Election by Community Consensus: Effects on Political Selection and Governance

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-45
Author(s):  
Ashna Arora

This paper evaluates the effects of encouraging the selection of local politicians in India via community consensus, as opposed to a secret ballot election. Using village-level data on candidates, elected politicians, government budgets, and workfare employment, I show that incentives for consensus elections lead to politicians that are more educated but less likely to be drawn from historically marginalized castes, and increase how regressively workfare employment is targeted. These results are supported by qualitative evidence that shows that consensus elections are prone to capture by the local elite, which may reduce the need for clientelistic transfers to the non-elite.

1992 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 272-273
Author(s):  
Theodore M. Vestal

My PLS article, “Risk Factors and Predictability of Famine in Ethiopia” (February, 1991), focused on one nation's experience with the complicated phenomenon of famine, but it suggested that microstudies were needed to investigate more fully those groups of people within a nation who are vulnerable to famine's ravages (Vestal, 1991). Alemneh Dejene's book is such an investigation based on field work that involved interviews with peasant heads of households, survey questionnaires, participant observation, and case studies of villages and families in Wollo Region and in resettlement sites (for settlers from Wollo) in Illubabor and Keffa in 1987-89. His village level data that identify local, place specific processes that fuel environmental degradation are a welcome addition to famine literature.


2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (9) ◽  
pp. 1177-1207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Holm ◽  
Benny Geys

Recent evidence of increasing income heterogeneity within developed countries has reignited debates concerning the redistribution of income and wealth. In this article, we contribute to this debate by assessing the role of individuals’ jurisdictional identification for their preferences toward intrafederation redistributive financial flows. Incorporating insights from social identity theory in a model of redistributive taxation, we show that federal, rather than local, identification can lead individuals to shift their redistribution preferences independent of their narrowly defined personal economic interests. Moreover, contrary to conventional wisdom, welfare state support will sometimes be decreasing in national identification. We empirically assess these predictions using individual-level data from the 2008 German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) and a 2013-2014 survey among Belgian local politicians. Our findings provide strong support for the model’s core predictions in both settings.


2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (8) ◽  
pp. 1074-1105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre F. Landry ◽  
Xiaobo Lü ◽  
Haiyan Duan

Political selection is central to the survival of all regimes. This article evaluates the relative importance of performance and political connection for the advancement of local politicians under authoritarianism. We hypothesize that in a large-scale multilevel polity, economic performance plays a greater role in promotion at lower administrative levels of government than at higher ones, even after controlling for political connections. This dualist strategy allows the ruling elites to achieve economic performance while minimizing the advancement of potentially disloyal challengers. Thus, balancing between loyalty and competence among subordinates enhances regime survival. Our empirical evidence draws on a comprehensive panel dataset of provincial, prefectural, and county-level Communist party secretaries and government executives appointed between 1999 and 2007. We find consistent evidence for our argument under various model specifications. We also explore the heterogeneous effects of performance on promotion given the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) age ineligibility rule for cadre promotion and jurisdiction characteristics.


2000 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 350-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
PRADEEP CHHIBBER ◽  
SAMUEL ELDERSVELD

This article analyzes why it is that China, an authoritarian political system, has managed to generate more popular support for the reform process than India, a democracy. The authors argue that when local politicians and bureaucrats are more supportive of the reform process, there is likely to be greater popular support for economic reform. Local political elite may be more supportive of reform in an authoritarian than in a democratic system because the level of local elite support for the reform process is influenced by the incentives faced by local elite. In China, institutional reform changed the incentives faced by local elite, whereas in India, reforms have not been accompanied by institutional changes that would encourage local elite to support reform to the same extent as in China. The argument is based on local elite and mass surveys conducted in China and India in 1990 and 1996, respectively. A logit model, controlling for a variety of alternative explanations, provides evidence that local elite support is critical for explaining whether reforms are popular.


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 159-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Drago ◽  
Tommaso Nannicini ◽  
Francesco Sobbrio

This paper uses an original dataset covering the presence of local news in medium-large Italian cities in the period 1993–2010 to evaluate the effects of newspaper entry and exit on electoral participation, political selection, and government efficiency. Exploiting discrete changes in the number of newspapers, we show that newspaper entry increases turnout in municipal elections, the reelection probability of the incumbent mayor, and the efficiency of the municipal government. We do not find any effect on the selection of politicians. Competition plays a relevant role, as the effects are not limited to the first newspaper entry. (JEL D72, L11, L82)


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 150
Author(s):  
Endik Hidayat Miskan

Increased political participation of the village community after the reformation, marked by increasing interest in the community to run for village head elections and village decision-making. Increasing village community participation certainly has hope that the neutrality of bureaucracy is maintained at the village level. So that the climate of political contestation at the village level runs ideally in accordance with the values of democratic life. The purpose of this research is to find out the role of bureaucracy politicization in winning candidate village head Aditya Dimas in Pilkades simultaneously December 26, 2016. Then, knowing the factors that cause political behavior are not neutral village officials and forms of violations in contestation Pilkades Sitimerto December 26 2016. This research using qualitative research methods with a case study approach. The selection of qualitative methods with a case study approach was carried out because there were distinctive characteristics in the election of the head of the Sitimerto village in Kediri Regency. The results of this study show, firstly, that the practice of neutrality in village bureaucracy in the Sitimerto village case is not proven, that the village apparatus is not neutral in the village head election. Second, the factors that motivate village officials to be non-neutral in the case of the Sitimerto village head election are the widespread use of money politics as an attraction for material benefits to the village apparatus and political dinasty of incumbent. Third, a number of forms of violations of neutrality that occurred in the case of the election of the Sitimerto village head were proven that the village officials acted as cadres of the incumbent candidates and participated in distributing money politics to the villagers. Keywords: Kekuasaan, Demokrasi,Netralitas Birokrasi, dan Pilkades


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