Promotion Strategy of Policy against Food Waste (PAFW): The Perspective on Evolutionary Game between Local Government and Large Supermarkets

The implementation of PAFW is an important way to reduce food waste. Discussing how to more successfully implement PAFW to reduce food waste is of great significance in achieving sustainable development. Different from the previous literature, this paper uses evolutionary game theory to establish a strategic interaction income matrix between local governments and large supermarkets and analyzes the strategic interaction between local governments and large supermarkets by copying dynamic equations, revealing the strategic choice between the two parties evolution process. A simulation-based approach is used to validate the theoretical results and analyze the influence of key parameters on the evolutionary trajectory. The study found the following: (1) to promote the system to an optimal evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), it is necessary to strengthen policy publicity, increase the willingness of large supermarkets to implement the PAFW, and increase the enthusiasm of the public or third-party organizations to monitor system; (2) stakeholders’ initial willingness will influence the evolutionary trajectory; and (3) it is important to strengthen the institutional development of local government regulators, improve the local government’s achievements, reduce the local government’s regulatory costs, improve policies to support large supermarkets’ implementation of the PAFW, and reduce the cost of implementing the PAFW for large supermarkets.

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Game Theory-Based Analysis of Local Governments’ Behavioral Dissimilation in the Third-Party Soil Pollution Control under Chinese-Style Fiscal Decentralization

Land ◽

10.3390/land10040389 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 10 (4) ◽

pp. 389

Author(s):

Caihua Zhou

Keyword(s):

Local Government ◽

Soil Pollution ◽

Pollution Control ◽

Local Governments ◽

Central Government ◽

Fiscal Decentralization ◽

Third Party ◽

The Third ◽

Party Control ◽

The Third Party

The participation of a third party of the environmental service enterprise theoretically increases the level and efficiency of soil pollution control in China. However, Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may have a negative impact on the behaviors of participants, especially the local government. First, this paper conducts a positioning analysis on participants of the third-party soil pollution control in China and discusses the behavioral dissimilation of the local government under fiscal decentralization. Second, taking the government’s third-party soil pollution control as a case, a two-party game model of the central government and the local government is established around the principal-agent relationship, and a tripartite game model of the central government, the local government, and the third-party enterprise is designed around the collusion between the local government and the third-party enterprise. The results show that Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may lead to the behavioral dissimilation of local governments, that is, they may choose not to implement or passively implement the third-party control, and choose to conspire with third-party enterprises. Improving the benefits from implementing the third-party control of local governments and third-party enterprises, enhancing the central government’s supervision probability and capacity, and strengthening the central government’s punishment for behavioral dissimilation are conducive to the implementation of the third-party soil pollution control. Finally, this study puts forward policy suggestions on dividing the administrative powers between the central and local government in third-party control, building appraisal systems for the local government’s environmental protection performance, constructing environmental regulation mechanisms involving the government, market and society, and formulating the incentive and restraint policies for the participants in the third-party soil pollution control.

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The Role of Social Media in Promoting Information Disclosure on Environmental Incidents: An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective

10.20944/preprints201809.0350.v1 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Shuang Ling ◽

Shan Gao ◽

Wenhui Liu

Keyword(s):

Social Media ◽

Local Government ◽

Local Governments ◽

Information Disclosure ◽

Central Government ◽

Media Use ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Media Influence ◽

Social Media Use ◽

The Public

Despite the expectation that social media use in the public sector contributes to enhancing government's transparency, few studies have been investigated whether social media use actually leads to more disclosure during environmental incidents in practice and how social media influence local governments and their officials' information disclosure. In this article, we model information disclosure during environmental incidents as an evolutionary game process between the central government and local government in social media context, and examine the internal mechanism that how social media influence the progress of information disclosure during environmental incidents. The findings indicate that social media plays an active constructive role in central-local government game relations. Specific- ally, social media can provides an efficient information channels for the central government supervise regional officials in environmental incidents, and thus improves its supervision efficiency, and it also provides an important means for internet mobilization and online-offline interaction by encouraging the public exchange information and express their views, and in turn forces local governments and their officials tend to disclosure ahead.

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Will Third-Party Treatment Effectively Solve Issues Related to Industrial Pollution in China?

Sustainability ◽

10.3390/su12187685 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 12 (18) ◽

pp. 7685

Author(s):

Qiao Peng ◽

Yao Xiao

Keyword(s):

Local Governments ◽

Industrial Pollution ◽

Central Government ◽

Replicator Dynamics ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Third Party ◽

Environmental Services ◽

Policy Recommendations ◽

Trial Basis ◽

Local Levels

China expanded the application of the third-party treatment model (TPTM) in 2017 for effectively tackling the issues related to industrial pollution on a trial basis, and the model could diversify the government’s toolbox for addressing industrial pollution. With multiple players such as local governments, polluters, and environmental services providers (ESP) involved in the TPTM, appropriate guidance and coordination among the three players are critical to the success of the TPTM. This study constructs an evolutionary game model for the three players to capture their interaction mechanisms and simulates the three-player evolutionary game dynamics with the replicator dynamics equation. The simulation results show that heavier penalties for pollution and lower regulatory costs incurred by local governments could effectively improve the performance of the TPTM. Moreover, although environmental incentives provided by the central government to local levels do not affect the ultimate performance of the TPTM, they do shorten the time needed for the effect of the TPTM to emerge. The study concludes by proposing policy recommendations based on these results.

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An Empirical Study of Industrial Conflict and Management in Nigeria Local Government System: A study of Enugu State

International Journal of Human Resource Studies ◽

10.5296/ijhrs.v2i3.2048 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 2 (3) ◽

pp. 1

Author(s):

Emma E.O. Chukwuemeka ◽

Joy Ugwu ◽

Titus Okey Enugu ◽

Dan Igwegbe

Keyword(s):

Local Government ◽

Collective Bargaining ◽

Leadership Style ◽

Local Governments ◽

Third Party ◽

Democratic Leadership ◽

Trade Dispute ◽

Conflict Situations ◽

Resultant Effect ◽

Enugu State

The study was carried out to assess labout conflict and management in the local Government system in Nigeria with particular reference to Enugu State. Descriptive Research method was adopted, data were collected and analysed. Essentially, the findings revealed that the organizational framework for management of conflict and grievances is poor. The problem is as a result of leadership ineffectiveness which according to the study had resulted to disputes and consequently to strike actions. Management scarcely bargains with staff in resolving conflict situations. Management does not always explain its reasons for taking a particular position in resolving conflicts.The study further revealed that other factors that heightened labour conflict include low participation of employees in taking key decisions, especially matters affecting them. The Local overnment of Enugu State of Nigeria is believed to be poorly funded, This information was furnished by a key respondent, the poor funding is peculiar to the following local governments: Enugu North, Igbo-Eze North, and Nsukka Local Government Areas.. The aforementioned local government areas were consistently on ‘zero allocation’, which the resultant effect was epileptic payment of salaries and allowances of workers. Flowing from the findings, the following recommendations among others were proffered A democratic leadership style should be imbibed in Enugu State Local Government Councils to ensure congenial work relationship, the reign of democracy, as a style would ensure reduction of labour conflict. In spite of the fact that funding was not identified as a major problem that led to labour conflict, funding of the Local government in Nigeria should be strengthened. Management and staff of the local government should strive to see labour conflict as a process to change and thus try to resolve it in such a way that both parties are winners. Labour conflict should be resolved through the instrumentality of collective bargaining, which involves negotiation, dialogue, or mediation by a third party or through statutory framework which involves Trade Dispute ACT No.7 of 1976 as amended in 1977. Keywords: Labour Conflict, Leadership, Funding of Local Government, Collective Bargaining

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The integration role of governmental information disclosure platform

Kybernetes ◽

10.1108/k-02-2019-0125 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 49 (5) ◽

pp. 1347-1379

Author(s):

Jing Peng ◽

Guoping Tu ◽

Yanhong Liu ◽

Hao Zhang ◽

Bibing Leng

Keyword(s):

Local Government ◽

Local Governments ◽

Information Disclosure ◽

Cost Allocation ◽

Environmental Behavior ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Environmental Data ◽

Online Information ◽

Monitoring Cost ◽

Content Type

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to provide a feasible scheme for local governments to regulate corporate environmental data fraud and to discuss whether the influence of the construction of online information disclosure platform on the environmental behavior of enterprises is better than the offline spot check. Design/methodology/approach Under the background of changing environmental fees into taxes in China, this paper conducts evolutionary game analysis between local governments and enterprises in view of the existing problem of environmental data fraud. Furthermore, through the introduction of government information disclosure platform, this paper discusses the impact of the integration of direct government regulation and indirect public concern regulation on the evolution of environmental behavior of both sides. Finally, the evolutionary game is simulated by adopting system dynamics to analyses the implementation effect of different cases on the game process and game equilibrium. Findings The results showed that the introduction of information disclosure platform mechanism can effectively suppress the fluctuations existing in the game play and stabilize the game. Moreover, it is worth noting that the regulatory effect of local governments investing part of the monitoring cost in the construction of online information platform is proved to be better than that of putting all the monitoring cost into offline investigation. While optimizing the monitoring cost allocation, the local government still needs to attach great importance to organically combine the attention of the public and media with the governmental official platform. Practical implications The obtained results confirm that the proposed model can assist local government in refining the effects of their environmental regulatory decisions, especially in the case of corporate data fraud under environmental tax enforcement. Originality/value Previous literature only suggested that local governments should reduce the cost of supervision to change the corporate behavior to a better direction, but no further in-depth study. Thus, this study fills the gap by discussing the positive transformation effect of local government cost allocation scheme on corporate environmental behavior.

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Research on the Evolution of Collusion between Government and Civil Construction Enterprises in Environmental Regulation

E3S Web of Conferences ◽

10.1051/e3sconf/202124802053 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 248 ◽

pp. 02053

Author(s):

Cao Yingying

Keyword(s):

Local Government ◽

Environmental Regulation ◽

Optimal Strategy ◽

Local Governments ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Regional Migration ◽

Construction Enterprises ◽

Emission Behavior ◽

The Cost ◽

The Way

Polluting civil construction enterprises usually use the way of "voting with their feet" to exert influence on the efforts of local government's environmental regulation, promote the formation of collusion between government and enterprises, and make the local government relax the supervision on the emission behavior of civil construction enterprises. Based on the Tibert model, this paper uses the evolutionary game method to study the collusion between government and enterprises in the cross regional migration of civil construction enterprises and its prevention. The results show that: when the civil construction enterprises comply with the production, the local government's optimal strategy is non collusion strategy; similarly, when the local government is not willing to collude, the non-collusion choice of civil construction enterprises will get higher benefits than collusion. In addition, the cost of civil construction enterprises transferring between different regions, the loss caused by the collusion between civil construction enterprises and local governments, and the probability of local government violations being found can effectively prevent the collusion between local governments and civil construction enterprises.

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The Evolutionary Game Model of Local Government Environmental Regulation with Media Participation

E3S Web of Conferences ◽

10.1051/e3sconf/202126701030 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 267 ◽

pp. 01030

Author(s):

Minxue Song ◽

Tianhua Wang

Keyword(s):

Local Government ◽

Local Governments ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Social Economy ◽

Pollution Prevention ◽

Game Model ◽

Clean Production ◽

Evolutionary Equilibrium ◽

Media Supervision ◽

The Media

The battle for pollution prevention and control has been promoted in an all-round way, and the quality of the ecological environment has been significantly improved, but the results are not stable, and environmental problems are still prominent. With the development of social economy, media supervision is playing an increasingly important role in government actions and environmental issues. This paper considers the role of media supervision, constructs an evolutionary game model between local governments and enterprises, analyzes and explains the evolutionary equilibrium. The results show that the media exposure of corporate pollution and local government inaction is conducive to achieve evolutionary equilibrium {regulation, cleaner production}. Local governments give enterprises pollution control subsidies and environmental protection rewards, which can promote green and clean production of enterprises. The paper provides a useful reference for promoting clean production of enterprises and achieving high-quality development.

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Low-Carbon Supply Chain Emission Reduction Strategy Considering the Supervision of Downstream Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Sustainability ◽

10.3390/su13052827 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 13 (5) ◽

pp. 2827

Author(s):

Guohua Qu ◽

Yanfang Wang ◽

Ling Xu ◽

Weihua Qu ◽

Qiang Zhang ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Local Government ◽

Local Governments ◽

Emission Reduction ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Collaborative Governance ◽

Selection Strategy ◽

Main Body ◽

Low Carbon ◽

Carbon Supply

In order to explore the issue of multi-party collaborative governance of energy conservation and emission reduction under the perspective of the low-carbon supply chain, the participation of downstream enterprises as an effective source of local government supervision is included in the selection of low-carbon behaviors of suppliers. First, this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model among local governments, suppliers and downstream enterprise groups. By calculating and copying dynamic equations, the asymptotic stability analysis of the three parties of the game is performed and the stability of the Jacobian matrix proposed by Friedman is used to analyze the local stability of the model equilibrium point and the evolutionary stability strategy of the system. Secondly, the evolution results and evolution paths of the model under different strategies are simulated by system dynamics and the influence of different parameters on the main body selection strategy of the tripartite game is analyzed. Finally, the paper puts forward corresponding policy suggestions from the perspectives of local government, suppliers and downstream enterprises in order to provide new ideas for the governance of China’s environmental problems from the perspective of low carbon.

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Does Fiscal Policy Promote Third-Party Environmental Pollution Control in China? An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

Sustainability ◽

10.3390/su11164434 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 11 (16) ◽

pp. 4434 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Caihua Zhou ◽

Hualin Xie ◽

Xinmin Zhang

Keyword(s):

Fiscal Policy ◽

Local Government ◽

Environmental Pollution ◽

Pollution Control ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Policy Implications ◽

Third Party ◽

Fiscal Policies ◽

The Third ◽

The Third Party

To promote third-party environmental pollution control in China, it is necessary to dissect the mechanism of fiscal policy in third-party environmental pollution control. This study first discusses the acting paths of fiscal policies on third-party environmental pollution control in theory. A tripartite evolutionary game model involving the local government, the polluting enterprise, and the third-party enterprise is established. The replicator dynamics, evolutionary stability strategies, and numerical simulation of the behavior of the three participants are analyzed to further study the acting mechanism of fiscal policy in third-party environmental pollution control. In addition, the influences of other parameters on the implementation of third-party environmental pollution control are evaluated. The results show that the behaviors of the local government, the polluting enterprise, and the third-party enterprise influence each other. Furthermore, strengthening the relevant fiscal policy, reducing the risks of the polluting enterprise and third-party enterprise, and improving the benefit to the local government are conducive to promoting third-party environmental pollution control in China. Based on these results, this study proposes the following policy implications: formulating fiscal policies for third-party environmental pollution control, implementing fiscal policies in a dynamic and progressive manner, improving the market mechanism of third-party environmental pollution control, and strengthening the environmental performance assessment of the local government.

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An Evolutionary Game Model for Industrial Pollution Management under Two Punishment Mechanisms

International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health ◽

10.3390/ijerph16152775 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 16 (15) ◽

pp. 2775 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Wang ◽

Shi

Keyword(s):

Pollution Control ◽

Local Governments ◽

Industrial Pollution ◽

Rapid Development ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Game Model ◽

Stable Strategy ◽

Evolutionary Trajectory ◽

Evolution Path ◽

Punishment Mechanism

In recent years, with the rapid development of the economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model for industrial pollution between the local governments and enterprises to study the dynamic evolution path of a game system and the evolutionary stable strategy under two punishment mechanisms. The results show that, in a static punishment mechanism (SPM), the strategy between governments and enterprises is uncertain. Moreover, the evolutionary trajectory between governments and enterprises is uncertain. However, under the dynamic punishment mechanism (DPM), the evolution path between governments and enterprises tends to converge to a stable value. Thus, the DPM is more conducive than the SPM for industrial pollution control.

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