scholarly journals What Is the Evil to Be Overcome?

Scrinium ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 160-180
Author(s):  
Nozomu Yamada

Significant perspectives on Christ’s life and death, which both Pelagius and the Eastern Fathers held, are Christ’s victory over the Devil, the continuous creation of humanity, and Christ’s redemption of human sin. Imitating Christ’s example by exercising free will is the most important Christian response to Christ’s victory. Synergism between the exercise of free will and Christ’s example as God’s grace are located in God’s mystical Oikonomia. As seen in their for-knowledge theory concerning the story of Esau’s abandonment, Pelagius’ synergism was in no way heretical, but rather completely consistent with the Eastern Fathers. On the other hand, the discontinuity in Augustine’s soteriology between human nature after the Fall and Christ’s redemption as God’s grace is significantly different from the continuity evident in Pelagius’ and the Eastern Fathers’ views. Augustine’s logical- philosophical speculation on Esau’s abandonment, which was repeated in non-historical contexts, had to come down to his theories of original sin and predestination. The peculiarity of the historical Jesus Christ in God’s Oikonomia, as well as the unique, special historicity of every human, was almost absorbed into the universality of Augustine’s theories. However, Pelagius as well as Basil and Rufinus thought that in every decision of free will to imitate Christ’s life and death, as seen in the same person narrative in Pelagius’ Pauline commentary, the grace of God was concretely and livingly expressed in the unique and personal history of believers.


1955 ◽  
Vol 75 ◽  
pp. 69-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Pfeiffer

When the Chairman of Council asked me to read a paper at the Jubilee Meeting of the Classical Association, I felt highly honoured by this kind invitation. Twice before I have enjoyed the privilege of reading papers at General Meetings of the Association during the last war, when I had been most hospitably received in this country and had found a new home at Oxford. I confess I still feel quite at home here, and it gives me enormous pleasure to come over from Munich and to speak to you once more; so I am deeply grateful to you for giving me this opportunity.But I think I owe you at least one word of explanation for the strange title of this lecture. The Chairman of Council said in his letter ‘that although one lecture should be given on the history of the Classical Association, the other papers should look forward rather than backward’. Now, I had been doing some work on a Hellenistic poet myself, especially during the years at Oxford; as far as I am concerned, I have finished with studies in that province of learning.


Author(s):  
Christina Howells

Sartre was a philosopher of paradox: an existentialist who attempted a reconciliation with Marxism, a theorist of freedom who explored the notion of predestination. From the mid-1930s to the late-1940s, Sartre was in his ‘classical’ period. He explored the history of theories of imagination leading up to that of Husserl, and developed his own phenomenological account of imagination as the key to the freedom of consciousness. He analysed human emotions, arguing that emotion is a freely chosen mode of relationship to the outside world. In his major philosophical work, L’Être et le Néant(Being and Nothingness) (1943a), Sartre distinguished between consciousness and all other beings: consciousness is always at least tacitly conscious of itself, hence it is essentially ‘for itself’ (pour-soi) – free, mobile and spontaneous. Everything else, lacking this self-consciousness, is just what it is ‘in-itself’ (en-soi); it is ‘solid’ and lacks freedom. Consciousness is always engaged in the world of which it is conscious, and in relationships with other consciousnesses. These relationships are conflictual: they involve a battle to maintain the position of subject and to make the other into an object. This battle is inescapable. Although Sartre was indeed a philosopher of freedom, his conception of freedom is often misunderstood. Already in Being and Nothingness human freedom operates against a background of facticity and situation. My facticity is all the facts about myself which cannot be changed – my age, sex, class of origin, race and so on; my situation may be modified, but it still constitutes the starting point for change and roots consciousness firmly in the world. Freedom is not idealized by Sartre; it is always within a given set of circumstances, after a particular past, and against the expectations of both myself and others that I make my free choices. My personal history conditions the range of my options. From the 1950s onwards Sartre became increasingly politicized and was drawn to attempt a reconciliation between existentialism and Marxism. This was the aim of the Critique de la raison dialectique (Critique of Dialectical Reason) (1960) which recognized more fully than before the effect of historical and material conditions on individual and collective choice. An attempt to explore this interplay in action underlies both his biography of Flaubert and his own autobiography.


1982 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 495-513
Author(s):  
Paolo Ramat

Summary The paper essays to give a brief survey of the imposing and complex work of Giacomo Devoto (1897–1974), with particular emphasis on its principal traits seen both from the point of view of the history of linguistics and its scientific significance. Especial attention is drawn first of all to Devoto’s position vis-à-vis Benedetto Croce’s Idealism and the linguistic positivism of the first half of the 20th century. It seems possible to define Devoto’s position as a dialectic one between these two intellectual currents, which eventually led to an historicism, which actually was typical of the Italian linguistic tradition. From this viewpoint then Devoto’s understanding of language as an ‘institution’ is examined, including his intervention in the dispute between N. Ja. Marr and Stalin. After having dealt with his concept of a ‘stylistics of language’, which returns to regarding langue as an historicaland social institution, and its difference from a literary stylistics, Devoto’s Indo-European studies are examined. Here, the question of the relationship between linguistics and the other disciplines concerned with antiuqty is discussed, a relationship which Devotohad been obliged on several occasions to come back to. The ‘Devotian’ position is presented critically with the help of discussions which Devoto himself had entertained, with archaeologists and with linguists.


Author(s):  
Oda Hiroshi

This introductory chapter provides a background to arbitration in Russia. The history of arbitration in Russia can be traced back to the seventeenth century. In 1831, the Statute on Arbitration was enacted. In this Statute, there were two different systems of arbitration: statutory arbitration and voluntary arbitration. Statutory arbitration was not based upon the parties’ free will. This was a system in which parties were mandated to choose arbitration because of the overloaded court docket. Voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, was based upon the agreement of the parties. Statutory arbitration was abolished by the Great Judicial Reform of 1864 and only voluntary arbitration remained in the Rules of Civil Procedure. However, after the Bolshevik Revolution, all laws of the Tsarist regime, including the Rules on the Civil Procedure, were abolished. Nevertheless, the decree on the court No. 1 of 1917 accommodated arbitration as a means of settling civil law disputes. There was no commercial arbitration under socialism, except for two institutions attached to All-Union Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The chapter then looks at arbitration after the collapse of socialism. After decades of confusion, as an outcome of the 2015 Arbitral Reform, relevant laws were substantially amended and a licensing system was introduced for arbitral institutions.


1909 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-160
Author(s):  
Ephraim Emerton

In the Genevan suburb of Champel, in an angle formed by the crossing of two unfrequented roads, stands a monument erected in the year 1903 by citizens of Geneva to commemorate an incident in the history of their community which for three centuries and a half has justly been regarded by critics as a blot upon its good name. The monument consists of a rough, irregular granite block about a man's height and resting upon a base of natural rock. On one side is the name of Michael Servetus, and on the other the following touching inscription:FILSRESPECTUEUX ET RECONNAISSANTSDE CALVINNOTRE GRAND REFORMATEURMAIS CONDAMNANT UNE ERREURQUI FUT CELLE DE SON SIECLEET FERMEMENT ATTACHESA LA LIBERTE DE CONSCIENCESELON LES VRAIS PRINCIPESDE LA REFORMATION ET DE L'EVANGILENOUS AVONS ELEVECE MONUMENT EXPIATOIRELE XXVII OCTOBRE MCMIIIThat such an inscription could be accepted as an expression of the best judgment of the modern Genevese in regard to this action of their fathers is evidence of a change of sentiment that has required all these three and a half centuries to come to its rights. During my travels two years ago I met a Genevan scholar of world-wide reputation in a field of knowledge that has kept him for the greater part of his active life far removed from the provincial feeling that might well cling to one who had never left the familiar scenes of early life. He was a member of an ancient Genevan aristocratic family, still in possession of a landed estate that for six generations at least had been in the hands of his fathers. In the course of conversation I remarked upon the admirable action of his fellow-citizens in showing, though tardily, their sense of the historic significance of Calvin's terrible act of justice. In so doing I meant to pay to Geneva the respectful tribute of my humble admiration. But the response was not such as I had anticipated. Not even yet was this Genevan aristocrat quite ready to admit that his fellow-citizens had done well to recognize thus publicly their regret that the man to whom they as well as he looked back as the creator of their redoubtable commonwealth had allowed himself this one human slip. Even modified as their expression of regret was, even though they had guarded the reputation of Calvin by ascribing his fault to the Spirit of the Age, still it seemed to this sturdy conservative that any such confession of error could be only another outburst of that radical temper which was slowly transforming the Geneva of Calvin into a community more in sympathy with the liberalism of the modern world.


2002 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 219-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Assimakis Tseronis

The publication of a dictionary is a means to describe, codify and ultimately standardise a language. This process is complicated by the lexicographer’s own attitude towards the language and the public’s sensitivity on language matters. The recent publication of the two most authoritative dictionaries of Modern Greek and their respective lexical coverage reveals the continuing survival of the underlying ideologies of the two sponsoring institutions concerning the history of the Greek language, as well as their opposing standpoints on the language question over the past decades, some 25 years after the constitutional resolution of the Greek diglossia, affecting the way they describe the synchronic state of language. The two dictionaries proceed from opposing starting points in attempting to influence and set a pace for the standardisation of Modern Greek by presenting two different aspects of the synchronic state of Greek, one of which focuses on the long history of the language and thus takes the present state to be only a link in an uninterrupted chain dating from antiquity, and the other of which focuses on the present state of Greek and thus takes this fully developed autonomous code to be the outcome of past linguistic processes and socio-cultural changes in response to the linguistic community’s present needs. The absence of a sufficiently representative corpus has restrained the descriptive capacity of the two dictionaries and has given space for ideology to come into play, despite the fact that both dictionaries have made concessions in order to account for the present-day Greek language.


cepts, or sermoned at large, as they vse, then thus clowdily enwrapped in Allegoricall deuises. But such, me seeme, should be satisfide with the vse of these dayes, seeing all things accounted by their showes, and nothing esteemed of, that is not delightfull and pleasing to commune sence. For this cause is Xenophon preferred before Plato, for that the one in the exquisite depth of his iudgement, formed a Commune welth such as it should be, but the other in the person of Cyrus and the Persians fashioned a gouernement such as might best be: So much more profitable and gratious is doctrine by ensample, then by rule. So haue I laboured to doe in the person of Arthure: whome I conceiue after his long education by Timon, to whom he was by Merlin deliuered to be brought vp, so soone as he was borne of the Lady Igrayne, to haue seene in a dream or vision the Faery Queen, with whose excellent beauty rauished, he awaking resolued to seeke her out, and so being by Merlin armed, and by Timon throughly instructed, he went to seeke her forth in Faerye land. In that Faery Queene I meane glory in my generall intention, but in my particular I conceiue the most excellent and glorious person of our soueraine the Queene, and her kingdome in Faery land. And yet in some places els, I doe otherwise shadow her. For considering she beareth two persons, the one of a most royall Queene or Empresse, the other of a most vertuous and beautifull Lady, this latter part in some places I doe expresse in Belphœbe, fashioning her name according to your owne excellent conceipt of Cynthia, (Phœbe and Cynthia being both names of Diana.) So in the person of Prince Arthure I sette forth magnificence in particular, which vertue for that (according to Aristotle and the rest) it is the perfection of all the rest, and conteineth in it them all, therefore in the whole course I mention the deedes of Arthure applyable to that vertue, which I write of in that booke. But of the xii. other vertues, I make xii. other knights the patrones, for the more variety of the history: Of which these three bookes contayn three. The first of the knight of the Redcrosse, in whome I expresse Holynes: The seconde of Sir Guyon, in whome I sette forth Temperaunce: The third of Britomartis a Lady knight, in whome I picture Chastity. But because the beginning of the whole worke seemeth abrupte and as depending vpon other antecedents, it needs that ye know the occasion of these three knights seuerall aduentures. For the Methode of a Poet historical is not such, as of an Historiographer. For an Historiographer discourseth of affayres orderly as they were donne, accounting as well the times as the actions, but a Poet thrusteth into the middest, euen where it most concerneth him, and there recoursing to the thinges forepaste, and diuining of thinges to come,

2014 ◽  
pp. 738-738
Keyword(s):  
To Come ◽  

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Youpa Andrew

This book offers a reading of Spinoza’s moral philosophy. Specifically, it is a philosophical exposition of his masterpiece, the Ethics, that focuses on his moral philosophy. Central to the reading I defend is the view that there is a way of life that is best for human beings, and what makes it best is that it is the way of life that is in agreement with human nature. I begin this study with Spinoza’s theory of emotions, and I do so because it is one of two doctrines that fundamentally shape the structure and content of his vision of the way of life that is best. The other is his view that striving to persevere in being is the actual essence of a finite thing (3p7). Together these make up the foundation of Spinoza’s moral philosophy, and it is from these two doctrines that his moral philosophy emerges. In saying this I am not denying that his substance monism, the doctrines of mind-body parallelism and identity, the tripartite theory of knowledge, and his denial of libertarian free will, among others, also belong to the foundation of his moral philosophy. Each of these contributes in its way to the portrait of the best way of life, and they play important roles in the chapters that follow. But it is his theory of emotions and the theory of human nature on which it rests that are chiefly responsible for the structure and content of his moral philosophy....


Author(s):  
David Bagchi

The reign of Henry VIII represented a transitional phase in the religious history of England. Despite a brief flirtation with Protestantism in the 1530s, the regime never adopted a full-throated Reformation, and by the end of the reign English Christians were still required to accept nearly all the doctrines and customs that had prevailed in 1509. On the other hand, the break with Rome, the effective rejection of the doctrine of Purgatory, and the severe pruning of the cult of the saints represented a clear discontinuity with the past. Above all, the regime’s decision to legalize the English Bible for the first time in 130 years, and to require every parish church to obtain a copy, influenced the direction of English Christianity, and of English literature, for decades to come.


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