and health of the public. For the management of the public health emergencies, all parties’ cooperation is the key to preventing and controlling the emergencies. Based on the assumption of bounded rationality, we formulate a tripartite evolutionary game model, involving the local government, the enterprises, and the public, for the public health emergency, e.g., COVID-19. The evolutionary stable strategies under different conditions of the tripartite evolutionary game are explored, and the effect from different factors on the decision-makings of participants for public health emergencies is also analyzed. Numerical analysis results show that formulating reasonable subsidy measures, encouraging the participation of the public, and enforcing the punishment to enterprises for their negative behaviors can prompt three parties to cooperate in fighting against the epidemic. Our work enriches an understanding of the governance for the public health emergency and provides theoretical support for the local government and related participants to make proper decisions in public health emergencies.

scholarly journals Effective Boundary of Innovation Subsidy: Searching by Stochastic Evolutionary Game Model

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 1531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junqiang Li ◽  
Jingyi Yi ◽  
Yingmei Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Random Disturbance ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
The Public ◽  
Effective Boundary ◽  
Reasonable Range ◽  
Value Range ◽  
Cooperation Strategy ◽  
Multiple Variables

Relationship between innovation subsidies and corporate strategic choices has been extensively studied. Public innovation subsidies are by no means a certain value, existing in the form of an effective range instead. This means that the public innovation subsidies existing within the reasonable range can achieve the same incentive effect. So, what is the reasonable range or the effective boundaries of public innovation subsidies to promote enterprises that adopt cooperation strategies? There is no definite answer. Based on classical game theory, a stochastic evolutionary game model is proposed in this paper, which takes into account the influence of random disturbance on the strategy evolution process. An effective boundary of public innovation subsidy is provided as the main contribution based on a mature game scenario. A set of experimental data is subsequently selected as the sample for numerical simulation and result verification. The results showed that the probability of noncooperation within the effective value range will successfully converge to zero, which also means that the agents will adopt a collaborative cooperation strategy. The regulation effect of the combination of multiple variables is also discussed.

An evolutionary game analysis of user-pay public–private partnership projects

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Danrong Song ◽  
Jinbo Song ◽  
Hehui Yuan ◽  
Yu Fan
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
The Public

PurposeWith the growing demand for infrastructure and public services in recent years, PPP-UP have attracted a great deal of attention. However, while the user focuses on the payment for use and the private sector is concerned with its return on investment, the public sector pays more attention to the efficient utilization of public funds. In order to analyze the willingness of each stakeholder to join PPP-UP, an evolutionary game model involving the three parties is constructed.Design/methodology/approachAn evolutionary game model is established that considers the users and the public and private sectors in user-pay public-private-partnership projects (PPP-UP). Eight scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. A situation where all three players are willing to cooperate in theory is also examined. The key influencing parameters that affect cooperation behaviors are further discussed.FindingsFirst, the results illustrate that by properly adjusting the influencing factors, the cooperation status among the three parties can be changed along with certain evolutionary trends. Second, it is hard to modify unsatisfactory evolutionary stability by small changes in both the price compensation of and the construction and operation compensation. Third, it is necessary to involve the users in the decision-making process in PPP-UP and take their demands regarding benefits and payments into account.Originality/valueIn this paper, we focus on PPP-UP to research interactions among the public and private sectors and the users. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, to facilitate the successful implementation and development of a project, several conditions are needed to ensure tripartite cooperation. Several recommendations are then proposed for decision-makers in PPP-UP.

scholarly journals Multi-Evolutionary Game Research on Heavy Metal Pollution Control in Soil: Based on a Third-Party Perspective

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (13) ◽  
pp. 5306
Author(s):  
Songtao Xu ◽  
Zhifang Zhou ◽  
Ke Liu
Keyword(s):  
Heavy Metal ◽  
Metal Pollution ◽  
Heavy Metal Pollution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Strategy Choice ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Soil Heavy Metal ◽  
Pollution Treatment ◽  
The Government

The introduction of third-party governance models for the treatment of soil heavy metal pollution has promoted the marketization, professionalization, and efficiency of pollution treatment, but also can result in distortions of relevant stakeholder relationships and conflicts of interest. The game relationship among the government, soil-polluting companies, and third-party governance companies may solve the practical dilemma of comprehensive management of soil heavy metal pollution and establish a good cooperative mechanism. We constructed a three-party evolutionary game model to analyze the interaction mechanism of each agent’s strategy choice as well as the evolution of each agent’s strategy choice under different parameter trends and simulation analyses. The research showed that the amount of fines and supervision costs, rent-seeking costs and governance costs, and government subsidies and rent-seeking benefits were key factors affecting the evolution and stability strategies of government departments, soil-polluting companies, and third-party governance companies. By cooperating with third-party governance companies, the government can effectively suppress the improper behavior of soil-polluting companies. The conclusions of the study are helpful to broaden the research boundary of soil heavy metal pollution treatment and provide theoretical guidance for the treatment of soil heavy metal pollution in China.

scholarly journals Green Product Quality Supervision Strategy in Online Shopping With Consumer Evaluation and Complaint

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hui He ◽  
Siyi Zhang ◽  
Lilong Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Product Quality ◽  
Online Shopping ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Green Product ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Strategy Combination

Green consumption is an important foundation for achieving stable and long-term economic development goals. With the rapid development of e-commerce and people’s widespread attention to sustainability, more and more consumers purchase green products online. Therefore, we consider consumer feedback mechanisms including evaluation and complaint and construct an evolutionary game model of green product quality supervision with the participation of governmental supervision department, third-party e-commerce platform, online seller and consumer, which analyzes the four parties’ evolutionary stable strategies. To verify the theoretical results, we conduct a numerical simulation by Matlab 2020b. Moreover, we study the conditions that make evolutionary stable strategy combination exist based on Lyapunov’s First Method. And we find that when consumer chooses complaint, (0, 0, 1) is likely to become an only evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller chooses to provide high-quality green product, third-party e-commerce platform chooses not to strengthen inspection, and governmental supervision department chooses to strictly supervise. Conversely, when the consumer chooses no complaint, (1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1) may become an evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller cannot be stable in providing high-quality green product. What’s more, governmental supervision department increases the penalty, which can incentivize a third-party e-commerce platform to strengthen inspection. Third-party e-commerce platform increases the reward and can promote online seller to provide high-quality green product. On the one hand, this paper enriches the theoretical basis of online shopping green product quality supervision. On the other hand, compared with existing literature, it extends the main body of the evolutionary game to four paries and broadens the application scope of the game model. In addition, it has put forward feasible suggestions for the government supervision department to strengthen the quality supervision, and provided decision-making support for the third-party e-commerce platform to assume the responsibility of quality inspection.

Study on Participant Behavior Game of Electronic Products Reverse Supply Chain Based on ECP

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 411-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mingbao Wang ◽  
Zhiping Du ◽  
Hong Duan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Simulation Method ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Reverse Supply Chain ◽  
Electronic Products ◽  
The Government ◽  
Differential Equation Method ◽  
Reward And Punishment

Abstract In this paper, a game model composed of three subjects — government, manufacturer and consumer has been built by using Evolutionary Game Theory on the basis of analyzing the trilateral game strategy of waste mobile reverse supply chain based on ECP; an evolutionary equilibrium model is to be sought for by utilizing the replication dynamic differential equation method; and the trilateral game strategy’s revolutionary trend and consistency have been analyzed by means of SD simulation method when government implements the static or dynamic reward and punishment strategy. The finding results reveal that, under the static reward and punishment strategy, the revolutionary process of trilateral game strategy is always unstable whether the initial behavior strategy is unitary or mixed. Therefore, it is more reasonable for the government to adopt the strategy of dynamic reward and punishment, and it is also stable and reciprocal for all the stakeholders when implementing this strategy.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Public Opinion Supervision of Engineering Quality in the Network Citizen Journalism Environment

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Yaohong Yang ◽  
Yi Zeng ◽  
Jing Dai ◽  
Ying Liu
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Mobile Networks ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Citizen Journalism ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Self Healing ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Government

With the rapid development of mobile networks and citizen journalism, public opinion supervision has become an essential social supervision on engineering quality. They consider the dynamic characteristics of the spread process of public opinion and the game process of social supervision on engineering quality. The tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, contractors, and the public was constructed by coupling the Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Removed (SEIR) model of public opinion spread and the evolutionary game model. Then, the influence laws of public opinion spread on the tripartite evolutionary game were analyzed and discussed through numerical simulation analysis. The results show that the public with more significant influence or authority is more able to restrain the quality behavior of government and contractors; increasing the probability of transforming ignorant into latent, the probability of converting latent into the communicator and topic derivation rate or reducing the direct immunization self-healing can improve the effectiveness of public opinion supervision; the true online public opinion can effectively restrain the quality behavior of contractors and urge the government to supervise actively. The research conclusions can provide a reference for improving the social supervision mechanism of engineering quality in the era of network citizen journalism.

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