Study on the evolutionary game of central government and local governments under central environmental supervision system

2021 ◽  
pp. 126574
Author(s):  
Xinran Sun ◽  
Wenwen Wang ◽  
Jingru Pang ◽  
Xiaoxiao Liu ◽  
Ming Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Supervision System

scholarly journals The Role of Social Media in Promoting Information Disclosure on Environmental Incidents: An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuang Ling ◽  
Shan Gao ◽  
Wenhui Liu
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Media Use ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Media Influence ◽  
Social Media Use ◽  
The Public

Despite the expectation that social media use in the public sector contributes to enhancing government's transparency, few studies have been investigated whether social media use actually leads to more disclosure during environmental incidents in practice and how social media influence local governments and their officials' information disclosure. In this article, we model information disclosure during environmental incidents as an evolutionary game process between the central government and local government in social media context, and examine the internal mechanism that how social media influence the progress of information disclosure during environmental incidents. The findings indicate that social media plays an active constructive role in central-local government game relations. Specific- ally, social media can provides an efficient information channels for the central government supervise regional officials in environmental incidents, and thus improves its supervision efficiency, and it also provides an important means for internet mobilization and online-offline interaction by encouraging the public exchange information and express their views, and in turn forces local governments and their officials tend to disclosure ahead.

scholarly journals Will Third-Party Treatment Effectively Solve Issues Related to Industrial Pollution in China?

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (18) ◽  
pp. 7685
Author(s):  
Qiao Peng ◽  
Yao Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Industrial Pollution ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Environmental Services ◽  
Policy Recommendations ◽  
Trial Basis ◽  
Local Levels

China expanded the application of the third-party treatment model (TPTM) in 2017 for effectively tackling the issues related to industrial pollution on a trial basis, and the model could diversify the government’s toolbox for addressing industrial pollution. With multiple players such as local governments, polluters, and environmental services providers (ESP) involved in the TPTM, appropriate guidance and coordination among the three players are critical to the success of the TPTM. This study constructs an evolutionary game model for the three players to capture their interaction mechanisms and simulates the three-player evolutionary game dynamics with the replicator dynamics equation. The simulation results show that heavier penalties for pollution and lower regulatory costs incurred by local governments could effectively improve the performance of the TPTM. Moreover, although environmental incentives provided by the central government to local levels do not affect the ultimate performance of the TPTM, they do shorten the time needed for the effect of the TPTM to emerge. The study concludes by proposing policy recommendations based on these results.

scholarly journals Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Coal Mining Safe Production Supervision under the Chinese Central Government’s Reward and Punishment Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Kui Zhou ◽  
Qi Wang ◽  
Junnan Tang
Keyword(s):  
Coal Mining ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Safe Production ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
Reward And Punishment

In recent years, although coal mine accidents in China have decreased, they still occur frequently. Most previous studies on the evolutionary game of safety mining are limited to a focus on system dynamics and two-party game problems and lack a spatial graphic analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of coal mining enterprises, local governments, and central governments. As our method, a payment matrix of participants and replicated dynamic equations is established, and we also implement parameter simulation in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in safe coal mining. Specifically, (1) intensifying rewards and penalties for coal mining enterprises and local governments will help encourage coal mining enterprises to implement safe production measures and local governments to implement central government safety supervision policies. However, increased rewards will reduce central government’s willingness to adopt incentive strategies. (2) The central government’s reward for coal mining enterprises’ safe production must be greater than the increased cost of safe production to encourage enterprises to implement such production. Economic incentives for local governments must be greater than the benefits of rent-seeking; only then will local governments choose to strictly implement supervision policies. (3) Increasing sales revenue and rent-seeking costs of coal mining enterprises can also encourage them to implement safe production. Therefore, a well-designed reward and punishment mechanism will change the behaviour of coal enterprises and improve the probability of safe production. The research presented in this paper further works on improving safe coal mining production and designing reasonable reward and punishment mechanisms.

scholarly journals The Role of Social Media in Promoting Information Disclosure on Environmental Incidents: An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4372 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shan Gao ◽  
Shuang Ling ◽  
Wenhui Liu
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Regional Government ◽  
Local Officials ◽  
Efficient Information

In recent years, social media has had a crucial role in promoting governments to act more responsibly. However, few studies have investigated whether social media use actually leads to increased disclosure during environmental incidents, or how social media influences regional governments’ information disclosure, even though delayed and insufficient disclosure on relevant incidents is often widespread in China. In this article, we model information disclosure during environmental incidents as an evolutionary game process between the central government and local governments, and examine the role of social media on game participants’ strategy selections in the information disclosure game. The results indicate that social media plays an active role in promoting the regional government to proactively disclose information during environmental incidents through two mechanisms: the top–down intervention mechanism, and the bottom–up reputation mechanism. More specifically, social media can provide efficient information channels for the central government to supervise local officials’ limited disclosure during environmental incidents, essentially sharing the central government’s supervision costs, and thus improving its supervision and intervention efficiency. Social media helps focus the public’s attention on the limited disclosure of local officials in environmental incidents, and actively mobilizes citizens to protest to maintain their interests, placing considerable pressure on the reputation of local governments.

scholarly journals Game Analysis of Endowment Insurance Collection and Supervision Behavior under the Background of Price Reduction

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-152
Author(s):  
Jin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Action Plan ◽  
Compliance Rate ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Endowment Insurance ◽  
Contribution Rate ◽  
Behavioral Decision ◽  
Symmetric Information

The Central government issued several consecutive articles stressing the need to reduce the contribution rate of endowment insurance and adjust the base of social security contributions. However, can we effectively improve the compliance rate of endowment insurance, and thus increase the actual collection income of endowment insurance through the reform of the fee reduction? What changes will be made to the behavioral decision-making methods among the various subjects, and will it affect the income from the collection of pensions? What kind of supervision is adopted by the central and local governments to promote the increase in the collection of endowment insurance? Based on these problems, this paper adopts the principal-agent game and the three-party evolutionary game model under non-completely symmetric information, analyzes the behavioral decisions of each subject in the process of collection after the fee reduction, and analyzes the influencing factors of dynamic stability and equilibrium. Analysis, and finally, in the context of the endowment insurance fee reduction, the action plan that can effectively increase the income of the endowment insurance collection. The empirical results show that the contribution rate and contribution base of endowment insurance are inversely related to the intensity of local endowment insurance collection, and the reduction of fees can effectively promote the enthusiasm of local governments for collection. When the burden of endowment insurance contributions declines, the enthusiasm of corporate payment has also increased. At the same time, improve the overall level of pensions, promote the openness and transparency of endowment insurance contributions, and strengthen the reward and punishment mechanism in the process of collecting endowment insurance premiums, which can effectively increase the income from endowment insurance collection.

scholarly journals Analysis of Farmland Abandonment and Government Supervision Traps in China

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 1815
Author(s):  
Yemei Li ◽  
Yanfei Shan ◽  
Ying Chen
Keyword(s):  
Food Security ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Rural Households ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Security Risk ◽  
Farmland Abandonment ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government

Farmland abandonment has become relatively common in rural China. In the context of food security, the Chinese government has introduced policies for farmland abandonment supervision, but the effect of these policies has proven to be marginal. By constructing an evolutionary game model, our research explores the evolutionary logic during the supervision of farmland abandonment by governments and rural households. The results indicate that low food yield and high opportunity costs are the leading causes of farmland abandonment. The probable punishment administered by the central government for dereliction is a major motivation for the local government to practice farmland abandonment supervision. The low supervision avoidance cost for rural households leads local governments and households to form collaborations to jointly cope with central government supervision. When this occurs, local governments’ supervision of farmland abandonment falls into a trap, as it leads to continued supervision practices that are costly and ineffective. Food security risk comes from the contradictory population and land resources demands. To improve food security while managing these contradictory demands, it is both necessary and feasible for the government to control population growth and focus on farmland protection, whereas it is unnecessary and unfeasible for the government to supervise whether or not farmland should be abandoned.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Stress Effect of Cross-Regional Transfer of Resource-Exhausted Enterprises

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Hui Yu ◽  
Wei Wang ◽  
Baohua Yang ◽  
Cunfang Li
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Eastern China ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Western China ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Stress Effect ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Countermeasures And Suggestions

This paper analyses the stress effect of cross-regional transfer of resource-exhausted enterprises from eastern China to central and Western China. A tripartite evolutionary game model including the central government, the local government of the operation recipient region, and the resource-exhausted transfer enterprises is established under the assumption of limited rationality. By analysing the evolutionary equilibrium and using MATLAB, for example, analysis, the relationship between equilibrium probability and various parameters, as well as the key influencing factors of equilibrium strategy were explored. The research shows, first, that the degree of punishment imposed by the central government on the local governments, the implementation of regulation by the local governments, and the amount of rewards/punishments implemented by the local governments for transfer enterprises are the key factors affecting evolutionary stability. Second, it shows that the local governments’ penalty for transfer enterprises has a significant impact on the convergence speed of enterprises’ strategic choice to “Completely Control Pollution.” Finally, from the perspective of the relationships between the central government and the local governments, as well as with transfer enterprises, countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to effectively prevent the stress effect of the cross-regional transfer behaviour of resource-exhausted enterprises.

scholarly journals Research on Ecological Restoration Mechanism of Rare-Earth Mines Based on Evolutionary Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Guangli Yan ◽  
Fei Xue ◽  
Zhongxue Li
Keyword(s):  
Rare Earth ◽  
Ecological Restoration ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Smelting Process ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Mining Areas ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Rare Earth

With the continuous improvement of the rare earth’s international status, the status of rare Chinese earth has gradually become prominent all over the world. When China enjoys the advantages of large reserves of rare-earth resources, at the same time, Chinese rare-earth enterprises are lagging in technology and lacking innovation capabilities. The rare-earth industry is mainly concentrated on the separation and smelting process, which has an indelible impact on the ecological environment around the mine. Some scholars have carried out research on ecological restoration in mining areas, but there are few studies on interest subjects in ecological restoration work in mining areas, especially the research based on game theory is more scarce. This article constructs a trilateral evolutionary game model of the central, local governments, and mining enterprises. This article analyzes the impact mechanism of policy changes on the rare-earth mining industry and analyzes the three-party evolutionary game model by adjusting the values of external variables. The research shows that the central government’s subsidies to local enterprises, the central government’s performance evaluation to the government, the local government’s punishment to enterprises, and the local enterprise’s reproduction income are important factors that determine the evolution of the trilateral game. Therefore, the central government should strengthen the supervision of local governments and enterprises when formulating policies related to the rare-earth industry, and local governments should strengthen their own management and local environmental regulations.

OPTIMALISASI PERAN PEMDA DALAM MENGATASI KENDALA PELAKSANAAN KONSERVASI KEANEKARAGAMAN HAYATI DI DAERAH (STUDI KASUS PROVINSI BENGKULU)

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Antung Deddy Radiansyah
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Biodiversity Conservation ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Wild Plants ◽  
Regional Government ◽  
Conservation Areas ◽  
Conservation Area ◽  
Conservation Policies

Gaps in biodiversity conservation management within the Conservation Area that are the responsibility of the central government and outside the Conservation Areas or as the Essential Ecosystems Area (EEA) which are the authority of the Regional Government, have caused various spatial conflicts between wildlife /wild plants and land management activities. Several obstacles faced by the Local Government to conduct its authority to manage (EEA), caused the number and area of EEA determined by the Local Government to be still low. At present only 703,000 ha are determined from the 67 million ha indicated by EEA. This study aims to overview biodiversity conservation policies by local governments and company perceptions in implementing conservation policies and formulate strategies for optimizing the role of Local Governments. From the results of this study, there has not been found any legal umbrella for the implementation of Law number 23/ 2014 related to the conservation of important ecosystems in the regions. This regulatory vacuum leaves the local government in a dilemma for continuing various conservation programs. By using a SWOT to the internal strategic environment and external stratetegic environment of the Environment and Forestry Service, Bengkulu Province , as well as using an analysis of company perceptions of the conservation policies regulatary , this study has been formulated a “survival strategy” through collaboration between the Central Government, Local Governments and the Private Sector to optimize the role of Local Government’s to establish EEA in the regions.Keywords: Management gaps, Essential Ecosystems Area (EEA), Conservation Areas, SWOT analysis and perception analysis

Asymmetrical Attribution of Performance in China

Asian Survey ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (5) ◽  
pp. 978-1003
Author(s):  
Jacqueline Chen Chen ◽  
Jun Xiang
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Cultural Theory ◽  
Political Trust ◽  
Mediation Model ◽  
Multilevel Mediation ◽  
Dual Pathway ◽  
Underlying Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

Existing studies of the impact of economic development on political trust in China have two major gaps: they fail to explain how economic development contributes to the hierarchical trust pattern, and they do not pay enough attention to the underlying mechanisms. In light of cultural theory and political control theory, we propose adapting performance theory into a theory of “asymmetrical attribution of performance” to better illuminate the case of China. This adapted theory leads to dual pathway theses: expectation fulfillment and local blaming. Using a multilevel mediation model, we show that expectation fulfillment mainly upholds trust in the central government, whereas local blaming undermines trust in local governments. We also uncover a rural–urban distinction in the dual pathway, revealing that both theses are more salient among rural Chinese.

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