scholarly journals The Paradox of Money in Politics: When Businessmen Choose to Be Politicians

Economics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
Heba Mohamed Zahra
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
JAN STUCKATZ

How important is the workplace for employees’ political donations? Contrary to research on workplace political mobilization, existing work assumes that most individual donors contribute ideologically. I link donations of employees and Political Action Committees (PACs) from 12,737 U.S. public companies between 2003 and 2018 to show that 16.7% of employee donations go to employer-PAC-supported candidates. I investigate the dynamics between employee and PAC donations within firm–legislator pairs over time and find that both rank-and-file employees and executives contribute more dollars to company-supported politicians. Firm–employee donation alignment is stronger on powerful and ideologically moderate politicians with high value for the employer. Results from a difference-in-differences design further show modest changes in the partisan composition of employee donations after swift changes in the partisan donations of corporate PACs. The results suggest investment-related rather than ideological motives for alignment and highlight the importance of corporations for money in politics.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. PROGRESS
Author(s):  
Anyualatha Haridison

This manuscript specifically explores the dynamics of the Pilkada of Palangka Raya City in 2018. As with the simultaneous regional elections in Indonesia in general, there are still problems related to the practice of vote buying, network of winning teams and strong patronage. This is a determining factor in a candidate's victory, even though he was once labeled a prisoner. We observed a phenomenon in the Pilkada of Palangka Raya City; that having high popularity and strong political clientelism cannot help a person that is labeled an ex-prisoner to attain victory. Our study is complemented by a case study approach with a holistic analysis method. We observed and interviewed key informants in order to obtain some data related to the theme. Results show that the ability of the winning candidate’s team to frame and counter frame the candidate as an ex-prisoner  who gives cash to former fellow inmates, succeeded in helping the other candidate to win the Pilkada in the Palangka Raya City. We found that the implementation of the frame and counter frame theories was successful in the Pilkada context. This method of framing and counter framing is very effective in producing regional leaders with integrity and clean records and in instilling rationality in voters to reject corrupt leaders. Empirically, the limitations in framing these issues have not completely eliminated the pattern of giving money in politics.


2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Graeme Orr

This article compares some key aspects of political finance regulation in Australia and New Zealand. It centres on public money and electioneering expenditure. These are treated in three sections: expenditure limits; incumbency benefits, such as government advertising and parliamentary entitlements; and direct public funding of electioneering. A comparison paper by Joo-Cheong Tham explores private money in politics, in particular donations and their disclosure. 


Author(s):  
Robert E. Mutch

Money in some form has always been needed to finance politics, even in the eighteenth century, before there were any political parties or election campaigns in the modern sense. The ways of raising and spending that money have changed many times since then, as have opinions about how it should be raised and spent. As long as that money was raised and spent inside the parties, and as long as it came from politicians themselves and from rank-and-file party members, regulation of campaign funds was minimal. That began to change toward the end of the nineteenth century, when political money began to come from rich donors outside the parties. Government regulation began when opinions about how campaign funds should be raised and spent became legitimate questions of public policy. This chapter reviews how campaign finance practices and the laws regulating them have changed over the course of American history.


Author(s):  
Peter Temin

The Median Voter Theorem does not explain American elections and policies because of low voter turn-out and high costs of information. The Constitution let states choose voting rules, allowing racial discrimination to be used to limit voting. Lack of information forces voters to choose blindly between complex alternatives. The Investment Theory of Politics is more accurate because it shifts our focus from voters to rich businesses and people who exert influence on voters by political advertising. The amount of money spent on elections determines outcomes more than candidates’ policy positions. The Investment Theory of Politics has become more important since Citizens United and the increase of dark money in politics.


Author(s):  
Daron R. Shaw ◽  
Brian E. Roberts ◽  
Mijeong Baek

Chapter 2 establishes a baseline by reviewing public opinion concerning money and politics, pre– and post–Citizens United, focusing on what Americans know about money in politics and campaign spending. On the one hand, given that citizens are typically not well informed about politics, it should come as no surprise that they do not know all that much about candidate spending or campaign finance. On the other hand, the public is not completely off base with respect to its sense of money in politics, and this basic intuition is perhaps even sharper in the post–Citizens United era. The data suggest that while Americans know a little bit about campaign finance, there is no systematic correlation between the regulatory environment of the state and how much people in that state know about campaign finance.


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