High-Level Foreign Policy Coordination: A Finnish Example

1984 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauri Karvonen
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 791-804
Author(s):  
Kenan Aslanli ◽  
Birol Akgün

The article aims to examine and explore with pros and cons of High-Level (“Strategic”) Cooperation Councils (HLSCC) mechanisms in Turkish foreign policy and evaluate its effectiveness in foreign trade, foreign policy cooperation, and crisis management capacity of Turkey concerning the relations with Russia. Turkey has already started to establish High-Level Cooperation Councils to build institutional infrastructure for strategic partnerships in foreign policy and strengthen institutional power in the bilateral cooperation after 2006. The study of Turkish foreign policy is an academically attractive topic mostly in terms of its geopolitical dimensions. The institutional mechanisms that enable the country to interact with other states in a dynamic regional and international environment remain less researched heretofore. The article attempts to highlight the evolution of Turkish foreign policy in terms of institutional changes in the bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. The article applies a case study method with descriptive analysis examining Councils’ functions such as foreign policy coordination and determination of collective commitments and official bilateral targets in the case of Russia - Turkey High-Level Cooperation Council. The article found out that these institutional mechanisms partly justified themselves as a coordination mechanism, but they were relatively weak for achieving the pledged commitments. The Councils were flexible and innovative cooperation mechanisms of the foreign policy to develop bilateral and multilateral ties in the age of the global power restructuring and the volatile conjuncture in world politics.


2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 545-563
Author(s):  
Josip Glaurdić

Could the Western foreign policy makers have done anything to prevent the violence accompanying the breakup of Yugoslavia? The answer to that question largely depends on their level of awareness of what was happening in the South Slavic federation in the run-up to war. This article analyzes a string of newly declassified documents of the British Foreign Office related to the February 1991 visit of a high-level British political delegation to Yugoslavia, together with interviews with some of the meetings’ protagonists. These declassified documents and interviews offer a unique snapshot in the development of the Yugoslav crisis and Britain’s policy in the region. They give us a clear picture of the goals and strategies of the principal Yugoslav players and show us what the West knew about the true nature of the Yugoslav crisis and when. The article’s conclusions are clear. Yugoslavia’s breakup and impending violence did not require great foresight. Their cause was known well in advance because it was preannounced—it was the plan of the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milošević to impose a centralized Yugoslavia upon the other republics or, if that failed, to use force to create a Greater Serbia on Yugoslavia’s ruins. Crucially, British policy at the time did nothing to dissuade Milošević from his plan and likely contributed to his confidence in using violence to pursue the creation of a new and enlarged Serbian state.


Author(s):  
Kai Michael Kenkel

Latin American states have become major providers of troops for UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) since the early 2000s. MINUSTAH (Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti), the UN mission in Haiti, 55% of whose troops were from the region, was a major watershed for local security cooperation and PKO contributions. Led by Brazil, these states were able to develop a specific approach to peacebuilding that reflects regional strengths and experiences, rooted in minimizing the use of force and bringing successful domestic development policies to bear abroad. This approach also reflects the common security and intervention culture that underpins policy in the region. Two states in particular have taken on a role as major providers of peacekeeping contingents. Tiny Uruguay, with a population of 3 million people, has maintained over 2,000 troops deployed on UN PKOs (more than 10% of its armed forces) since 2005. While Uruguay’s motivations are mostly economic—UN reimbursements exceed the country’s costs—Brazil’s ascendance as a major peacekeeping provider during MINUSTAH was part of a larger emerging-power foreign policy project. Participating in peacebuilding allowed the country to provide security through actions in the development realm, bridging a key gap in many rising states’ capabilities, and to mount an incipient challenge to the Western-led peacebuilding paradigm. The remaining states of Latin America show considerable diversity in their peacekeeping engagement, with many others sending small or token contributions and some no troops at all. Latin American states’ involvement in PKOs cannot be understood without looking at their interaction with patterns of civil–military relations in the region. In the case of such states, the effect of peacekeeping participation on civil–military relations, while a key point in need of monitoring, has not been decisive, as other factors prevail. Finally, PKOs have served as the locus for a significant increase in policy coordination and cooperation in the defense arena in the region. As the UN moves toward stabilization operations which privilege counterterrorism measures over the peacebuilding paradigm that is a strength of Latin American countries, PKOs may lose attractiveness as a foreign policy avenue in the region. Additionally, the swing to the right in recent elections may serve to reduce the appeal of a practice which came to the fore under previous left-wing governments.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Mayora Bunga Swastika

This article examines Indonesia’s choice to not join the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Piracy is a transnational crime that requires cooperation to deal with. Asian waters has a high level of piracy, especially in the Malacca Strait and Indonesian Waters. ReCAAP, as a regional institution, was formed to deal with piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asian waters. Indonesia has been choosing not to join ReCAAP to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships. The purpose of this article is to explain the causes of Indonesia’s rejection to join ReCAAP. This article uses literature study by collecting related data piracy in the Malacca Strait and Indonesian waters. Beside, this article collecting related data about Indonesia foreign policy. In the end, this article shows there are non-material factors that influencing Indonesia’s behavior not to join ReCAAP. The non-material factors are historical, values, and norms.Keywords: Indonesia, piracy, Malacca Strait, maritime cooperation, ReCAAP, values, norms


Significance Singapore was chosen to host the meeting because it has ties to both countries, which view it as neutral turf, while the event resonates with the city-state’s foreign policy interests. Impacts ASEAN would view the summit as underscoring its centrality in the regional security architecture. If the summit takes place and is successful, the leaders of Japan and Russia will seek their own high-level meetings with Kim. Trump may be reluctant to travel to Singapore again in November to attend the East Asia Summit.


2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
James P. Todhunter

Abstract The notion that national leaders use foreign policy actions for domestic political benefit is widely accepted in the foreign policy literature, but has only been studied with regard to foreign policy involving the use of force. Literature on third-party mediation has emerged separately and has not taken mediators’ domestic political motivations and constraints into account when explaining mediation occurrence and outcomes. Diplomatic efforts such as mediation should be appealing to leaders seeking to impress their domestic audience because it provides them with a low risk opportunity to appear competent to their domestic audience. While mediation is a regular occurrence in US foreign policy, its public visibility varies greatly. However, models of presidential media coverage suggest that media outlets are likely to pay a disproportionate amount of attention to presidents and their high level surrogates while engaging in diplomacy overseas. The article proposes that the higher the profile of the official an administration sends to mediate a crisis overseas, the greater the increase in the president’s approval rating. Additionally, the public’s attentiveness to foreign policy should condition the effect of a high profile mediator on presidential approval. As foreign policy becomes more salient to the public, the effect of a higher profile mediator on presidential approval should be greater. Empirical results support the argument.


1999 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 621-641 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ellen Hauser

Aid donors' support for democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s has been tempered by their desire to achieve other objectives. In Uganda, a high level of donor support for the Museveni government has been compatible with the Ugandan government's reluctance to introduce multiparty democracy. Donors have opted for ‘dialogue’ rather than coercive methods. This may be ascribed to a number of factors, including the destruction from which Uganda was recovering, the need to present Uganda as a success story for economic liberalisation, and donors' need to maintain good relations with Uganda in order to pursue their foreign policy goals. The resulting donor–recipient relationship has however created dangers for the maintenance of long-term sustainable democracy in Uganda, by condoning divisive policies, and neglecting the need for coalition-building and conflict resolution.


2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (191) ◽  
pp. 69-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hubert Gabrisch

This paper discusses the need for macroeconomic policy coordination in the E(M)U. Coordination of national policies with cross-border effects does not exist at the macroeconomic level, although requested by the EU Treaty. The need for coordination stems from current account imbalances, which origin in market-induced capital flows, destabilizing the real exchange rates between low and high wage countries. The recent attempts of the Commission and the European Council to reform E(M)U governance do not address this problem and thus remain incapable to protect against future instability. Macroeconomic coordination needs (I) a clear identification of union-wide employment goals, and (II) the establishment of a high level institution responsible for coordination following these objectives. The paper proposes a High Representative for Economic Policy, equipped with an appropriate office and supported by a Council of Economic Advisers committed to the union-wide objectives.


Napredak ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-16
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Bocan-Harčenko

The article outlines the basic principles of Russian foreign policy and traces their implementation in the context of the strategic partnership between Russia and Serbia. In 2020, the world celebrates related jubilees, the 75th anniversary of the Victory in the Second World War and the establishment of the UN. Russia, as one of the principal architects of the World Organization, advocates the strengthening of the UN central role in international affairs and fostering a polycentric and fair world order based on the rule of international law, primarily the UN Charter. Harmonization of integration processes in various parts of the world is essential. To that end, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin introduced the initiative of the Greater Eurasian Partnership. Conscious of its special responsibility for maintaining peace and security, Russia is committed to promoting political and diplomatic settlement of crises and working with all interested countries in order to build a global common space of equal and indivisible security and strategic stability. Russia aims at further dynamic development of mutually beneficial cooperation with Serbia across a wide range of fields. A trust-based high-level political dialogue plays the decisive role. Russian stance on the Kosovo settlement remains unchanged and is based on UN SC Resolution 1244.


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